Abstract
Abstract J.L. Austin further developed Moore’s distinctive methodological approach. This chapter offers an interpretation and defense of Austin’s response to the dream argument for external world skepticism. Austin argues that we can tell that we are not dreaming, and he appeals to empirical background knowledge to support this claim. This chapter argues that features of ordinary epistemic life highlighted by Austin allow an appeal to empirical knowledge for this purpose. Central aspects of Austin’s view are articulated and initially defended, including the claim that it is unproblematic to appeal to considerations about the world to reject the Dream Scenario, the Evil Demon Hypothesis, and the like. Barry Stroud’s influential version of the dream argument is shown to fail for reasons Austin highlights. Finally, Austin would have good reason to reject any demand for an explanation of our knowledge of the world that does not appeal to knowledge of the world.
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