Are We Actually There? Assessing RPKI Maturity

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) enables global Internet routing and underlies all modern Internet communication. Despite its critical role, BGP lacks built-in security, and attacks on BGP are frequent and detrimental to this day. The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) was standardized to protect BGP against attacks and is starting to see widespread deployment, with over 55% of announced IP prefixes protected through RPKI and major players pushing for more RPKI adoption. But can RPKI live up to its increasingly critical role of securing global Internet routing? This dissertation analyzes the current design of RPKI, the effectiveness of its deployments, and the quality of its implementations to identify and resolve the fundamental issues that prevent RPKI from fulfilling the security and reliability requirements that its wide deployment increasingly demands. Through measurements, this work demonstrates that the adoption of RPKI enforcement is growing, but also reveals that the effectiveness of enforcement varies: while large networks provide Internet-wide protection, enforcement in Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) has a smaller and more localized effect. The security of RPKI rests on the resilience of its software ecosystem. This work identifies and closes 40 vulnerabilities in RPKI software that allow downgrading RPKI protection of deployments or, worse, enable attacks on the servers running the software. Identifying these vulnerabilities required designing and implementing a new, comprehensive fuzzing tool that incorporates multiple novel conceptual fuzzing techniques, enabling the first fuzzing tests of RPKI validation. Attacks on RPKI may, however, also target the components RPKI builds upon. This work presents and closes detrimental vulnerabilities in the Domain Name System (DNS), which is used by RPKI and many other Internet protocols to resolve domain names to IP addresses. The attacks, named KeyTrap, exploit flaws in the DNSSEC specification to stall DNS resolvers through validation load. While KeyTrap was patched, it highlights the urgent need for accurate and clear specifications, as errors in specification inadvertently impact all compliant implementations. As this work demonstrates, the specification of RPKI also leads to issues in implementations due to its immense complexity and vague/conflicting requirements, making the correct implementation of RPKI challenging and error-prone, thereby facilitating the substantial number of vulnerabilities found by this work. Issues in the RPKI specification extend beyond how it is written: The current design of RPKI includes several fundamental flaws that render RPKI immensely complex and inefficient. By systematically removing these flaws, this work demonstrates that a redesign of RPKI can improve security while achieving 20x efficiency improvements in practice, without omitting any existing use cases. By identifying and resolving these flaws, this work makes an important contribution to advancing RPKI towards a mature and secure architecture. Still, the findings also emphasize that RPKI requires further work by the community to improve its specification, expand deployment, and ensure reliability. Despite its flaws, RPKI remains the best available solution to effectively protect BGP deployments against attacks. Advancing RPKI deployment, while addressing its issues, must thus remain a key community priority.

Securing the Internet’s inter-domain routing system against illicit prefix advertisements by third-party networks remains a great concern for the research, standardization, and operator communities. After many unsuccessful attempts to deploy additional security mechanisms for BGP, we now witness increasing adoption of the RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure). Backed by strong cryptography, the RPKI allows network operators to register their BGP prefixes together with the legitimate Autonomous System (AS) number that may originate them via BGP. Recent research shows an encouraging trend: an increasing number of networks around the globe start to register their prefixes in the RPKI. While encouraging, the actual benefit of registering prefixes in the RPKI eventually depends on whether transit providers in the Internet enforce the RPKI’s content, i.e., configure their routers to validate prefix announcements and filter invalid BGP announcements. In this work, we present a broad empirical study tackling the question: To what degree does registration in the RPKI protect a network from illicit announcements of their prefixes, such as prefix hijacks? To this end, we first present a longitudinal study of filtering behavior of transit providers in the Internet, and second we carry out a detailed study of the visibility of legitimate and illegitimate prefix announcements in the global routing table, contrasting prefixes registered in the RPKI with those not registered. We find that an increasing number of transit and access providers indeed do enforce RPKI filtering, which translates to a direct benefit for the networks using the RPKI in the case of illicit announcements of their address space. Our findings bode well for further RPKI adoption and for increasing routing security in the Internet.

Despite its critical role in Internet connectivity, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) remains highly vulnerable to attacks such as prefix hijacking, where an Autonomous System (AS) announces routes for IP space it does not control. To address this issue, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) was developed starting in 2008, with deployment beginning in 2011. This paper performs the first comprehensive, longitudinal study of the deployment, coverage, and quality of RPKI.We use a unique dataset containing all RPKI Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) from the moment RPKI was first deployed, more than 8 years ago. We combine this dataset with BGP announcements from more than 3,300 BGP collectors worldwide. Our analysis shows the after a gradual start, RPKI has seen a rapid increase in adoption over the past two years. We also show that although misconfigurations were rampant when RPKI was first deployed (causing many announcements to appear as invalid) they are quite rare today. We develop a taxonomy of invalid RPKI announcements, then quantify their prevalence. We further identify suspicious announcements indicative of prefix hijacking and present case studies of likely hijacks.Overall, we conclude that while misconfigurations still do occur, RPKI is ready for the big screen, and routing security can be increased by dropping invalid announcements. To foster reproducibility and further studies, we release all RPKI data and the tools we used to analyze it into the public domain.

