Atmospheres, Environments, and Affects

Purpose. This article discusses researching the nature and basic structure of acts of empathy. Such research first requires answering the question: are empathic acts intentional acts of our consciousness? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then there is a need to answer the following questions: what are the features of acts of empathy as intentional ones? And can such acts be qualified as opening a special and complex type of access (epistemic, social, and ethical) to "other minds"? Theoretical basis. The research is based on the problems set by the phenomenological tradition and the developed analytical philosophy, which found their continuation in the philosophy of mind. With the tendency to naturalization, representatives of these areas have another common sphere in the research of mental reality. The changes that both traditions are undergoing can be observed in the transformation of fundamental theoretical concepts such as "intentionality". The linguistic turn gives impetus to the development of new theoretical approaches to the understanding of consciousness, which give preference to the research of language rather than the research in the structure of the Self. The change in methodological guidelines is due to a few factors. In particular, this is a noticeable progress in empirical sciences and the dominance of Behaviorism guidelines in psychology, as well as the fact that the Anglo-American tradition inherits several features intrinsic to British empiricism. Today, three main directions of understanding intentionality can be distinguished. Starting from Brentano and Husserl, we have a classical theory – mental intentionality (phenomenological). As part of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language, we can talk about linguistically interpreted intentionality. Sellars’ model of intentionality has a definite linguistic component. Also, a modern version that functions in the philosophy of consciousness: attempts to naturalize intentionality (this is, for example, the research of Galen Strawson and Daniel Dennett). Originality. The problem is studied not in the context of the phenomenological or analytical traditions in their isolation, but in a problematic-conceptual way, which allows us to reach a new level of generalization and reveal the theoretical advantages of combining both traditions. Conclusions. Empathic Acts can be defined as intentional within the classical phenomenological tradition. As intentional acts, they have their specificity in that they are directed to the "other mind" and can form the basis for the research of intersubjectivity. For the analytic tradition and early philosophy of consciousness, such statements are not obvious. However, discussions about the role of corporality and the problem concerning embodied cognition are becoming increasingly common today. In such discussions, empathy, as an element in the knowledge of others and a possibility for grounding the social sciences, seems more promising than attempts to make epistemic access to other minds possible on the basis of the argument by analogy or on the basis of the inference to the best explanation.

Feminism

This chapter uses a comparison between Seebohm and the social scientist Felix Kaufmann as a way of introducing Kaufmann, a fascinating figure in his own right who was both of a member of the Vienna Circle and a phenomenologist to a wider philosophical audience, and to locate Seebohm’s positions within the broader framework of discussions in the philosophy of the sciences that were so central to both the analytical tradition and—at least in its inception—the phenomenological tradition as well.

The ArgumentIn this rejoinder to Gyorgy Markus (Science in Context1:5–51), I argue that although there are nonphilosophical hermeneutical studies of communication among scientists (a “weak” hermeneutics) from which much can be learned about scientific practices, there is also the philosophical genre of a hermeneutics of natural science (a “strong” hermeneutics), with which this paper is concerned. The former is the nonphilosophical use of hermeneutics in the study of texts and historical sources; the latter is a philosophy pursued within a working canon of philosophical works defined principally by the writings of Heidegger and Husserl. There is also a hermeneutically sensitive analytic philosophy of science, such as in the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, and Elkana. These genres are distinguished by their literary canons and their basic phenomenologies or critical experiential givens; each genre comprises an exemplary phenomenology as understood with the help of a characteristic fundamental literary canon.I argue that analytic philosophy is pursued within a canon that makes it difficult to raise hermeneutical questions about natural science, and that it assumes a generally positivistic phenomenology. I argue that hermeneutical phenomenology currently defines itself in dialectical opposition to “science” as understood (positivistically) by analytic philosophy, and has failed to exploit the opportunity of making its own positive contribution to the philosophy of science by examining for itself the phenomenology of laboratory work, especially data production, and the transformation of the language of theory into a descriptive language of scientific phenomena. A “strong” hermeneutical philosophy of natural science, then, challenges both analytic philosophy and the existing tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology.

