ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA 3.7 (431A4–7)

Elixir Atque Fermentum:New Investigations about The Link between Pseudo-Avicenna’s Alchemical De Anima and Roger Bacon: Alchemical and Medical Doctrines Sébastien Moureau Introduction Between 1994 and 1997, William Newman published three articles1 in which, for the first time, a profound connection between Roger Bacon’s doctrine and Ps.-Avicenna’s alchemical De anima was pointed out. These studies were a major step in understanding Roger Bacon’s elemental physics, alchemy, and alchemical medicine, as well as his prolongatio vitae theory. By a thorough study of the physical, alchemical, and medical doctrine of the Jābirian treatises via Ps.-Avicenna’s De anima, in comparison with Bacon’s texts, I will continue the work initiated by Newman and draw some new conclusions. I will specifically focus on some principal differences between Roger Bacon and his favorite alchemical source, which allow us to understand the originality and innovation of the Franciscan. In addition to the De anima, a specific aspect of the alchemy of the Ps.-Aristotelian Secretum secretorum will also be studied here, being another of Bacon’s major sources. The following pages also include a set of new reflections about the elixir system and the ferment system. The case of Bacon’s doctrine and his sources brings new insights into the fundamental system of proportions that is found in those treatises, and allows us to reconsider and rethink both the elixir system and the ferment system, and to continue and perhaps refine the study of these fundamental notions. First, the alchemical De anima will be presented, along with the textual links of Roger Bacon’s works with it. Then, the physical, alchemical, and medical doctrines of Ps.-Avicenna’s De anima will be explained, followed by a description of Bacon’s elemental physics, alchemy, and prolongatio [End Page 277] vitae. After these observations, a comparison and a conclusion will be drawn. The Alchemical De anima of Ps.-Avicenna The De anima or Liber de anima, better known under the title of De anima in arte alchemiae,2 is the compilation and Latin translation of three now-lost Arabic alchemical treatises.3 It is impossible to date the compilation stage, but the translation seems to have been made around 1226 or 1235.4 Unfortunately, it is impossible to say whether the treatise was translated before its compilation or compiled before its translation. [End Page 278] The proposed translation date could be the translation date of the compilation, or the translation date of only one of the three parts. The first part is a treatise about elemental physics, the Porta elementorum (literally “chapter of the elements”), in which the physical basis of the alchemy of the De anima is presented. The Arabic original (no longer extant) was probably written before the mid-twelfth century,5 and the translation was probably made in Spain or by a translator who knew Castilian, attested by linguistic transformations of a specific word.6 Another text that seems to be another Latin version of this Arabic treatise is still extant in the manuscript Cotton Galba E IV, under the title De elementis, attributed to a certain Marius.7 The second part of the De anima, the main part of the book (about 80%) was written between the third quarter of the eleventh century and the mid-thirteenth century in Al-Andalus (Islamic Spain).8 This second part was translated in Spain or by a translator who knew Castilian, since many words are Castilian. The Arabic original is lost. The last part of the De anima, which was very likely inserted to complete the missing end of the second part, is impossible to date precisely. It was probably translated in Spain, because of linguistic traces, but the original is also lost.9 [End Page 279] The treatise was wrongly attributed to Avicenna.10 The De anima is characterized by Jābirian alchemy, presenting the same elixir theory as the Jābirian texts. It contains a very interesting description and classification of materials (dictio 5),11 which is indebted to Jābirian texts.12 The De anima is the main alchemical source of Vincent of Beauvais, who quotes it very often in the Speculum Naturale...

