Bargaining power and the trade-off between the ownership and control of international joint ventures in China

Abstract

Abstract Equity ownership and operational control constitute two crucial elements in the design of the governance structure of international joint ventures (IJVs). Based on the bargaining power theory, this study proposes that discrepancies between majority ownership and dominant control may exist as a consequence of bilateral bargaining, which is attributable to the influence of both contextual and resource content variables. Based on a survey database containing over 700 IJVs in China, our empirical findings illustrate contingencies under which equity share and dominance of control may reveal a trade-off relationship. The foreign partner will be more likely to secure a position of dominant control by accepting ownership concessions when it is at the upstream stage of the IJV, which is characterized by a high dependence on foreign input. Furthermore, while intangible resources furnished by the foreign parent exert positive impacts on the foreign partner’s attainment of dominant operational control in general, the foreign partner’s supply of product related knowledge and marketing expertise is particularly capable of rendering it bargaining power in managing the trade-off between ownership and control whenever necessary. These findings may suggest foreign firms adopt a flexible mindset in their negotiations with potential local counterparts in order to achieve collaborative goals.