‘At Least So Long As We Are Talking About Marching, the Inferior Is Not the Black, It’s the White’: Italian Debate over the Use of Indigenous Troops in the Scramble for Africa

Abstract

Like other nineteenth-century colonizers, Italy recruited, trained and deployed indigenous troops. These troops represented Italian colonial power, but their use evoked comparisons with Italian soldiers: which were better? A debate over their relative merits occurred in public print between 1885, when metropole troops first seized territory on Africa’s Red Sea coast, and 1891, by which time indigenous troops constituted the majority of Italy’s colonial force and had been incorporated into the royal army. The questions debated were as much cultural and economic as military. This article traces the debate, which revealed not only metropole power but also its limitations and vulnerabilities, thus illustrating colonialism’s ‘long arms and weak fingers’ (Frederick Cooper). The debate centered on four points: first, the considerable difficulties faced by Italian troops in Africa because of the torrid climate and the mass of equipment and supplies – including ice – necessary for their support; second, the cost of such imported troops; third, the greater mobility and lower cost of indigenous troops; and last, questions about the trustworthiness of indigenous troops in combat against other ‘ indigeni’. By the end of 1891, public debate recognized that Italy had little choice but to rely on indigenous units for most colonial military and police functions. Contrary to claims of ‘Italianization’, indigenous soldiers were valuable to Italy precisely for certain of their ‘African’ qualities. After a few years of quiescence, the catastrophic 1896 Italian defeat at Adua (‘Adowa’, ‘Adwa’) reawakened debate over indigenous troops, but they emerged unscathed by attempts to scapegoat them. Italy continued to rely heavily on indigenous troops.