J.F. Finamore: Intellect and Common Sense27 Intellect and Common Sense in Aristotle's De Anima III.7 John F. Finamore Critics have regarded Aristotle's De Anima ??.7 as a collection of unrelated fragments.1 A closer inspection of the various parts of III.7 would show more continuity than these critics suggest. This paper will consider three contiguous "fragments" (431al7-20; a20-bl; b2-9) and show how they are united to each other and to what precedes them. Also, it will suggest a new interpretation for the third passage.2 1 The following woiks will be cited by the author's name alone: H.G. Apostle, Aristotle's On The Soul (De Anima) (Grinnell 1981); E. Barbotin and A. Jannone, Aristote De L'Ame (Paris 1966); C. Baeumker, Aristotles Lehre Von den Äussern und Innern Sinnesvermögen (Leipzig 1 877); G. Biehl, Aristotelis De Anima Libri III (Leipzig 1896); I. Bywater, "Aristotelia UI," Journal ofPhilology 17 (1888) 53-74; W. Christ, Studio in Aristotelis Libros Metaphysicos Collata (Berlin 1853); J. Freudenthal, "Zur Kritik und Exegese von Aristotles' trepl TUf ?????? s?µat?? ??? ????? ????? (Parva Naturalia): ?. Zu de Memoria," RhM 24 (1869) 392-419; D.W. Hamlyn, Aristotle's De Anima Books II and III (With Certain Passages from Book I) (Oxford 1968); R.D. Hicks, Aristotle De Anima (1907; rpt. Salem 1988); D.K. Modrak, Aristotle: The Power ofPerception (Chicago 1987); J. Neuhaeuser, Aristotles' Lehre von dem Sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermägen und seinen Organen (Leipzig 1878); G. Rodier, Aristote Traité de L'Ame (Paris 1900); W.D. Ross, Aristotle De Anima (Oxford 1961); W. Theiler, Aristoteles De Anima Libri III (Berlin 1959); A. Torstrik, Aristoteles De Anima Libri III (1862; rpt. Hildesheim 1970); F.A. Trendelenburg and C. Beiger, De Anima Libri Tres, 2nd ed. (1877; rpt. Berlin 1957); J. Tricot, Aristote De L'Ame (Paris 1947); and E. Wallace, Aristotle's Psychology (Cambridge 1882). References to Aristotle's Parva Naturalia are from the edition of W.D. Ross (Oxford 1955); and to the commentaries of Philoponus, Simplicius, and Themistius from the Commenlaria in AristotelemGraeca (Berlin 1182-1907). 2 Torstrik (199, 205) thinks that the chapter, although it does contain Aristotelian doctrines, has been compiled by an unknown editor. In particular, Torstrik believes that the first two passages (431al7-bl) are out of place with what precedes and what follows. Biehl (90) and Ross (303) follow Torstrik. Theiler (146) finds only a weak association among the various sections. Hamlyn (146-47) thinks that the first two passages are connected to each other, albeit with a lacuna, and that the third is connected with what precedes the first. 28Syllecta Classica 1 (1989) Chapter seven of book three of the De Anima is chiefly concerned with the practical intellect (43 la14 ? d?a???t???; 431b2 t? ???t????/) and its role in action, but Aristotle also compares this thinking faculty with the soul's sensitive faculty (431a5TÖ a?s??t????/; 43 la8 t? a?s???es?a?). In 43 la8- 17, Aristotle compares sensing and thinking. It is through pleasant and painful sensations that the sensitive faculty leads one to pursuit or avoidance, whereas it is through images that the thinking faculty does so. In the first "fragment" under consideration (431al7-20), Aristotle deals with the sensitive faculty or, more precisely, with the common sense faculty, which as a single entity connected with all the individual senses serves as the fundamental perceptive principle. Commentators believe that the first passage is an incomplete fragment and either hypothesize an ellipsis at the end or try to connect it to the previous sentence by means of some additional phrase. If, however, one takes¿krrrep (al7) as parallel with ?a? (al8), there is a single complete sentence:3 And just as the air has made the pupil of such a sort and this in turn makes another of such a sort, hearing also acts in the same way. The end (t? ?s?at??), however, is one and a single mean but many in essence. In III.2.426bl6, Aristotle used the phrase t? ?s?at?? a?s??t????? for the common sense faculty.4 In ??.2 Aristotle stated that each sense faculty discriminates among its own objects...

