At All Costs: How Relative Rebel Strength Affects PGM Sexual Violence in Civil Conflict

One of the most shocking aspects of civil war is the prevalence of sexual violence committed by armed groups. Recent research identifies many of the factors driving this horrific phenomenon. What is generally lacking, however, is an understanding of the factors that can prevent conflict-related sexual violence. We argue that women’s economic rights are key. Women’s economic rights provide women with the ability to flee dangerous war zones, work in less vulnerable environments, and access to safe housing. We test our claims using a global sample of civil conflicts from 1989 to 2019. We find evidence that the presence of robust women’s economic rights is associated with significantly lower levels of observed sexual violence in civil conflicts, even after controlling for a variety of potential confounders. Additionally, we probe the possibility of egalitarian gender norms driving our results by examining the relationship between women’s political empowerment and conflict-related sexual violence. We find no relationship between women’s political empowerment and conflict-related sexual violence. Importantly, we continue to find a negative relationship between women’s economic rights and conflict-related sexual violence even when accounting for women’s political empowerment, suggesting women’s economic rights have an independent effect on conflict-related sexual violence. Our findings highlight the importance of enhancing women’s economic rights in the global fight against wartime rape. Providing women with greater economic agency has the potential to curb sexual violence in conflicts around the world.

Responding to sexual violence in armed conflict

It has long been understood that pro-government militia activity and pro-government militia violence increase during civil war. Recent literature contends that pro-government militia activity also rises when a state is involved in an interstate rivalry. We maintain that the combination of these two threats may, somewhat counterintuitively, result in reduced pro-government militia activity in some autocracies. This unexpected outcome can be explained by differences in state capacity and legitimacy. Using Geddes’ categorization of authoritarian regimes, we expect a decline in the number of operational pro-government militias when personalist and military regimes are challenged by both an insurgency and a rivalry. Pro-government militia liabilities are magnified in this context and add to these governments’ already considerable cumulative hazards. Pro-government militia numbers will, in contrast, remain consistent in single party regimes in this same circumstance. Since party governments have ample capacity, well-known disadvantages of pro-government militias rarely pose a threat to these capable regimes. In a sample of 142 autocracies from 1981 to 2010, we find considerable empirical support for our contention.

Why do governments choose to fund pro-government militias (PGMs) if doing so could extend costly civil conflict? While PGMs are active in a majority of civil wars, their impact on conflict termination remains poorly understood. We argue that the choice to fund PGMs is a strategic one for states and part of their efforts to influence wartime dynamics and conflict termination. We hypothesize that PGMs’ impact on conflict termination is conditional on whether they are government funded. Government-funded PGMs help states to ward off costly negotiations and encourage the rebellion's gradual dissolution. Using competing risks analyses on civil wars ending between 1981 and 2007, we find robust evidence that PGM funding affects conflict outcomes.

In addressing the United Nations Security Council at its 7938th meeting, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, said that the social stigma attached to sexual violence is integral to the logic of using sexual violence as a tactic, a method of war or even torture. The perpetrators of sexual crimes understand that sexual violence attacks one’s individual and collective identity and ostracises survivors, thus untying the strings of family and kinship that hold the very fabric of communities together. As a result, survivors of gender-based and sexual violence often find it difficult to cope with its social repercussions. This article will pursue a detailed discussion pertaining to the severe stigma suffered by survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and how this issue is not adequately addressed in international law. The risk faced by survivors is threefold: first by the action of the perpetrator, then by the reaction of society through stereotypical and patriarchal attitudes, and finally by the courts, which often are not only unresponsive but also perpetuate negative social norms and rape myths leading to double persecution. Due to a lack of evidence and other factors, such as patriarchy and social inequalities, the stigma associated with conflict-related sexual violence is manifested in court rooms through various rape myths about its survivors. Sexual violence is a gendered phenomenon, in that it is often linked to, and stems from, harmful social and traditional practices relating to perceptions of gender and power dynamics surrounding them. In times of conflict, prevalent power dynamics, and the practices linked to them, can be further exacerbated leading to a higher prevalence of sexual violence. Therefore, the core argument advanced in this article is the necessity of combatting stigma and rape myths, and to promote the reporting of sexual crimes by and access to justice for survivors.

Sexual violence against men in conflict settings is neither a rare nor recent phenomenon, yet its absence in academic scholarship and humanitarian initiatives remains glaring. Despite the advances in our understanding of the determinants of wartime sexual violence against women, surprisingly little empirical research exists on sexual violence against men in conflict. Acts of sexual violence are commonly enacted against men in war, yet because they do not fit more narrow definitions of rape, accounts of these experiences are often misclassified as “torture.” Moreover, in many countries experiencing pervasive conflict-related sexual violence, there exist restrictive laws regarding sodomy and homosexuality, reducing the chances that males will report their experiences. Using originally coded data on sexual and gender identity laws and reported incidents of sexual violence in civil conflict, I find that laws that outline the protection of sexual and gender identity expression including the decriminalization of same-sex activity are significantly associated with reports of acts of sexual violence against men. The results speak to the gap in the literature on male sexual violence with tangible consequences for the distribution of humanitarian aid, availability of medical and psychological services for victims, and aims of peacekeeping missions.

