Becoming Fully Human in Community: Towards a Critical Theology of Ubuntu

This paper aims to examine human freedom and habits based on justice. The main issue guiding this research is how justice can direct human freedom and habits to create equality in the state, and the authors use a historical-factual approach to the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas to sketch out how this can be achieved. The main result of this research shows that justice is a moral virtue which perfects the will and directs human acts for good. Justice is also called a habit because it perfects the will and inclines the will to give each man what is his, equality. It implies equality because it relates to others and indicates a significant relationship with others. Justice is principally in rulers because of their primary authority and competency, while it is secondary and administrative in the people. Power exists among the people through the law to bring the common good, whereas the people are indirectly present in the state community through obedience to the law. However, the law can be unjust because power prioritizes the interests of capital owners over those of the vulnerable. This practice is common because power benefits from their existence. Furthermore, when power moves away from the common good in favor of itself, the classical notion of justice suggests depriving those in power of their rights of appointment and leaving the offices of state to the best. Therefore, the people have to strive diligently to provide good leaders and keep them from falling under tyranny.

Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals.

Obedience, Conscience, and Propria Voluntas in St. Thomas Aaron Maddeford OBEDIENCE PLAYS an important role in human perfection, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, who says that it is, in a way, the greatest moral virtue. In an article on the obedience of Christ in St. Thomas, Michael Waldstein calls obedience "the often maligned virtue."1 It does seem that obedience in St. Thomas's thought, if not actively maligned, has at least been given less attention than its status as one of the greatest moral virtues would warrant.2 One possible reason for [End Page 417] this is that obedience at times seems to conflict with other human goods, in particular the inviolability of our conscience and free will. For instance, Jean Porter, in an article on obedience in St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, focuses on the limitations of obedience that are, in her view, imposed by equality and by freedom.3 But there is a tension between the description of such a circumscribed and qualified obedience and that obedience which St. Thomas says is the most excellent moral virtue because it consists in the sacrifice of one's propria voluntas, "proper will," and whose paradigm is Christ, who was "obedient unto death, even death on a cross."4 In this article, I will look at the relationship between obedience and conscience and between obedience and free will. This will help not only to resolve their apparent tensions, but also better to understand the nature of obedience in St. Thomas's thought. In the first part, I will look at St. Thomas's study of obedience in his treatment of the virtues. Two questions arise. [End Page 418] First, St. Thomas argues that we must follow our conscience even against the order of our superior. How is this in accord with his teaching that obedience is the greatest moral virtue? Second, St. Thomas frequently uses St. Gregory's formulation, which describes obedience as the sacrifice of one's propria voluntas, one's "proper will." How is such a sacrifice possible, given that obedience, like every virtuous act, must be voluntary and so arise from our free will? In the second part, I will look at St. Thomas's teaching about obedience in his description of man's first sin and Christ's redemptive mission. In the third part, I will briefly review the use of the term propria voluntas in the Christian tradition and consider St. Thomas's way of appropriating this term. I will argue that the will immolated by obedience, referred to by St. Thomas as propria voluntas, is not the faculty of the will simply but the will insofar as it aims at some good that is opposed to a more common good. The immolation of propria voluntas through obedience does not restrict human freedom, but grants us the truest freedom, that of obtaining our ultimus finis. In the fourth part, I will argue that the injunction to follow our conscience over the commands of superiors does not lessen the importance of obedience, since to follow our conscience is an act of the virtue of obedience on St. Thomas's account. In the end, we will see that an examination of obedience in its relationship to conscience and free will, far from lowering its status, confirms the exalted place St. Thomas accords it among the moral virtues. I. Obedience and Its Limits A) The Virtue and Counsel of Obedience Obedience is a moral virtue that is part of justice. Justice is the "habit according to which someone by a firm and continuous will renders to everyone his due."5 Justice is a cardinal [End Page 419] virtue, and like the other cardinal virtues has certain virtues joined to it, which in some way fall under the definition of justice but in another way do not. Among these virtues is observantia, which is the virtue by which "reverence and honor are shown to persons established in authority [dignitate]."6 Like justice, it is ordered to another person, but unlike justice, what is given is not equal to what is owed, since we cannot give to those who rule well the honor they deserve.7 Observantia...