'De Anima' in focus presents an amended version of R.D. Hick's classic translation of Aristotle's De Anima Books 1 and 2, with pertinent extracts from Book 1, together with an introduction and six papers by prominent international Aristotelian scholars. Michael Durrant brings together up-to-date discussions of Aristotle's De Anima, examining central topics such as the nature of perception, perception and thought, thinking and the intellect, the nature of the soul and the relation between body and soul. These papers draw attention to the importance and value of Aristotle's original contributions both to these topics and to philosophical psychology in general. They show the relevance of Aristotle's ancient classical philosophy to contemporary philosophical debate. This book also examines the key issues of Aristotle's thesis and aims to demonstrate its enduring significance. The De Anima is placed within a wider Aristotelian framework, and also within a more comprehensive structure, as a contribution to philosophical development and advance.

AQUINAS AS A COMMENTATOR ON DE ANIMA 3.5 JAMES T. H. MARTIN St. John's University Jamaica, New York DOES ST. THOMAS AQUINAS in his commentary on De Anima 3.5 provide an acceptable gloss on Aristotle 's cryptic remarks about active mind? That is, can one accept .that what Aquinas says about active mind is what Aristotle meant but for some reason did not say? Many modern commentators, among them Franz Brentano, Marcel de Corte, Paul Siwek, and Francisco Peccorino, appear to think so and present an interpretation of active mind which agrees substantially with what Aquinas says in his Sententia Libri De Anima (Sent.).1 i Senteiitia Libri De Anima, opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita (Paris: Vrin, for the Leonine Commission, 1984). While he does criticize St. Thomas Aquinas for some statements which " seem to betray a certain lack of clarity concerning the nature of active intellect,'' Franz Brentano awards the first place among earlier commentators on Aristotle's doctrine of active mind to Aquinas : " Indeed, I am not sure whether I should not say that he correctly grasped Aristotle's entire doctrine" (The Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of Active Intellect, ed. and trans. Rolf George [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977], p. 155). De Corte holds that the originality of his study consists entirely in combining " all the technical means refined by modern criticism and which the thirteenth century did not have at its disposition " with the " Thomist interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intelligence," an interpretation with which de Corte agrees, and which he presents as a necessary correction of the errors of modern commentators, who are "more or less instilled with an unconscious Averroism which radically vitiates their power of understanding" (La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Aristote [Paris: Vrin, 1934], p. 2). Siwek notes that "many of St. Thomas's explanations of Aristotelian psychology are altogether consonant with our own explanations,'' and warns his readers against undervaluing Aquinas's views (Aristotelis Tractatus de Anima Graece et Latine, editit, versione latina auxit, commentario illustravit [Rome: Desclee & C.i, 1965], p. 30). Peccorini com621 622 JAMES T. H. MARTIN Aristotle's text is concerned with two minds, "a mind which is such as matter by becoming all things, and another which is such as an active principle by making all things" (430a14-15). What are these minds, and what do they do? The central elements of Aquinas's exegesis of De Anima 3.5 consist in his answers to these questions. He holds that these two minds are " parts or potencies of the soul " (Sent. 3.4. 126). The role of passive mind, the "mind which is such as matter," is to apprehend the intelligible object (Sent. 3.4. 101-2), while that of active mind, the mind " which is such as an active principle by making all things," is to abstract the intelligibles (Sent. 3.4. 103-4), a role which he explains in this way: Active mind makes those things intelligible in act which previously were intelligible in potency. It does this by abstracting them from matter, for in this way they are intelligible in act, as has been said. Aristotle was led to posit an active mind to exclude the opinion of Plato, who held that the natures of sensible things are separated from matter and actually intelligible. Thus for Plato it was not necessary to posit an active mind. But because Aristotle holds that the natures of sensible things are in matter and not actually intelligible, it was necessary that he posit a certain intellect to abstract them from matter and so make them actually intelligible. (Sent. 3.4 50-63) Active mind on Aquinas's reading makes the potentially intelligible forms of sensible things actually intelligible, and in this way these sensible things become objects of thought. If one accepts this role for active mind, one is forced to accept as well, I think, that active mind is part of the soul rather than something separate from the knowing human subject. Aquinas argues this point at length in his commentary on De Anima 3.5. If thinking , the action of the passive mind, is in fact...

