ASEAN’S INITIATIVES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE: QUEST FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

ASEAN’s Stakes:The South China Sea’s Challenge to Autonomy and Agency Alice D. Ba (bio) The South China Sea has come to involve important stakes for all involved. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is no different—though its situation is also notably distinct. The South China Sea occupies what Michael Leifer once characterized as the geographic “heart of Southeast Asia.”1 Geography alone means that whatever happens in the South China Sea affects ASEAN states the most directly. Moreover, as smaller powers, these states confront much greater vulnerabilities when it comes to great-power demands, even as they may be particular beneficiaries of great-power association. China’s activities in the South China Sea have no doubt underscored these dilemmas as the ASEAN states all try to navigate between the strategic vulnerabilities and the economic opportunities associated with a rising, more confident China. Nor are ASEAN states’ great-power dilemmas limited to China: the latter’s activities in the South China Sea have also precipitated heightened attention from the United States. ASEAN’s challenge is thus compounded by the fact that the South China Sea has become an important focal point of rivalry and tension between the ASEAN region’s two most important great-power relationships. Maintaining a space between China and the United States—one in which Southeast Asian states can enjoy some range of maneuver and choice—may prove to be the greatest challenge confronting the ASEAN region. This essay considers what is at stake in the South China Sea disputes for ASEAN’s coalition of smaller powers, with special attention paid to institutional interests and constraints. It considers not only the more immediate challenges created by territorial disputes but also the more general great-power dilemmas that heightened tensions have recently thrown into sharp relief. [End Page 47] ASEAN’s Immediate Challenges Most immediately, China’s physical and jurisdictional assertions create the challenge for ASEAN of agreeing on a collective response. This challenge, however, is made more complicated by the fact that it is an intergovernmental organization. Tus, while other governments may have to manage a constellation of domestic interests and agencies, ASEAN as an institution is the expression of ten distinct sovereign actors. States differ not just in the importance they attach to the disputes but also in their relations with China and the kinds of regional responses they prioritize. ASEAN’s unprecedented and very public failure to produce a joint communiqué at its 2012 annual foreign ministers’ meeting chaired by Cambodia in Phnom Penh dramatically illustrated this challenge. Additionally complicating ASEAN’s response is the fact that critical differences exist even among the grouping’s four claimant states. The Philippines and Vietnam have been the most vocal and active in responding to China’s activities, while Brunei and Malaysia—even with recently growing Malaysian concerns—have generally favored softer approaches. Such differences challenge ASEAN’s efforts to adopt a collective position as well as implement possible ad hoc workarounds that might facilitate a way forward. In its response to the South China Sea disputes, ASEAN as a collective has prioritized the pursuit of a regional code of conduct (CoC) because it keeps attention on the principles of international law, as well as existing codes of conduct like ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Following the embarrassment of ASEAN’s 2012 meeting, Indonesia quickly moved to facilitate ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea. This statement identifies the “early conclusion” of a CoC and the “full implementation” of both ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the 2011 guidelines as important priorities alongside self-restraint and the nonuse of force by all parties, “full respect” for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the peaceful resolution of disputes. These six principles continue to provide ASEAN states with an important basis for consensus and action. Indonesia’s moves to quickly correct the failures of the 2012 ASEAN ministers’ meeting under Cambodia’s chairmanship are indicative of the understood risks that the South China Sea disputes pose to the organization. Notably, however, the CoC is “not meant...