Freedom of will does exist, it is self-leadership of man based on reason and ethos. Evidence comes from truth. Determinism cannot be proved since if you try, you mean to prove a truth; but there is no truth without freedom. By contrast for freedom there are many pieces of evidence e.g. science, arts, technology. Freedom utilizes creative abstract thinking with phantasy. Freedom is graded, limited, based on nature, but not developed without good will. We perceive reliably freedom by self-consciousness and in other persons as long as we are sober. Freedom needs intelligence, but is more, it is a creative and moral virtue. The basis for freedom is phylogenesis and culture, in the individual learning and experimenting. Factors in the becoming of freedom are not only genes and environment but also self-discipline. But the creativity of free will is dangerous. Man therefore needs morale. Drives and feelings become humanized, cultural interests are developed. There is a humane nobility from long good will.

This article provides a cursory overview of the life and thought of Professor Martin Prozesky, and his contributions to academia via his ethical and spiritual project. There were many people of various personalities that influenced his life, including the path he chose in academia. Some of these were scholars, such as the internationally acclaimed Professors Alister Hardy, John Hick, Lloyd Geering, Ninian Smart, Wilfred Cantwell Smith, feminist Professors Mary Daly, Ursula King and Rosemary Radford Ruether, and various process theologians. Others were spiritual leaders such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Mahatma Gandhi, the Chief Rabbi of the orthodox United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth (1991 - 2013), Jonathan Sacks, and the Dalai Lama. THESE ARE: From his base in Theology and Religious Studies to his move to Ethics and Spirituality it could be established that there are five main contributions in Martin Prozesky's work which he had made to academia and of which cognizance should be taken. : (1) the religious philosophy of Friedrich Schleiermacher; (2) the development of a critical theology; (3) his values-based explanation of religion; (4) the debate about God; and (5) the need for a multi-cultural, even global, multi-disciplinary approach to applied ethics with special attention to African ethics. These contributions among other works are discussed in this article. (The article was made possible through an interview with Prof. Prozesky that was recorded and transcribed

In what relation the Magna Moralia stands to the genuine works of Aristotle, and to what phase of Peripatetic doctrine it belongs, are questions which have been discussed with a fair measure of agreement by living scholars. Jaeger described the revolution within the Peripatos which, within two generations, led Dicaearchus to reject the ideal of the contemplative life, making human happiness depend on moral virtue and the life of action. Walzer showed beyond reasonable doubt that the M.M. was influenced by Theophrastus's terminology and statement of problems, and was led to infer that the writer, in his treatment of phronesis and sophia, had formed an uneasy compromise between the views of Theophrastus and Dicaearchus (p. 191). Brink proved from the terminology and style of the treatise, and in amore general way from the structure of its argument, that the author was expounding, probably at an interval of several generations, a received doctrine which he failed to think out properly for himself. Building upon their results, Dirlmeier boldly tried to fix the absolute date of the work within half a century. He argued that it must have been in existence before the first century B.C., since it was used as an authoritative text by the Peripatetic writer from whom Arius Didymus took his compendium of Peripatetic ethical doctrine. On the other hand, a terminus post quem can be obtained from 1204a23, where we read that ‘some persons either equate happiness and pleasure, or regard pleasure as essential to happiness; others, unwilling to reckon pleasure as a good, nevertheless add absence of pain (sc. to ἀρετή in their definition of happiness). Who then were these others? Cicero provides the answer: Diodorus, eius [Critolai] auditor, adiungit ad honestatem vacuitatem doloris (de Finibus V 5, 14, cf. Tusc. Disp. V 30, 85). Now this Diodorus lived in the second half of the second century B.C., and the M.M. mustbe nearly contemporary with him. In confirmation of this, Dirlmeier showed that the writer uses without comment terms which are unquestionably of Stoic origin, such as προθετικός, ἐπιτευκτικός, κατόρθωμα, ἀποκατάστασις, which are coinages not of the earliest Stoicism but of Chrysippus or his followers. Both Walzer and Dirlmeier have called attention to the fact that the writer shows himself to be wholly without understanding of Aristotle's theology, and actually becomes polemical, refusing to contemplate a God who contemplates himself (1212b37–13a10).