Reviewed by: De Anima (On the Soul) by David Bolotin Ignacio De Ribera-Martin ARISTOTLE. De Anima (On the Soul). Translated by David Bolotin. Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2018. xi + 152 pp. Paper, $18.00 Aristotle’s De anima is the first attempt of a comprehensive and scientific account of the soul as the principle of life in the history of thought. Its influence on the history of philosophy is perennial and cannot be overemphasized. At the same time, however, due to the complexity of its subject matter and to its intricate textual transmission through the centuries, the De anima is one of the most difficult Aristotelian treatises to read and interpret. In this light, Bolotin’s English translation of the De anima (as well as other recent English translations, such as Shield’s, Reeve’s, and Miller’s) should be welcomed with much gratitude by those interested in understanding such a monumental treatise. This includes those who do know Greek, since it is not possible to translate the De anima without at the same time making relevant word choices and thereby engaging to some extent in its interpretation. Bolotin’s translation is primarily based on Biehl’s edition of the text (1884), slightly revised by Otto Apelt in a Felix Meiner recent edition (1995). Since this edition is less complete from the point of view of the number of manuscripts collated (nine manuscripts), Bolotin has also made use of Jannone’s 1966 edition (collating fifteen manuscripts), and Siwek’s 1965 (so far, the most complete edition, collating a total of sixty-five manuscripts). There are several aspects of Bolotin’s translation that are commendable. Bolotin offers a very careful and accurate translation, almost word by word, which is particularly helpful to those who want to pay the price of some (tolerable) awkwardness in exchange for a precise translation of the text. He is quite attentive to the reader, signaling any addition to the translation that is not explicitly present in the Greek text. Another strength of Bolotin’s translation is the consistency with which he translates key terms through the whole treatise (alerting the reader when he eventually needs to render the key term differently). Thus, the reader who does not know Greek can be certain that the same English word is translating the same Greek word. Footnotes are also very helpful. Besides indicating the cross-references and parallel passages, as well as his departures from Biehl’s edition (and how the text would then be translated in the alternative readings), Bolotin also notes those passages whose interpretation is more complex, trying to make the best [End Page 587] possible sense of them without hiding the difficulties. In short, the translation is very close to the text and decently readable despite its awkwardness, which is a faithful reflection of the intricacy of the Greek itself. There are a few aspects of Bolotin’s translation that are open to discussion. While I agree that we should be as conservative as possible in rejecting emendations and additions to the text that are not supported by manuscripts, this cannot be the only textual principle in choosing the best reading. Otherwise, we would be ruling out a priori the possibility that copyists may have made some additions or modifications through the more than two millennia of textual transmission. The translation of key terms is sometimes too awkward (for example, “deed” for ergon or “being admissible” for endechesthai), and a few times probably disputable, as when Bolotin translates “material” for hulê (not every hulê is material), or “to judge” for krinein (“discerning” should be a better translation, as lower living beings discern while they are unable to judge). As he does in some cases, for example with logos, I would transliterate the difficult terms entelecheia and energeia rather than translate them consistently by “completion” and “actuality,” as Bolotin does. While the term “completion” seems to capture well the meaning of entelecheia—in fact, in the later Greek tradition some commentators would sometimes use the word teleiotês (completion) and entelecheia as almost interchangeable—rendering energeia as “actuality” obscures the fact that (inactive) entelecheia and some potentialities are also actual. Notwithstanding the possibility to...

