Audit committee chairs' narcissism and audit quality

This paper examines the association between changes of the audit committee (AC) chair on audit quality and audit fees. We find that changes of the AC chair are negatively associated with audit quality. This finding indicates that firm-specific knowledge and task-related experience have an impact on audit quality. Furthermore, AC chair changes are positively associated with audit fees. Specifically, audit fees are approximately 7.14 percent higher following a change of the AC chair. However, our analyses show that our findings depend on the accounting experience of the former AC chair. Thus, if the former AC chair has no accounting experience, the negative effect of AC chair changes on audit quality turns insignificant, which indicates that former AC chair’s firm-specific knowledge and task-related experience only improve the effectiveness of the AC when the former AC chair has simultaneously accounting expertise. This result highlights the importance of accounting expertise for AC chair´s monitoring effectiveness. Similarly, if the former AC chair has accounting experience, the effect on audit fees turns insignificant. We, therefore, conclude that new AC chairs are aware of the supervisory shortcomings of former AC chairs without accounting expertise, and, thus, demand a greater degree of audit procedures from the external auditor resulting in higher audit fees. However, it appears that the extension of audit procedures cannot compensate for the monitoring shortcomings associated with the change of the AC chair and, thus, for the decrease of audit quality.

This study examines the effects of audit committee (AC) chair characteristics on audit quality in Saudi Arabia. This study applies logistic regression to investigate how AC chair independence, busyness, and expertise influence audit quality. The sample covers 282 firm-year observations of energy and materials companies listed on the Saudi stock exchange from 2017-2022. The results show a positive correlation between AC chair independence and expertise and higher audit quality, while a negative correlation exists with AC chair busyness. The results underscore the critical role of AC chair attributes in enhancing audit quality, aligning with findings from prior studies. The findings address a significant gap in how AC chair characteristics may affect audit quality in Saudi Arabia's unique context. The study's empirical contributions are particularly significant given the limited attention this topic has received in the context of a developing Middle Eastern economy. The analysis not only sheds light on the influence of AC chair characteristics but also provides actionable insights for optimizing audit committee structures to improve financial monitoring in light of ongoing Saudi reforms. The robust methodological framework and the consistency of the results with existing literature support the study’s validity and reliability. The findings advocate for strategic enhancements in AC chair selection criteria to bolster audit quality amidst the evolving governance landscape in Saudi Arabia.

We investigate whether the characteristics of audit committee (AC) chairs are associated with decisions about auditor choice, audit fees and audit quality. Using hand‐collected Australian data, firms with AC chairs who have longer tenure and multiple AC memberships across several boards are found to be more likely to choose Big 4 and/or industry specialist auditors, pay higher audit fees and have lower discretionary accruals. Those AC chairs with higher business qualifications are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor, pay higher audit fees and have lower discretionary accruals, while AC chairs with professional qualifications are more likely to hire a Big 4 and/or industry specialist auditor. In contrast, firms with AC chairs who are executive directors are less likely to hire a Big 4 auditor and have higher discretionary accruals. Our findings contribute to the literature by documenting that various characteristics of AC chairs are important for enhancement of auditor selection and audit quality.

Purpose Religious ethics, namely, zakat, could influence organizational ethics, particularly accounting and auditing processes and decision-making. Therefore, this study aims to examine the effect of zakat and the financial and nonfinancial expertise of the audit committee (AC) chair on audit quality. Design/methodology/approach A panel data set of 302 companies listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange is used to analyze the effect of zakat and the AC chair’s expertise on audit quality, supporting agency theory. Findings A firm’s propensity to pay zakat is more likely to improve audit quality and discourage rent-seeking. Zakat improves audit quality and mitigates fraud by reinforcing organizational ethics. Zakat also supports AC chairs’ financial and nonfinancial expertise in improving audit quality. However, the financial expertise of the AC chair has a more significant impact on audit quality. In that context, this research offers novel evidence for policymakers’ and management practitioners’ interest in organizational ethics. Also, it helps shareholders and investors understand the management’s intentions. Originality/value This paper investigates the impact of zakat, a religious ethics, on auditing from an organizational ethics perspective and presents evidence of zakat’s impact on audit quality.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the characteristics of the audit committee (AC) chair affect audit report timeliness. In particular, the direct association between AC chair accounting expertise and audit report delay, and the moderating effect of other characteristics of AC chair on this association are examined.Design/methodology/approachTo achieve the purpose of this study, the characteristics examined by this study are AC chair expertise, shareholding, tenure and multiple directorships. Furthermore, a sample of Malaysian companies during the period 2005–2011 and the fixed effects panel data method are utilized.FindingsThe results suggest that an AC chair with accounting expertise is associated with a reduction in audit delay. The reduction is more obvious when the chair holds shares in the company, but is weakened by longer tenure and multiple directorships. These results are robust after conducting several robust tests. Using mediating analysis, the authors also document that an AC chair with accounting expertise can enhance the timeliness of audit reports even when the quality of financial reporting is lower. The reported result is supported by additional analysis that finds that AC chairs with accounting expertise and AC chairs with accounting expertise and shareholding are significantly associated with shorter abnormal audit delay.Originality/valueThis study provides comprehensive analysis concerning the association between AC chair and audit report timeliness using a unique setting. It is among the limited evidence that reports the moderating effect of AC chair characteristics on the role of such chair on audit report timeliness.

