Back to the future? Financialisation, local statecraft, and situational analysis

I was a lecturer at the Institute for Local Government Studies (INLOGOV) between 1970 and 1975. It was the unofficial staff college for senior officers in local government. It had two sides-development studies and British local government. I was in development studies for no better reason than they advertised the job. My research was on British local government. I had never taken a course in development studies, let alone taught such a course to others. I was a fish out of water among "expats" who were colleagues from the Colonial Civil Service; used to display an effortless superiority over the natives, I fear the expats saw me as a native. I did not fit in. My immediate boss was Ken Pickering who ran the division as if he was still a District Commissioner. The flash point was a patronage appointment to a lecturing post. I protested, politely at first, and suggested we advertise. He refused and told me to mind my own business. I became bolshy and appealed his decision to Henry Maddick, head of INLOGOV. It transpired that Henry agreed with me, although he never said so to my face. The job was advertised. Ken summoned me to his office for some name-calling. I was "a snake in the grass." I was on a two-year contract. He

The paper is concerned with the problematic nature of English governance. The discussion begins with reference to the reluctance to engage in debates about English national governance. It then poses a series of questions about the balance to be drawn between localism and regionalism and the fragmentation of local governance in England (in contrast to the rest of the UK), suggesting that local government might provide a solution to the problem through the building of effective patterns of governance from the bottom up. This is contrasted with the various proposed formal and institutional ‘solutions’ to English governance, which are bound to fail. The discussion goes on to consider the problem of the English regions and concludes that the political conditions do not exist for the English regions to be the primary sites for the building of new English governance. After a review of ways in which governance can be built, attention reverts to the local level where it is suggested that the current reorganisation of English local government suggests ways in which the foundations of English governance can be developed locally.

Several recent papers in the literature have reformulltlated the nature of equilibrium in IFiebout mo(lels by alSSlIuim`ing an exogenous number of communities, inflexible commullity l)OU(alaries, anti in pirticular inactive lantlowners and developers. Ihis paper argues that these assumptions are unwarranted and reSul1t iIn in(eterminate solutions and incorrect analyses. Determinate lOn1g-rUn1 solutions require equilibrium in intercommui land markets, which in turn require giving lantlowners and/or entrepreneurial (leveloelers an active role in the models. The role of politics in these models and its juxtaposition with entrepreneurial activities are also analyzed.

This article explores interpretations of resilience within English local government. Using a historical and multi-scalar framework, it argues that previous accounts of resilience in English local government have neglected the effect of sub-national institutional restructuring and compounding the impact austerity has had on local government capacity to navigate this complex landscape. The article situates resilience in the broader context of decentralisation, illustrating the benefits of adopting a broad spatial perspective to focus on resilience within local government systems. Continuing austerity and inconsistently applied institutional reorganisation are highlighted as potential twin threats to the ‘survivability’ of English local government.

This paper assesses the impact of a decade of New Labour reforms on English local government. It focuses on assessing the outcomes of three key areas of reform: policies intended to improve the performance of local government services; measures aimed at reviving local democracy; and significant ‘non-decisions’ made in relation to crucial aspects of central–local relations, particularly local government finance. It is argued that New Labour's modernization agenda, inspired by notions of ‘the Third Way’, has had greatest impact where it has gone with the grain of New Right reforms. As a result, the most distinctive impact of New Labour policy on English local government has been that it has succeeded where Conservative administrations had failed in implementing a distinctively New Right agenda for English local government.