Nationalism and Domestic Politics as Drivers of Maritime Conflict Meghan Kleinsteiber (bio) Drivers of Maritime Disputes In her essay, "Oceans of Conflict: Determining Potential Areas of Maritime Disputes, " Elizabeth Nyman examines five main factors that drive maritime disputes: the pursuit of nonliving resources, the pursuit of living resources, conflicting claims to sovereignty over uninhabited rocks or islands, pollution, and the future role of climate change in driving future conflicts. Nyman notes that uncertainty over sovereignty of rocks and islands is the driving force behind Japan and China's dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, as well as conflicts between China and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Nyman suggests that states desire sovereignty of a region because they desire the right to resources in that region, and in doing so, she neglects a non-economic explanation for the escalation of these disputes. I argue that the fundamental drivers behind the disputes in the East and South China Seas are not potential or claimed natural resources, but rather domestic politics, rising nationalism, and irredentism. Resource Claims First, I contradict the claim that disputes in the East and South China Seas are purely driven by resources, because the actual quantity of resources in the seas is unknown, and resource extraction is currently too costly for regional actors. Many of the world's fisheries resources are found in the East and South China Seas. It is well documented that the fisheries stocks in the East and South China Seas are bountiful, but rapidly depleting. On the other hand, the extent of hydrocarbon wealth in the region is uncertain. The United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that the South China Sea could hold up to 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion [End Page 15] cubic feet of natural gas, and that the East China Sea may contain between 60 and 100 million barrels of oil. In contrast, a report published by Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) provided significantly higher estimates of 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the South China Sea, and another Chinese source claimed resources in the East China Sea to be anywhere between 70 and 160 billion barrels.1 Both the EIA and Chinese estimates include proven and probable ranges of reserves. However, given the technological capacity of the littoral states involved, resource extraction is not economically viable at present. Thus, the amount of hydrocarbons that could feasibly be extracted from the East and South China Seas is highly debatable, calling into question the assertion that potential resources are the primary factor that has reinvigorated the maritime disputes in recent years. Even if resources are an important component in heightened activity in the East and South China Seas, conflicts over sovereignty appear to be counterproductive to gaining access to the available resources. As Nyman notes, increased aggression and uncertainty scare away private firms, and a calmer environment is more conducive to joint development. A recent CSIS report by Gregory Poling illustrates what he calls an "area of maximum dispute," the overlap of each country's maximum claim assuming that all contested features are considered islands (as opposed to rocks), and are thus awarded a full exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles, instead of a 12 nautical mile territorial sea.2 Poling argues that, as all parties are bound by their UNCLOS obligations, they should accept this area as being in dispute. By clearly defining the area of dispute, the potential for joint exploitation and the development of resources becomes much greater. In fact, joint development projects have already led to the extraction of resources in parts of both the East and South China Seas. In 2009, Brunei and Malaysia established a "Commercial Arrangement Area" for the joint development and exploitation of petroleum resources off of Borneo after resolving a contested maritime area between the two countries.3 Although questions of resource ownership have existed for decades, conflict has only been sporadic. Not long ago, the disputes in the East and South China Sea had been relatively dormant...

Abstract: The paper is trying to look whether China is a status quo power or a revisionist power in theSouth China Sea dispute based on status quo indicator developed by Johnston and perspectives onconformity towards norms. Meanwhile, this paper argues that China is neither a status quo nor arevisionist in the South China Sea dispute to the extent of its compliance with the Declaration on theConduct of Parties (DoC) in the South China Sea. Using status quo indicators developed by Johnstonand also the perspectives on conformity and violation towards norm, it is found that China's position inthe South China Sea is determined by its interests over the disputed area. A moral dilemma betweenexpected behaviors in the South China Sea based on China's involvement in the DoC and China's otherself interests. Moreover, China has been conducting activities which fall under both categories, bothstatus quo and revisionist. China is lying in the middle between status quo and revisionist in the SouthChina Sea dispute, between an obligatory action that is mandated by the DoC and the desire to act inorder to pursue its self-interest such as its sovereignty claim, natural resources, and geostrategicposition of the disputed territory. China's position in the South China Sea dispute as well as its moraldilemma in the end could be seen through its mixed and constrained actions indicated by an aggressiveact and a justification related to the aggressive act.Key words: China, South China Sea Dispute, Status Quo, Revisionist, Norm, DoC.

South China Sea Territorial Dispute: A Lesson for Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Notes on Contributors Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Map of South China SeaIntroductionSam Bateman and Ralf EmmersPart I: Geopolitics in the South China Sea 1. Dangerous Ground: A Geo-Political Overview of the South China Sea Clive Schofield 2. The South China Sea Dispute: An International History Geoffrey Till3. Maritime Territorial Disputes and their Impact on Maritime Strategy -- A Historical PerspectiveBruce A. EllemanPart II: Non-Traditional Security Issues in the South China Sea 4. Fisheries Management in the South China SeaDavid Rosenberg5. Cooperative Development of the Oil and Gas Resources in the South China SeaZou KeyuanPart III: Politics and Security in the South China Sea 6. Southeast Asia and the South China Sea DisputeChristopher Chung7. Sovereignty in ASEAN and The Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the South China SeaMak Joon Nam8. The De-escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian RelationsRalf Emmers9. China's South China Sea Dilemma: Balancing Sovereignty, Development, and Security Li Mingjiang10. China and Joint Development in the South China Sea: An Energy security PerspectiveLee Lai To & Chen ShaofengPart IV: Towards a Co-operative Management Regime 11. The South China Sea -- The Long Road Towards Peace and Cooperation Hasjim Djalal12. The Contribution of the South China Sea Workshops -- Importance of a Functional ApproachIan Townsend-Gault13. The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China SeaNguyen Hong Thao14. Legal Regimes for Cooperation in the South China SeaRobert C. BeckmanConclusion: The Prospects for a Cooperative Management RegimeSam Bateman

