Assessing the Readiness of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Can It Effectively Address Future Crises?

Introduction Southeast Asia was hit by financial crises in 1997-1999 and again by the global financial catastrophe of 2007-2009. In both cases, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the region’s premiere multilateral institution, responded by facilitating the push for greater regional integration. Yet, in the aftermath of both crises, ASEAN has actually achieved relatively low levels of economic, political and social integration. What accounts for this limited institutional development? This chapter argues that the answer to this question lies in the fact that ASEAN has never been a strong instrument of regional integration. As a regional institution, it has smoothed out political difficulties between its member states, but its activities have never promoted full-fledged economic, political or security integration in any substantial way. ASEAN’s relationship with its member states hinges on the institution being as minimally invasive as possible in their sovereign affairs. ASEAN’s focus on non-interference is a defining attribute of the institution from when it was first created in 1967. In many important ways, the same factors that made the protection of sovereignty paramount in 1967 drive ASEAN today. So long as the ASEAN states continue to believe that the preservation of their sovereignty is key to their survival as viable states, ASEAN’s functional level of regional integration will remain low. This will create a gulf between ASEAN’s rhetorical aspirations and its institutional capabilities. This observation contrasts with many other studies of ASEAN – particularly constructivist studies – which emphasise the norm and community-building aspects of the organisation (Acharya 2013; Busse 1999; Caballero-Anthony 2014). This study does not deny that ASEAN forms the basis of a nascent Southeast Asian community, but the commitment of regional citizens and elites to that community is seriously diluted by their focus on and commitment to more parochial identities and interests. The chapter is divided into the following sections: Section one explains the paper’s main argument, using the theoretical framework of Saurugger and Terpan to set the questions about regional integration and ASEAN that we must answer. The analytical categories identified by the framework demonstrate thatthe bonds of economic self-interest, political affinity and social cohesion that are necessary to further regional integration are only minimally present in the case of ASEAN. The chapter then examines the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), a regional financial instrument that includes ASEAN and the major Asian powers – i.e. China, Japan and South Korea. CMIM is a direct product of the 1997 economic crisis and was given further impetus by the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. However, it is in its preliminary stages and remains untested and restrained by complex political concerns. In contrast to the CMIM, the ASEAN Community (AC) is a genuine effort on the part of ASEAN to further regional political, security, economic and cultural integration. However, a closer examination of the AC and its component parts reveals that it has poor prospects of success, largely because its member states continue to choose the preservation of their sovereignty over effective regional integration. The conclusion of the chapter is that ASEAN has responded ineffectively to two major financial crises. The political, economic and social divisions that exist between the ASEAN states cannot be easily overcome. They ensure that the organisation remains a relatively loose collection of sovereign states.

Comment on “Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Origin, Development, and Outlook”