We investigate whether new audit committee (AC) chairs provide more effective monitoring of the financial reporting process when they have firm-specific knowledge, proxied for by prior service on the firm’s AC. Consistent with practitioner and governance experts’ views on the importance of firm-specific knowledge, we find that firms are less likely to misstate their financial statements when new AC chairs previously served on the AC. This effect is stronger in the first two years of the AC chair’s succession period and when the incoming AC chair has more prior service on the AC. AC chair industry, accounting, and supervisory expertise, as well as prior experience as an AC chair at a different firm, do not compensate for a lack of firm-specific knowledge. These findings contribute to the literature on the AC chair’s role in the financial reporting process, suggesting that AC chair succession planning is important for financial reporting outcomes.

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates whether audit committee (AC) chairs' collectivism has an impact on corporate financial frauds. Based on the rice theory of culture, we identify the AC chairs born in rice‐planting regions as those from collectivist cultures. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2013 to 2019, we find that firms with collectivist AC chairs are less likely to commit financial frauds. This result suggests that collectivism motivates AC chairs to focus on organizational interests and curb managerial misconduct in financial reporting at the expense of shareholders' wealth. This effect is strengthened by AC chairs' tenure, accounting expertise, and reputation. Further analysis suggests that collectivistic AC chairs enhance internal control quality, hire a more competent auditor, and exhibit greater risk aversion. Moreover, the relationship is more salient when the AC chairs share the same culture with the CEO or when other AC members also have collectivistic tendencies.

Audit committee chairs (ACCs) are key links in the financial reporting value chain. Whereas prior literature analyzes how ACCs contribute to effective corporate governance, we investigate how ACCs’ personal incentives help explain their audit-related preferences and actions. Guided by a three-step risk management framework (risk identification, evaluation, and mitigation) we conduct semi-structured interviews with 23 ACCs of public German firms. First, we document how ACCs’ objective of avoiding financial reporting outcomes that pose personal (reputational) risks leads them to focus on specific attributes of management’s accounting judgments to evaluate their personal risks. Second, our data reveal that ACCs consider specific auditor attributes helpful in evaluating these risks. Concerning risk mitigation, we find that ACCs prefer to be actively involved in critical discussions with management rather than delegate these entirely to the external auditor. Overall, we document that ACCs’ concerns about personal risk can translate into different preferences (e.g., an aversion to even positive surprises) than concerns about governance effectiveness. These insights contribute to a more nuanced understanding of audit committees’ role in corporate governance, as well as about the enabling factors of audit quality.

Audit quality in South Africa is perceived by the audit regulator to be deteriorating, with the primary cause being a compromise of auditor independence, mostly as a result of excessively long audit firm tenures. The regulator has responded with mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR). The purpose of this research is to employ field surveys to collect the views of experienced audit committee (AC) chairs, chief financial officers (CFOs) and auditors of JSE-listed companies on the necessity for, and potential efficacy of, this regulation. An additional focus of the paper is to explore potential unintended outcomes, as well as identify preferred alternatives and provide recommendations and practical solutions to negative effects. Findings show that auditors, CFOs and AC chairs are strongly opposed to MAFR in South Africa on a cost-benefit analysis. Respondents do not believe that audit quality and independence has deteriorated and feel that existing measures to safeguard auditor independence are sufficient. In addition, the loss of knowledge and experience of the clients that will result from firm rotation, together with other unintended consequences such as unmanageable cost increases, provide further reasons not to implement MAFR. Findings also indicate that MAFR will not contribute towards decreasing the dominance of the market by the ‘Big 4’ firms. Practical recommendations are suggested based on the findings.

In my dissertation, I examine the role of the audit committee chair in the financial reporting process and test if the change in audit committee chair is associated with changes in audit fees, audit report lag, and audit quality. Motivation for this dissertation comes from the increased attention paid by legislators and regulators in recent years on the role of the audit committee in the financial reporting process. While prior studies have examined diverse issues related to the composition of the audit committee, no prior study has examined the role of the audit committee chair on the oversight of financial reporting, even though the chair of the committee has significant control over the functioning of the committee. In the first essay of my dissertation, I show that audit fees are higher in firms that have a change in the audit committee chair. In the second essay, I examine the association between changes in the audit committee chair and audit report lag. In a changes regression, I find that the change in audit committee is associated with higher audit report lag. The third essay examines the association between changes in audit committee chair and two different measures of audit quality: restatements and abnormal accruals. There is no evidence in support of the argument that changes in audit committee chair is associated with higher quality financial reporting. Overall, the results suggest that the change in audit committee chair has an important impact on the financial reporting process of public companies.

