Abstract
Many important aspects of arms races are captured by the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game. In this analysis, strategies are developed and analyzed for IPD games which most resemble arms races; those which are finite, uncertain and time varying in length. It is shown that, under certain conditions, it can be rational to unilaterally cooperate following a series of mutual defection. A number of conclusions concerning arms race behavior are drawn.
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