Abstract
Strategic information transmission, commonly referred to as "cheap talk", was first introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982), who showed that there is only limited amount of information that can be transmitted between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. There were attempts to achieve full revelation by introducing several senders, but they rely on unreasonable off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This paper shows that in the situation with one receiver and N senders, even if senders are limited to sending only two types of signals, and state space is fixed, asymptotically there is robust full revelation, so that the receiver gets to know the state of the world almost perfectly, as the number of senders goes to infinity.
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