Regional Disorder: The South China Sea Disputes. By Sarah Raine and Christian Le Miere. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge for IISS, 2013. Softcover: 225pp. The seemingly intractable disputes in the South China Sea have become something of a modern day Gordian Knot which cannot, it seems, be untangled without a game changer or the swing of a sword, metaphorically speaking. The complexity of the disputes can be attributed to a number of factors: multiple (i.e. six) claimants; competing claims to sovereignty of the atolls; rivalries over fisheries and hydrocarbons; China's economic and military growth; and, increasingly, the interests of external powers such as the United States, Japan and India. While the authors have done a good job of explaining the roles of the central players they could have delved deeper into the nature of the conflict as a backgrounder to the book. Raine and Le Miere focus a lot of attention on the policies and actions of the various players, particularly China (Chapter Two). They make the point that Beijing has to juggle managing domestic problems, wielding its new found economic and military power as well as relations with rival claimants (p. 39). While the authors have painted a generally positive picture of China, its recent actions in the South China Sea such as its continued presence at Scarborough Shoal, increasingly frequent intrusions into Malaysia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (including the much publicized excursions to James Shoal in 2013 and 2014) and the passage of domestic fisheries laws seem to suggest that, as the authors note, China may have decided that it is the master of its own fate in the South China Sea (p. 97). Notwithstanding China's rising power, the other claimants either individually or collectively through ASEAN have sought to manage the dispute and prevent it from turning into a full blown conflict. 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) was seen as a major step towards improving conflict management, and despite the perceived failure of that agreement to curtail the destabilizing activities of the claimants one can argue that the full suite of cooperative opportunities offered by the DoC in areas such as marine scientific research and prevention of crime are still largely unexplored. However, the DoC is not the solution to the disputes but merely a tool to better manage them while the claimants work towards a more permanent solution in the form of a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (CoC). While the CoC has been touted as a possible game changer, negotiations are expected to be protracted given the wide range of contentious issues that need to be addressed as well as differing interests among the various players. The important role of ASEAN in managing the South China Sea disputes cannot be denied. However it is important to recognize the fact that ASEAN is made up of ten members with disparate priorities, policies and levels of development. As the authors rightly point out, there are divisions within ASEAN over the dispute (pp. 113-28) and because ASEAN works on the basis of consensus, in principle the non-claimants have as much say on the South China Sea as the claimants themselves. This situation has allowed Beijing to sway the opinions of non-claimants which are dependent on China for economic and development aid such as Cambodia, thus frustrating ASEAN unity. …

1. Introduction: Unknotting Tangled Lines in the South China Sea Dispute Jing Huang and Sharinee Jagtiani PART I: ORIGINS 2. Origins of the South China Sea Disputes Nguyen Thi Lan Anh PART II: LEGAL DIMENSIONS 3. Setting Aside Disputes and pursuing Joint Development' at Crossroads in South China Sea Zhang Xinjun 4. The Philippines v. China Case and the South China Sea Disputes Robert Beckman PART III: THE ROLE OF ASEAN: CHALLENGES AND CHOICES 5. ASEAN's Position on the South China Sea and Implications for Regional Peace and Security Heng Yee Kuang 6. A Critical Assessment of ASEAN's Diplomacy Regarding the South China Sea Walter Lohman PART IV: REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES 7. Taiwan in the South China Sea Disputes: Policies and Prospects Katherine Tseng 8. Philippines Approaches to the South China Sea Disputes: International arbitration and the challenges of a rule-based regime Angelo A. Jimenez PART V 9. The United States, China, and Cooperation in the South China Sea Patrick Cronin 10. The South China Sea Disputes: Whither A Solution? Yang Fang Conclusion Harmony from Disunity: Core Issues and Opportunities in the South China Sea Andrew Billo

The South China Sea represents one of the most contested maritime spaces globally, characterised by its economic, strategic, and geopolitical significance. The region’s vast natural resources and function as a vital international trade route have made it a focal point of disputes involving several ASEAN member states and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To mitigate tensions and promote peace, ASEAN has sought to develop a binding Code of Conduct (CoC), building on the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC). This study employs a qualitative juridical-normative approach, utilizing literature review and descriptive-analytical methods to examine ASEAN’s role in the formulation of the CoC and its broader implications for regional security governance. Findings reveal that ASEAN plays a multifaceted role as a diplomatic mediator, normative forum, and integrative platform; however, divergent national interests hinder its effectiveness, China’s negotiation dominance, and external pressures from global powers, such as the United States. While the CoC offers significant potential to enhance trust, prevent conflict escalation, and reinforce the legal framework established by UNCLOS 1982, its effectiveness depends on ASEAN’s internal cohesion and the willingness of external actors to commit to binding agreements. This article concludes that a robust and legally binding CoC is crucial for strengthening ASEAN’s centrality and maintaining stability in the South China Sea.

