Abstract

Despite extensive recent investigations of moral judgments, little is known about how negative judgments like blame might differ from positive judgments like praise. Drawing on theory from both social and moral cognition, the present studies identify and test potential asymmetries in the extremity and differentiatedness of blame as compared to praise. The amplified blame hypothesis predicts that people will assign greater blame for negative behaviors than praise for positive behaviors. The differentiated blame hypothesis predicts that, as compared to praise judgments, blame judgments will more finely differentiate among distinct mental states that precede action, such as thoughts, desires, and intentions. A series of studies—using varied stimulus sets and samples—together provide robust support for the differentiated blame hypothesis and somewhat weaker support for the amplified blame hypotheses. These results illustrate systematic asymmetries between blame and praise, generally revealing that blame is more extreme and differentiated than praise. Together, the findings reflect the social costs and social regulatory function of moral judgments, suggesting that blame and praise are not mirror images and that blame might be more complex.

Highlights

  • Morality regulates social behavior by way of norms [1,2]

  • Individual differences in the tendency to blame or praise others do not appear to be opposing ends of a single continuum. Such dispositions toward blaming and praising have been shown to be orthogonal: one’s inclination to condemn morally negative behavior is wholly independent of one’s inclination to praise morally positive behavior [20]. If they are not mere opposites, what systematic differences might exist between blame and praise? Drawing upon previous research—including the small subset that has compared blame to praise—we identify two hypotheses concerning candidate asymmetries between blame and praise

  • We present a series of studies designed to test two potential asymmetries between moral judgments of blame versus praise

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Summary

Introduction

Morality regulates social behavior by way of norms [1,2]. Norms reflect community demands on individual behavior [3] and are enforced by community approval and disapproval [4]. Some norms prohibit negative behavior, and a person violating them may be blamed; other norms prescribe positive behavior, and a person abiding by them may be praised. Are blame and praise mirror images of each other? Previous research offers scarce evidence on asymmetries between moral judgments of blame and praise. This article takes a first step toward a systematic investigation of such potential asymmetries.

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