Azerbaijan’s Behaviour as a Smart Small State Towards the EU: Geopolitics of Energy and Shelter Theory

This chapter takes stock of “the common” in the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Doing so, the chapter analyses the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) both in terms of institutions and substantive policies. Showing how European Union (EU) foreign policies after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty have partially been crafted without the necessary institutional consolidation, it sheds light on the many policy challenges that EU diplomacy is confronted with. Cases that this chapter analyses by way of illustration are policies in reaction to the so-called “Arab Spring” and the transnational war in Syria, the EU’s foreign policy performance at the Iran nuclear talks, and the impact of the “Ukraine crisis” on both the EU’s foreign policy manoeuvrability and the perception thereof in other parts of the world. Likewise, the 2015 refugee crisis has become a stress test for common foreign policy responses, and will therefore be assessed in its impact on the perception of EU foreign policy. Finally, the chapter also touches upon the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its intricate interplay between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) structures and EU autonomous defence instruments. The European Union’s credibility as a foreign policy actor, it will be argued, hinges on its ability to both formulate common strategies and policies internally, and to hold such policies up in the face of third parties in order to see such European foreign policies implemented beyond declaratory rhetoric.

Is the European Union (EU) best seen as a ‘normal’ power in global politics and is the way the EU develops and implements foreign policy akin to other actors on the international stage? In this article we explore these issues in the context of EU-Central Asia relations and use the process of developing the EU strategy on Central Asia as a case. Grasping some of the mechanisms of what may be termed ‘normalization’ in EU foreign policy is of particular relevance in increasingly contested world regions such as Central Asia – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan – where Chinese, European, Russian and US interests intersect, albeit in varying degrees. Drawing on a set of twenty-eight semistructured interviews conducted with members of the diplomatic service of the EU and its Member States in the capitals of Central Asian republics as well as in Brussels, we seek to gauge the scope of normalization at the stage of strategy formulation vis-à-vis this region. The article explores two internal dimensions which we distil from the concept of ‘normal power Europe’, namely hierarchical centralization of power and the pre-eminence of larger Member States in the making of EU foreign policy. The article challenges notions of the prominent role small states in European foreign policy making may assume. Exploring the development of the Central Asia Strategy, adopted in 2019, it finds first that the strategy-making process was highly centralized and led by the EU headquarters in Brussels; second that a set of larger EU Member States had considerable leverage in the strategy-making process in contrast to assumptions that small EU Member States could eventually punch above their weight. European External Action Service (EEAS), Central Asia, EU Strategy for Central Asia, small states, EU normal power

To ensure adequate oil supply and mitigate geopolitical uncertainties, China has diversified its sources of crude oil imports in recent years. Central Asia is a neighbor region of China, rich in oil and natural gas reserves, which can play an important role in China’s strategy to reduce its dependence on energy supplies from the Middle East. The geopolitical attributes of energy and the geopolitical situation in Central Asia determine that Central Asia’s energy development and cooperation are disturbed by domestic and foreign factors, and also face the risks of complex energy structural evolution and geopolitical games, which create a unique energy geopolitical pattern in Central Asia. This study proposes an analysis framework for energy geopolitics in Central Asia, arguing that the complexity of energy geopolitics in Central Asia can be demonstrated from the perspectives of both the main countries of energy development (game actors) and the whole-industry-chain of energy development (game themes). The most obvious feature of Central Asian energy geopolitics is the fierce game that is played between key countries and regions, Russia, the United States, China, the European Union (EU), Japan, India, Iran, and Turkey. Strategic geopolitical considerations and resource requirements necessitate the active participation of these players in Central Asian energy development and mean that the foreign policy agendas of states in this region are likely to become ever more crowded. Therefore, the energy cooperation between China and Central Asia faces the geopolitical risks of the great power games. It is necessary to develop reasonable and effective policies to establish guarantee mechanisms to minimize the risks of energy cooperation. This study characterizes the energy geopolitical strategies of Russia, the United States, China, and other related powers in Central Asia. It also assesses the country risks faced by energy cooperation between China and Central Asian countries. To withstand possible geopolitical and country risks, this study develops a series of policy frameworks which can be used to fortify the stability of the energy cooperation between China and Central Asian countries, and can also be effective in responding to the array of risks that might be encountered in the coming years.