The Implications of U.S. Strategic Rebalancing:A Perspective from Thailand Kitti Prasirtsuk (bio) President Obama's participation in the East Asia Summit (EAS) for a second consecutive year confirms the United States' heightened attention to and engagement with Asia. Earlier, many Asian observers had doubted that a U.S. president could remain committed to attending the annual summit, particularly when the 2012 meeting was hosted by Cambodia, a relatively small country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The fact that Obama kept his commitment to attend the EAS is evidence that the United States is stepping up its rebalancing efforts in Asia. This essay offers a perspective from Thailand—a traditional U.S. ally—on the motivations behind U.S. rebalancing, as well as on the policy's implications for Thailand and Southeast Asia as a whole. U.S. Motivations As seen from Thailand, there are four major motives behind the United States' rebalancing strategy. The first two concern China, while the other two motives relate to policy reorientation in the United States itself. First, China has gained considerable influence in East Asia, thanks in part to its strong relations with ASEAN. China became a dialogue partner in 1991, and its constant participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since 1994 and in other subsequent regional cooperation schemes has enabled Beijing to play a key role in the region. Alongside Japan, China has also been instrumental in setting the agenda for the ASEAN +3 forum. Among the most prominent achievements of the ASEAN +3 is the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), the currency swap scheme aimed to help member countries suffering from a financial crisis. As the world's largest foreign-reserves holder, China is a formidable partner in the CMIM. Further, Beijing has pledged support for the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and other programs to improve logistics connectivity, including the construction of roads, bridges, river ways, and high-speed trains, which will further link southern China with ASEAN. [End Page 31] On the economic front, China-ASEAN trade surged from $7.6 billion in 1990 to $186.5 billion in 2009, and China has been ASEAN's biggest trade partner ever since.1 This strong relationship is largely the result of the China-ASEAN free trade agreement, which was agreed to in 2002 and went into full effect in 2010. In the socio-cultural realm, China participates in a number of exchange programs with ASEAN countries, and Beijing's so-called panda diplomacy has likewise been effective. After leasing a couple of pandas to Thailand a decade ago, China has recently made similar deals with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Moreover, Chinese tourists have become top visitors to many ASEAN nations, including Thailand.2 In short, China-ASEAN relations have been strengthened in several areas spanning the political, economic, and socio-cultural realms. Against such a backdrop, the United States could not remain on the sidelines. Second, China has become more assertive in its external posture. As Aaron Friedberg observed in the July issue of Asia Policy, this increasing assertiveness has been manifest on a variety of fronts, including Beijing's defense of North Korea over the sinking of a South Korean vessel, its confrontation with Japan over the arrest of a Chinese fishing boat captain near disputed islands in the East China Sea, and intensifying territorial claims in the South China Sea.3 At the same time, China continues to enhance its military capabilities, as demonstrated in the development of stealth fighters and an aircraft carrier. Given the strength of the Chinese economy, the country's defense budget will only increase in coming years. Third, the lack of attention paid to Southeast Asia during the George W. Bush administration, which was largely preoccupied with the war on terrorism in the Middle East, generated unfavorable perceptions of the United States. In particular, regional states noted the consecutive absences of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the ARF meetings. During the Obama administration, the United States has sought to re-engage with Southeast Asia through sending high-level envoys, including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, to visit the region and attend multilateral forums such as the EAS...

This study investigates existence of any economic linkages among the five founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and explores the nature of these linkages. Based on the Vector Autoregression, variance decomposition and impulse response function analyses applied to quarterly real GDP data for the 1975-93 period, the results show the leading role of Indonesia and the significant economic linkages among them. The direction of causation and transmission is from Indonesia to the Philippines to Thailand to Malaysia and to Singapore. A two-way causation is found between Singapore and Malaysia. The study also finds the economic vulnerability of the ASEAN group of countries to changes in U.S. output, and the competitive nature between the Japanese and the ASEAN economies. These findings have important policy implications. 1. Introduction This article examines the issue of economic linkages among the ASEAN group of countries, and assesses the strength and the direction of these linkages.1 Although much has been written about the growing economic interdependence among these countries, so far no study has been undertaken to quantify and explore the nature of their interdependence. To achieve this objective, we utilize vector autoregression (VAR) techniques used to study regional linkages (Cargill and Morus 1988; Cromwell 1992; Sherwood-Call 1988). We examine the regional and international spillover effects on the ASEAN economies. Specifically, we investigate these questions: Which ASEAN country drives the ASEAN region? Do economic shocks in a member country spill over to other member countries? If yes, what is the direction of shocks transmitted among the ASEAN countries? Are these economic shocks external to the ASEAN economies? Understanding how economic shocks are transmitted among the ASEAN countries is important because of policy implications. If ASEAN economies are susceptible to spillovers from each other (which can be positive or negative) and if we can identify the source of transmission, then the effectiveness of one's macroeconomic policy setting will greatly be enhanced. Under this scenario, policy coordination for the mutual benefit of the ASEAN member countries may be called for. In light of growing intra-ASEAN trade and investments under a more liberal economic environment, the ASEAN countries are expected to share common economic linkages so that a recession in one member country may spill over into other member countries in terms of output and employment decline. The 1985 recession and the 1997 currency crisis, for example, which hit all the ASEAN group of countries, could be a reflection of these economic linkages. The questions of which ASEAN country drives the ASEAN region and how the economic shocks are transmitted among different economies are answered by employing vector autoregression (VAR) techniques using quarterly data on real GDP for ASEAN countries, Japan and the United States for the period of 1975 to 1993. The results can be used to identify leading and lagging relationships between variables and, with further identifying restrictions, to measure the economic importance of these dynamic relationships. Variance decomposition method is used to measure the economic importance of these relationships and impulse response functions are used to trace the direction of the effects of a shock in one country on the other countries. The objective is to examine the extent to which economic fluctuations in a country are driven by its own economy, or by linkages to other countries. This article complements other work that study linkages among the ASEAN economies. Ariff (1996) studies the external effects on financial liberalization in four ASEAN members and finds that external effects induces efficiency in the financial systems. Manzur and Ariff (1995), on the other hand, examine the relationship of prices in five ASEAN economies and find that a long-run relationship holds. …