Addressing alcohol health harms through non-health sector policies in English local government: a systematic overview, legal analysis, and case study

In March 2004, two important documents on alcohol policy were published by the British government. One is an Alcohol Harm Reduction Strategy for England (UK Cabinet Office 2004). This document has received more attention, but is arguably of less import. As we shall see, what it offers is a recipe for ineffectiveness at the national level. The second document, the kind which only a lawyer could love, is entitled Draft Guidance issued under Section 182 of the Licensing Act 2003 (UK Ministry of Culture, Media & Sport 2004). The consequences of this document are likely to be much more serious for public health and safety, as it is intended to eviscerate any possibility of effective action on alcohol issues at the local level. In the same month, then, the Blair government has managed to accomplish not only a missed chance at the national level but also a thoroughgoing neutralization of local powers to control the alcohol market in the interests of public health and safety. This deliberate effort to disable the public interest applies directly only to parts of the United Kingdom, but it is of wider significance. As will be discussed, the same government also holds important powers for the whole of the United Kingdom, and there is nowhere else to look for policy decisions on such matters. Further, the UK government has an important voice in the European Union, and in this context has generally sided, as in the Strategy, with British alcohol industry interests at the expense of public health and safety. More generally, in an international context the effort is worth holding up to the light for detailed examination as a textbook case of how industry interests can be brought to bear, through an ideologically friendly central government, to thwart local efforts to deal with the problems which enthusiastic and unchecked alcohol marketing can bring at the street level. In 1998, the government of the United Kingdom stated that it was ‘preparing a new strategy on alcohol’ (UK Department of Health 1998, §9.14), and the next year added that ‘we expect to publish our strategy . . . early in the year 2000’ (UK Department of Health 1999, §2.23). In 2003, a PowerPoint presentation entitled the Interim Analytical Report was published on the web (UK Cabinet Office, 2003). As noted, the strategy has now finally been published (UK Cabinet Office 2004). Prepared by the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, the strategy carries a foreword signed by Tony Blair himself. Although originally billed to be a National Strategy, the final document is a strategy only for England. This presumably partly covers any embarrassment from the fact that, by the time it appeared, every other part of the United Kingdom, including the Isle of Man, already had its alcohol or its drug and alcohol strategy. The downshifting of focus may also reflect that the strategy, as we shall discuss, largely avoids recommending any measures (such as changes in excise tax or in blood–alcohol level for drink-driving) which would require action at a broader level than England. This begs the question of the need still for an alcohol strategy for the United Kingdom, covering the aspects of alcohol policy which can be enacted only by the UK government. Both England and the rest of the United Kingdom are in trouble with respect to alcohol. The Interim Analytical Report and the Strategy itself each document this as best they can, given the spotty nature of available British statistics of alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harms. A further accounting can be found in a recent report from the Academy of Medical Sciences (2004; it should be noted that I was a member of that report's working group). The Strategy's proposals for how to respond to a bad and worsening situation can best be described as bathetic. If one takes the listing at the back of Alcohol—No Ordinary Commodity (Babor et al. 2003), for instance, where preventive measures are ranked roughly on the evidence of their effectiveness, there is an almost total correspondence between the measures proposed in the Strategy's recommendations and the measures which are ranked in the listing as ‘ineffective’. They are all there in the Strategy: school education, voluntary advertising codes, even a half-hearted discussion of alternative entertainment for youth. Conversely, the Strategy eschews almost all the strategies ranked as ‘effective’. For those from the effective end of the list which it does advocate—for instance, brief interventions in primary health care—no new resources are provided, and the problem of actually getting health workers to conduct brief interventions (Roche & Freeman 2004) is not addressed. Concerning drink-driving, the one concrete initiative mentioned is a designated-driver publicity campaign run by an alcohol industry group; again the Strategy chooses a measure for which there is no evidence of effectiveness. The Strategy mentions that the United Kingdom's blood alcohol limit of 0.08% is among the highest in Europe, but does not broach the idea of reducing the limit to 0.05% to match most of the rest of Europe, nor other effective measures such as intensive random breath-testing. Again, the Strategy steers away from any measure with a reasonable track-record of effectiveness. The Strategy acknowledges that ‘there is a clear association between price, availability and consumption’ (p. 23). However, it eschews any proposals either on excise taxes or on controls of availability, with the explanation that ‘our analysis showed that the drivers of consumption are much more complex than merely price and availability’. While this statement is true (although no back-up analysis for it is offered), it is irrelevant: that the aetiology of emphysema is more complicated than just cigarette smoking is not an argument against doing something