The validity of the routing advertisements sent by one router to another is essential for Internet connectivity. To perform routing exchanges between Autonomous Systems (AS) on the Internet, a protocol known as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is used. One of the most common attacks on routers running BGP is prefix hijacking. This attack aims to disrupt connections between AS and divert routing to destinations that are not appropriate for crimes, such as fraud and data breach. One of the methods developed to prevent prefix hijacking is the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). RPKI is a public key infrastructure (PKI) developed for BGP routing security on the Internet and can be used by routers to validate routing advertisements sent by their BGP peers. RPKI utilizes a digital certificate issued by the Certification Authority (CA) to validate the subnet in a routing advertisement. This study aims to implement BGP and RPKI using the Bird Internet Routing Daemon (BIRD). Simulation and implementation are carried out using the GNS3 simulator and a server that acts as the RPKI validator. Experiments were conducted using 4 AS, 7 routers, 1 server for BIRD, and 1 server for validators, and there were 26 invalid or unknown subnets advertised by 2 routers in the simulated topology. The experiment results show that the router can successfully validated the routing advertisement received from its BGP peer using RPKI. All invalid and unknown subnets are not forwarded to other routers in the AS where they are located such that route hijacking is prevented.

BGP, the Internet's interdomain routing protocol, is highly vulnerable to routing failures that result from unintentional misconfigurations or deliberate attacks. To defend against these failures, recent years have seen the adoption of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), which currently authorizes 4% of the Internet's routes. The RPKI is a completely new security infrastructure (requiring new servers, caches, and the design of new protocols), a fact that has given rise to some controversy. Thus, an alternative proposal has emerged: Route Origin Verification (ROVER}, which leverages the existing reverse DNS (rDNS) and DNSSEC to secure the interdomain routing system. Both RPKI and ROVER rely on a hierarchy of authorities to provide trusted information about the routing system. Recently, however, it has been argued that the misconfigured, faulty or compromised RPKI authorities introduce new vulnerabilities in the routing system, which can take IP prefixes offline. Meanwhile, the designers of ROVER claim that it operates in a fail-safe mode, where [o]ne could completely unplug a router verification application at any time and Internet routing would continue to work just as it does today. There has been debate in Internet community mailing lists about the pros and cons of both approaches. This poster therefore compares the impact of ROVER failures to those of the RPKI, in a threat model that covers misconfigurations, faults or compromises of their trusted authorities.

BGP, the Internet's interdomain routing protocol, is highly vulnerable to routing failures that result from unintentional misconfigurations or deliberate attacks. To defend against these failures, recent years have seen the adoption of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), which currently authorizes 4% of the Internet's routes. The RPKI is a completely new security infrastructure (requiring new servers, caches, and the design of new protocols), a fact that has given rise to some controversy. Thus, an alternative proposal has emerged: Route Origin Verification (ROVER}, which leverages the existing reverse DNS (rDNS) and DNSSEC to secure the interdomain routing system. Both RPKI and ROVER rely on a hierarchy of authorities to provide trusted information about the routing system. Recently, however, it has been argued that the misconfigured, faulty or compromised RPKI authorities introduce new vulnerabilities in the routing system, which can take IP prefixes offline. Meanwhile, the designers of ROVER claim that it operates in a "fail-safe mode", where "[o]ne could completely unplug a router verification application at any time and Internet routing would continue to work just as it does today". There has been debate in Internet community mailing lists about the pros and cons of both approaches. This poster therefore compares the impact of ROVER failures to those of the RPKI, in a threat model that covers misconfigurations, faults or compromises of their trusted authorities.

The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers (ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origination assertions. In the future, ISPs also will be able to use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route. However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of the RPKI to control its own network while making use of RPKI data. The mechanisms described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global RPKI repository data as needed.

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is vital to the security of inter-domain routing. However, RPKI enables Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) to unilaterally takedown IP prefixes - indeed, such attacks have been launched by nation-state adversaries. The threat of IP prefix takedowns is one of the factors hindering RPKI adoption.In this work, we propose the first distributed RPKI system, based on threshold signatures, that requires the coordination of a number of RIRs to make changes to RPKI objects; hence, preventing unilateral prefix takedown. We perform extensive evaluations using our implementation demonstrating the practicality of our solution. Furthermore, we show that our system is scalable and remains efficient even when RPKI is widely deployed.