Previous articleNext article No AccessThe Psychology of Visual Perception in Ptolemy's OpticsA. Mark SmithA. Mark Smith Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Isis Volume 79, Number 2Jun., 1988 Publication of the History of Science Society Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/354695 Views: 15Total views on this site Citations: 6Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1988 History of Science Society, Inc.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Colin Webster Ptolemy’s Optics, double-vision, and the technological afterimage, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 94 (Aug 2022): 191–200.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2022.06.011Jürgen Mittelstraß P, (Jan 2016): 74–523.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-00141-2_2Delphine Bellis The Perception of Spatial Depth in Kepler’s and Descartes’ Optics: A Study of an Epistemological Reversal, (Sep 2016): 125–152.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41075-3_5Sergio Barbero Briones Los defectos ópticos de la visión explicados por Aristóteles, Asclepio 65, no.11 (Jun 2013): p005.https://doi.org/10.3989/asclepio.2013.05Dallas G. Denery II Seeing and Being Seen in the Later Medieval World, 43 (Jul 2009).https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511496462P. J. Boner Soul-Searching with Kepler: An Analysis of Anima in His Astrology, Journal for the History of Astronomy 36, no.11 (Feb 2005): 7–20.https://doi.org/10.1177/002182860503600102

Acknowledgements. Preface. Introduction. Inaugural Study. The Human Soul in the Metamorphosis of Life A-T. Tymieniecka. One: The Soul in its Passions. Phenomenology of Soul in Mulla Sadra's School S.M. Khamenei. The in-between Reflections on the Soul in the Teachings of Ibn 'Arabi W.C. Chittick. The Three Movements of the Soul According to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka K. Haney. The Human Being and its Soul in Edith Stein A.A. Bello. Avicenna's 'De Anima', between Aristotle and Husserl N. El-Bizri. Avicenna's (Ibn Sina) Phenomenological Analysis of How the Soul (Nafs) Knows Itself ('ilm al-huduri) M. Aminrazavi. Two: The Spheres of the Mind. Intentionality in Husserl and Mulla Sadra G. Reza A'Awani. Some Notes on the Problem of Mental Existence in Islamic Philosophy S. Mustafa, M. Damad. The Copulative Existence G. Hossein, I. Dinani. Good and Evil in Islamic Neo-confucianism S. Murata. Gadamer on the Cultic W. Lammi. Soul, Body and the Spirit -Phenomenology of Medicine H. Hanafi. Three: Flux and Stasis. The Bow of Heraclitus: A Reflection on the Language of Becoming A. Przybyslawski. The 'Distinctio Realis' between Essence and Existence in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas J. Ellul. Concurrence between Husserl's Conception of the Essence and Duns Scotus' Theory of Common Nature J. Surzyn. Essence and Existence in Phenomenological Ontology: Roman Ingarden N. Mardas. The Polarity of Existence and Essence According to Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa'i I.S. Hamid. Four: More about the Phenomenon and its Unveiling. Unveiling the Hidden, On the Meditations of Descartes and Ghazzali M. Azadpur. A Shared Quest between Islamic Philosophy and Phenomenology R.D. Ardakani. Appendix: Programs of Two Symposia Held in the Institutes Program of Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in a Dialogue at the American Philosophical Association Meetings of December 2000 and December 2001. Index of Names.