This study employs a qualitative and analytical approach using historical-critical and biblical-theological methods to examine the relationship between God's sovereignty and human freedom in the Old Testament. This topic is significant in theology because it helps clarify human moral responsibility within God's divine plan. The historical-critical approach investigates the historical background, redaction processes, and socio-political influences that shaped these concepts, while the biblical-theological method focuses on key texts to uncover their theological significance. The findings reveal that God's sovereignty does not override human freedom but instead defines its boundaries within the framework of divine law and covenant. Old Testament narratives illustrate a dynamic interaction between human free will and God’s sovereign will in Israel’s history of salvation. This research contributes to Old Testament theology by offering new insights into the balance between divine authority and human agency. Additionally, it provides a relevant perspective for contemporary theological discussions, particularly in understanding human freedom within the Christian faith.

Introduction An important issue concerning design ethics is the nature of the moral character of the designer.1 Ethics in the disciplines of design has essentially been articulated around notions of duty and virtue,2 which correspond broadly to Kantian and Aristotelian views respectively.3 These in turn belong to two general conceptions of ethics, namely imperative and attractive moralities.4 The imperative view refers to the principles of duty and universal law achieved through reason and to which one must obey in all circumstances. This is, for instance, what Kant calls the categorical imperative. Most professional codes of ethics and practice in design disciplines belong to that tradition. Virtue ethics is the practice of one’s virtues that leads to the perfection of moral character, which implies that the character of the individual is somehow a fixed attribute or an objective feature.5 It is in opposition to these conventional conceptions of the imperative principle of duty and universal law, on the one hand, and of virtue ethics which treats a person’s character as a collection of objective facts, on the other hand, that Sartre’s view of human freedom and ethics has to be seized as a possible foundation for design ethics. Indeed, Sartre provides a radically different perspective on the nature of human character. A conception of design ethics based on a Sartrean existentialist conception of human reality may offer a particularly enlightening and useful perspective on the nature of the moral character of the designer and therefore a ground for design ethics. In a Sartrean perspective, cause and motive6 (reason and emotion) cannot provide a definitive basis for the action of the individual in the pursuit and justification of moral duty or moral virtue. Cause and motive are to be placed in relation to a much more basic reality, namely the freedom of the individual. Indeed, the designer confronting a moral choice is free to choose, and by making a free choice he/she is creating his/her existence.7 According to Sartre, the ”authenticity” with which the individual faces his/her freedom is the primary criterion for judging actions as ethically good or bad. Thus, if the designer’s moral character (i.e., authenticity) has meaning in a Sartrean perspective, it is to be found not in instrumental reason but in being reflectively conscious of his/her human condition and acknowledging and accepting his/her freedom. For