It is widely acknowledged that responses to fiction can be divided into two categories: emotions or moods. Research on the paradox of fiction, however, solely focused on emotional responses to fiction. This paper analyses the different potentials of the mood concept with regard to the paradox of fiction: its potential to avoid the paradox on the one hand and its potential to rise a new paradox of fiction, a paradox of fiction for moods, on the other. To this end, the paper distinguishes two different meanings of the everyday concept of mood and two different paradigms in the research on moods.The mood concept can designate not only affective states of an individual (moods1), but elusive, nuanced atmospheres of objects, places or situations (moods2). The mentalistic paradigm, widespread in psychology and analytic philosophy, generally assumes that moods are mental states with a certain quality of feeling (and physical symptoms). Moods2are regarded by such approaches, if they discuss them, as a secondary phenomenon based on subjective perception. In contrast, the phenomenological paradigm focuses on moods2and, if it accommodates moods1as well, often postulates a characteristic connection between the two: moods1reveal extra-individual atmospheres (moods2) that are assumed to exist in some ontologically robust sense. Therefore, moods1can be said to have a world-disclosing function within the phenomenological paradigm.Researchers in the mentalistic paradigm deal, among other issues, with the difference of emotions and moods1. One way in which moods1differ from emotions is that they lack an intentional object and it is for that reason that the concept of mood1, at first glance, seems to offer a solution to the paradox of fiction. The paradox of fiction presumes that we have emotions with regard to fictional objects. If it were possible to redescribe the alleged emotions as more subtle mood1responses without clear intentional objects, this would undermine a central premise of the paradox and dissolve it. However, such a redescription seems not equally plausible for all cases discussed in the debate (e. g. the green slime case). Therefore, moods1can only be one element of a more subtle ›phenomenology‹ of affective reactions towards fiction and the »paradox avoiding potential« of the mood concept is limited.The paradox creating potential of the mood concept emerges if one takes into account the outlined complex semantics of the concept »mood« and the postulated world-disclosing function of moods1. It seems possible to construct a new paradox, the paradox of fiction for moods: (a) Only real entities or representations of real entities can evoke moods1with world-disclosing function (because this mood1evocation is actually immersion in an atmosphere). (b) Many entities in fictions are not real. (c) Nevertheless, fictions can evoke moods1with world-disclosing functions (e. g. with regard to places, situations) in the recipient.The paper argues that the outlined paradox can be dissolved by pointing out that the expression »moods1with world-disclosing function« in sentence (a) means something different than in (c). While the expression in (a) relates to the idea of grasping an atmosphere (mood2) that somehow is »in the world«, it means acquiring a non-propositional form of knowledge, namely knowledge of what-it-is-like to be in a certain situation, in (c). The idea that it is possible to acquire knowledge of what-it-is-like by means of fiction has often been postulated in the research literature, but rarely been spelled out in greater detail. The paper argues that such an acquisition can occur, among other possibilities, on the basis of mood1evocation, but that the conditions for the acquisition of knowledge of what-it-is-like by means of fiction are more demanding than under usual circumstances: A recipient of fiction can reasonably be said to acquire knowledge of what-it-is-like to be in a certain situation if the fictional representation evokes a mood1which is characteristic of a situation S and the recipient understands this mood1as an affective reaction to a situation of the type S. Please note that moods2play no explanatory role in the second interpretation of »world-disclosing function«.Since assumption (a) and assumption (c) concern different world-disclosing functions or, in other words, different mechanisms of world-disclosure, there is no paradox. Although moods1evoked by fictional representations (with some limitations pointed out in section 4) do not possess a world-disclosing function in the sense the phenomenological tradition postulated, it is possible to ascribe these moods1a world-disclosing function, even within a non-phenomenological framework: They allow the recipient the acquisition of a knowledge of what-it-is-like to be in a certain situation or in a certain place.Ultimately, for the paradox of fiction for moods seems to hold what could be said about the classical paradox of fiction as well: Even if the paradox ultimately dissolves, its analysis can be instructive for related research fields like the debate on knowledge from fiction which takes moods rarely into account until now.

