Ballistic Missile Defense: Putting a Roof over our Forces in the Theater

Abstract

Abstract : This paper examines the development of ballistic missile defense and the concepts that operational commanders should consider to counter growing threats posed by potential adversaries possessing ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In Desert Storm, the Scud missiles launched served primarily as terror weapons, as they were not militarily very significant, due to their poor accuracies, conventional warheads, and low launch rates. But, with accelerating technological advances and strong pressures for proliferation of theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) and WMD, regional aggressors will likely resort to using TBMs as a relatively cheap, effective warfighting means. We must anticipate facing more sophisticated, challenging scenarios. Moreover, in the next regional contingency/conflict, it is not likely the enemy win allow us five months for a secure, orderly buildup instead, he may try to quickly interfere with our political and military preparations. Although Patriot appeared successful in the Gulf War, it is inadequate; and regional CINCs must advocate, acquire, integrate, and exercise new systems for theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD). Preparation is key. Also, all CINCs must cooperate to deter aggressors from acquiring and employing WMD, realizing that TBMs in one theater could be launched against targets in another, and that TBMs carrying WMD could have strategic implications. Our forces must not only attempt to deter and deny the enemy; they must also be able to defend against any TBMs launched.