Aristotle's 'De Anima' Translated into Hebrew by Zeraḥyah ben Isaac ben Shealtiel Ḥen

Reviewed by: Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima Dominik Perler Paul J. J. M. Bakker, Johannes M. M. Thijssen, editors. Mind, Cognition and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima. Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007. Pp. vii + 259. Cloth, $99.95. Late medieval and early modern commentaries on De anima are Janus-faced texts. They look backwards, continuing ancient debates about well-known Aristotelian topics, and forwards, introducing new concepts and methodological principles that pave the way for non-Aristotelian theories of mind. The eleven essays in this volume, which cover the period between the late thirteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, elucidate this double orientation by presenting case studies of Aristotelians who engaged in discussions about classical issues (the immateriality of the intellect, the plurality of forms, etc.) and thereby opened the door to new theories such as materialism and substance dualism. The papers do not aim at providing a survey of the commentary literature, but focus on specific texts. Some of them deal with often neglected sources. Thus, Olaf Pluta presents a detailed analysis of Nicholas of Amsterdam’s Questions on De anima and nicely shows that one can find a form of “soft materialism” (114) in his philosophy of mind. For Nicholas rejected the thesis that the intellect is a separable, immaterial entity, claiming instead that intellectual states are always dependent on material ones without being reducible to them. Other papers provide a fresh re-interpretation of well-known texts. For instance, Guy Guldentops makes clear that the late thirteenth-century philosopher James of Douai was neither an Averroist nor a Thomist, but an original thinker who argued that the individual intellect is “infused” in the body at the end of the process of generation (30). Still other papers present a general framework for assessing theories of mind. Let me focus on a remarkable example. In his paper covering the entire late medieval debate, Robert Pasnau defends the thesis that it was not so much the mind-body problem that was at stake, but the mind-soul problem: how is the relationship between the mind (or intellect), responsible for thinking, and the soul, making a piece of matter a living thing, to be explained? Pasnau points out that philosophers in the Aristotelian tradition developed three theoretical frameworks to answer [End Page 637] this question. According to “the way of exclusion,” the mind is metaphysically separate from the soul. This way was chosen by Averroes, who claimed that there is no room for an immaterial, eternally existing mind within a perishable soul. Pasnau convincingly argues that this position was taken up by Descartes, who also saw a metaphysical gap. Of course, Descartes did not posit just one mind, but a plurality of individual minds, and he did not conceive of the soul hylomorphically, but chose a mechanistic explanation. But what he borrowed from the Averroist tradition was the crucial claim that an immaterial entity cannot be derived from a material one. In contrast, “the way of unification” attempted to minimize the difference between mind and soul by claiming that the mind is simply a substantial form united with the soul as a bundle of other substantial forms, namely those responsible for nourishing, perceiving, etc. This option was chosen by Ockham, who assumed that there is indeed a plurality of forms in a human being. However, this leaves open how and why all these forms are united, given that they are really (and not just conceptually) distinct from each other. That is why Pasnau turns to a third model, “the way of inclusion,” which he considers to be the most promising. According to this model, prominently defended by Aquinas, the mind is a specific power somehow included in the soul’s essence and caused by it. Looking ahead to the modern period, Pasnau recognizes an “almost Leibnizian orientation of Aquinas” (18), because the mind is not considered to be something added to the soul. It rather arises from the soul’s inside and gradually develops. What makes this model appealing in Pasnau’s eyes is the fact that it preserves the unity of a human...