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises six free enterprise economies, namely, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The ASEAN economies com bined are considered to be quite large by world standards. In 1983 the total popula tion of the ASEAN states was about 270 million, and the combined gross national product was just above US$200 billion. All of the countries have come a long way from being agriculture and primary product pro ducing economies to much broader based economies with rapidly growing manufac turing sectors and modernized trading and financial sectors. The economic achievement of the ASEAN countries over the last three decades has been due to the conscientious policy of opening up the countries to for eign trade and investment, and to strong commitment to economic growth and development. The results have been high real GNP growth averaging 5 per cent to 10 per cent, rising per capita income, improv ing productivity in agriculture and industry, rapid modernization in infrastructure, and growing urbanization. In fact, the pace of economic change has been so rapid that even a close watcher of ASEAN develop ment has found it very difficult to keep up with all the changes. The development of the ASEAN econ omies has not of course been without problems. Because of their close link to the world economy, the ASEAN economies have been subject to the world economic depression of the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. The recent recession has hit ASEAN economies very hard. The GNP growth rates have all slowed down. For some econ omies, the experiences with financial instability have been very difficult. While most ASEAN economies managed to recover from the recession in 1983 and 1984, it has become clear that the experiences of rapid growth with relative stability as in the recent past cannot be expected in the remaining years of the 1980s. In addition, there are still many other problems which require the attention of all parties con cerned. Highest on the list of the largest ASEAN countries are the problems of unemployment and poverty followed by the problems of security in food and energy in some countries. Thus the tasks which lie ahead for the ASEAN economies are how to manage the economies such that reasonable growth is attained while the problems of instability are minimized, and to continue to improve the equity situations at the same time. To do so ASEAN will rely on its strength in terms of natural resources and economic dynamism.

A dynamic export demand model of India–Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) competitiveness is estimated that explicates India’s strategic export behaviour to the nth country in ASEAN in relation to the import function and the unit value of exports of India implicit to the local price level of the consumer country. The research article identifies the structure within which improvement of connectivity of India’s technical expertise could be extended to ASEAN for comprehensive and wide-ranging economic cooperation. The study’s inferences contribute in entailing how the ASEAN community recognises the need to provide necessary capacity building and to initiate reforms for enhancing their business competitiveness and to upgrade their national enterprises at a more sophisticated level determining their future competitiveness. While, on one hand, it seems that economic integration will remain the key to ASEAN competitiveness in the countenance of vicious competition in the global marketplace, on the other hand, the trade and investment relations of the ASEAN with other countries, particularly with developed economies, will also foster their investment development path and prosperity. In addition to the possibilities of India–ASEAN integration, other challenging efforts for governance would narrow the development gaps among ASEAN economies. This corroborates prospects for India in a constructive manner yielding association within the ASEAN economic framework that will eventually congregate with the affiliation. The findings entail that economists pay much more attention in identifying other sources of permanent and Asian country-specific real changes to explain economic fluctuations in ASEAN economies.

