Arthur Pap in Vienna and the Criticism of Logical Empiricism

A. J. Ayer. Editor's introduction. Logical positivism, edited by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, pp. 3–28; also first paperback edition, The Free Press, New York 1966, pp. 3–28. - Bertrand Russell. Logical atomism. A reprint of XXV 333. Logical positivism, edited by A. J. Ayer, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1959, pp. 31–50; also ibid., pp.

Logical empiricism, as is well known, was deeply intertwined with both physics and logic. Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Hans Reichenbach, Moritz Schlick, Friedrich Waismann, and, later, Herbert Feigl and Carl Hempel all pursued research programs inspired particularly by the achievement of relativistic physics and informed, to quite various degrees, by such accomplishments in logic as Gottlob Frege's account of mathematical knowledge, David Hilbert's program of axiomatization and implicit definition, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus , Bertrand Russell's theory of types, Kurt Godel's incompleteness results, and Alfred Tarski's theory of truth. Quite often these thinkers were not merely inspired by the profound achievements of relativity and mathematical logic, but (as in the case of Schlick and Reichenbach especially) developed, as their own central philosophical projects, accounts of the validity and objectivity they took to be embodied in these advances in the natural and formal sciences. Thus to a considerable extent the history of logical empiricism reflects, and even parallels, the history of physics and logic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet a review of logical empiricists' writings reveals an affinity toward and a growing interest in behaviorism, neobehaviorism, Gestalt, and psychophysics - varieties of experimental psychology that flourished in the 1920s and 1930s.

Most logical empiricists stayed away from value theory and related issues. The reason is often held to be the movement's purported commitment to noncognitivism. Some critics even allege that the logical empiricists were caught in a paradox. How could they be noncognitivists and at the same time visibly engage in moral, social, and political activities? The chapter addresses the central claims of noncognitivism as well as this seeming paradox. The first part deals with how noncognitivism relates to the logical empiricist's verifiability principle of meaningfulness. The second part lays out their individual positions. Rudolf Carnap, Alfred J. Ayer, Hans Reichenbach, Friedrich Waismann, and Otto Neurath are well known for their noncognitivist stance, but the contributions of Moritz Schlick and Victor Kraft seem to challenge this consensus.

Both the authorship and the dating of the so-called “Diktat für Schlick” (DFS), once attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein and assigned by Georg Henrik von Wright to the Wittgenstein Nachlass as item 302, are debated topics in Wittgenstein and Vienna Circle research. Schulte (Waismann as Spokesman for Wittgenstein. In: McGuinness B (ed). Friedrich Waismann - causality and logical positivism. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 15. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 225–242, 2011) and Manninen (Waismann’s testimony of Wittgenstein’s fresh starts 1931–35. In: McGuinness B (ed). Friedrich Waismann - causality and logical positivism. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 15. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 243–265, 2011) hold that DFS was authored by Friedrich Waismann rather than Wittgenstein. Applying techniques from computational stylometry to the authorship question, the paper concludes that DFS is located stylometrically in the middle between Waismann’s and Wittgenstein’s writings, but slightly closer to Wittgenstein, and so Wittgenstein authorship is hence stylometrically still not unlikely. The paper concludes by presenting a number of factors that speak in favour of the view that DFS might originally indeed have been dictated by Wittgenstein. For the computational stylometry component, the paper uses the Eder et al.’s (Stylometry with R: a package for computational text analysis. R Journal 8/1:107–121. Accessed 21 Oct 2021. https://journal.r-project.org/archive/2016/RJ-2016-007/index.html, 2016) “Stylometry with R” package; the degree of similarity and dissimilarity between documents is calculated by Burrows’ Delta measure; and the results are displayed using Hierarchical Cluster Analysis and Principal Components Analysis. For the text corpus part, the paper uses texts authored by Schlick, Waismann and Wittgenstein. For the archival research part, the paper refers to materials form the Schlick Nachlass in the North Holland Archives, the Waismann Nachlass in the Bodleian Libraries, the Rose Rand Nachlass in the Pittsburgh Archives of Scientific Philosophy, the Ludwig Wittgenstein Nachlass in the Trinity College Cambridge Wren Library, and the Cornell copy of the Ludwig Wittgenstein Nachlass. The paper is a follow-up on Oakes and Pichler (Computational stylometry of Wittgenstein’s ‘Diktat für Schlick’”. In: Hareide L, Johannson C, Oakes M (eds). The many facets of corpus linguistics in Bergen: In honour of Knut Hofland. Bergen Language and Linguistics Series (BeLLS), Bergen, pp 221–240, 2013); for the current paper we have extended the Waismann text corpus with more texts written under the influence of Wittgenstein, a.o. Logik, Sprache, Philosophie (1976).KeywordsComputational stylometryLudwig WittgensteinFriedrich WaismannMoritz SchlickRose RandArchive materialsDictated manuscriptsStenographyAuthorship disputesDating disputesWriting style

