At the track

Abstract

Generalization as a method of science, Ewing suggests, does injustice to the anthropological object/subject. But this judgment itself generalizes, giving short shrift to various alternative forms of generalization (e.g., Weberian ideal types) quite distinct from those of a nomothetic or deterministic sort. Sahlins expressly takes his notion of generalization from Leach (1961). The method is inductive and consists of using “inspired guesswork” to recognize “a similar pattern of relationships in a few disparate social systems, thus launching a possible universal proposition” (p. 14, emphasis added). It involves not only imagination but crucially involves a “gamble”—“You may be wrong or you may be right, but if you happen to be right you have learnt something altogether new” (Leach 1961: 5). Anthropology, on this view, is something of an experimental science.