The enhancement of the financial sector significantly drives a nation’s economy and thereby increase energy intensity. Considering this situation, the current study aims to examine the link between globalization and financial advancements with the energy intensity of the top 5 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) economies. The development structure of the ASEAN region is considered significant for having stable growth. The authors used the annual data from 1990 to 2018 for five of the largest ASEAN economies: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The present study used novel methodology, the Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS), to examine the nonlinear behaviour among globalization, financial development, and energy intensity in the top 5 ASEAN countries. The study results using ANFIS confirm that globalization and financial development are positively correlated and have a significant impact on the energy intensity level in the top ASEAN countries. The results further suggest that globalization and financial development increase the level of energy intensity more in the countries that are developed relative to their peers in the top ASEAN countries. Moreover, the outcomes of ANFIS also suggest that those countries, which are more globalized and financially developed, have more potential to increase the level of energy intensity. Therefore, the government needs to focus more on projects that involve renewable energy and are environmentally friendly.

It was common political fear that brought the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) together in 1967. By and large, it was also an external threat that had held ASEAN together through the years. But while peace and stability within ASEAN provided a conducive environment for economic growth and development, each member in ASEAN had developed largely out of its own independent achievement. They owed rela tively little to joint ASEAN economic co-operation efforts. Existing economic co-operation had been based on inward-looking, bureaucratic protracted negotiations as formulated in the conceptual framework of the Kansu report (1974).1 With the dissolution of the Cold War and the resultant change in political configurations in Southeast Asia, the external threat can no longer be the glue. ASEAN needs a new cohesive force and a common purpose to survive the coming decade. Moreover, there are also other factors such as wider regional efforts in the Asia-Pacific which may create centrifugal forces to threaten the fragility of ASEAN sohdarity. On the other hand, ASEAN and Pacific economic co-operation in the 1990s could take advantage of the increasing web of economic linkages among ASEAN countries resulting from their progressively outward oriented industrialization strategy since the early 1980s. The latter was sus tained by investments from multinational corpora tions (MNCs), increasingly from Northeast Asia, which have penetrated all the ASEAN economies. This study examines ASEAN involvement in Pacific economic initiatives, and is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a brief overview of past ASEAN economic co-operation efforts, to highlight the structure and trends of development so far, and to assess the impact of the mechanisms chosen for ASEAN economic co-operation (ASEAN industrial projects, ASEAN industrial comple mentation scheme, ASEAN industrial joint venture scheme). Existing trends in direct foreign invest ment and trade in the Asia-Pacific region will be examined in Section 2 to reflect the outward orientation of ASEAN economies in the 1980s, particularly the new mode of ASEAN economic co-operation based on an outward oriented strategy that emphasized the role of the private sector, while Section 3 analyses the various regional economic

The United States has a robust trade and investment relationship with China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN is collectively the fourth-largest trading partner, and China is one of the largest trade partners of the United States, the largest export destination for China. Thus, China and ASEAN countries are competing in the US market intensively. The purpose of this paper is to calculate the net gains or losses for the ASEAN-5 Members and China during 1993 and 2007 in the US market. There are two main contributions of this paper: one is to dynamically estimate the net shifts of the economies as compared to the traditional comparative static approach; the other is to extend the shift‐share analysis to attribute the net gains or losses to competing exporters. This study adopts the widely used shift-share analysis technique to exam the net gains or losses for the ASEAN-5 and China during 1993-2007 in the Unites Sates market. The paper provides a new extension to the shift‐share analysis to attribute the net shift to competing economies with a dynamic approach. The paper applies the methodology to the competition among China and ASEAN-5 in the US import market with the data drawn from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), a data consultation and extraction software developed by the World Bank. The discussion focuses on three periods: 1993-1997, 1998-2002 and 2003-2007. In general, China performs the best among the competing economies. Among the ASEAN-5 Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand perform better than the other two members. During the first period, all economies have positive export growth as the actual export growth shows. However, in terms of net shift, only China and the Philippines are the winners with positive value of net shifts. During the second period, China stands out while the ASEAN economies show negative net shifts values. Similar is the case for the third period. In terms of the industries, China focuses on different industries during the thee periods, and the ASEAN economies depend heavily on a few industries. China’s gains in these industries are much bigger than the ASEAN economies’ gains in value. The ASEAN economies gain in small numbers of industries with small values. When attributed the gains or losses to competing economies, China only loses to the Philippines during 1993-1997, and gains from all competing economies during all periods. Though net losers, the ASEAN-5 also gain from other competing economies. For example, Indonesia gains from Singapore and Thailand during 1993-1997, from the Philippines and Singapore during 1998-2002, from Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore during 2003-2007. The trade war between the United States and China provides opportunity for the ASEAN countries in the Unites Sates market, however, there are negative impacts on the ASEAN countries as well. The ASEAN countries are more vulnerable. Keywords: shift-share analysis, export competitiveness, Asia, ASEAN, China.

