Barth's moral theology: human action in Barth's thought

1. Introduction 2. 'Life from the third dimension': Human action in Barth's early ethics 3. 'The great disruption': Word of God and moral consciousness in Barth's Munster ethics 4. 'The firmest grasp of the real': Barth on original sin 5. 'Assured and patient and cheerful expectation': Barth on Christian hope as the Church's task 6. Freedom in Limitation: Human freedom and false necessity in Barth 7. Eloquent and radiant: The prophetic office of Christ and the mission of the Church 8. 'The grammar of doing': Luther and Barth on human agency 9. Justification, analogy and action: Barth and Luther in Jungel's anthropology Further Reading Index of names

‘The Great Disruption’: Word of God and Moral Consciousness in Barth’s Münster Ethics

Evolution, the Origin of Human Persons, and Original Sin: Physical Continuity with an Ontological Leap

The Abuse of Conscience: A Century of Catholic Moral Theology, MatthewLevering, Eerdmans, 2021 (ISBN 978‐0‐8082‐7950‐9), viii + 360 pp., hb $45

From the Publisher: The Great Disruption begins by observing that over the past thirty years, the United States and other developed countries have undergone a profound transformation from industrial to information societies; knowledge has replaced mass production as the basis of wealth, power, and social interaction. At the same time, Western societies have endured increasing levels of crime, massive changes in fertility and family structure, decreasing levels of trust, and the triumph of individualism over community. Just as the Industrial Revolution brought about momentous changes in society's moral values, a similar Great Disruption in our own time has caused profound changes in our social structure. Drawing on the latest sociological data and new theoretical models from fields as diverse as economics and biology, Fukuyama reveals that even though the old order has broken apart, a new social order is already taking shape. Indeed, he suggests, the Great Disruption of the 1960s and 1970s may be giving way to a Great Reconstruction, as Western society weaves a new fabric of social and moral values appropriate to the changed realities of the postindustrial world.

audacity of faith is to believe in a knowledge, a truth, a superior and more profound wisdom than science. Moreover, it is to hold that there is no opposition between a believing intellect and authentic science insofar as each of them follow and respect the same love of truth, each according to their own nature and methodology. (1) Though fundamental for theology, the relationship between faith and reason is much contested, at least in terms of the degree to which they overlap. It is a relationship intrinsically connected to those other much fought over pairings--theology and philosophy, and nature and grace. In this article I wish to survey the thinking of Servais Pinckaers, OP, the influential twentieth-century Belgian moral theologian. (2) Pinckaers presents a robust defense of the priority of faith in theology that is rooted in the need to see prayer as a source of theological reflection. Pinckaers's account of the role of faith does not resort to a Catholic fideism, but upholds reason's intrinsic place in Catholic theology, very much in the tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas. Faith as the Starting Point in Theology In his definition of moral theology (or, more precisely Christian ethics), Pinckaers states that moral theology needs to be studied in light of revelation and reason (and in that order). (3) He asks whether moral theology should be seen as primarily a rational science with revelation seen as having a role as confirmation or external inspiration. Or should moral theology consider revelation as its primary and direct source? Pinckaers answers: Without a moment's hesitation I choose the second alternative. I hold that the priority given to Scripture and faith in no way fetters the use of reason in theology, but rather supports it. Reason has its rightful place in my definition. But this faculty must not be viewed according to the rationalistic concept, which would separate it radically from faith. It should be viewed rather as the power of human intelligence simultaneously open to spiritual enlightenment and faithful to the rigorous discipline of thought. This is how the Fathers saw it. (4) It is also, according to Pinckaers, how Aquinas sees it: teaching method St. Thomas proposes to us, like that of the Fathers of the Church, includes two moments. first consists in planting faith in the disciple as the root of the wisdom of God, placing it in mind and heart as a foundation and source of divine truth. Faith is the acceptance of the preaching of the Cross ... as a mystery hidden from human eyes. It is not contrary to reason but rises above it and summons us to abandon our human reasoning in order to receive this higher wisdom as a sheer gift of the Holy Spirit. (5) Pinckaers believes that any renewal in moral theology will be ineffective if the fundamental methodological question is not addressed. This question involves asking what the primary source and starting point of moral theology is: faith or rational knowledge? (6) answer for Pinckaers is faith. Theology must begin its research with an act of faith. This act of faith submits to the word of God as read and interpreted in the Church, that is, to something exterior. It is also an act that submits to the interior action of the Holy Spirit: The theologian is not simply an intellectual, a scholar who chooses the text of revelation and the life of the church as an object of study. theologian is before all else a believer, well aware that for the one who receives the Word of God with a docile mind, it becomes a source of light and life surpassing all human reason and communication. (7) In reflecting on the connection between the prologue of John's Gospel--the meditation on the preexisting word of God made manifest in the flesh of Jesus of Nazareth--and theology, Pinckaers states the following: These words [the prologue of John's Gospel] are addressed to us in our search for God through intellect and free will, in the search for light and life, the struggle with the darkness of sin and death--all this, in order to form faith in the human heart. …