about the smoking. The Strategy also mentions ‘evidence [which] suggested that using price as a key lever risked major unintended side-effects’. No such evidence is given, but presumably potential rises in cross-channel purchases and smuggling are what is meant. A discussion of these issues would have been a good opportunity to raise the issue of whether the United Kingdom should attempt to change EU rules on alcohol in the Single Market which undercut public health. Indeed, an indication of the parochial quality of the Strategy is that the European Union (EU) is mentioned only once (in connection with seeking permission from the EU to require warning labels on alcoholic beverage containers; p. 33). After implying that price and availability policies would be unpopular, the Strategy offers its capping argument for looking away from price and availability: ‘measures to control price and availability are already built into the system’ (p. 23). The idea the Strategy can thus ignore a whole arena of action because it is ‘already built into the system’ is a breathtaking contradiction with the Strategy's general thrust, which points out how fragmented alcohol issues are between government departments, with ‘no clear focus for policymaking’ (p. 82). A document cannot be accepted seriously as taking ‘a strategic approach to addressing alcohol issues’ (p. 82) if it rules out of consideration some of the most effective available strategies. Having offered its arguments for steering away from price and availability, the Strategy continues: ‘So we believe that a more effective strategy would be to provide the industry with further opportunities to work in partnership with the government to reduce alcohol-related harm’ (p. 23). No evidence is offered of why this would be ‘a more effective strategy’; again, the evaluation research literature would not support the belief. My reading of the sentence is that it must have been written with a wink, essentially as a statement that ‘our political masters decided that the Strategy's approach would be to work with the alcohol beverage industry, and vetoed recommendations on matters like price and availability which would upset the industry’. This reading of the sentence is supported by the most ludicrous item in the Strategy—the model of actors and responsibilities for reducing harms from drinking (pp. 24–25). Three sets of actors are named. The first are ‘individuals and families’, who are responsible through ‘their own choices about what they and those for whom they are responsible drink, where and how’, including being responsible for actions while intoxicated. The third actor is ‘government’, which is responsible for informing consumers, ‘supporting those who suffer adverse consequences’, protecting others from the drinker, ‘ensuring a fair balance between the interests of all stakeholders’ and ‘providing the right strategic framework’. Also mentioned is ‘protecting against harms caused by the supply of alcohol where appropriate, and for regulating to the minimum necessary to achieve this’. (One can guess which qualifiers in this sentence were insisted upon by industry interests.) Between the individual and family and the government is another actor, the ‘Alcoholic drinks industry’, which is assigned responsibilities for giving accurate information and warning about consequences of drinking, for ‘supplying its products in a way which minimizes harm’ and for working with national agencies and local partners. So much for civil society. No other intermediate actor is mentioned in the chart, whether professions, institutions, voluntary associations or—notably—local governments. There is simply the individual drinker or family, the government and the alcoholic beverage industry. It is a telling and indeed a rather totalitarian picture, and an utterly inadequate representation of reality in a complex society such as the United Kingdom. As noted, in the same month another major British alcohol policy document was released, the Draft Guidance issued under Section 182 of the Licensing Act 2003 (UK Ministry of Culture, Media & Sport 2004). This document was also the result of a long process of consideration. In May 2001, the Home Office published its proposals on alcohol licensing ‘reform’ (UK Home Office 2001), the culmination of a review and consultation process dating back to 1998. A notable feature was a provision to eliminate any national closing hours for pubs and nightclubs. After an intervening election, legislation based on the proposals was finally passed in 2003. The Draft Guidance, which must be passed by Parliament, begins the process of actually implementing the new legislation. After the election, responsibility for alcohol licensing matters was transferred to the Ministry of Culture, Media and Sport. This transfer, which of course further fragmented government responsibility for alcohol matters, has tended to provide the industry with a more reliable governmental ally (alcohol licensing falls under the ‘tourism’ section of the ministry's portfolio). A 2002 speech by the Culture Secretary to an alcohol trade group, for instance, essentially promised that the reforms would increase alcohol sales: ‘the reforms would be good for the economy, opening the way to new and more diverse markets, providing new investment opportunities and creating new employment’ (UK Ministry of Culture, Media & Sport 2002). A major change in the new licensing law is the abolition of the centuries-old system of ‘licensing justices’ and their replacement by a licensing committee drawn from the local elected council. This can be seen as a positive change in terms of governance and accountability, making the licensing authorities responsible to the community which elects them. However, this is precisely what has greatly worried alcohol industry interests, which fear that such local authorities may be less co-optable: ‘They have a vested interest in the people that vote for them’, a board member of the Restaurant Association complained (Restaurant industry speaks out . . . 