B Clough (ed) The spaces of mental capacity law: Moving beyond binaries (2022)

This chapter begins with the historical developments that put mental health and capacity law into context, then moves on to the relationship to other areas of law. It describes the principles, and the roles of professionals and relatives. It goes on to explain the procedures for using civil powers, and civil admission for treatment. Consent to treatment, leave from hospital, civil community treatment, and after-care. The chapter then details police powers under mental health law, court-ordered pre-sentence assessment and sentence of treatment, alongside other court orders. Transfer from prison to treatment is included, with restriction orders, then appeals against treatment and detention is outlined. The subsequent section outlines human rights law, the European Convention of Human Rights, misuse of mental health law, and finishes with mental capacity laws.

Mental health and capacity law can often feel complex and bewildering. They are governed by a range of different legal frameworks, including (but not limited to) the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA), the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA), and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Each legal framework comes with its own unique set of legal principles and ideological baggage, and is also subject to the constant ebb and flow of case law. Last year alone saw major judgments handed down on, for example, the interface between the MHA and MCA,1 the zone of parental responsibility in relation to 16 and 17 year olds,2 and deprivation of liberty in intensive care settings.3 The legal frameworks are also subject to frequent legislative reform; most recently the Police and Crime Act 2017, which reformed police powers under sections 135 and 136 of the MHA and the duties of coroners to investigate the deaths of people who were subject to the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS). Even the judiciary and specialist legal practitioners struggle to keep abreast of the changes. However, mental health and mental capacity law is not ‘lawyers’ law’, in the sense that it is not primarily played out in the courtroom. It is written overwhelmingly for front-line health and social care professionals (and in the case of the MCA, family and other unpaid carers), most of whom will have had no formal legal training. The question, therefore arises, how can busy professionals become and remain fully conversant with these complex and fluctuating legal frameworks?

Unified mental health and capacity law: Creating parity and non-discrimination?

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) requires a reconceptualised approach to rights enjoyment by persons with mental disabilities promoting equality through support, institutional and environmental adjustments, and envisaging ‘protection’ in terms of all rights enablement and not rights restriction. Mental health and capacity law has tended to focus exclusively on authorizing and regulating non-consensual interventions, contrary to the CRPD message. Scotland’s current mental health and capacity law is no different. The terms of reference of the 2019–22 independent review of this law included making recommendations on CRPD realization. The resultant recommendations sought to strengthen the voice of persons with mental disabilities, reduce psychiatric coercion, and secure the enjoyment of all rights whilst providing an aspirational but workable basis for achieving CRPD alignment. It proposed a new model for mental health and capacity law, centred on reconceptualising mental health and capacity law to take account of realization of all categories of human rights, equality in the enjoyment of such rights, and reduction of non-consensual measures. This article will consider the practical and conceptual CRPD implementation challenges faced by Scotland and other countries, and the Review’s recommendations, seeking to address them in their wider context.

This chapter concludes the book Capacity, Participation and Values in Comparative Legal Perspective. We draw together key themes and observations from across the book’s chapters, which focus on mental capacity – or guardianship – laws across different jurisdictions, seeking to learn whether and how a person for whom a decision is being made under such laws is empowered to participate in the decision making, and to understand how that person’s values are identified and brought into decisions. The book invites reflections on similarities and distinctions in uses of technical language, and shared or overlapping legal framings and approaches. However, it also provides the basis of deeper-seated observations. These include points of clashing principle within the aims of laws: for example where tensions arise between empowerment, equality, dignity, welfare and respect for a person’s wishes and values (to name just a few). In light of such principled challenges, we examine two salient themes that we perceive in the book: first, how laws and their application belie the myth of liberal neutrality, notwithstanding efforts to achieve a detachment from moral judgement within mental capacity laws; second, how legacies of oppression and/or colonialism bear on the interrelationships between individuals, communities and the state under mental capacity laws.