Normativity and Instrumentalism in David Lewis’ Convention

When Kuhn published his Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962, he and many of his readers thought that introducing a historical dimension into the study of scientific theories and their languages was a decisive break with logical empiricism. But it has now been shown that Carnap himself — the editor of the series in which Kuhn’s book was published — welcomed it unreservedly, and that he had good reason to.1 Kuhn’s position, it is now widely agreed, was to some degree compatible with Carnap’s later view, which had developed considerably since the Vienna Circle doctrines of the 1920s.2 But why, then, have history and philosophy of science since Kuhn largely rejected logical empiricism? Evidently, Kuhn added more than just a historical dimension; his conception of knowledge was also quite different from Carnap’s (Section 1 below). Could Carnap have accommodated a historical dimension that fit better? This chapter argues that Carnap’s framework (Section 2) allows a role for the history of science that is distinct from ‘history proper,’ or history as it is ordinarily conceived by historians (Sections 3 and 4). Moreover, history of science in just this Carnapian spirit began to appear soon after Kuhn’s first writings (Section 5). And although it attracted less attention than Kuhn at the time, it has grown into a flourishing alternative tradition, which, I conclude (Section 6), deserves more attention, as it can interact fruitfully with the post-Kuhnian mainstream to open new perspectives for a historically-informed logical empiricism.

May 01 2013 "Logical Positivism"—"Logical Empiricism": What's in a Name? Thomas Uebel Thomas Uebel Thomas Uebel is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manchester, England. His research interests include, alongside systematic topics in epistemology and philosophy of science, the role of logical empiricism in the history of philosophy of science and history of analytic philosophy more generally. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Thomas Uebel Thomas Uebel is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manchester, England. His research interests include, alongside systematic topics in epistemology and philosophy of science, the role of logical empiricism in the history of philosophy of science and history of analytic philosophy more generally. Online ISSN: 1530-9274 Print ISSN: 1063-6145 © 2013 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology2013 Perspectives on Science (2013) 21 (1): 58–99. https://doi.org/10.1162/POSC_a_00086 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Thomas Uebel; "Logical Positivism"—"Logical Empiricism": What's in a Name?. Perspectives on Science 2013; 21 (1): 58–99. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/POSC_a_00086 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsPerspectives on Science Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2013 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology2013 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Americanization of originally European analytic philosophy, beginning with the rise of Nazism in Europe before WWII, has aptly been described as a move “from the Vienna Circle to Harvard Square” (Holton 1993). There are, indeed, significant links between the Viennese-based (and more generally European) logical empiricism and the American tradition of pragmatism; these links, furthermore, can also be argued to have been influential, albeit often implicitly, in the emergence of what is today known as “neopragmatism”. In the United States, C.I. Lewis, Ernest Nagel, and W.V. Quine, among others, were important mediators between these philosophical schools; accordingly, the Columbia and Harvard philosophy departments were instrumental in the development of this very special dialogue between two key orientations of twentieth century philosophy. Another mediating figure – some decades earlier – between pragmatism and early analytic philosophy was Frank Ramsey, who could have changed the history of twentieth century philosophy by developing a synthesis of these philosophies, had he lived longer. Charles Morris’s “pragmatic empiricism” was yet another milestone between Vienna and America; Morris argued for the complementarity and even convergence of pragmatism and logical empiricism throughout the 1930s, and he returned to the topic in his contribution to the Library of Living Philosophers volume on Rudolf Carnap in the 1960s (see Morris 1937, 1938, 1963; cf. Carnap 1963).

In the late 1930s, a few years before the start of the Second World War, a small number of European philosophers of science emigrated to the United States, escaping the increasingly perilous situation on the continent. Among the first expatriates were Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, arguably the most influential logical empiricists of their time. In this two-part paper, I reconstruct Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with American academics in the decades before their move in order to explain the impact of their arrival in the late 1930s. This second part traces Reichenbach’s development and focuses on his frequent interactions with American academics throughout the 1930s. I show that Reichenbach was quite ignorant about developments in Anglophone philosophy in the first stages of his career but became increasingly focused on the United States from the late 1920s onwards. I reconstruct Reichenbach’s efforts to find a job across the Atlantic and show that some of his English publications—most notably Experience and Prediction—were attempts to change the American narrative about logical empiricism. Whereas U. S. philosophers identified scientific philosophy with the views of the Vienna Circle, Reichenbach aimed to market his probabilistic philosophy of science as a subtler alternative.