2002). As troubles with drinking in the core city area have increased, a number of British municipal governments have become activist in their licensing policies, and some have been looking to charge the trade for the extra policing, street-cleaning and late-night transport that later closing hours would require (BISL hits out . . . 2002). The trade became worried that the shift in structure might mean a more restrictive rather than a weakened licence regime, including in some places a reduction rather than an increase in opening hours. The task for industry interests, thus, has been to lobby the central government to impose severe constraints on what actions local licensing boards can take, in the form of ‘guidance’ from the central government on how the boards can act. The March 23 document gives evidence of the trade's very considerable success in this effort. From the perspective of an outsider, the result is astonishing. The instructions on what may and may not be carried out are, after all, directed at local councillors who have presumably been elected to their positions as people of experience and judgement. It is hard to imagine such an audience anywhere taking kindly to the tone of the guidance, which in its admonitions sometimes reads as if directed at fractious kindergarteners. As for the substance, the consistent intent is to tie the hands of any local regulation. First of all, the document is firm on the limits of the legitimate uses of the licensing power, which are limited to ‘the prevention of crime and disorder; public safety; the prevention of public nuisance; and the prevention of children from harm’ (p. 15). ‘There is no power for the licensing authority to attach a condition [to the licence] which is merely aspirational: it must be necessary. For example, conditions may not be attached which relate solely to the health of customers rather than their direct physical safety’ (p. 65). ‘The public safety objective [of licensing] is concerned with the physical safety of the people using the relevant premises and not with the public health, with is dealt with in other legislation’ (p. 92). Secondly, licensing authorities are enjoined to look no further than the door of the premises in question in terms of causal chains which might result in conditions on the licence. ‘Conditions attached to licences cannot seek to manage the behaviour of customers once they are beyond the direct management of the licence holder and his staff or agents’ (p. 90). ‘Conditions [on licences] relating to public nuisance caused by the antisocial behaviour of customers once they are beyond the control of the licence holder . . . cannot be justified . . . Beyond the vicinity of the premises, these are matters for personal responsibility of individuals under the law’ (p. 95). Thus, also, ‘noise from customers in the street beyond the premises cannot be taken into account’ by police in considering a temporary closure of premises (p. 123). Thirdly, licensing authorities may not impose conditions which affect the prerogatives of licencees as employers. ‘No conditions relating to the management competency of designated premises supervisors should normally be attached to premises licences . . . It will normally be the responsibility of the premises licence holder as an employer, and not the licensing authority, to ensure that managers appointed at the premises are competent and appropriately trained and licensing authorities must ensure that they do not stray outside their powers and duties’ (p. 91). Fourthly, existing licences are to be treated essentially as an inalienable property right, which must be protected from ‘frivolous or vexatious’ complaints (p. 66) or even regular compliance checks—characterized dismissively in terms of a ‘culture of annual inspections’ (p. 35). This applies even to provisional licences issued prior to construction or alteration of premises, even though ‘a great deal of time may pass’ (p. 70) before the premises are opened. ‘It will be important for investment and employment opportunities’ that no new complaints are considered when the premises actually open (p. 70). While licensing authorities are allowed to adopt ‘special policies relative to cumulative impact’ which restrict the granting of new on-premises licences in a designated area, ‘cumulative impact’ may only be taken into account when a new licence or change in an existing one is being considered; it cannot be taken into account even in a review of an existing licence (p. 66). Such policies ‘should never be used as a ground for revoking an existing licence [even] when relevant representations are received about problems with those premises’ (p. 26). Fifthly, licensing authorities should not interfere with the free operation of the market. The old criterion of ‘need’ used by the licensing justices is no longer a legitimate consideration. ‘ “Need” concerns the commercial demand for another pub or restaurant or hotel. This is not a matter for the licensing authority . . . “Need” is a matter for planning committees and the market’ (p. 23). Sixthly, citizen input concerning problems from a prospective or current licence is strictly limited. The requirement for advertising that an application has been is limited to one on the premises (p. only and but also are to be from consideration for example, which would have been when the application for the licence was first and which were by of the prior of a provisional licence (p. It is that the on whether a is thus not to be considered be to staff of the licensing committee (p. This that political is as an of decisions on considering a ‘should not be on the of any political which would a approach to the This may be for councillors complaints from their own (p. and all, the is in For instance, on of it in general that and be allowed to alcohol at any time which they to The document in the British government that and early closing are ‘a key of and when of customers are to premises This in the of the research literature (Babor et al. 2003, and experience . . 