Abstract
This paper proposes the use of Bayesian potential games as models of informationally decentralized organizations. Applying techniques in team decision problems by Radner (1962), this paper characterizes Bayesian Nash equilibria in terms of Bayesian potentials and demonstrates using examples that Bayesian potentials are useful tools for studying the efficient use of information in organizations.
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