The objective of this study was to determine why Indonesia take a role in the form of foreign policy in the South China Sea dispute and to know the shapes of Indonesian foreign policy related to the dispute. Political constellation in the Asia Pacific region at the same colored grim situation heats up. South China Sea that becomes the fulcrum of geopolitics in the Asia Pacific region into an international level talks for causing triggering a conflict between a number of major countries in Asia and some member states of ASEAN. The core issue is around claims disputed border area (territorial zone). By the end of 2014, the South China Sea territorial disputes this has impacted quite dramatically towards polarization force the warring countries. Indonesia as one of the countries in Southeast Asia was not directly involved in the conflicts over territory in the South China Sea. However, Southeast Asia is a strategic land for Indonesia which has a number of potential regionality within ASEAN membership. In short, if the regional stability in the ASEAN body threatened by dispute in the South China Sea, then it will have an impact on the credibility and noncompliance with ASEAN security posture that would be influential for Indonesia. This study uses research instrument documentation, using techniques reseach library (library research), namely by taking the data from books, articles, and internet. Design in the design of this study was descriptive, whereas Comparative analysis using Constant (Grounded Theory Research). Keywords: Foreign Policy Affairs, Dispute LTS, National Interest Indonesia, stability of the region, ASEAN

On 4 November 2002, China and ASEAN signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (ASEAN, 2002). Incidents related to occupation of islands, ‘illegal’ fishing and oil exploration had been major irritants in the relationship between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam during the 1990s. The declaration on a code of conduct reflects the complexity of the South China Sea dispute: it is a multilateral agreement between one major power and an association of ten states. However, China remains adamant that it will resolve the South China Sea dispute only through bilateral negotiations. For this policy to produce results, bilateral talks with Vietnam will be essential. On 25 December 2000, China and Vietnam signed bilateral agreements on maritime delimitation and fishery cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin, and experts from the two countries also discussed the larger disputes in the South China Sea. However, two years later, the bilateral agreements had still not entered into force and negotiations over supplementary protocols had stalled. This article describes the Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement in the 1990s, analyses the South China Sea ‘irritant’, presents the Gulf of Tonkin agreements and discusses the prospects for a Sino-Vietnamese initiative to resolve the South China Sea dispute.

This chapter aims to explain the efforts to manage the South China Sea (SCS) dispute by employing the concept of mediation regime. Several important developments are taking place over or related to the SCS dispute. These are: the shift of the location of the contention among the disputants from the physical field to the diplomatic space within ASEAN, the incorporation of regional norms and values for the regulation of the behaviour of disputing parties, economic integration between China and ASEAN, the creation of mutually beneficial identities for the disputing parties and the efforts to re-frame the incompatible territorial claims. These developments and efforts can be considered as reflecting the functions of a mediation regime, which can be understood in terms of short-term crisis management, middle-term relationship management and long-term incompatibility management. Although the SCS mediation regime appears to have successfully managed the dispute, recent developments can be understood as the inroad of the alliance approach to the management of the SCS dispute. This approach promoted by the U.S. and accompanied with the ideas of the balance of power and deterrence works to undermine the integrative power of the SCS regime. Currently, the two approaches to managing this dispute are interacting with each other, and the final outcomes of the interaction depend on the wider bilateral relations between China and the U.S.