2002). opening in for instance, in police in and in The police work was more the but this a change in police shift to the new work at et al. 2002). One to the problem of when the pubs at the same it would might be closing licensing authorities should also not seek to closing by for closing . . . In the this would only to the current of and . . . with a of . . . and would not be necessary to the licensing The general should be to support later opening that customers for a longer (p. 82). I found for a the of the document ‘licensing authorities should not closing for (p. this would a key of the 2003 (p. 26). are licensing authorities allowed to reduce opening hours in the to the new licensing regime, even in the case of premises with permission to open for hours. the even more ‘a licensing authority is from conditions . . . which would have the of opening hours to more limited hours than the current (p. the other any idea of the public responsibilities as a of public to be ‘there is no . . . to open for the . . . for example, a public has no trade on a the licence holder is entitled to the premises’ (p. The end result of the Guidance, if it into will be a the new local licensing authorities will be with and but will be almost to the licensing power to the or of operation of the alcohol in their for local to have power to alcohol licensing is also not For instance, the in that there was local input when the licensing system was In such the for in some local control alcohol has been through their planning and In for instance, have good of which essentially impose controls on hours and conditions of through the planning system & The UK Guidance that the local planning process is also in local control of alcohol In it the argument that local authorities should provide control and licensing will be to and (p. it is hard to how is to However, the of the has arguments that the limited local planning powers in England cannot work as a for licensing powers 2003). A for the Prime Minister's Office of the of a measure by the government in to local gives support to this that ‘the local authorities the of about uses planning ‘The by of the is about the for and drinking in ‘the of public that has taken in This a market that has been by the central constraints on local ‘It is by planning authorities to have the of and to have given to because of the number of people in one area and by in the (UK Ministry of Culture, Media & Sport 2001, As the report on the there is a problem in British and with alcohol and the & et al. 2003). The planning powers of local governments have been they cannot provide a The Guidance on the new Licensing to ensure that licensing cannot provide a and there is in the Strategy which is likely to have much in reducing these The consistent which is of a central government which is to be with respect to alcohol and which effort to any by local government to adopt effective alcohol This is a which England has to at the end of of efforts on the Strategy and on the Licensing The one feature of the is that the because this gives some to the that there has been the government the is I itself is a very and is to alcohol industry In recent some have taken of the The supply of to was to have between and A member of noted ‘a rather change in the The most of the while the of drinking are . . . I have there are now more people than before who in the in a 2002). Media have also to drinking among a on Home Office proposals to by it just the and suggested that the Home Secretary was by the of the Home 2002). Alcohol industry interests are in and in the government. The is the at with of and industry interests to have as an on this government as they on the governments which In March for instance, the government that it was on its dating from to reduce the blood–alcohol limit for from 0.08% to the general level of the European Union, to this the with the which is by the drinks industry and reducing the The Department of on research by the A of noted that ‘the with that of the alcohol industry but is by local the the British Medical the the for the of the and the for (UK of 2002). The of the of a noted that by the of the drinks 2002). The also general of the Blair government. has a to problems in individual to the in pubs and outside on the street to be seen as a matter of and the are individual and from or a law for the police to on the for and antisocial This from the Prime with police but up again in the Strategy as a of to be by the and (p. in the is thus solely in terms of steering away from the and commercial in which the trouble as more to than any government . . . It that it has been to to the more than any of its It would be hard to of a more of than the of the Blair government on alcohol the end of the Strategy, under the ‘ensuring the is there is an attempt to the are to the industry to its to by best that in the should be voluntary . . . the next if industry actions are not to an in reducing will the case for including legislation. However, in the light of the it is hard to much to this There was a not long when was of on alcohol It is to the new Strategy with the report on Alcohol in in the final of the government, by the The report was but never published in in beyond the of the Act the Strategy, the review noted the of alcohol issues UK government departments, by the for the for for However, the of the do not much further than The review on the literature a of alcohol consumption to of in the and not the It proposed that ‘the should a positive on the in consumption and on the reduction of alcohol-related (p. It the of alcohol taxes as an of alcohol with the at a minimum being level with changes in the price licensing should not be further it should be and in respect to under drinking its ‘the on drinking and should be and legislation (p. A the review still a than the document for a British strategy on alcohol.