ASEAN and the Mekong:A Functional Approach Le Dinh Tinh (bio) Until recently the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had largely marginalized Mekong River issues. The argument against including Mekong concerns in the association's agenda originates from a geographic factor: Southeast Asia consists of both maritime and mainland areas, and for a long time countries in the former grouping did not perceive the Mekong River as an important variable affecting their security and development or that of the entire region. But things have changed. In 2020 the Mekong made its way onto the official ASEAN agenda for the first time. This essay explains why the Mekong has assumed this new sense of importance to ASEAN and how it can be approached from a functionalist perspective for the betterment of the strategic and practical interests of the region as a whole and the Mekong subregion itself. Why the Mekong Increasingly Matters The Mekong is one of the biggest and most essential rivers in the world. The livelihoods of millions of people depend on the resources the river provides on a daily basis. Although the subregion is low in its level of development, foreign investors have considered it an attractive destination. The ASEAN economies have become more united through the organization's economic integration schemes such as the Initiative of ASEAN Integration, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC 2025), of which the Mekong subregion is an integral part. Furthermore, severe nontraditional security challenges such as water security and climate change have turned the subregion into a hotspot and a top policy priority for the riparian states and their partners. What is new is the increasing great-power rivalry, namely between the United States and China, that has engulfed the subregion. This section further examines these dynamics. First, the Mekong basin supports the livelihoods of around sixty-six million people, equivalent to 10% of ASEAN's population, including "most of the population of Laos and Cambodia, one-third of Thailand's [End Page 63] sixty-five million, and one-fifth of Vietnam's ninety million people."1 Not until recently have maritime countries such as Singapore and the Philippines, for example, realized that their economies depend a great deal on the Mekong. Singapore has sizable investments in the Mekong subregion,2 while the Philippines imports most of its rice from the subregion.3 Second, despite starting from a low level of development, the subregion consists of some of the fastest-growing economies in the Asia-Pacific. Vietnam's GDP growth rates averaged 6.8% during 2016–20. Cambodia registered a rate of more than 7% during 2018–19, only slowing in 2020 because of the Covid-19 pandemic. During that same 2016–20 period, the Laotian economy expanded by more than 5.5%. The Mekong subregion is also connected to China—the second-biggest economy in the world—and this brings a lot of potential. For this reason, it is attractive to foreign investors.4 Third, as a group, ASEAN comprises the fifth-largest economy in the world, with the promise of becoming both a single production base and market. However, there are different speeds and levels of economic development within ASEAN, which has pushed regional leaders to adopt the thinking that for the region to prosper sustainably and make the most of economies of scale, narrowing the gap between the regional economies is necessary. For example, MPAC 2025 takes into account subregional arrangements. In other words, for the plan to work, the Mekong subregion must play an integral part. The same logic could be applied to trade agreements within ASEAN (such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area) and between ASEAN and its partners (such as RCEP and bilateral free trade agreements). Fourth, almost all the emerging nontraditional security challenges currently facing the world find expression in the Mekong subregion, among [End Page 64] them being pandemics, climate change, and water security. Several recent studies have even made the extreme prediction that the Mekong could dry up by the middle of the 21st century.5 In Vietnam the Mekong River is called Cuu Long, or "Nine Dragons," representing the nine branches of...

