Abstract
In a tragedy of the commons, individual competition over a resource can reduce the resource itself, and thus reduce the fitness of the whole group. An extreme example is evolutionary suicide, which is predicted to occur when the selfish interests of free-riders and cheaters overwhelm cooperative behaviors, and the social good on which they depend ceases to exist. Case studies cite many different and seemingly interacting factors for success. Here we propose an equation-based theoretical model to predict changes in this balance, which determine whether the tragedy of the commons is observed in a particular scenario. Using survey data from 20 Balinese subaks, we explore the explanatory power of two theoretical traditions that are currently used to analyze commons management institutions, revealing multiple regimes with correlated responses to environmental threats. To explore case studies from a comparative perspective requires both theory and methods that can account for differences between regimes and explore transitions between them.
Highlights
Neoclassical economics enables us to predict how changes in prices affect market equilibria
We highlight the potential significance of multiple equilibria because it bears on the explanatory power of the two theoretical traditions that are currently used to analyze commons management institutions, both of which require an assumption of equilibrium
It is predictable that multiple equilibria (Lade et al, 2013; Sugiarto et al, 2015) are likely to arise naturally in the management of the commons, because the incentives for collective action depend on both social relations (Chung et al, 2013) within the group and the efficacy of governance institutions, as well as the costs and benefits of the common resources
Summary
Neoclassical economics enables us to predict how changes in prices affect market equilibria. In the cases to be considered here, more is required: self-interested competition must give way to collective action to sustain the shared resource, as is evident from ethnographic and historical studies of the cooperative management of Balinese irrigation (Lansing and de Vet, 2012) This minimally requires an effective system of governance, which determines the steering capacity of the group. Threats to vulnerable resources that produce significant benefits can motivate higher investments in the steering capacity that sustains them, damping down internal competition or free-riding We tested this hypothesis with a sample survey of farmers in each of the 20 Balinese rice-growing communities in our study. We analyzed variation at the subak level that bears on the likelihood of movement towards or away from component tragedies in response to changes in steering capacity
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