As a creature of Statue, British local government is subject to constant change emanating from a superior constitutional source: central government. Much of the change that is imposed upon local government because of the need for governing institutions to respond to two competing sets of requirements: those that drive and are driven by either, technocracy or democracy. In all major reorganisations of local government, the attempts tofind a structuralfit between these two mutually antagonistic factors have seen the latter lose out to the former The question of local government size is part of the clash between technocracy and democracy that has been played-out in various reforms of local government in Britain. Indeed, current discussions about unitary councils and city-regions will ultimately result in larger, more remote and technocraticaly driven units of local government The article sets out a construct for British local government that would rest on the creation of a new constitutional settlement between the centre and the localities. It explores the role newly empowered local government could play within the context of a federal UK, and addresses how the politics of these new councils should be conducted. The article also explores what new formns of political accountability would be required in this new constitutional settlement and to whom local government should be accountable. It also examines the mechanisms by which that accountability can be secured. The article sets out a radically new context for central local relationships resting on a new balance of political power; responsibility and accountability.

Taking as a starting point the suggestion that US‐style elected mayors might be appropriate for British local government this article explores the implications of such a development. It analyses the experience of the United States and notes crucial differences between the local government systems of Britain and the United States. These differences require a discussion of certain adaptations and changes that would need to be considered before an elected mayor in Britain could be established. The extent to which such an emulation would constitute an improvement to the current British local government system is considered. The article demonstrates the potential of prospective evaluation. It asks what we can learn from the experience of another country by projecting that experience onto the particular setting an circumstances of our own country. It provides otherwise unavailable evidence about the likely effects of a potentially important reform. The article concludes with an assessment of the general case for experimenting with an elected mayor in British local government and the prospects that such experiments will be taken forward.

