Behind closed doors: reassessing European participation in the Kosovo intervention through the case of Denmark

The war in Kosovo was the most divisive foreign policy issue of the post-Cold War era. It was the second time that the United States had intervened to stop genocide committed by Slobodan Milosevic, the “Butcher of the Balkans”. Kosovo was more than a debate about whether the United States and its NATO allies should intervene in the affairs of a sovereign state to halt genocide. Kosovo demonstrated how myths and prejudices can be manipulated to inflame racial and ethnic hatred. The war in Kosovo was also about the legacy of the Cold War. Was the Cold War fought to defend a balance of power, or was it fought in defense of freedom and human rights, the same values that were defended during World War II? The war in Kosovo also determined how U.S. foreign policy would be defined during the post-Cold War era. Some felt that since the Cold War was over, there was no longer a need for extensive U.S. involvement overseas, while others felt that the United States needed to remain involved in international affairs to protect human rights and to help shape the post-Cold War world. The political alignments on this issue often did not correspond to a party affiliation or ideology.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo in the spring of 1999 was the result of the refusal to be inactive and merely watch the abuse of military force and the massacre of the civilian population. The decision about what concrete form it was to take was reflected also by fears that a land operation could have worse effects than air strikes. The positions of the majority of the direct protagonists in the decision-making process were unequivocally in favour of the operation. From the point of view of the impact on the thinking and decisions of dictators, the most important effect of the Allied Farce operation could have been a serious warning given to all politicians who wanted to act in the same way as Milosevic. But in their assessment professional journals point out that fundamental political issues have not been solved, that the stability of the Balkan countries has been further undermined and that innocent people have been subjected to punishment. Amnesty International argued that NATO had not adopted all essential measures to protect the civilian population, as stipulated by Supplementary Protocol I of the Geneva Convention of 1949. At the moment a number of contradictions are linked with decisions on intervention in the name of humanitarian values. The priority of political approaches could well result in the restriction of soldiers’ freedom to take decisions. NATO member states have the greatest potential for carrying out operations of this type, but that also have the lowest potential for making sacrifices. The role of the UN is being questioned and, consequently, the practice of international law is becoming relative. The relative nature of the sovereignty of the state is relative because it threatens only those states which do not possess nuclear weapons and are not permanent members of the UN Security Council. The inequality of states with regard to security, war and peace has become more prominent at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. The decision-making processes within NATO are, and will continue to be influenced by the position, role and influence of the USA. The conviction, deeply rooted in America, that the US is a model of future society, that the US has a worldwide mission and right to oversee what the others are doing, to judge them and in an extreme situation even to punish them could result in an “erosion” of its present position. In decisions about its security strategy in a period after Kosovo, the US will be able to choose between several alternatives, especially between global unilateralism, advocating the maximum influence and some kind of globalist role of NATO or cooperative security. According to Tony Blair, Kosovo was a triumph of a progressive approach to international relations over the long obsolete traditional concept. Others (including Solana) believe that Kosovo is an exception which neither forms a precedent nor lays down the rules of the game. It is, therefore, nor likely that the conflict between traditions and a new approach towards international relations will be solved in the foreseeable future. There are a number of more or less serious differences and disagreements between states which adopted a negative stance to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and that is why they can hardly create a compact community advocating a comprehensive strategy against NATO. A return towards a confrontation is, therefore, most unlikely.

The United States and its NATO allies have defended the air strikes against Yugoslavia on moral grounds (to stop atrocities) and security grounds (to prevent the conflict from spilling over to neighboring European countries), but curiously they have never articulated a legal justification for the intervention. The nearest the NATO countries have come to articulating a legal rationale has been to cite various resolutions of the Security Council, in which the Council has determined that the actions of Yugoslavia in Kosovo constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and, pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, demanded a halt to such actions. Notably, however, these resolutions do not employ the talismanic phrase, 'States may take all necessary means..' which would constitute an express Security Council authorization of the use of force.The failure of the NATO countries to articulate a legal basis for their humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is puzzling in that there are in fact several compelling legal arguments that could be made to justify the Kosovo intervention. The reason for this silence may be that each possible legal underpinning carries with it the specter of a practical consequence that the NATO countries traditionally hope to avoid. Unfortunately the policy of silence is a blunt and weak tool for navigating these concerns and, in the long term, frequently exacerbates the concerns and validates the objections to the legitimate use of force for humanitarian intervention.