Japan’s principal security interest in Southeast Asia is the safety and security of regional sea lanes. Over the past several years, Japan has expressed growing concern at rising tensions in the South China Sea and the lack of progress by the claimants to negotiate effective conflict management mechanisms. Japan is not a claimant in the dispute, but as a major maritime trading nation, it is a significant stakeholder. Japan has two major concerns over the South China Sea. First, that instability has the potential to disrupt the free flow of maritime trade on which the country’s economic prosperity depends, and, second, that if China is able to persuade or coerce other Asian nations into accepting its claimed ‘historic rights’ in the South China Sea, existing international legal norms would be undermined. Moreover, Tokyo is alarmed at China’s increasingly assertive posture in the maritime domain, and views the disputes in the South and East China Seas as linked. To mitigate its concerns over the South China Sea, Japan is pursuing a number of strategies: it raises the problem at regional security forums; it seeks to enhance cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on issues of maritime security and encourage unity within the organization on the South China Sea; it discusses the problem bilaterally with Southeast Asian countries and has started to provide capacity-building support to selected claimants (principally, the Philippines); and it seeks closer ties with other external stakeholders that share its concerns.

The decline of United States oil and natural gas reserves could be moderated by increasing exploratory drilling. During each of the past three years, 1978-1980, the United States produced approximately 3.0 billion barrels of crude oil, 0.7 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, and 20 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, for a total of more than 7 billion barrels of oil equivalent. In contrast, discoveries have been more than 2 billion barrels of oil equivalent. Annual estimates of ultimate recovery (past production plus reserves) are calculated for each year since 1920 by the American Petroleum Institute and the American Gas Association. To each of these estimates, we must add an estimate of future reserve growth resulting from revisions, extensions, new pool discoveries, in-field drilling, and enhanced recovery. From the derived quantities of oil and natural gas discovered each year and from the estimates of the footage drilled annually in new field wildcat wells, the oil and natural gas discovered per foot are estimated. In the late 1940's, the average discovery per foot was more than 350 barrels of oil equivalent. By the late 1970's, the average discovery per foot had dropped to approximately 50 barrels of oil equivalent. Projections of t ese decline curves determine the number of feet of new field wildcats needed to find 2 billion barrels of oil equivalent per year, a limited rate of discovery in the United States. Projecting the average drilling depth permits calculation of the number of needed wildcats per year. The 1979-1990, 12-yr total is 388,514 wells, which is 5 times the drilling rate of recent years. Estimated discoveries are 7% oil and 8% natural gas. The projected increases in drilling and completion costs from 1979 to 1990, in inflated dollars indicate a total cost of $179 billion. Lease, geological and geophysical, development well, and overhead costs are not included. A projected increasing role of natural gas and natural gas liquids in the total energy mix is due to the relatively large proportion of natural gas, on a Btu-equivalent basis, being discovered per foot of new field wildcat drilled. At the present finding rates it is not possible to replace the production of more than 7 billion barrels of oil equivalent. The projected costs are so large that attaining these limited goals, 2 billion barrels of oil equivalent per year, does not seem possible. The total cost of the necessary new field wildcats, $179 billion, is of the same order of magnitude as the estimated federal income from the 'windfall' profits tax for 1980-1990. Total exploration costs, however, would be more than one trillion dollars, $50 per barrel of oil equivalent discovered. In any case, estimates of available oil and natural gas resources indicate that it is possible to moderate the decline in reserves and production.

The South China Sea (SCS) dispute has been a contentious issue in the Asia-Pacific region, with multiple claimants vying for territorial control and access to its abundant resources. This study examines the ASEAN approach towards the SCS dispute and China's soft power response from 2010 to 2022. The “Soft Power” theory of Joseph Nye has been adopted to analyze the ASEAN approach towards the SCS dispute and China’s response to influence the member states. Moreover, the Qualitative approach has been used for collection of data through primary and secondary data sources. John Scott's model of documentary analysis is used for data analysis. This study explores ASEAN's multilateral diplomacy, consensus-building mechanisms, and conflict resolution frameworks utilized to address the dispute. Additionally, it investigates China's deployment of soft power tools, such as economic investments, cultural exchanges, and diplomatic engagements, aimed at influencing the regional changing dynamics. The research findings shed light on the effectiveness of ASEAN's approach in managing the SCS dispute and evaluate China's soft power response within the context of its regional ambitions. Ultimately, this research offers insights into power dynamics and potential future developments within the SCS region.

This article explores the role of the local government in Hainan Province in Beijing’s policy in the South China Sea (SCS) disputes. The article argues that Hainan has played three major roles in the SCS disputes: an avid defender of China’s claim and position, an active definer of China’s interests in the disputes, and a helpful participant in asserting China’s national security in the SCS. The establishment of the Sansha city has significantly increased Hainan’s involvement in the SCS contestations. This article concludes that Beijing’s policy in the SCS is unlikely to become significantly more moderate partly because of Hainan’s strong position on the dispute and keen interest in the resources in the area. The article also recommends incorporating the views and activities of local governments in future studies on Chinese foreign and security policy.