Ballistic missile defense: a potential arms-control initiative

Abstract

US strategic forces must be restructured to meet national-security objectives in a changing world. Growth and modernization of Soviet strategic missile forces are causing our land-based strategic missiles to become increasingly vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack. For some strategic force configurations, the goals of flexible nuclear deterrence and strategic arms limitations appear mutually inconsistent. With such forces, prospects for arms limitations would degrade further if the current Soviet build-up were to continue, or if the Soviets were to install unilaterally an anti-ballistic missile system capable of wide-area, multicity defense, or both. However, if the US installs an anti-ballistic missile system along with reduced but modernized offensive strategic forces, arms limitation appears compatible with both assured destruction and war-fighting deterrence policies. This conclusion appears equally valid for expanded Soviet forces even if the Soviets also install ballistic missile defenses. In particular, an American strategic posture including layered defense of MX missiles based deceptively in silos was analyzed. The exoatmospheric-intercept component of this defense system could also defend some of our cities and industrial and military installations. If the US were to adopt this strategic posture, we believe it would create incentives for the Soviet Union to restrain strategic-armsexpansion. Mutual arms-control initiativesmore » could follow. Test and installation of the needed defensive systems are now precluded by the Anti-Ballistic-Missile Treaty adopted in 1972. An opportunity for Treaty reconsideration occurs in 1982. Substantiation of our results would suggest that consideration be given to Treaty modifications or to replacing the Treaty with other agreements.« less