The skeptical foundations of E. Husserl's phenomenology and analytical philosophy are examined using the example of the works of L. Wittgenstein. In contemporary philosophy, there is a need to search for unity or at least approximation of the two theories, both in the interpretation of certain psychological aspects of understanding human cognition and in the field of theoretical epistemology. The main goal of the work is to study the general problems of phenomenology and analytical philosophy, as it is expressed in the works of the founders and most prominent representatives. Skepticism is considered as a theoretical basis inherent in these areas of modern philosophy, which for these thinkers acts not as an end in itself, but as a balanced theoretical position that reflects real problems on the path of knowledge, especially when it comes to consciousness and mental characteristics of a person. In modern philosophy, there is a need to search for points of intersection of the two theories, both in the interpretation of certain psychological aspects of the understanding of human cognition, and in the field of the fundamental foundations of theoretical epistemology. Such a search is not only an interesting theoretical problem, but the development of philosophy in our era largely depends on the revision and reinterpretation of the conceptual apparatus of various philosophical positions. This is not only and not so much about the development of new, more adequate terms, but about the search for common starting points. The skeptical position is quite fundamental for both theories; the only question is change or coincidence of aspects. It should be noted that further research into the possibilities of combining the phenomenological and analytical traditions can be carried out within the framework of both theories, each of which has its own capabilities and provides for a change in approaches to understanding and interpreting the concept of mentality in the world of modern achievements. We are talking about a combination of these theories, both at the level of problems and at the level of methodology. In the first respect, this is certainly a question about consciousness, its characteristics and mental states of man. No less relevant is the question of the status of logical-mathematical models of reality. Of course, such complex issues are not without significant differences. For Husserl, mathematics is an eidetic science, i.e. devoid of a natural attitude, as well as phenomenology, with the difference that mathematical discourse deals with extremely formal objects. For early analytical philosophy, mathematics is an area of formal-logical relations, a special logical-semantic game, the rules of which are established conventionally. Regarding methodology, we should talk about systematic skepticism of the theories under consideration, and this skepticism is not only implied, but also directly declared, as we are going to show in this article. Here it is enough to point out the Husserlian principle of the era - abstinence from judgment, developed already in ancient skepticism. As for Wittgenstein, his skeptical attitude has long been the subject of debate and is hardly in doubt. In E. Husserl's consideration, pure consciousness is revealed as a result of the implementation of phenomenological reductions – consistent abstention from any recognition of the reality of the world of phenomena, bracketing out all elements of reality, even non-eidetic elements of consciousness itself. For consciousness to exist as a temporal flow of our intentions, there is no need for any real existence. Phenomenology asserts that the existence of objects is not a necessity – it is, in a certain respect, random in nature. The following is implied here: it can always be that the further course of experience will force one to abandon what was its basis. Thus, between mental acts and reality there is a boundary of uncertainty. The very fact of the existence of consciousness cannot be determined by the existence of nature. The latter, from the standpoint of phenomenology, exists only as ordered and systematized by acts of consciousness. It is this constitution that is precisely the intentional activity of consciousness to form its own objectivity as noematic structures. Wittgenstein deploys his skepticism as a consistent theoretical approach, moreover, his skepticism has several levels and often concerns his own beliefs and statements. Although not unambiguous, this approach to understanding skepticism is very close to the very spirit of phenomenology with its abstinence from judgments about the reality or unreality of the surrounding world, a question that is consistently raised in the brackets of philosophical discourse.

Set in the context of the current interest among Analytic philosophers in the “epistemology of disagreement,” this paper explores the meta-philosophical problem of philosophical incommensurability. Motivated by Nietzsche’s provocative remark about philosophy as prejudices and desires of the heart “sifted and made abstract,” the paper first outlines the contours of the problem and then traces it through a series of examples. Drawing largely on the tradition of phenomenology and philosophical hermeneutics, a broadly Continental response to this formidable problem is suggested. Disagreement cannot be understood simply in terms of epistemological strategy, but needs to be regarded in a fundamentally hermeneutical light.