The Authority of the Gospel: Explorations in Moral and Political Theology in Honor of Oliver O'Donovan. Edited by Robert Song and Brent Waters. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing, 2015. xxi + 294 pp. $45.00 (cloth).In his foreword to this festschrift Rowan Williams describes Oliver O'Donovan as of the most serious thinkers the Anglican family has nurtured in the last century or so (p. viii). Although Reinhold Niebuhr and Stanley Hauerwas may have had wider general influence, if one considers the field of Christian ethics, then in terms of erudition in scholarly languages, theological insight, historical engagement, and the sheer range of issues of concern to which O'Donovan brings his illuminating analysis, he is without peer.This festschrift is reflective of the broad range of O'Donovan s interests: political theology, of course (historical and contemporary), ethical theory (practical reason, natural law, virtues), detailed engagement with the application of moral principles in complex situations (for example, just war), and the life of the Christian in the world and in the church (preaching and liturgy).There are several essays on the intersection of church and world, of public and private morality, an area where the insights of Augustine are still bearing fruit. Eric Gregory has a fine essay on the civic virtues. Brian Brock has a helpful essay on What Is ?the Public'?, interacting with Augustine, O'Donovan, and Bonhoeffer and reflecting, for example, on the misguided French authorities banning forms of Muslim dress in public on the basis of false universals. Jonathan Chaplin also deals with the challenge of pluralism in modern society, and how governments can make judgments about controversial issues in the context of a variety of fundamental moral and religious convictions. The complexity and diversity of the world itself should be reflected in the complexity of such judgments.Christian character and moral virtue, supported by sound theology, is foundational to the effective witness of the church in the world. In fact, the festschrift underscores this point by bracketing the entire collection with treatments of Christian love: in the first essay Bernd Wannenwetsch explores the dialectic of faith and love in Augustine and Luther. And in the final essay we have O'Donovan himself returning to the theme of self-love, its degeneration to material self-interest, and the problems with modern notions of equality.The virtue of prudence is in large part a form of seeing things correctly (as well as making good judgments), and Hans Ulrich brings Old and New Testament material to bear on the importance of discernment. The late John Webster has a very helpful analysis of the role of sorrow in the Christian life, largely based on interaction with Thomas Aquinas.Moving from the Christian individual to corporate life in the church, we have Shinji Kayama and Joan O'Donovan. Kayama, a pastor in Yokohama, Japan, writes on preaching as moral pedagogy, drawing lessons from the different (and sometimes questionable) ways in which Augustine dealt with the challenge of re-incorporating the Donatists in the Catholic Church, and how he developed the central concept of pax ordinata. There are many valuable insights in Joan O'Donovan's reminder of the Tudor reformers' theological intentions in framing the Anglican liturgies, such as this part of her conclusion: Only the eschatological renewal of human moral agency and action through the church's practice of proclamation, centred in her common worship, can overcome the tyranny of the law . …

Because of its appeal to the imagination, the intellect, the affections, and the will, literature has an invaluable role in the applied ethics education of business professionals and college students. This essay reaps ethics and ethical leadership insights from King Lear, while relishing its aesthetic value. By its side, core concepts underlying a proper understanding of applied ethics and hence ethical leadership are emphasized; particularly, the elements of human nature, moral agency and responsibility, the difference between morality and ethics, and an overview of virtue ethics and key intellectual and moral virtues. Stressing the connection between literature and moral philosophy, this essay shows how poetry can engagingly and compellingly transmit ethical concepts and values in leadership education.

This study examines Eusebius of Emesa’s De arbitrio, voluntate Pauli et Domini passione (Homily I), a fourth-century homily rediscovered in the twentieth century, to elucidate its contribution to the theological debate on free will within early Christianity. While Eusebius, a bishop of the Antiochene school, has been historically overlooked, his homily offers a nuanced defence of human moral agency against the deterministic paradigms prevalent in late antiquity. Through a critical analysis of the text, focusing on key biblical episodes—the conversion of St Paul, the election of Jeremiah and Jacob, and the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart—this article demonstrates how Eusebius reconciles divine sovereignty with free will by prioritising literal exegesis and emphasising humanity’s God-given capacity for self-determination. The methodology combines close textual analysis with contextualisation within broader theological controversies, particularly addressing Stoic fatalism, Gnostic predestination, and Manichaean dualism. The results reveal that Eusebius’s arguments, though pastoral in intent, are philosophically rigorous, asserting that free will underpins moral responsibility and virtue, while Christ’s voluntary Passion exemplifies divine respect for human freedom. The study concludes that Eusebius’s homily not only refutes deterministic worldviews, but also affirms free will as a theological cornerstone, bridging scriptural interpretation and doctrinal orthodoxy.