This study evaluates whether an association exists between the agency incentives of the audit committee chair and voluntary disclosure of their monitoring activities in their audit committee report. Prior research suggests that a shift toward greater voluntary disclosure in the audit committee report occurred following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act but does not directly address the determinants of voluntary disclosure. Consistent with agency theory, audit committee chairs signal their duty-specific monitoring activities to shareholders, possibly to protect their reputation and justify their compensation. Within a high-litigation industry, this study provides evidence that audit committee chairs with a greater reputation level (i.e., more public company directorships) provide more concise duty-specific voluntary disclosure when serving companies with high levels of agency conflicts. This provides evidence consistent with efficiency in the market for audit committee chairs. This study also provides evidence that audit committee chairs respond to likely shareholder concerns by providing more concise duty-specific voluntary disclosure when their company has previously restated its financials. Finally, audit committee chairs provide increased voluntary disclosure specifically related to external audit oversight when high agency conflicts exist. As a whole, this contributes to the existing audit committee literature by providing evidence that voluntary disclosure incentives for financial reporting are also important determinants of more qualitative compliance-based reporting in the proxy statement. This has implications for accounting and governance practitioners as voluntary audit committee report disclosure offers shareholders detailed information that they may use in evaluating audit committee monitoring performance.

This study uses GMI Ratings directorship data from 2008 to 2013 along with the associated financial data to examine the relationship between audit committee chair change with the absolute discretionary accruals in the financial statements of the reporting companies. Our results suggest that audit committee chair change is positively associated with the absolute discretionary accruals. Specifically, absolute discretionary accruals are significantly higher when there is a change in the audit committee chair. These results are consistent with prior research that deviations from the predicted values of accruals is an indicator of “poor” audit quality. An additional finding of this paper is that a person younger than 60 is more likely to be a new audit committee chair when there is a change and therefore will have less experience and contacts than the outgoing chair. An important implication of these results is that audit committee chair change can have a significant impact on the quality of the financial statements of a company as well as on the audit quality.

Even though audit committee (AC) characteristics and corporate social responsibility (CSR) relationship has long been well investigated, scarce research on committee leadership is observed in the literature. Considering the growing emphasis on the potential role of the audit committee chair (ACC) on financial and non-financial reporting, the current study aims to fill this literature gap by analyzing the influence of ACC characteristics on the level of CSR. Using a Jordanian sample of 475 firm-year observations over the period 2014 to 2018, this study employs content analysis to quantify CSR disclosure and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test the proposed hypotheses. The study findings show that ACC independence, legal expertise, and education level are positively and significantly associated with CSR reporting. However, ACC age has a significant inverse relationship with CSR reporting, suggesting that older ACC perform more poorly in a committee function. Importantly, ACC tenure and financial expertise have an insignificant relationship with CSR reporting. These findings are robust under a battery of sensitive tests such as employing OLS with robust standard errors and using alternative measurements of ACC features. The sub-sample analysis results also show that ACC characteristics predominantly enhance CSR reporting in large firms but not in small firms, implying that firm size strengthens the relationship between ACC characteristics and CSR reporting. The current study provides new evidence of the significant role of ACC on non-financial reporting in an emerging economy, Jordan. Policymakers, researchers, and stakeholders may benefit from these results in recognizing the potential role of ACC in advancing CSR reporting.

This research is motivated by the Omani government’s desire to reduce tax avoidance and bolster tax revenue collected from financial institutions. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of overlapped audit committee (AC) chairs and other directors on tax avoidance practice and whether they play a monitoring or advisory role in tax avoidance practice. As a measure of overlapped AC chairs, we used a dummy variable to indicate whether an AC chair sits on other committees within a company or not. We used the proportion of AC members who serve on the AC and other committees within a company as our proxy for overlapped AC directors. We used a company’s cash effective tax rate as a proxy for tax avoidance. We regressed tax avoidance on overlapped AC membership and other control variables, using a sample of 204 firm-year observations from financial institutions listed on the Muscat Stock Exchange between 2014 and 2019. Our regression results show that a higher proportion of overlapped AC members and the presence of an overlapped AC chair were both associated with lower effective tax rates, which equated to more tax avoidance. This suggests that these directors play an advisory role in the Omani context. We found, however, that these directors play a monitoring role when firms take a loss. From these findings, we draw important implications for regulators who need to rethink the potential consequences of having overlapped AC chairs and AC directors. Our study focuses on Omani financial institutions, which are highly regulated and monitored by the central bank, and our findings may not be directly applicable to non-financial institutions that are less regulated, so caution is needed when interpreting the findings. Further research could employ a repeated measured research design, such as ours, and explore the same research question in non-financial institutions.

This research investigates the relationship between the expertise of female audit committee (AC) chairs and financial reporting quality (FRQ). Also, it examines the moderating effect of the expertise of AC female chairs on the relationships between internal control (ICS), components of ICS, and FRQ This study analyses 302 firms listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2016. Data on ICS, FRQ, and other corporate governance indications are collected manually from annual reports. This study concludes that the accounting expertise of AC female chairs enhances FRQ better than their male counterparts. Also, the accounting expertise of AC female chairs improve corporate governance mechanisms and ICSs (i.e., Control Environment, Control Activities, and information and communication). This research offers implications for shareholders and regulators. The accounting expertise of female AC chairs (WACCH) improve monitoring that enhances shareholder value and investor confidence. The regulator needs to be stricter regarding the requirements for AC chairs.