Latin commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima generally contain a series of introductory chapters or questions on the nature of the scientia de anima — the science of the soul or psychology—and its place in the framework of the philosophical disciplines. This chapter focuses on the introductory questions from the commentary on De anima by Petrus Trapolinus. It considers two introductory questions from Trapolinus’s commentary, namely the question on whether psychology is a natural philosophical discipline and the question on the subject matter of psychology. The chapter demonstrates that, prior to the reception of the Greek commentaries, Trapolinus’s introductory questions open new fields of inquiry that were the result of the intrinsic dynamics of the Latin commentary tradition on De anima . The chapter first talks about the Petrus Trapolinus and his work, and then focuses on Trapolinus’s text. Keywords: De anima ; Petrus trapolinus; psychology

JJ?. Finamore: The Rational Soul in Iamblichus' Philosophy 163 The Rational Soul in Iamblichus' Philosophy John F. Finamore It is well known that Iamblichus insisted on a special position for the human soul. It is separate from Intellect and the other higher souls, and holds an intermediate position between them and nature below.1 But if the human soul is entirely separate from Intellect, how does the soul unite with it? If it does so through an intellectual component of its own, how is this psychic ???? different from the higher ???? and how does this conception of ???? differ from that of Plotinus? Iamblichus lays out his theory in the De Anima and, to some degree, in the De Mysteriis and in the fragments of his Platonic commentaries. In this paper, I wish to examine this theory of the soul and see how Iamblichus' solution is consistent. Iamblichus thought that Plotinus and other Platonists did not adequately differentiate the Intellect from the human soul.2 In In Timaeum, frg. 87, we are told that Iamblichus argued against Plotinus' opinion that there is "in us something impassible (?tta??? t?) that always thinks (?e? ?????)" (lines 8-9). Iamblichus argues that if there were this highest part of our soul, we would be perfectly happy at every moment. Rather, Iamblichus concludes, the whole human soul descends from the higher levels into this lowest realm of nature. "For if the ???? is this [highest part], it does not concern the soul. But if it is part of the soul, the rest [of us] is also happy" (lines 20-21). Further, Iamblichus says, we learn from the Phaedrus that the highest part of the soul descends as well.3 Thus, Iamblichus concludes that the 1 I have discussed this issue in the first chapter of J.F. Finamore, Iamblichus and the Theory ofthe Vehicle ofthe Soul (Chico 1985) 1 1-32. 2 See the works cited in Finamore (above, note 1) 92-94. See also CG. Steel, The Changing Self: A Study on the Soul in Later Platonism (Brussels 1978) 34-38, and RAl. Berchman, "Rationality and Ritual in Plotinus and Porphyry," Incognita 2 (1991) 189-200. 3 On this fragment, see lamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis Diálogos Commentariorum Fragmenta, JAl. Dillon, ed. and trans. (Leiden 1973) 382-3, and Steel (above, note 2) 40-45. 164Syllecta Classica 8 (1997) whole human soul sinks to the level of nature, that none of it remains above, and that ???? is separate from the human soul.4 What then is this highest part of the human SOUl if it is not ????? Iamblichus is interested in this same problem in his De Anima. In De Anima 318.12-15, Iamblichus discusses the intellect:5 Many of the Platonists themselves introduce the intellect into the soul at the same time as the first entry of soul into body, and they do not differentiate at all between the soul and its intellect. In De Anima 365.5-366.1 1 , Iamblichus states who these Platonists are and compares his own beliefs to theirs.6 These Platonists say that all souls are made from one 4 Van den Berg in his paper in this collection (pages 149-162) has questioned whether we can use this fragment from Proclus' Timaeus commentary as evidence for Iamblichus' own views. Van den Berg sets out an intriguing argument that (1) whereas this fragment states that the highest part of the soul is the charioteer (???????), Iamblichus believed that the highest part was the helmsman (??ße???t??), which was for him the soul's One (In Phaedrus, frg. 6) and (2) whereas here the soul is affected by the descent, Iamblichus held that some souls were unaffected. I will return to the second point later. As to the first, there are three possible ways to accept the fragment as evidence for Iamblichus' beliefs. First, when Iamblichus discusses matters that are beyond human ken (the One, the gods, intellect), his vocabulary is flexible and suited to the argument at hand. Thus, in De Mysteriis 1.15, Iamblichus calls this highest element t? ?e??? èv ?µ?? ?a? ??e??? ?a? Iv, ? e? ???t?? a?t? ?a???? ??????? ("the divine, intellectual, and one in us—or if...