A close reading of the United Nations Charter supports humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. While the explicit Charter provisions permitting force do not appear to be applicable, the Charter implicitly permitted and even mandated the action. The strongest justifications for humanitarian intervention in Kosovo are linked to affirmative human rights concerns, subject to substantive and procedural limitations. While the intervention in Kosovo was fully legal at the outset, any claims that the bombing campaign violated the laws of war should be investigated. Meaningful humanitarian intervention does not threaten world order. Rather, it vindicates the fundamental principles for which the United Nations was created.

The horrors of World War Two made it universally clear that the world cannot progress without general respect for human rights. Still, the need for humanitarian intervention arose several times before 1999, but international political and military organisations including the UN, were either late or hesitant to prevent genocides or other related human catastrophes worldwide. The NATO intervention in Kosovo, however, marked the beginning of the new era in international relations. The facet of this intervention in view of legality is the topic of this paper. The aim of this study, above all, is to analyze the Security Council actions, debates and resolutions concerning situation in Kosovo, and the level of impact that the military operation had in international law (in particular) and international relations (in general). The study uses many authentic documents issued by the United Nations Security Council itself and other material related to the theme in order to develop an argument on the points raised. Throughout, this research paper has attempted to answer numerous issues related to the topic and offer a balanced view on the all the themes examined. Several but distinct points raised focus on relevant core subjects, discuss the challenges and opportunities of the humanitarian intervention and offer recommendations regarding the future of such operation for the well being of the humanity.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999) is only the most recent of a series of illegal interventions for which plausible moral justifications can be given. Others include India's intervention in East Pakistan in response to Pakistan's massive human rights violations there (1971), Vietnam's war against Pol Pot's genocidal regime in Cambodia (1978), and Tanzania's overthrow of Idi Amin's murderous rule in Uganda (1979). Without commenting on what the dominant motives of the intervenors were, it is accurate to say that in each case military action was aimed at preventing or stopping massive human rights violations. All could qualify as instances of humanitarian intervention, which may be defined as follows: humanitarian intervention is the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.

This article employs the interpretive approach to show that Britain's embrace of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was less a result of the election of New Labour or the psychology of Tony Blair, as conventional wisdom suggests, and more a consequence of a change in belief among policy-makers in the UK and beyond regarding the use of force for humanitarian ends, which originated prior to 1997 in American intervention in Bosnia in the summer of 1995. The effects of the moralism of the new government and its leader must therefore be viewed within a wider transatlantic context and against the background of the continued importance of the ‘Atlanticist’ tradition in UK foreign policy, with important implications for the study of UK foreign policy beyond the Balkans.

The Clinton Administration and War Powers

In 1999, Canada participated in NATO’s Operation Allied Force, a seventy- eight-day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia meant to end the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians. Officially, Canada’s interests in developing its foreign policy toward Kosovo were humanitarian and regional stability considerations. These were shared with the rest of its NATO allies. Thus, on the surface, it would seem that Canada and its NATO allies had similar concerns during the decision-making process around Kosovo. Digging deeper, an analysis of the primary sources available suggests that Canada did, in fact, have additional and unique considerations during the Kosovo crisis, namely national unity. This analysis amply illustrates the close interconnection between domestic issues and Canadian foreign policy. During the Kosovo War, Canada had to balance sovereignty sensitivities with humanitarian concerns. From the first time Kosovo was mentioned in Parliament on 18 November 1991 to the end of the Kosovo War on 11 June 1999, Canadian parliamentarians attempted to distinguish what Canada’s views on Kosovo were. Historians have likewise been occupied with the same task: distinguishing the Canadian contribution and position. Like the parliamentarians, not one of the Canadian historians who has written on the topic has questioned the official government version of what motivated Canada’s policy in Kosovo. They all credit a combination of humanitarian and regional concerns. Therefore, there was consensus at the time, and has been since, about what motivated Canada’s policy toward Kosovo. However, an analysis of the primary sources reveals that Canada did in fact have an additional and unique consideration during the Kosovo crisis: national unity. Canada’s domestic national unity issue influenced Canadian foreign policy toward Kosovo at every stage.