Aquinas argued that every human action is for the sake of some end. Aquinas distinguished between a human action (actus humanus) and an action of a human being (action hominis). Human actions are those that proceed from human beings in virtue of their distinguishing power, which is to be in control of their own actions (dominus suorum actuum) through reason and will. Anything else that a human being does can be called the action of a human being, but not a human action. Human actions are those that are willed on the basis of rational deliberation. Aquinas argued that at any given time, a human being can have only one ultimate end. This single ultimate end can be an aggregate of goods that the agent regards as collectively constituting his perfection. This ultimate end, whether unitary or aggregate, must be (Aquinas argued) the ultimate explanation for all of a given person's actions. All human beings have the same ultimate end, for all human beings desire their own perfection, though different people will have different ideas about what perfection consists in. Consilium is an investigation of the means by which the intended end may be attained or realized. Consilium terminates with an act of iudicium, the intellect's judgment that one of the means that have received the will's consent is the best, all things considered.

International Review of MissionVolume 92, Issue 367 p. 498-520 GOD'S MISSION IN PRACTICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION, DIGNITY AND JUSTICE IN AFRICAN SOCIETIES Klaus Nürnberger, Klaus Nürnberger Klaus Nürnberger is professor emeritus and honorary research associate at the School of Theology, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.Search for more papers by this author Klaus Nürnberger, Klaus Nürnberger Klaus Nürnberger is professor emeritus and honorary research associate at the School of Theology, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.Search for more papers by this author First published: 25 March 2009 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-6631.2003.tb00425.xCitations: 1 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume92, Issue367October 2003Pages 498-520 RelatedInformation

A Choice Outstanding Academic BookReaders will be grateful for this excellent comprehensive survey of Aquinas' theology. It is a compendium in the best sense of the word, both introduction for beginners and a reliable source of information for advanced scholars. Even experts in Thomist thought will highly appreciate the great number of original and stimulating essays which provide new views and interpretations of seemingly well known texts. --Ulrich Horst, O.P., Ludwig Maximilian UniversityThis comprehensive volume provides an in-depth overview of every major aspect of Thomas Aquinas's theology. Contributors offer fresh and compelling readings of Aquinas on the Trinity, creation theology, theory of analogy, anthropology, predestination and human freedom, evil and original sin, Christology and grace, soteriology, eschatology, sacramentology, ecclesiology, moral theology, the relation between theology and philosophy, and scriptural exegesis.Contributors toThe Theology of Thomas Aquinascome from seven different countries and a variety of specialties within the discipline of theology. Their diverse perspectives add considerable merit to the depth and breadth of this project. Contributors both outline the thought of Aquinas in its own right and bring it into dialogue with present theological concerns. The high quality of these essays make this volume a valuable reference tool.