The context- and person-specific nature of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) in England and Wales means inherent indeterminacy characterises decision-making in the Court of Protection (CoP), not least regarding conflicting values and the weight that should be accorded to competing factors. This paper explores how legal professionals frame and influence the MCA's deliberative and adjudicative processes in the social space of the courtroom through a thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with legal practitioners specialising in mental capacity law and retired judges from the CoP and the Courts of Appeal with specific experience of adjudicating mental capacity disputes. The concept of the ‘human element’ offers important new insight into how legal professionals perform their roles and justify their activities in the conduct of legal proceedings. The ‘human element’ takes effect in two ways: first, it operates as an overarching normative prism that accounts for what good practice demands of legal professionals in mental capacity law; secondly, it explains how these professionals orientate these norms in the day-to-day conduct of their work. The ‘human element’ further presents challenges that demand practical negotiation in relation to countervailing normative commitments to objectivity and socio-institutional expectations around professional hierarchies, expertise, and evidential thresholds.

This chapter concludes the book Capacity, Participation and Values in Comparative Legal Perspective. We draw together key themes and observations from across the book’s chapters, which focus on mental capacity – or guardianship – laws across different jurisdictions, seeking to learn whether and how a person for whom a decision is being made under such laws is empowered to participate in the decision making, and to understand how that person’s values are identified and brought into decisions. The book invites reflections on similarities and distinctions in uses of technical language, and shared or overlapping legal framings and approaches. However, it also provides the basis of deeper-seated observations. These include points of clashing principle within the aims of laws: for example where tensions arise between empowerment, equality, dignity, welfare and respect for a person’s wishes and values (to name just a few). In light of such principled challenges, we examine two salient themes that we perceive in the book: first, how laws and their application belie the myth of liberal neutrality, notwithstanding efforts to achieve a detachment from moral judgement within mental capacity laws; second, how legacies of oppression and/or colonialism bear on the interrelationships between individuals, communities and the state under mental capacity laws.

This article analyses the role of evidence in resolving Court of Protection proceedings, drawing on qualitative data obtained from observations of the Court of Protection, a review of Court of Protection case files and interviews with social workers. It is argued that there is a hierarchy of professional evidence in mental capacity law. Psychiatric evidence is at the top of this hierarchy, whereas social work evidence is viewed as a less persuasive form of knowledge about mental capacity. The article argues that this is because mental capacity law views psychiatric evidence as a form of objective and technical expertise about capacity, whereas social work evidence is viewed as a form of subjective, experiential knowledge. In challenging this hierarchy, it is instead argued that mental capacity law should place greater weight on experiential knowledge emanating from a relationship with the subject of the proceedings, rather than elevating the status of psychiatric evidence about mental capacity.

Mental health and capacity laws in Northern Ireland and the COVID-19 pandemic: Examining powers, procedures and protections under emergency legislation

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) took effect in 2008. This paper discusses a number of flashpoints where the CRPD will require real and significant reconsideration of English mental health and mental capacity law. The CRPD introduces a new paradigm into international disability law, relying on the social model of disability. While that is no doubt a good thing, there is as yet no clear sense as to how that is to be implemented. After providing an introduction to the Convention, the paper considers four specific areas: mental capacity law (focussing on the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005), psychiatric treatment without consent, civil detention of people with mental disabilities, and mental disability in the criminal system (fitness to plead, insanity and diminished responsibility).

Under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) in England and Wales, the liberal commitments to subjective freedom guide obligations towards persons who do not lack capacity. For the subject of proceedings who might lack capacity (P), it is less clear as to what obligations orient best interests decision-making on their behalf. The UK Supreme Court has emphasised the centrality of ‘P-centricity’ in best interests decision-making, where there is the legal obligation to consider P’s subjective views and wishes in a holistic consideration of best interests. Unclarity nonetheless persists as to what is owed to P in the best interests standard, leading to the tendency to interpret obligations of P-centricity through the normative prism of subjective autonomy. This paper argues that such moves reduce the complex moral phenomenology of what a P-centric ethos entails. Instead, the phenomenological and ethical stance of moral considerability and recognition respect can best capture the enriched normative grounding for P-centric decision-making in mental capacity law.