Background: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the world’s largest and most powerful collective security organisation in modern times. Membership in this organisation is the objective and effort of many countries, including most of the countries of the Western Balkans. Membership ensures collective protection, security and political stability. Since its inception, NATO has emerged as a global force for security and the spread of peace almost across the globe. Not everyone deems it as such, considering the Russian Federation sees it as its main enemy. Its military operations have been centred around protecting human rights and maintaining peace. The best example of this commitment is NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, one of the countries of the Western Balkans. Even after June 1999, NATO was present in this country and took care of the peace and security of the entire Western Balkans. The presence of this organisation in this part of the globe remained essential, as did knowing the geopolitical history of this region. The Balkans still suffers from nationalist policies and interethnic divisions, which in either case remain a very important factor for security in this region. One fundamental issue of Western Balkan countries is the acceleration of economic reforms, the rule of law and the fight against corruption to achieve membership in the European Union. Instead of these important issues in the Western Balkans, clashes have continued over border changes and nationalist rhetoric, which could undermine peace and security in this region. The current problems of the Western Balkans are inherited from the dissolution of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia. The wars in the former Yugoslavia, despite being the cause for the establishment of new independent states, did not fulfil the ethnic expectations of these countries. Given that the Republic of Serbia, in the preamble of the 2006 Constitution, foresees the Republic of Kosovo as its own territory,1 legal action that expresses territorial claims against a sovereign state poses a risk for new conflicts in the Balkans. A situation with conflicting tendencies is also present in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the official policy of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia has openly shown the tendencies for secession from the Federation and union with Serbia.2 This paper deals with the role that NATO has played and continues to play with its presence in the Balkans in maintaining peace and regional security, the challenges of security and building a stable peace in this region of Europe, where nationalist tendencies dominate as well as interethnic problems, lack of political culture and deficits of democracy. Methods: Combined scientific methods were used in this paper, starting with the qualitative method and literature review. The qualitative method was used to interpret the scientific theories related to security. Reviewing the literature, we managed to combine the results of other studies related to our study topic. This paper also used the analysis method, which helped us separate the elements from the totality of the study problem. The historical method has served to show the axis of the security problem in the Balkans and to explain the development of NATO. Results and conclusions: As a security organisation, during the Cold War, it served as a mechanism for collective defence against the nuclear threats of the Warsaw Pact and the spread of democratic values of the Western world. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, it has served as an organisation that promotes global peace and security, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The existence of open political issues in the Western Balkans, in particular the territorial claims of Serbia against Kosovo, the nationalist tendencies of the Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina for separation from the Federation, the attempts of Russia to influence this region, using history, culture and intelligence services and some other issues such as the lack of political culture in Albania and Montenegro and the issues of North Macedonia with Bulgaria have posed risks to the regional security. In this geopolitical environment called the Western Balkans, the integration of all countries in NATO and its presence in this region is essential for the future and security. In this context, the membership of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina in NATO will have to be a priority for Western countries. The membership of these two states would serve regional peace and security.

This paper focuses on the perceptions of Greek public opinion concerning NATO's intervention in Kosovo as a case study for Greek anti-Americanism and, especially, its post-Cold War expression. Greek opposition towards NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999) has often been attributed to bias, nationalism and emotionalism. However, the main influential factor in the shaping of the Greek perception of the Kosovo war was the anti-American legacy. It should also be emphasized that the post-Cold War version of Greek anti-Americanism has distinct qualitative characteristics, the most important of those being its diffusion into the ideological and political spectrum. Based on a qualitative analysis of the press, this study attempts to show how this generalized anti-Americanism functions like a prism during the Kosovo crisis and to illustrate the influence of a complex set of historical myths and conceptual schemes, as well as the role of several secondary factors such as political strategies and party competition. In the conceptual field, the legacy of the Kosovo narration is the establishment of the totalitarian argument as far as the US is concerned and the shaping of a negative image of American society that is directly linked to US aggression in foreign relations.

The collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began in Slovenia and Croatia, and this disaster was discharged into Bosnia and Herzegovina and ended up in the last bastion of Kosovo. One of the longest and most critical wars in the former Yugoslavia was the inter-ethnic conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. In particular, the most prominent humanitarian crisis that this paper will deal with concerns the period of 1998- 1999. The Armed Forces of the government of Serbia might be classified in the ranks of “defensive realism”. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was struggling to protect the Albanian civilian population from the Milosevic regime, while Serbia was committed to preserving and attaining national security. In addition, there the principle of security dilemma because the KLA was declared a terrorist organization by state organs at that time. On the other hand, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, even though it was missioned to protect human values, additionally aimed at its geopolitical and hegemonic strategies in the world of the anarchic international political system. Yet, in the theory of international relations, this can be classified as a form of offensive realism. This article consists of two main parts: The first part aims to research the position of classical realism regarding the conflict in Kosovo using the main principles as they are; survival, self-help, and security dilemma, and the position of neoclassical realism, which focuses more on state agents and domestic policy and the reflection of these state variables toward the impact on the construction of foreign policies. The second part of this study focuses on criticisms of the realist school’s criticism of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. The main purpose of this article is to investigate the position of realism claiming that; the exclusive monopoly in the use of power belongs to states. In addition, this study aims to illuminate the criticisms that realism uses against foreign interference in domestic affairs. Yet, states are major actors in the anarchic global system that possesses a sole monopoly over their people and sovereignty. Any domestic disturbance and intervention from abroad is strongly condemned and violates the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign states.

This article delves into NATOs involvement in Kosovo and the 2023 Israel Hamas conflict, specifically looking at actions taken without approval from the UNSC. By examining the concepts of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Instant Customary International Law (ICIL), this analysis evaluates how these interventions align with changing norms and significance of opinio juris in establishing ICIL. The study investigates the applications and challenges associated with R2P and ICIL, suggesting alignment of UN Charter Article 103 with interventions lacking UNSC authorisation to prioritise rights over procedural requirements.

This chapter now turns to the second key element essential for a CNN effect—impact on government foreign policy. In the second chapter, four tests in relation to the government and its policy were introduced for validating cases of the CNN effect. This chapter focuses on the first two of these tests—the quantitative and the coding tests. The next chapter focuses on the last two tests—the policy substance and the linkage tests. This division is made because the first two tests review the 15-month period before NATO intervention in Kosovo in its entirety, while the latter two review the period over seven phases, discerning the periods before and after the events meeting the media criteria for the CNN effect. As such, this chapter is subtitled “The Macro Review,” while the next chapter is subtitled “The Micro Review.”

The growing number of coalition governments in European states, many of which are minority governments, raises questions about how they form and function. The case of Denmark, where such governments have long become a part of political everyday life, helps to identify the main specific features of foreign policy portfolio allocation in the cabinet and the Danish parliament, since the Kingdom is one of the most successful examples of cooperation between the government and parliament in the field of foreign policy and defence. The article analyses the mechanisms and factors for the foreign policy portfolio allocation in 2001-2023, taking into account successive "blue" and "red" party blocs. Various theories of coalition formation and portfolio allocation in coalition governments are used to explain the distinguishing features of such allocation at a particular historical stage. In addition, general features of the development of the Danish political system at the present stage, the main trends and prospects for this development are considered. The authors conclude that when allocating portfolios in the government, preference is given to "junior" coalition partners, while in parliament - to "senior" ones; the opinion of the Danish People's Party is taken into account by coalition partners without the Party’s inclusion in the government; the choice is given in favour of popular and authoritative politicians constituting the foreign policy elite of Denmark over the past three decades; the functioning of the Foreign Policy Committee provides some kind of balance of power in the Danish Parliament on foreign and defence policy. It is also found out that the strategies for coalition formation and foreign policy portfolio allocation do not significantly differ between the "blue" and "red" party blocs, but follow the same logic aimed at maintaining the stability of the minority government’s position.