Reviewed by: Catholic Moral Theology & Social Ethics: A New Method by Christina A. Astorga Maureen O’Connell Catholic Moral Theology & Social Ethics: A New Method. By Christina A. Astorga. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2013. 571pp. $50.00. Although patterns of Catholic moral theology after Vatican II point to the centrality of moral vision for the moral life, the tradition continues to be relatively short-sighted in this regard. Christine Astorga attempts to bring moral vision into better focus by developing a new method for moral theology, one which she describes as an integration of “an ethics of holistic reasoning” and virtue ethics. Her method includes attention to the cultural context of moral agents; an insistence on narrative hermeneutics; feminist, liberationist and global interpretations of fundamental theology from which moral theology grows; compatibility between moral norms and virtues; and three modes of Ignatian discernment. She asserts this integrative method can bridge all sorts of limiting divides in contemporary Catholic theology: between ethics and dogmatic theology, between Western historical preserve and contemporary applications coming from the margins, between principles and virtues, between reason and affectivity. While perhaps targeted for an academic audience either familiar with or new to the many strands of the Catholic tradition that she weaves together, Astorga insists on the practical urgency that drives her method: “We have to live the ordinariness of our lives with a profound sense of transcendence. The moral choices we make are not discrete acts; rather, they enter into the shaping of the fundamental orientation of our lives. And with our lives so deeply intertwined with other lives, our choices have far-reaching consequences” (233). [End Page 86] Astorga painstakingly develops her method over the course of ten chapters, organized around themes of “vision,” “norm,” and “choice,” and each of which incorporate classic figures and texts, and introduce insights of those on the leading edge. To that end, the book is an exhaustive survey of theological landscape of the twentieth century. However, Astorga’s eye for patterns or trends that come to the fore when we approach moral theology as a kind of vision, helps the reader to discover what she sees as the trajectory of the tradition: that the moral life is about individual and collective affectivity that arises when we engage the wisdom of religious stories incarnated in the particularities of culture, rather than simply a response to directives or norms. To develop her method, she relies on paradigmatic thinkers in Catholic systematic and moral theology (Rahner, Johnson, McCormick, Grisez, Cahill, Keenan), as well as those in and beyond Catholicism who contribute to its growing edges (Gilkes, Hauerwas, De La Torre). She also reviews the evolution of the fundamental components of moral theology (fundamental concepts such as love, grace, community; modes of biblical interpretation, moral norms; virtue ethics) and social ethics (central documents of Catholic social teaching, as well as theological methods (feminist, liberationist, Ignatian) making the text a helpful primer in moral theology or Christian ethics for graduate students. Of particular note is Astorga’s emphasis on the importance of culture in shaping moral vision and moral choice, both in terms of acknowledging religion as a particular source of culture and in embracing a diversity of cultures in which moral agents are formed. She invokes Tillich, Henriot, and Bellah in calling for “cultural exegesis” in methods of moral theology that will effect change in individual and communal lives, and offers an example of such a cultural interpretation in her review of the Filipino’s People’s Power Revolution in the first chapter. She notes, “Only when the cultural symbols and values of a people are taken seriously is their creative potential in the process of social change unfolded” (89). Attention to cultural diversity, and not simply the diversity of individual experience, through what she calls a [End Page 87] “hermeneutic of appreciation” is an innovative way of contextualizing moral theology in an increasingly diverse church. While exhaustive, Astorga’s presentation of her method is also at points somewhat exhausting in light of the copious thinkers and components of the moral tradition she incorporates. A tremendous amount of material is brought forward, and at times it is difficult to track what is...

If Jesus Christ has accomplished the good in our place and summons us to confirm it in our own conduct, it is clear that there is a place for human action in Barth's moral theology. But if the good is already accomplished, what significance can human action possibly have? This chapter examines the meaning, reality, and limitations of human action in Barth's moral theology in light of the central notion of Christ's accomplishment of the good in our place. His fundamental claim is that God's grace does not nullify human action or deprive it of significance but rather establishes it by empowering it to be, in its very creaturely nature, an analogy of grace.

This chapter starts with a theoretical introduction to the concept of the creation and perception of cultural landscapes. Niche construction theory and human agency, often treated as controverse concepts are discussed as complementary aspects of human environment relations. The DPSIR framework (the concept of Driving forces, Pressures, States, Impacts and Responses) is applied as valuable approach for the explanation of the transformations in human behaviour in reaction to environmental developments. Aspects of intended and unintended reactions to human agency and action are discussed as well as the temporal and spatial scales of transformations that consequently occured. Therefore, four examples are presented from case studies within the CRC 1266. The Palaeolithic and Mesolithic use of natural resources will have left visible but short-lived traces in the landscape as first steps towards a cultural landscape. The role of humans in the spread of plants and the influence of human action on the plant distribution and composition are discussed in this context. The Neolithic transformation shows a new dimension of changes in the landscape. The producing economy leads to a wide range of resource extractions that enable a much higher population being nourished by the manipulated environment with anthropogenic open land as a new landscape element or niche. Bronze Age progression and intensification of land use in many areas lead to soil degradation and the widespread expansion of heathlands. Even though the process was too slow to be perceived consciously, associated economic adaptations to this new type of cultural landscape are observable. The fourth example explains an unexpected positive aspect of deforestation. In the context of Neolithic Trypillian megasites the soil developed towards a deep and fertile Chernozem. The role of earthworms is discussed as key factor for the soil development in the transition from a forest and forest steppe towards the agrarian steppe of today. The difference between human agency and human action is discussed for the presented examples as the awareness of the consequences of human behaviour very much depends the velocity of changes and human perception.