This article considers the hard-earned lessons that New Zealand might draw from developments in English mental capacity law that should inform a comprehensive review of New Zealand’s equivalent adult guardianship legislation, the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the shift towards supported decision-making, requires State parties to rethink domestic laws and engage with the key concepts of this important human rights convention. The most significant development under the Mental Capacity Act (England and Wales) 2005 is the identification of the so-called ‘Bournewood gap’ and the realization that the common law doctrine of necessity provides inadequate procedural safeguards for people with impaired capacity who are unable to consent or object to their healthcare and living arrangements. In addition, the ‘best interests’ standard for decision-making in English law has evolved with a greater emphasis on support for the exercise of a person’s legal capacity into this standard. This article argues that these developments should influence reform of New Zealand’s mental capacity law.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to consider the role of social work professional evidence in mental capacity law, specifically Court of Protection proceedings. The authors analyse how social workers perform as evidence givers in this domain and how social work as a profession is perceived alongside other professions within the context of adult social care decision-making in mental capacity law. Design/methodology/approach This paper draws on textual evidence from judgments and existing empirical data published elsewhere. The authors consider the contribution of social work professional expertise to best interests decision-making in formal legal proceedings which, in turn, reflects on how social work expertise is relevant in everyday practice. Findings The findings of this paper include that social workers are well placed to be experts on best interests decision-making in mental capacity law. However, the authors show that the Court of Protection has not always endorsed this form of social work expertise in its judgments, meaning that social workers can struggle to articulate an expert knowledge base. Originality/value Overall, the authors conclude that social work evidence is incredibly valuable as expertise about the person’s best interests, particularly in the domain of welfare cases and care planning.

<p>When the Bamford Review of Mental Health and Learning Disability completed its work in the autumn of 2007, it drew to a close an extensive consultation and analysis of mental health and learning disability services and the law in Northern Ireland. Its last report on A Comprehensive Legislative Framework made<br />a compelling case for a major overhaul of the law that the Review team itself described as ‘quite radical’. The Review identified the case for reform in the need to ensure that mental health law conforms to the requirements of human rights law, reflects changes to professional practice, reflects the needs of service<br />users and their carers, and keeps pace with reform elsewhere in the UK. Alone of all the jurisdictions in the UK, Northern Ireland has been operating largely in a legislative vacuum in relation to mental capacity law. The Review’s proposals for reform therefore extended to reform of mental health law and the introduction of mental capacity law.</p><p>In the autumn of 2008 the NI Executive published its response to the Bamford Review indicating that it intended to develop the law sequentially: reform of the Mental Health (NI) Order 1986 by 2011 followed by the introduction of mental capacity law in 2014. Responses to the Executive’s consultation resulted in<br />the Department of Health Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS) revising its approach and it signalled its intention to bring forward mental capacity and mental health legislation together. This reated a unique opportunity in Northern Ireland for fusion of incapacity and mental health legislation. A further consultation paper was issued in January 2009, setting out the key approaches to the content<br />of two bills. However as a result of the consultation, the Health Minister Michael McGimpsey announced in September 2009 that there would be a single bill with an overall principle of autonomy. His press statement noted: “ A strong body of opinion, particularly from professional groups and lead voluntary organisations, which considered that separate mental health legislation continues to be stigmatising and recommended that mental capacity and mental health provisions should instead be encompassed into a single piece of legislation”</p><p>This short paper provides an overview of the current direction of travel on law reform in Northern Ireland. It comments on the policy climate and arguments for a fusion of mental capacity and mental health legislation. It also highlights some of the key policy issues that will need to be further explored as the Department develops its law reform proposals and concludes with some hopes and fears for the new legislation.</p>

The roots of mental incapacity and mental health legislation in England and Wales are deeply intertwined. Changes in healthcare policy, human rights principles, demographics and social attitudes have highlighted deficiencies in the law to protect the interests and rights of people considered to lack decision-making capacity. This led to calls for legal reform from social workers amongst other groups. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 took shape alongside the more controversial Mental Health Act 2007. Whilst mental capacity and mental health legislation are separate once again, both are concerned with the care and treatment of adults who are perceived as lacking capacity to make specific decisions. The Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards enacted as part of the Mental Health Act 2007 to amend the Mental Capacity Act 2005 will change practice for many social workers as they will give rise to new assessments and roles. Social workers will need to be aware of the potential interaction of the two Acts to ensure compliance with the laws and to promote positive practice. This article explores the interface between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and Mental Health Act 2007 in England and Wales and examines and speculates on some of the possible implications for social work practitioners.