SummaryBackgroundSince March 2011, more than 1 million people, mostly men, have been arrested, detained, and tortured by the Assad regime. Published literature does not reflect the evolution of symptoms after male sexual and physical violence in detention. This cohort study examines the constellation and evolution of self-reported symptoms after male conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in Syrian state detention.MethodsSexual, psychological, and physical symptoms and conditions experienced by a cohort of 106 male detainees after CRSV in Syrian regime detention were evaluated over a ten-year period (2012–2022). Men sought forensic medical expert evaluations (FMEs) to document torture and later consented to semi-structured interviews (SSIs), a median of 8.8 years after their detention. A standard data collection tool was used to assess symptoms and conditions during FMEs (Time 3), and at the time of the SSI (Time 4), during which men also reported symptoms experienced during detention (Time 1) and after detention release (Time 2).Findings30.2% of men spent more than 1 year in detention and 9.4% were detained >5 years. 90% reported being slapped, punched, kicked, hit with objects, 60.4% of men reported torture with multiple devices, and 48.1% reported being burned or electrocuted. Multiple sexual violence types were reported during detention: 97.2% forced nudity, 45.3% violence to genitals or anus, 30.2% collective sexual humiliation, and 9.4% rape. Men recalled nearly universal presence of acute pain, bleeding wounds, skin infections, sleep disturbances, fear, sadness, anxiety, and despair during detention. By Time 4, acute physical and psychological conditions were fading or absent, while scars, avoidance, intrusive memories, lack of trust, self-isolation, chronic pain, anger, and low self-esteem were reported by ≥50%. The most persistently reported symptoms following detention through the SSI included scars, pain, intrusive memories, and avoidance in ≥50% of men. At the SSI, 26.4% of men reported erectile dysfunction and 23.6% challenges with sexual relations.InterpretationMen reported persistent symptoms and conditions years after CRSV, torture and detention. The unique constellation of findings and their evolution in male CRSV survivors, particularly increasing rates of anger, distrust, and self-isolation, must urgently inform design and delivery of support services and health care.FundingThis study was funded by the United Kingdom Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and the 10.13039/501100000267Arts and Humanities Research Council through the project ‘Understanding and Addressing the Impact of Invisibility on Conflict-Related Male Sexual Violence in Syria'.

In recent years, the relations between weak central governments and armed groups in the periphery have attracted great attention. Rebels, warlords and other actors have not only undermined the authorities' grip on power, but gradually come to shape the nature of governance and political system in their countries. Warlordism, rebelocracies and aliocracies are just a few of the political systems identified by students of conflict and armed groups. However, the literature has generally overlooked one category of armed groups and their implications on political order: pro-government militias (PGMs). As PGMs have become ubiquitous in civil wars, this article identifies a new political order emerging in countries where central governments have become reliant on PGMs in counter-insurgency operations. The article defines this order as a militiatocracy. Unlike armed groups in other political orders, PGMs do not seek to overthrow, undermine or replace the central government. Instead, in militiatocracies, PGMs and central governments develop symbiotic relations, which on the one hand help the government to survive an insurgency, but on the other allow militia leaders to secure an increasing presence in politics. The article illustrates the emergence and nature of militiatocracies by employing the case of Syria during the civil war.

Ending sexual violence in conflict and beyond

ABSTRACTTo end sexual violence in civil conflict is often mentioned as motivation and aim for contemporary interventions by the international community. But what types of measures are used for this end? This study identifies two competing logics that motivate different types of measures depending on whether women’s security is viewed as part of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, or as a separate policy field: More Women, More Peace. According to the first, women are viewed as victims and interventions are likely to be punitive in nature, to provide protection and punish perpetrators. The second sees the problem as women’s exclusion from power and lack of agency, and will more likely be followed by measures that promote participation such as mediation and peacekeeping. Following a global analysis of civil conflicts 1989–2009, we find that both the United Nations and regional organizations deploy peacekeepers to conflicts with high prevalence of sexual violence. We also find different patterns of intervention for sexual violence than for other forms of civilian abuse, suggesting limited linkages between the Responsibility to Protect and Women, Peace and Security agendas.

Previous research on non-state actors involved in civil wars has tended to disregard the role of extra-dyad agents in influencing conflict outcomes. Little is known as to whether the presence of such extra-dyadic actors as pro-regime militias affects conflict termination and outcomes. This article develops and tests a number of hypotheses on the pro-government militias’ effect upon civil war outcomes. It proposes that pro-regime militias involved in intrastate conflicts tend to act as proponents of ‘no peace, no war’, favouring low-activity violence and ceasefires over other conflict outcomes. These hypotheses are examined using an expanded dataset on pro-government militias and armed conflict in a statistical analysis of 229 civil war episodes from 1991 to 2015. These findings shed new light on the role of extra-state actors in civil wars.