People’s understanding of the origins of social structures and their relatedness, or lack thereof, to human actions and divine providence has a bearing on the moral significance they attach to the rules of structures. Within sociology, both structural-conflict theory and micro-interactionist theory has provided theories on the interplay between human actions and structures. Although both strands attempt to ground their ideas in empirical evidence, philosophical-anthropological views on human nature, the human will and human freedom play a major role in constructing the theories. In this article it is argued that the two theories are based on philosophical premises that create moral difficulties. Conflict theory, emphasising structures as the cause of human behaviour, risks cultivating a revolutionary moral attitude towards social structures that may end up in endless cycles of nihilist conduct. In contrast, micro-interactionism’s social constructivist explanation of the relationship between human action and structures could lead to moral relativism and apathy. This article reflects on an alternative approach. At the core of both voluntarist and revolutionary moral attitudes towards structures lies the notion that morality has no grounding in a deeper reality – they are merely social constructions. The article argues that a Reformed-Christian theory that grounds moral responsibility in what Michael Welker calls an ‘anthropology of the spirit’ may provide an alternative that avoids the moral ambiguities created by structural-conflict theory and micro-interactionist theory. This approach resists voluntarism by grounding morality in God who is the origin of being and understanding moral conduct in terms of the encounter between the divine and human spirit. It counters anarchy by promoting a spirit of moral realism and constant social renewal that takes seriously the consistent threat of the desire for power.Contribution: The specific contribution of this article consists in it bringing Reformed theology and sociology into dialogue. It identifies blind spots in conflict and micro-interactionist theories on the relationship between human agency and social structures, especially when it comes to morality. It also indicates how both theories are guided mainly by presuppositions about human nature and the human will. In response, it is attempted to provide an alternative theological outlook on the question of the relationship between human agency and social structures, which grounds morality in an anthropology of the Spirit. Until now, no such attempt has been made.

One of the primary tasks of a philosopher is to engage with problems, and in turn offer potential solutions to them. Unsurprisingly, problems engaged with can pre-date philosophers, and can sometimes take on a life of its own that is independent to the philosopher. Of course, philosophy can be more than understanding problems, however, in this chapter I have turned to MacIntyre’s concern with the role of reason in human agency, particularly the restoration of rationality. To some, they may be wondering: What is at stake in MacIntyre’s arguments put forward regarding rational human agency? According to MacIntyre, philosophical discourse has shown that actions cannot have causes, and as a result demonstrates that a good deal of the human sciences is gravely confused because scientists continue to offer-up causal explanations of human action. Indeed, these type of explanations have done a disservice to any notion of rationality in human agency because it overlooks human freedom, responsibility, and the possibility of successful interventions to alter my actions. If we hold that the essence of human agency is reason, then the ramifications for educational systems are significant because anything worthy to be called an education necessitates the cultivation of reason and rationality. This is why MacIntyre’s restoration of rationality is so important to education because it provides the resources to explain rational human action, particularly practical rationality. In turn, MacIntyre’s account of rationality establishes a publically shared framework for explaining rational human agency that is suitable for judging rational human action, but also the means in which it can be cultivated and fostered in educational systems. Subsequently, for the purposes of this chapter I be concerned with the discussion of the following: first, I provide a critique of MacIntyre’s theory of human action; and, lastly I sketch-out MacIntyre’s account of rationality and how social science can assist in its explanation.

For as long as Western scholars have studied Islamic law, they have struggled to understand the relations between its and aspects. This chapter joins these efforts in exploring the details of the juristic integration of religious and legal concerns. The argument is that pre-modern Muslim jurists' understandings of the nature of language, including divine speech, displays important continuities with jurists' understanding of the nature of human action as encompassed by language. The rules of Islamic law are a meeting point - for jurists - between the divine and the human, a meeting that takes place in the realm of language. Jurists had a two-part task both of discerning, in the words of the revealed texts, God's intentions and rules governing human actions, and of identifying human actions by assigning to them names, and thus lining up the words of God's rules with the words naming human actions. Keywords: divine speech; God; human action; Islamic law; legal concern; pre-modern Muslim jurists; religious concern; Western scholars