Energy security has been one of the most important issues in the European Union over the past few years. Although the debate has focused primarily on the approach of the main EU powers, this research aims at studying the impact of small Member States’ size on their energy security in the EU. Then it provides proposals to safeguard the energy security of EU small countries by providing a comprehensive interpretation of the term alliance in shelter theory. Applying the composed “smallness” index and the quantitative method, the results imply a direct relationship between the small states’ size and energy security in the first step. The study shows that such a relationship cannot be proven in non-small States. Although the EU has tried to strengthen collective energy security in Member States, such differences show that complementary policies are needed to ensure energy security in small countries. Given an extensive interpretation of “alliance” in shelter theory, this research proposes deep integration of the small states’ energy infrastructure in order to ensure their energy security. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, where the EU’s energy security, especially in the small states, is more fragile than ever, adopting such a policy seems more vital.

The member states of the European Union (EU) coordinate, define, and implement foreign policy in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This policy area, often referred to as EU foreign policy, has a broad scope covering all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to security and defense. The CFSP is supported by a unique institutional framework, in which member states diplomats and officials from the EU institutions jointly make policy. It is led by the High Representative, who is the “face and voice” of EU foreign policy, and supported by the substantial European External Action Service and 140 EU delegations in other countries and international organizations. Because foreign policy is normally the business of sovereign states, the exceptional nature of the CFSP has long been a subject of inquiry. The CFSP has particularly puzzled advocates of the traditional theories of European integration and international relations, who have failed to appreciate what the EU does in the field of high politics. Given the absence of formal diplomatic recognition and a strong reliance on the resources of the member states, the EU is still not a full-fledged actor, yet it has a strong international presence nonetheless. Its presence and the gradual increase in “actorness” have also raised questions about whether the EU presents a different type of actor, a civilian or normative power, which derives its influence from nontraditional sources of power. Under the assumption that the EU has some actorness, the Europeanization of foreign policy has become an area of interest. Member states can act through the EU structure to achieve more impact internationally, can adjust national foreign policy on the basis of EU positions, and are socialized into greater European coordination. The relationship between national and EU foreign policy is thus a significant topic of debate. Finally, governance perspectives increasingly provide insight into the organization of the CFSP. How the member states and the EU institutions collectively coordinate, define, and implement EU foreign policy is not only an important question in itself but also matters for policy outcomes.

This study aims to comprehensively address the foreign policy cooperation processes shaped at the European Union (EU) level, especially in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), through the concept of Europeanization. In-depth analysis of the effects of the EU's integration and cooperation processes in the field of foreign policy on the national foreign policies of the member states is of great importance in understanding how this interaction is shaped both at the European and national levels. In this framework, it will be analyzed in detail how the EU's common foreign policy practices, which have been developed to increase its global influence, have harmonized with national interests and how they have sometimes come into conflict with these interests. Thus, it will be revealed how the EU's foreign policy strategies and national foreign policy dynamics interact. In this context, this study aims to examine the challenges faced by the EU in the foreign policy-making process and the historical, theoretical and practical obstacles in solving these challenges within the framework of the concept of Europeanization. It aims to analyze the development of foreign policy cooperation within the EU, especially in the period starting with the Maastricht Treaty, and the balance between the member states' desire to protect their national sovereignty and their efforts to establish a common foreign policy. In doing so, the scope and dimensions of the Europeanization process of national foreign policies in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy will be discussed and the formation process of the EU foreign policy and the important turning points in this process will be analyzed.

THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON SECURITY DEFENCE POLICY AND A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

Energy security is a key element of national security. It is difficult to formulate a proper structure for strategic culture or political strategy without considering this key element. Therefore, it is nec-essary to discuss particularly important factors shaping the Polish security policy: diversification of energy ties, adaptation of the national technical infrastructure to contemporary requirements of the raw materials market, and bilateral and multilateral agreements on energy security problems. The influence of the Russian Federation plays an important role in Poland’s energy security policy. Bilateral relations in the energy sector affect Poland's energy security and foreign policy. They also affect Poland's internal policy and, therefore, should be regarded as crucial for the Polish national interest. The research problem of the paper what author used is: How and by what means, meth-ods, techniques, and forms does the Russian Federation influence Poland's energy security and what consequences does this have for our country? The aim of the paper is to present the state of Poland's energy security and the desirable prospects in the relations with the Russian Federation in the context of natural gas and crude oil supplies. The paper uses such research tools as analysis, synthesis, comparison, and inference to determine Poland’s current energy.

The ongoing disputes between Russia and its neighbouring states vis-à-vis the critical transmission of primary energy resources to the remainder of the European continent has led Brussels to place the matter squarely within the scope of European Union (EU) energy security policy. EU–Russia energy negotiations have more often than not displayed patterns of rationalism with an ingrained cost–benefit orientation. Notwithstanding, this incidence has been complicated by the reality of changing geo-political constellations in Central and Eastern Europe in the course of the past two decades. This has influenced the political landscape of EU–Russia negotiations concerning projects under construction, as well as proposed others on the continent, such as Nord Stream (bypassing Belarus and Poland) and South Stream (bypassing Ukraine). Given such considerations, we observe that the Czech Presidency of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2009 has shown greater leniency towards Ukraine, Belarus and Poland than the general consensus in EU–Russia energy talks maintained in Brussels would have otherwise provided for. We also observe that France and Germany are driven by a greater rational self-interest in their conduct of EU energy security policy. In consequence, Russia's awareness of the divergent dispositions amongst the EU Member States becomes the dependent variable in our analysis. Thus, the primary question that this paper poses is whether rational cost–benefit orientations in individual EU Member States can lead to collective bargaining outcomes in EU–Russia energy negotiations.

Treaty of Lisbon; Advancing European Union's Energy Security through External Energy Policy.