Conflict-related sexual violence has been the focus of significant international activism and policy attention. International legal norms and frameworks have evolved to recognize it as a war crime, and a representation of sexual violence as a “weapon of war” is now widely endorsed. This article examines how international norms about conflict-related sexual violence are adopted and utilized in multiple ways in the armed conflict in Kachin state in northern Myanmar. Throughout decades of civil war, international norms on sexual violence have constituted key resources for international advocacy and awareness raising by local women’s rights activists. Further, activists have drawn on international norms to effect changes in gendered relations of power within their own communities. However, international norms on sexual violence in conflict have also been effectively used as tools for ethno-nationalist identity politics, rallying support behind the armed insurgency and mobilizing women’s unpaid labor in the service of war. Thus, international norms on conflict-related sexual violence have simultaneously opened up space for women’s empowerment and political agency and reproduced gendered forms of insecurity and marginalization. Exploring these contradictions and complexities, this analysis generates novel insights into the politics of international norms in contexts of armed conflict.

Are sanctions effective in reducing government sexual violence? In recent years, states and international organizations have started to impose sanctions against states that are reported to commit crimes of sexual violence. Some bodies, including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), have even adopted sexual and gender-based violence as a designation criteria for sanctions. Although anecdotal evidence shows that sanctions are imposed to punish actors that participate in these crimes, are they actually effective in doing so? We argue that the decline in resources encountered by sanctioned targets does not deter them from using sexual violence but, rather, creates an incentive to perpetrate or tolerate sexual violence to make up for their financial and military losses. Using existing sanctions data and original data on sanctions that refer to government conflict-related sexual violence, this study tests the impact of military and economic sanctions on sexual violence by state forces in civil conflicts during the period of 1989 to 2012. Findings support the study’s claims and show that government sexual violence is more likely if states are subject to sanctions, including ones that have a clear objective of reducing conflict-related sexual violence.

Governments often supplement the regular military with paramilitaries and progovernment militias (PGMs). However, it is unclear what determines states’ selection of these auxiliary forces, and our understanding of how auxiliary force structures develop remains limited. The crucial difference between the two auxiliary types is their embeddedness in official structures. Paramilitaries are organized under the government to support/replace the regular military, whereas PGMs exist outside the state apparatus. Within a principal–agent framework, we argue that a state’s investment in a particular auxiliary force structure is shaped by available resources and capacity, accountability/deniability, and domestic threats. Our results based on quantitative analysis from 1981 to 2007 find that (a) state capacity is crucial for sustaining paramilitaries, but not PGMs; (b) PGMs, unlike paramilitaries, are more common in states involved in civil conflict; and (c) although both paramilitaries and PGMs are associated with regime instability, there is no significant difference between them in that context.

<p><b>Conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence (CRSRV) against women and girls is a persistent and pervasive form of warfare. It is applied in diverse forms in different contexts. But its perpetration depends, invariably, on similar practices of silencing – by force, threat, coercion, or any other means – prior to, at the time of, or consequential to the violation itself, in order to prevent the victim or witness from speaking out, seeking, and obtaining justice. This thesis examines the recording of, and responses to, CRSRV in the literature and in law to make the case for application of the right to the truth therein, as both a reparative and preventative measure. The right to the truth, and in particular acts of testimony, hold profound potential to inform and sustain processes of redress, and to displace the silences involved.</b></p> <p> To this effect, the truth represents a number of interrelated objectives, including but not limited to setting down a historical record of past violence, disruption of cultures of impunity through prosecution of perpetrators, and redress for victims. This research locates the subject of CRSRV within a rights-based approach to development, but views the discourses of WID and WAD as insufficient in light of CRSRV, and calls for inclusion of the right to the truth within this framework in order to uphold a victim-centred perspective. The methodology is oriented in a narrative view of history, in protection of a victim-centred perspective, and relies on testimonies of victims, as well as witness accounts, within Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, or other forms of documentation. Practices of CRSRV are contextualised within three case studies, regarding Peru, El Salvador, and Iraq. Reference to different conflict settings furthermore demonstrates with absolute clarity a common practice of silencing underlying all forms of CRSRV. But regardless of the common application of this method of silencing, the silences of victims are not identical. Testimonies of victims reveal their experiences in the vernacular. This thesis, in response, sets out two complementary proposals. First, a reconsideration of the term “conflict-related sexual violence,” proposing its extension to “conflict-related sexual and reproductive violence”. This extension would, first, better reflect the extent of harm experienced by victims as evidenced in their testimonies and, second, encourage more appropriate forms of reparation in light of their right to the truth. But protection of the right to the truth of victims is, in turn, dependent on a second extension, which proposes that the truth, in this vein, should be extended from its original conception of the right to know, to the right to testify, to actively contribute to the construction of the truth surrounding rights violations.</p>