Recent historical discussion of conceptual engineering by analytic philosophers has largely focused on precedents for contemporary conceptual engineering within the history of analytic philosophy. However, I suggest that we can and should look outside of the analytic tradition for further examples of conceptual engineering, and inspiration for further work in conceptual engineering. Here I will look to one such other tradition – American Black feminism. I do this by considering the work of Audre Lorde and Patricia Hill Collins in tandem with a tradition that is the more usual stomping ground of analytic philosophers: logical positivism. I draw out Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath’s respective views on conceptual engineering, before turning to Collins and Lorde. I suggest that Collins on the power of self-definition provides a model of conceptual engineering that closely matches that given by Neurath, whilst we can read Lorde’s work on poetry as giving a distinctively individualist spin on the conceptual engineering. I conclude with a comparative discussion of the various models on offer, suggesting that rather than being in competition, these various views of conceptual engineering are best seen as a toolbox of methods for conceptual engineering.

The paper tries to critically expose Hans-Johann Glock’s <i>What is Analytic Philosophy</i>? In this work, Glock identifies the limitations within the geographical, linguistic, historical, methodological, metaphysical and normative oriented conceptions of analytic philosophy. By developing a comparison of analytic and continental philosophy, he shows that no strict criteria could be employed in order to make such a distinction. In return he emphasizes the idea of a family resemblance amongst different proponents and strands of thought within the analytic tradition. This family resemblance is used to explore whether or not there is an underlying thread that is manifested in the different orientations that are identified under analytic philosophy. By analyzing Glock’s conception of analytic philosophy, it will be argued that, the book successfully shows the limitations of conventional definitions of analytic philosophy, exposes the current attempt to equate scientism and logical positivism with analytic philosophy in general, and also demonstrates the relevance of the analytic tradition in today’s world where the need for analysis is more than ever required. It does not limit the significance of analytic philosophy to the analysis of language and shown how there is also an interest in metaphysical and epistemological considerations. Still, Glock also needs to further articulate his thesis of family resemblance, and show whether it constitutes an orientation, philosophical current or perspective within the analytic tradition.

This paper offers a preliminary study of Otto Neurath's philosophy of science. Neurath was a key member of the Vienna Circle in the early twentieth century. His point of view in relation to scientific knowledge was a minority in the circle, different from other members like Schlick and Carnap. In recent years it has been rediscovered and has entered the mainstream of Anglo-American epistemology and philosophy of science. Neurath's ideas of anti-foundationalism, opposition to fixed methods in practical science, and his holism anticipated the work of later naturalists and pragmatists W. V. Quine, Kuhn and Feyerabend who criticized the 'orthodoxy' of logical empiricist philosophy of science. This paper examines Neurath's notions and shows they were also contained in his holistic concept of 'unified science'.

In this article, I consider the influence of the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and above all the ideas of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus on the philosophy of logical positivism. Agreeing that the question of such an influence is not a self-evident one, I clarify at first the concept of logical positivism and then turn to the evidence of the leading logical positivists about the influence of Wittgenstein upon them. An analysis of recollections of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann, and Alfred Ayer suggests that at least these thinkers themselves considered such an influence as very significant.

Friedrich Waismann: The Decline and Fall of Causality,-A Philosopher Looks at Kafka,- Causality,-The Logical Force of Expressions,- Tributes and Impressions,- Mathieu Marion Waismann's Lectures on Causality: An Introduction,-Alexander Bird Waismann Versus Ewing on Causality,- Brian McGuinness Waismann: the Wandering Scholar,-Joachim Schulte Waismann as Spokesman for Wittgenstein,-Juha Manninen Waismann's Testimony of Wittgenstein's Fresh Starts in 1931-35,- Wolfgang Kienzler Waismann's Conception of Philosophy,- Michael Heidelberger Waismann on Causality and Probability General Part: Report - Documentation: Hadwig Kraeutler/ Corinna Oesch/ Gunther Sandner Otto Neurath's 'Encyclopedia of the World War': A Contextualisation, -Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau Logical Syntax and the Application of Mathematics Reviews Obituary: Stephen Toulmin,- Activities of the Institute Vienna Circle.

The article analyzes the conflict between the “analytic” and “continental” approaches in philosophy on the example of the development of historical epistemology, which can be considered as “French style” in the philosophy of science. The French tradition is especially interesting due to the specificity of the reception of analytic philosophy that took place in it, where analytic philosophy did not receive an institutional form. The phrase “analytic philosophy” was problematized in the French academy in the 1950s and indicates the existence of a number of differences between the two types of philosophizing, as well as the absence of any stable connection between the French and Anglo-Saxon philosophical communities. One of the main reasons of this divide is that the philosophers interested in logical positivism and seeking to acquaint the French philosophical public with its ideas have suddenly passed away. The author’s argumentation is based on the material of historical epistemology in France, which was traditionally associated with the philosophy of science much more than epistemology in other countries. The article considers two approaches to defining the difference between analytic and continental philosophy: theoretical approach (distinctions between these traditions that are based on the subject of research, methodological techniques, key ideas, style) and institutional (based on geographical division – a particular philosopher belongs to a country or an academy – or based on the choice of his predecessors by the philosopher himself). The author demonstrates the inconsistency of the theoretical approach to the definition of analytic and continental philosophical traditions.