The paper examines the invariance principles proposed by the analytical and phenomenological traditions for demarcating the boundaries of formal and regional ontologies. The principle of invariance with respect to isomorphic transformations, generalizing Alfred Tarski’s criterion for logical concepts, is extended to formal ontology as the theory of manifolds in its phenomenological interpretation. Isomorphism types, which are abstract individuals of the highest order, hypostases of forms of all possible ontologies, are considered as model-theoretical analogs of manifolds. The correlativity of the phenomenological principles of demarcation of ontological regions and the criterion of invariance with respect to isomorphic transformations is demonstrated, leading to the convergence of logic and formal mathematics in both traditions and, at the same time, to the exclusion of geometry from formal ontology. Particular attention is paid to the discussion of the analytical and phenomenological traditions of the synthetic (material) a priori and the contribution that Wittgenstein’s doctrine on internal relations at different stages of its evolution makes to this discussion. The paper reveals the basis for later Wittgenstein’s criticism of his earlier project of creating a phenomenological language for expressing internal regional relations (such as the colours exclusion). The paper shows how Wittgenstein’s doubts about the possibility of an ideal notation based on the dichotomy of the logical and phenomenological led him to the study of invariants arising in language games. These invariants are not determined by the special properties of the categorical objects of formal ontology or the structures of regional subject matter, but are stable equilibria generated by the “consensus of actions.” New perspectives are outlined that are opened for logic and phenomenology by switching focus from the invariants of ontological structures to the invariants of structured interactions of various agents.

Eco-phenomenology developed from the effort of a number of continentally-oriented philosophers exploring the thought of decisive authors in the phenomenological tradition, such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, with the purpose of offering a different insight into environmental issues than those predominant in Anglo-American philosophy. This initiative has proceeded not only from Western scholars but has had a resonance also in the distant philosophical tradition of Japan. The present contribution seeks to deepen the thought of a central figure for Japanese phenomenology: Nishida Kitaro. Nishida, indeed, was the first to introduce Husserlian thought in Japan and to seriously dialogue with the German phenomenologist from a Zen-oriented point of view. The purpose of this effort is to throw light on the theoretical origins of modern Japanese (eco)phenomenological thought, in order to grasp also its differences with Western eco-phenomenology, as led by Nishida’s Buddhist reading of Husserl’s works.

The article studies the intellectual origins of a discursive approach in political science. Attention is drawn not to the process of discoursive approach formation (which was formed in the 1960s–1970s under the influence of the “linguistic turn”), but to the many themes of thought that developed and had a decisive influence on the solution of the problem of language non-neutrality in the perception and reproduction of political relations. In many respects, the reliance on different traditions predetermined the inconsistency of the notion of discourse. We are interested not so much in direct referrals (this would lead to the compilation of a very voluminous list that allow little to understand), but rather specific intellectual borrowings in the form of identifying a problem field, marking out, distinguishing and denoting the research space. What does it mean to study language as a non-neutral dimension of comprehension and re-actualization of political processes? Analytical philosophy would draw attention to the logical structures of the language, German linguistic philosophy – to the “world view”, provided by the basic structure of everyday language. Formalists would make a research in text narratives, while structuralism insists on basic structures and provides “langue/parole” model. Semiotics is a general science about symbols, which provides specific meta-language, whereas “phenomenological tradition” is based on the idea that a language plays constitutive role in the process of the intersubjective interactions and creation of social relations.

Throughout the history of analytic philosophy the notion of the ‘phenomenological fallacy’ originally formulated by Place, has been used to criticize reification of the mental. Although this fallacy was originally not used to criticize the phenomenological tradition, it has popped up recently in debates between analytic philosophers and phenomenologists. However, a study of the history of both traditions reveals that a polemical notion similar, if not identical, to the phenomenological fallacy can be found within the phenomenological tradition, namely Sartre’s ‘illusion of immanence’. In this article, I will explicate these two polemical notions and place them in the context of their respective traditions. This will reveal that both notions must be understood as a criticism of a certain form of representationalism I will call ‘dual-world representationalism’. This deep-rooted similarity between the analytic philosophy of mind and phenomenology, in turn, sheds a new light on current discussions between the two traditions.