When talking or writing about the (Southern) Caucasus, I usually like to start by illustrating the diversity of its three countries when it comes to their cultural, linguistic, historical, economic and religious composition. This is due to the heavy migration in the region and the century-long influence of surrounding regional powers and to the fact that it is located in a strategic triangle between Iran, Russia and Turkey, with additional geopolitical interest coming from the European Union and the United States. There is a significant background of existing conflicts to take into account. For those who know the region this may seem redundant; however, for "newcomers" it is a good start in describing the (Southern) Caucasian Babel.I will begin by explaining the most significant features that lead me to believe that the Southern Caucasus is a modern-day Babel. With new developments in the context of the European Union (EU) I will demonstrate that these features are present in and inherent to the region.Original features of Babel:* Nations: Three states with different titular nations and minorities* Languages'. From Indo-Germanic (e.g. Armenian, Ossetian) to different Caucasian ones (e.g. Georgian, Abkhaz), Turkic (e.g. Azerbaijani) and Russian as a long-time lingua franca* Scripts'. From Latin (e.g. Azerbaijani variant) to Armenian, Georgian and Cyrillic (e.g. Ossetian variant)* Religions: Armenian apostolic, Georgian Orthodox, Islam (Shia, Sunni), Russian Orthodox, etc.* Boundaries'. After the collapse of the Soviet Union there were three independent states, three autonomous republics and two autonomous regions. Autonomous units were often disconnected from the "motherland" (e.g. Nagomyi-Karabakh, Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic) and nationalities were divided along borders (e.g. South and North Ossetia) - which were arbitrary Soviet border drawings.This "Babylonian spirit" is reflected to an even higher degree in the Northern Caucasus (comprising seven autonomous republics: Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North-Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygea). These are populated by different ethnicities (approximately 30), which are primarily but not exclusively Muslim and have different points of view concerning their relationship with the central Russian government. This was perhaps also one of the reasons for the demise of the Soviet Union, among others: the conflict of nationality in the Southern Caucasus (NagomyiKarabakh), followed by others (e.g. Abkhazia, South Ossetia), reinforced the split in the region.Today's Babel:Since the aforementioned "original features of Babel" were not confronted and changed, the development of the region continued in dissonance after the collapse of the Soviet Union.1. Foreign presence. Russian troops are still present in Armenia (Gyumri), Abkhazia and South Ossetia.2. International peace ejforts/presence. The OSCE, stationed in Armenia and Azerbaijan, had to stop work in South Ossetia (Georgia) after the 2008 Georgian-Russian War. The OSCE Minsk Group was established for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The UN peacekeeping presence in Abkhazia (Georgia) had to cease after the 2008 Georgian-Russian War. The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has been present along the border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the Georgian-Russian War in 2008. The Geneva Peace Talks try to solve the Abkhaz and South Ossetian question (Participants are Abkhazia, EU, Georgia, OSCE, Russia, South Ossetia, UN, USA).3. Economy. Azerbaijan is the clear winner here. Due to its substantial gas and oil reserves, Azerbaijan has developed into the richest country in the region, investing in huge infrastructure projects and the military, among other things. However, huge parts of the population m rural areas remain very vulnerable and poor, thus contributing to an ever-growmg income gap. Due to its wealth of natural resources, Azerbaijan plays a significant role in energy supply, also for the European Umon. …

The emergence of European Union in global politics, addressing pressing issues throughout the world while also championing causes like social justice, individual liberties, and the rule of law. This paper analyses how the European Union’s foreign policy stance affects international relations. Discussions focus on the EEAS and the potential for EU peace missions to grow. The research paper aims to highlight the efforts of EU to protect the peace and stresses the EU's unyielding dedication to preserving calm, preventing conflict, and responding to disasters. This article examines the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy in great detail, including the many missions and initiatives the EU has taken to show its proactive engagement in international problems. In this article, we take a look at the European Union's (EU) efforts to improve international norms and safeguard human rights via programs including humanitarian assistance, diplomatic initiatives, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The European Union's (EU) dedication to promoting and protecting human rights internationally has been proved via its funding of considerable humanitarian aid, participation in United Nations (UN) programs, and punishment of human rights abusers. It is also notable that EU’s involvement with countries in the Pacific, Africa, and the Caribbean are based on EU's dedication to trade-based development in those regions. The paper also analyses European Union (EU) foreign policy, contrasting the EU's normative stance with the realism paradigm supported by the United States government. It looks at the European Union's role as a regional power on the global arena and how it may work with the United States and other big states to accomplish its own foreign policy goals. Using the European Union's (EU) engagement in the Israel-Palestine conflict as a case study, this paper aims to show how the EU handles complex geopolitical difficulties while remaining true to its core values and promoting the idea of two nations. In the end, the European Union is engaged in a wide variety of global political endeavors, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and the promotion of progressive principles. Its standing in the international world has improved thanks to its work in international organizations and efforts to address global problems.

This chapter will consider to what extent the European Union (EU) conducts foreign policy ‘with an ethical dimension’. Several of the EU's member states have declared that ethical considerations will influence their foreign and development policies; if there is no attempt to introduce ethical considerations into collective policy-making at the EU level, then the commitment to foreign policy with an ethical dimension must be doubted. But the EU may also ‘add value’: member states can push for EU action on ethical issues, thus augmenting their own policies, and reluctant member states could come under pressure to take ethical considerations into account. That an EU position represents the positions of fifteen member states and the institutions of the world's largest trading bloc also adds value: the ‘politics of scale’ increases the international impact of an ethical dimension. Of course, the first question to ask is whether the EU conducts ‘foreign policy’ at all, with or without an ethical dimension. The answer is a qualified yes. The EU does not have a foreign policy. Its foreign policy competences are divided or shared with the member states. And the member states must generally agree unanimously to act collectively in international affairs – which does not happen all the time. An effective common foreign policy also requires consistency between the different decision-making frameworks or ‘pillars’ (for trade and development policy, and foreign policy).

Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, eds The European Union as a global conflict manager London: Routledge, 2012. 254pp, $39.95 (paper) ISBN 978-0-415-52872-6In recent years, European Union (EU), as an established regional institution, has taken steps to become a global actor in conflict management. EU foreign policy was first outlined in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). After Treaty of Lisbon was adopted in 2007, policy was renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and developed a new focus on conflict prevention and management. The depth and effectiveness of this policy has become a topic of heated debate in international relations.The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager, edited by Richard Whitman and Stefan Wolff, contributes to debate on European foreign policy, notably conflict management, and provides an analytical framework to evaluate role to which EU now aspires. The book, consisting of 14 chapters, offers comprehensive analysis of European common foreign, security, and defence policy, and EU's capacity to manage conflicts in its immediate neighbourhood and globally. Empirical chapters provide thorough discussions of EU's mediation and peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus, sub-Saharan Africa, Israel-Palestine, Georgia, Afghanistan, Moldova, Bosnia and Elerzegovina, and Macedonia.The book also offers some thoughtful recommendations for EU policymakers. The institutional architecture introduced by Lisbon Treaty has enabled EU to develop an effective global conflict management strategy by bringing together instruments of EU's external action and by integrating its member states. The focus on global security management also fosters new cooperative avenues between EU and other regional actors such as Russia, Turkey, China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. Yet post-Lisbon experience shows that such an approach poses a major challenge to EU. The 28 operations conducted by EU since 2002 have not been framed under a common policy. Another challenge is limited scope of EU military engagements in light of cuts in military spending within member states.The book's introduction sets tone by correctly pointing out that existing theories on EU as a conflict manager fail to account for its successes and failures in specific interventions. The first part of book outlines conceptual perspectives on EU and its institutional nature as a global conflict manager. For instance, it discusses distinction between Europe as civilian power and Europe as military power.In second part, contributors explore seven cases of EU intervention. For example, Gorm Rye Olsen observes that three military missions launched by EU in Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur reveal EU's capacity and political will to engage in conflict prevention and management in Africa. This policy focus, he notes, is strongly influenced by shared interests of Europe's former colonial powers-especially France and UK. In other cases, EU's room for manoeuvre is much more circumscribed. The EU's policy toward IsraeliPalestinian conflict is a case in point. Asaf Siniver argues that the EU displayed once more inherent inconsistencies between its rhetoric and actions (86). …

Armenia is one of the 44 landlocked countries in the world. It is also among those landlocked nation states that face peculiar geopolitical challenges. Armenia has no diplomatic relations with two of its neighbors, which renders 80% of its land borders closed. The geography and regional political conjuncture have unambiguously shaped the priorities in Armenia’s foreign and security policy in the post Soviet-era. Since the early days of independence, a plethora of historical, political, and geostrategic factors has converged the interests of Russia and Armenia. Armenia has actively participated in several Russia-led integration and security projects—the Commonwealth of Independence States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union, to name only a few. The fact of multi-layered cooperation with Russia, however, did not prevent Armenia from cooperating with the European Union (EU). Armenia has been part of the EU-led European Neighborhood Policy, Eastern Partnership and signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU in November 2017. How was Armenia able to find a working compromise between its strategic ally—Russia—and its “normative ally”—the European Union? In contrast to the prevalent argument that the foreign policy choices and security alignments of small states are mostly determined by external and imposed factors, this chapter argues that a set of equally significant domestic variables impact small states in making foreign policy decisions.