(1991). The new suburban right in British local government — conservative views of the local. Local Government Studies: Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 45-62.

The core of the Palestinian political regime takes its roots in the course of the struggle for independence against British occupation government that attempted to establish Jewish State in the territory of Western Palestine. This research examines the history of Palestine under the British Mandate after the World War I. The object of this article is Palestine in the time of creation of post-colonial system of international relations; while the subject is the political-legal aspects of Palestinian political regime during British colonization period of 1917-1948. The article is based on the political-retrospective analysis of regional situation. The authors were able to determine the factors that contributed to the emergence of Arab-Israeli conflict; reveal the state of Palestinian internal political forces and actors, their impact upon the political regime of Palestinian State; as we;; as well as identify the potential conflict risk zones within the Arab leadership. Analysis of the regional situation allows formulating approaches towards forecasting the course of events.

This article is about the persistence and resilience of the form of local government that emerged in England in the nineteenth century and took shape in the twentieth century. English local government has adapted to successive reorganisations and changes to its functions; it has survived centralisation, privatisation, the imposition of quangos, regional governance, elected mayors, performance management and latterly fiscal austerity by responding to opportunities and meeting the continual need for administrative tasks at the local level. The centralised structure to political management in English local government has generated a high level of organisational capacity and a pragmatic sensibility that ensures the institution remains in place even in unpropitious circumstances. Other local organisations, such as voluntary sector bodies and quangos, have less capacity to compete and work to shorter timescales. Such resilience has come to the fore in the period of fiscal austerity since 2009 when local authorities have had to manage severe declines in their budgets whilst taking on additional functions, such as council tax benefit. The organisational capacity and pragmatism of English local government create path dependence as its very efficiency at managing services may have shut off options for democratic renewal and participation.

Local government in England has a long tradition of experimentation with decentralisation and devolution within its own territorial boundaries. Those experiments have partly been driven by political values that favour passing functions and responsibilities from the town hall to local communities and partly by the need to compensate for the large scale of English local government. The creation of sub-municipal units takes a range of forms and purposes most of which are controlled, shaped and organised by the council which formed them and which can abolition them if it chooses. Parish and own councils stand unique among the sub-municipal units in English local government as they are statutory bodies with their own set of roles, powers and functions which are not the property of another municipality. The chapter explores the diverse nature of the types of sub-municipal units that exist in English local government and examines the contribution they make to service delivery, decision-making and local democracy.

IMPACT The current challenges facing English local government of austerity, structural changes, and increasing demand are well known and understood in practice and research. These issues have contributed to record levels of intervention and widespread use of exceptional financial support, with sector representative bodies warning that more councils will face these challenges in future. In this context the national Labour government has committed to resetting central–local relations and closed the recently established Office for Local Government. While there has been extensive research on state failure, scholars of public administration and statecraft have overlooked how ‘failure’ is represented and constructed at a sub-national level, and the impact this brings to central–local relations. This article analyses the current context of English local government to advance a broader conceptualization of failure for the sector, arguing that learning from recent experiences should be a prominent research agenda and priority in practice.

A Situation Analysis (SA) was conducted in seven local government health centers as part of a larger project studying the feasibility of integrating RTI services within the existing Family Planning/Reproductive Health Program of the Department of Health (DOH). The SA was part of a series of baseline activities conducted by the Family Planning Operations Research and Training Project as part of its study on Integrating RTI Management in Local Government Unit Health Centers. It was conducted by Population Council, Manila, for the DOH. Participating health centers were located in a large and highly urbanized community, a medium-sized city, and two semi-urban municipalities. The research team visited these centers to examine existing facilities and equipment, staff capabilities, and client-provider interactions. Clients related their perceptions about quality of service. SA results showed that FP/MCH and other services offered in the clinics were generally satisfactory. In the clinics that had a laboratory, capacity was limited due to inadequate supplies. None of the centers could conduct basic lab tests for RTIs. As this report indicates, clinic facilities, client-provider interaction, and staff capability, though satisfactory, can still be improved. However, RTI services are either lacking or only addressed inadequately.