The principal differences between the contemporary philosophic traditions which have come to be known loosely as analytic philosophy and phenomenology are all related to the central issue of the interplay between predication and perception. Frege’s critique of psychologism has led to the conviction within the analytic tradition that philosophy may best defend rationality from relativism by detaching logic and semantics from all dependence on subjective intuitions. On this interpretation, logical analysis must account for the relationship of sense to reference without having recourse to a description of how we identify particulars through their perceived features. Husserl’s emphasis on the priority and objective import of perception, and on the continuity between predicative articulations and perceptual discriminations, has yielded the conviction within the phenomenological tradition that logical analysis should always be complemented by description of pre-predicative intuitions. These methodological differences are related to broader differences in the philosophic projects of analysis and phenomenology. The two traditions have adopted markedly divergent positions in reaction to the critique of ancient and medieval philosophy initiated by Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes at the beginning of the modern era. The analytic approach generally endorses the modern preference for calculative rationality and remains suspicious of pre-modern categories, such as formal causality and eidetic intuition.KeywordsLogical AnalysisPropositional ContentAnalytic TraditionPhenomenological TraditionDivergent PositionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The Things Themselves: Phenomenology and the Return to the Everyday H. Peter Steeves. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. For more than fifty years, significant doctrinal differences among American academic philosophers have turned on commitments either to the analytic or to the Continental traditions: the former focus on language, mathematical logic, and scientific method while Continental adherents (related movements include existentialism and phenomenology) emphasize personal experience, especially its affects. In polemic moments the Continentals accuse the analytically attuned of triviality and mimicking the quantitative disciplines. From their side, analytic philosophers have denigrated what they allege to be the antirationalism and willful obscurity of the Continentally committed. H. Peter Steeves, associate professor at DePaul University, stands sympathetically with the phenomenological tradition (Husserl, Merleau Ponty, Levinas, Heidegger) while stepping back from this intramural strife. The result is enlightening for the study of the social self and culture. Unlike most books written by academic philosophers, The Things Themselves takes a popular direction in both topics and expository language. One of Sleeve's jacket blurbists ranks him-fairly in my estimate-with Roland Barthes and Jean Baudrillard. Steeves shows a Barthian flare for selecting and unfolding the odd but culturally symptomatic arena. And like Baudrillard, Steeves can explore subtly some of the new commercially sponsored illusions that contribute to American hyperreality. The chapters, which include some previously published essays, evoke a wide range of cultural experiences: communicating with animals; visiting Disneyland and Las Vegas; watching Kiana Tom's porn-aerobic exercises on ESPN TV. For readers who have no previous immersion in phenomenological description, Steeves renders intuitively accessible applications of the method. The final chapter narrates his own adventures as a Fulbright professor to Venezuela, where he navigates shopping, politics, and his own near-death encounter with diarrhea. The tale breathtakingly illustrates the truism that we deepen the grasp of our own culture by encountering one that differs from it significantly. The phenomenological orientation is distinguished by systematic attention to feeling qualities, intentions, ascribed identities, and presuppositions about objects. Although Steeves often references other cultural interpreters, he helps us maintain a steady gaze upon experience. The first section of the book deals engagingly with broad subjects rooted in all cultures. Chapter 1, Monkey see examines whether animals can speak symbolic language or simply emit signals. As in other chapters dealing with animals, he articulates more kinship to human language than difference. Chapter 2, Illicit Crossings deals with attitudes toward feral children and Bigfoot creatures, using these phenomena to demonstrate the elasticity and defensiveness of our concept of the human species, hence its remoteness from the scientific precision often ascribed to it. Chapter 3, Lost Dog deals with the social status of dog packs in Venezuela, a topic that leads into animal psyche generally and the rarely posed question of whether dogs can have faces. …

Philosophers in the analytic and phenomenological traditions have interpreted Brentano's intentionality thesis, and his empirical psychology more generally, in significantly different ways. Disregarding Brentano's distinctive psychological method, analytic philosophers have typically read him as a philosopher of mind, and his intentionality thesis as a contribution to the Cartesian project of clarifying the distinction between the mental and the physical. Phenomenologists, while more attentive to his method, tended to read Brentano as merely Òon the wayÓ to a truly phenomenological approach. I offer a third reading of Brentano thesis, one that attends to both the motivating concerns and the distinctive methodological features of his psychological project.

Transcendental arguments were prominent in Western philosophy, German idealism, phenomenological tradition, and P. F. Strawson's thinking. They have fallen out of fashion because of their associations with transcendental idealism and verificationism. They are still invoked by important figures in the analytic tradition even if the very same tradition has cast doubt on such arguments. The nature of transcendental arguments remains unclear: Are they supposed to be deductive? Are they synthetic or analytic? If they are a priori, how are they supposed to be about the empirical world? What are their relations to necessity, conceivability, and essence? This Element takes up the challenge of elucidating the nature of transcendental arguments, embedded in the wider context of transcendental epistemology. It will be argued that the key premise 'transcendental conditional' is synthetic, necessary, and a posteriori.