Human freedom has long served as one of the central inquiries across disciplines, interrogating the nature, limits, and possibilities of self-determination. In the modern era, as technology permeates nearly every sphere of life-from professional and personal realms to healthcare, education, communication, and leisure-the question of freedom assumes new dimensions and dilemmas. This paper offers a comprehensive, multidisciplinary exploration of human freedom, tracing its evolution from historical and philosophical conceptions to its present-day reinterpretations in a digital age. The introductory section reviews centuries of thought on freedom through philosophical, psychological, anthropological, social, and cultural lenses. The main body of the paper is divided into two focal areas. The first, "Promethean Price and Technologically Mediated Living," examines how rapid technological evolution has reconfigured daily life, reshaping the structures and practices that define modern existence while influencing individual agency and collective social dynamics. The second, "Conceptual Golden Cage or Mind-forged Manacles," draws on philosophical, social, psychological, and anthropological analyses-invoking the insights of Marshall McLuhan and the poetic imagery of William Blake-to explore how the integration of technology into every facet of human existence might simultaneously empower and constrain. By comparing the liberatory potential of technological advances with their capacity to condition thought, behavior, and even values, the paper highlights the dual-edged nature of modern innovation. The concluding section reflects on human freedom as an ultimate philosophical concern, proposing that without critical engagement and conscious control over technological integration, the very concept of freedom risks being undermined. In doing so, this paper contributes to ongoing debates about technology's role in shaping human agency and the future of freedom.

This chapter considers the doctrines of providence and sin in the Institutes of Christian Religion in order to draw out Calvin’s views on the interplay of human and divine agency. Calvin’s account of God’s particular providence establishes the basic conditions for human responsibility and characterizes God’s agency as perfectly efficacious—so much so that the relationship between God’s willing and evil/sin cannot adequately be captured through language of ‘permission’. The doctrine of sin further inflects this account, clarifying the relationship between human freedom, necessity, and responsibility for sin. The result is a challenging picture, in which humans are responsible for sin, but not for good, and in which God is causally determinative of both good and evil. The key to this account—to understanding its perplexities and to identifying what features of meaningful human action are at stake—is the nesting of intentions within a layering of human and divine agency.

Abstract: This research by using qualitative research methodologies. The results of this study concluded that the idea of religious figures of Islamic theology in North Bengkulu looked sense can serve to obtain clarity on the issues of divinity in the importance of reason necessary for aspects of Islamic teachings are informed by revelation. Revelation is a source of knowledge about God, good and evil, as well as the obligation of mankind to do good and keep away evil sense function, without revelation will bringheavy burden in human life. Meaning here, religious leaders in North Bengkulu wearing traditional pattern, although the one hand there is the rational or principled Mu’tazila. Thought religious leaders about human freedom and the absolute will of God, trend of thought religious leaders in North Bengkulu more directed to understanding of the authority and the absolute will of God, as to which are held by Asy’ariyah understand, because humans trying to be balanced with the absolute power of God. Human beings are not creation that freely, but free man limited by God as a limited human being with age. This indicates that humans are limited and everything has an end. Thought religious leaders in North Bengkulu on qadha and qhadar which are already provisions inviolability, humans could only surrender and resignation to God. Thus they tend to be closer to understanding Asy’ariyah. Thought religious leaders on the nature of God, they adopts Asy’ariyah, they’ve studied the attributes of God. By reading and realize their self-interest as human beings would study the nature of God, then verily Allah can describe it is there. Factors affecting patterns of thought religious leaders of the Islamic theology in North Bengkulu, namely their learning that be a forum to understand the Islamic faith, boarding schools in Bengkulu Utara place of formal education and non-formal and social situations such as differences in environmental conditions and impact of globalization very closely influence in shaping the understanding of Islamic theology in North Bengkulu.

1. Introduction 2. 'Life from the third dimension': Human action in Barth's early ethics 3. 'The great disruption': Word of God and moral consciousness in Barth's Munster ethics 4. 'The firmest grasp of the real': Barth on original sin 5. 'Assured and patient and cheerful expectation': Barth on Christian hope as the Church's task 6. Freedom in Limitation: Human freedom and false necessity in Barth 7. Eloquent and radiant: The prophetic office of Christ and the mission of the Church 8. 'The grammar of doing': Luther and Barth on human agency 9. Justification, analogy and action: Barth and Luther in Jungel's anthropology Further Reading Index of names