Abstract
Dustin Stokes book Thinking and Perceiving is a substantial achievement. In this comment, I discuss issues related to cognitive penetration. While I agree with Stokes’ criticisms of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s discussion of cognitive penetration with respect to the role of attention, I provide a supporting, but different argument against how they understand attention. I also emphasize that the common appeal to behavioural data in arguing for cognitive penetration is less effective than an argument that supplements behavioural data with computational models. I sketch how drawing on computational models strengthens the case for the cognitive penetration of attention by intention. This suggests that cognitive penetration is as common as intentional action.
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