The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) already protects around 50% of announced BGP prefixes, and around 28% of systems enforce RPKI validity in routing. RPKI binds ownership of prefixes to public keys inside certificates, which are signed by the respective issuer. For signatures and keys, RPKI currently exclusively supports RSA-2048, forbidding other algorithms and key sizes. In this work, we practically show that RPKI efficiency could significantly benefit from algorithm agility, allowing for smaller more efficient algorithms like Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). We further illustrate that current plans for shifting algorithms, which will eventually become necessary to shift towards quantum-secure algorithms, are infeasible due to bandwidth limitations, validation overhead, and issues with patch management. From our observations, we derive a new agility procedure that uses separate repository versions additional to two separate trees (a mixed tree and a legacy tree) to enable incremental deployment of a new algorithm. In contrast to existing approaches, our procedure provides benefits also for early adopters, facilitating deployment.

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) defends against BGP prefix hijacking by signing Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) and filtering malicious BGP routes with ROAs. However, RPKI's low deployment weakens its defense against prefix hijacking. In the absence of a large fraction of Autonomous Systems (ASes) signing ROAs, the incentive to use filtering to eliminate hijacked prefixes commensurately decreases. There is a cyclic dependency here because reduced filtering in turn lessens the incentive for non-adoptees to become adoptees. Previous studies on RPKI deployment are mainly from the measurement perspective or focus on the deployment of large Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The above circular dependency problem inside the RPKI has not been fully studied. To improve RPKI's defense, this paper studies the circular dependency problem from an evolutionary game theory perspective. We model the strategy evolution of ASes choosing to deploy signing alone, deploy filtering alone, or deploy both signing and filtering. The results show that when the deployment rates of signing and filtering reach a certain range, the evolution can reach an ideal deployment state at a faster speed. Therefore, to increase the probability of evolution reaching the ideal deployment state, we propose RPKIN to widen this interval and reduce the minimum deployment rate required for signing and filtering.

The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a new infrastructure that prevents some of the most devastating attacks on interdomain routing. However, the security benefits provided by the RPKI are accomplished via an architecture that empowers centralized authorities to unilaterally revoke any IP prefixes under their control. We propose mechanisms to improve the transparency of the RPKI, in order to mitigate the risk that it will be used for IP address takedowns. First, we present tools that detect and visualize changes to the RPKI that can potentially take down an IP prefix. We use our tools to identify errors and revocations in the production RPKI. Next, we propose modifications to the RPKI's architecture to (1) require any revocation of IP address space to receive consent from all impacted parties, and (2) detect when misbehaving authorities fail to obtain consent. We present a security analysis of our architecture, and estimate its overhead using data-driven analysis.

The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a new infrastructure that prevents some of the most devastating attacks on interdomain routing. However, the security benefits provided by the RPKI are accomplished via an architecture that empowers centralized authorities to unilaterally revoke any IP prefixes under their control. We propose mechanisms to improve the transparency of the RPKI, in order to mitigate the risk that it will be used for IP address takedowns. First, we present tools that detect and visualize changes to the RPKI that can potentially take down an IP prefix. We use our tools to identify errors and revocations in the production RPKI. Next, we propose modifications to the RPKI's architecture to (1) require any revocation of IP address space to receive consent from all impacted parties, and (2) detect when misbehaving authorities fail to obtain consent. We present a security analysis of our architecture, and estimate its overhead using data-driven analysis.

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a solution to mitigate the security issues faced by inter-domain routing. Within the RPKI framework, Route Origin Authorization (ROA) plays a crucial role as an RPKI object. ROA allows address space holders to place a single IP address prefix or multiple IP address prefixes in it. However, this feature has introduced security risks during the global deployment of RPKI. In this study, we analyze the current status of ROA issuance and discuss the impact of using two ROA issuance policies on RPKI security and synchronization efficiency. Based on the aforementioned work, recommendations are proposed for the utilization of ROA issuance policies.

Although Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is critical for securing the inter-domain routing, one of the arguments hindering its adoption is the significant power that it provides to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), allowing prefix takedowns. In this work, we propose a small change to RPKI to distribute the power of RIRs preventing any single one of them from taking down a prefix. We design and implement a distributed RPKI system that relies on threshold signatures. This ensures that any change to the RPKI certificates requires a joint action by a number of RIRs, avoiding unilateral IP address takedowns. We evaluate the performance of our design and use historic RPKI data to analyse its performance and efficiency.

The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) stores attestation objects for Internet resources. In this demo, we present RPKI MIRO, an open source software framework to monitor and inspect these RPKI objects. RPKI MIRO provides resource owners, RPKI operators, researchers, and lecturers with intuitive access to the content of the deployed RPKI repositories. It helps to optimize the repository structure and to identify failures.