In 1997, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proudly looked back at its past thirty years of accomplishment in forging regional peace and security, vibrant economic growth, and higher levels of social welfare, a new issue — economic security — confronted the grouping's economies. Rapid growth of over 7 per cent per annum achieved during the past decade, which made ASEAN one of the fastest-growing regions in the world, came to a crashing end because of the financial crisis that hit the region in the second half of the year. ASEAN's economic growth in 1998 is predicted to be the lowest in the last three decades. However, the factors that contributed to rapid economic expansion in ASEAN countries remain strong, and have the potential to return the region's economies back to a sustainable growth path. ASEAN continues to enjoy, for example, high levels of saving, a strong work ethic, low underlying inflation rates, and a dynamic and entrepreneurial private sector. In previous instances of economic slow-downs in the 1980s and 1990s, each ASEAN country was able to come out relatively unscathed after the restructuring of their industrial sectors. Since then, the region's rapid economic growth, particularly in the real sector, has resulted in strong demand for capital to finance economic development. This led to large inflows of both long and short-term capital into the region. The development of strong financial institutions both at the regional level and for each ASEAN member country is of crucial importance in order to cope with such large inflows. The adjustment to the present crisis will therefore be different from previous ones. The crisis is a region-wide phenomenon and calls for a regional solution. It also involves private debts for which the role of the private sector would be crucial. ASEAN Economies Up to the 1990s: An Overview To understand the financial turmoil it is necessary to begin by looking at macroeconomic developments in the region up to the middle of 1997. The sound macroeconomic fundamentals of ASEAN countries defied any suspicion of the dramatic collapse of exchange rates that began in July 1997.

Climate change adds another layer of complexity to existing development challenges and to economic growth. This chapter analyses the role of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for dealing with the topic of climate change. As a matter of fact, ASEAN has recently taken a stronger position around the communication of climate change. ASEAN's main aim is to accelerate economic growth based on better integration between the ASEAN economies, social progress, and cultural development in the region. Climate change is a transnational issue, but adaptation measures are usually developed at the regional, national and local levels. The climate-policy agenda of ASEAN is closely linked mainly to its environmental efforts. Since 2007 ASEAN joins international climate conferences by formulating Joint Statements. The Joint Statements are clearly meant to show that ASEAN is making proactive progress towards climate change, and progress in which climate change is understood as fundamentally important risk. Keywords: adaptation measures; ASEAN; climate change; Southeast Asia

The introduction of a free trade area between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China (ACFTA) in 2012 brought China to a leading economic position in Southeast Asia (this was manifested in a significant, almost 2.2-fold, increase in the volume of trade) and turned it into a driving force of ASEAN’s economic prosperity. However, this increased economic interdependence creates challenges for both China and ASEAN: on the one hand, China seeks to make the transition from a high-income country to sustainable economic development in the ASEAN region, and on the other hand, ASEAN has concerns about excessive economic dependence on China. This situation requires a balance to be struck to avoid repeating the historical patterns seen in Japan in the 1960s and 1980s. This article examines the investment, trade and geopolitical relations between China and ASEAN in a historical retrospective of 2010-2022, assesses their economic dependence and the mechanisms of political-economic relations, identifies the factors that caused China’s rapid economic breakthrough, and outlines directions for overcoming the most modern challenges that have place in the context of this relationship through formulation of suggested frameworks. The article considers 2 research questions, for the solution of which the G/T (Grounded Theory) approach was used and a qualitative analysis of the 12 most relevant sources was carried out (limitation of their number – according to the concept of theoretical saturation), selected primarily through online databases, websites, international organizations’ data, analytical reviews, and scientific papers. RQ1: Identify the root causes of the problems faced by ASEAN middle-income countries in their engagement with China. The article identifies the following 3 main reasons through the empirical review analysis: 1) dependence of middle-income ASEAN countries on financial assistance, especially from China; 2) a noticeable decrease in unity in the ASEAN region; 3) China’s lack of recommendations on the advisory policy of economic development in the ASEAN countries. RQ2: development of recommendations for middle-income ASEAN countries to increase their ability to pave independent paths to sustainable economic development and reduce their economic dependence on China, taking into account the review of the balance of power in political relations with the United States and China. Using the qualitative analysis tool ATLAS.ti (version 24) for the G/T approach, it was concluded that to overcome the syndromes of lower-middle-income trap (LMIT) and higher-middle-income trap (HMIT), ASEAN economies should implement the following spontaneous strategies: infrastructure development, improvement of basic education and promotion of science and technology. In addition, it is important to raise awareness of political tensions between China and the US, apply the techniques of thoughtful diplomacy, fine-tuned policy formulation, and shared vision to establish a diplomatic balance between China, the US, and Japan in the context of geopolitical risk management.