In this fine and important book, the culmination of many years of work on these topics by its author, Thomas Kjeller Johansen develops and defends an account of the structure, nature, and methodological underpinnings of Aristotle’s theory of the soul. Johansen’s main focus is on Aristotle’s De Anima (DA). As he readily acknowledges, this is hardly a neglected work. What makes Johansen’s book distinctive, in its author’s own words, is its focus on ‘the explanatory role of the soul’s capacities as such within Aristotle’s psychology’ (p. 7). Johansen argues that Aristotle treated the ‘capacities’ (or ‘powers’, dunameis — he uses these terms interchangeably) of the soul as principles, which are explanatorily basic relative to other things that can be said about the soul. The book is organized roughly as follows. In chapters one to three, Johansen addresses general questions about Aristotle’s goals and methods in De Anima, focusing on Aristotle’s stated goal of providing a definition of the soul. In chapters four to five, he deals in general terms with the notion of a capacity and the relations between capacities, activities, and objects. In chapters six to twelve, he works his way through Aristotle’s discussions of the different capacities of soul in De Anima, beginning with nutrition, followed by perception and phantasia (‘imagination’), the intellect, and locomotion. Finally, in chapters thirteen to fourteen, Johansen considers the relationship between Aristotle’s theory of the soul in De Anima and his biology.

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The Renaissance fortunes of major treatise, De anima, have never received definitive study, no doubt principally because this task would be so dauntingly complex. Harvey, and more recently Park and Kessler, have done valuable work in surveying the range of Renaissance writing about psychology, while Cranz has dealt more specifically with the reception of De anima.1 Within De anima, short chapter on the (11.3; 427a17-430a25)2 is, one might suppose, the briefest of interludes, almost an aside, amid larger and thornier questions. Yet short as it is, this chapter does represent most sustained investigation into the nature and operations of the which has crucial role to play in relaying sense data to the mind. Moreover, the Rezeptionsgeschichte of this chapter in the Renaissance shows that among the problems of perception and its relationship to mind, certain issues are articulated which open up different connections between sense perception and guiding rationality which seeks to control the senses, especially through discourse which naturalizes the processes of body and mind. How and why reasonable account of particular psychological phenomenon, the comes to fail is the subject of this study. It will be as well to attempt to establish, first of all, what view Aristotle holds about the imagination. This is no easy task, since the very coherence of his arguments in De anima 111.3 has been matter of fierce debate. Hamlyn, for instance, thought that the chapter has a disjointed look, its principle of unity being loose one, while elsewhere he is even more severe (there is little consistency here).3 Schofield had more positive view of the chapter, but nevertheless contended that Aristotle's phantasia is loose-knit, family concept,' which, with great panache, he defended as virtue of the philosopher's analysis. More recent interpreters such as Modrak, Watson, and Wedin have argued for greater coherence both in general view of phantasia and in his definition of it in De anima.5 Frede rightly locates the principal source of unease in the term phantasia itself, which, she recalls, covers wider spectrum than the English word imagination, in that phantasia designates the capacity, the activity or process, and the product or result.6 All these aspects occur in Deanima 111.3. definition of phantasia seems innocuous enough: imagination

This paper examines in detail the reception history of Tertullian’s treatise De anima in the later literature and thought of the early church, the two key theological concepts, introduced in De anima and which subsequently found wider resonance, being the corporeality of the human soul and its transmission ex traduce. Since Augustine included Tertullian in De haeresibus, Tertullian was considered, strictly speaking, a heretic (the first signs of the reserve towards the Carthaginian being detectable since the mid-fourth century), and his name was only seldom mentioned by later authors. However, both of his aforementioned concepts, elaborated in De anima as adaptations of originally Stoic heritage, found a wider, albeit not very sympathetic response, especially in Jerome, one of the few known admirers of Tertullian in late antiquity, and in Augustine himself. Although Jerome’s predilection for Tertullian only seldom implied a deeper interest in the content of his writings in general, he must have been familiar with De anima: from it he borrowed some isolated, pointed statements, plus the notion of the traducianist transmission of the human soul, which he touches upon several times in his own writings. One cannot ignore their Tertullian heritage. Augustine, on the other hand, had studied Tertullian’s treatise thoroughly, and while he was critical towards Tertullian in general and especially towards his corporealism, De anima served not only as a catalyst for his own reflections on the origin of the soul (with his perpetual hesitation between creationism and traducianism) but probably also as a loose inspiration for his own explanations regarding the soul in De Genesi ad litteram.