Robust economic growth across the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has lifted millions out of poverty. Nevertheless, there are concerns about whether growth will be derailed in the future. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of growth slowdown for the ASEAN economies which are at different levels of development. We aim to answer two questions: First, are determinants of economic slowdown likely to differ across income groups? Second, what are the probabilities that economies in ASEAN will experience a growth slowdown in the near future? We construct a sample of 107 economies including ASEAN economies, Greater China economies, as well as sub-national economies of India and Indonesia. The sample spans the period 1993-2013. We first classify these economies into four different income groups: low-income economies, lower-middle-income economies, upper-middle-income economies and high-income economies using the criteria proposed by Felipe (2012). Next, we adopt the methodology of Eichengreen et al . (2012) to create a dummy variable representing the occurrence of growth slowdown episodes in each income group. We then run income group-specific logistic regressions to identify the determinants of growth slowdown and use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) techniques as a robustness check for our empirical findings. Using the regression results, we compute economy-specific predictive probabilities of growth slowdown over the period 2012-2017. Overall, the level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and human capital formation appear as important determinants of growth slowdown in all income groups. However, aside from these two variables, growth slowdown tends to be associated with different factors at different levels of development. Most notably, FDI inflows is an important determinant of growth slowdown for low-income and lower-middle-income economies while employment in the tertiary sector affects the probability of growth slowdown of lower-middle-income, upper-middle-income and high-income economies. Furthermore, we find that on average, ASEAN economies have a one-in-five chance of experiencing growth slowdown over the period 2012-2017. In terms of policy implications, the economy-specific predictive probabilities we compute may serve as early warning signs for policy-makers. Meanwhile, results from the regression analyses provide a roadmap for policy intervention to combat the risk of growth slowdown.

Environmental degradation is increasing gradually due to economic activities by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN energy center estimated 4.4 percent increase in the consumption of final energy among ASEAN nations in 2030 which is greater than the average growth rate of 1.44%. The current study empirically analyzes the impact of economic activities on environmental protection across four largest ASEAN economies (Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia) over a period of 1998-2018. In order to achieve this objective, the study employs several panel econometric tests; ADF, panel cross-sectional dependence, Johansen-Fisher panel cointegration, FMOLS and country specific long run output method.” The study finds significant positive impact of non-renewable energy consumption (NRNC), GDP and labor force on CO2 emission. Renewable energy consumption (RNC) has negative impact on CO2 emission. As RNC causes reducing CO2 emission in the sample ASEAN economies, the study suggests the policy makers to inductee effective policies to encourage the generation of renewable energy and its uses across ASEAN economies. While the generation of non-renewable energy should be discouraged as it promotes CO2 emission.Keywords: Economic Activities, Energy Consumption, GDP, ASEAN, FMOLS.JEL Classifications: R11, K32DOI: https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.10831