Are the Kids Alright? The Falling Level of Support Among Youth For Quebecois Sovereignty

The far right is gaining increasing traction among young voters – an age group that constitutes the future electorate. Yet, the underlying drivers of this trend remain insufficiently explored. This article addresses this gap by investigating why the ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD) resonates so strongly with young voters in eastern Germany – a region typical for the far right’s rise and consolidation. Drawing on established approaches from electoral sociology and contemporary insights from research on populism, the far right, and youth political behaviour, the study analyses original survey data collected during the 2024 state elections in eastern Germany. The findings reveal that support for the AfD among young voters is not only strikingly stable, but also closely linked to strong levels of party identification and pronounced nativist attitudes. These results point to a broader normalisation of far-right positions among younger generations and provide important insights for both political actors and future research.

The 2024 European Parliament election showcased a surprising new trend. While progressive parties have traditionally done well among younger voters, it was far-right parties that enjoyed unprecedented electoral support among young voters in the 2024 EP elections. Analyzing data from the European Election Studies (EES) 2024, covering 27 countries and almost 25,000 voters, this paper shows that there is a sizable gender gap in voting for the far right. The electoral success of far-right parties among young voters is primarily driven by the support of young men, peaking at over 21% of all young men in 2024 compared to only about 14% among women of the same age cohort. Descriptive analyses from the EES shows that this gap can partially be explained by attitudinal differences, with young women holding more socially progressive views than young men. Age-Period-Cohort models based on EES data covering eight elections from 1989 to 2024 further reveal that this gender gap is greatest for Millennials and Generation Z. Since political attitudes and voting behaviour during the formative years may have a long-lasting effect on voting patterns and attitudes later in life, our findings have important implications for the future of European democracies.

Exploration of millennials' perception of spending on cities, mass transit, and highways

Stability and change in partisan political identification: Implications for lowering the voting age

Despite concerns that the accuracy of pre-election telephone polls would be harmed by the omission of voters who could be reached only by cell phone, most national polls performed well in predicting President George W. Bush’s reelection, and state polls were generally accurate as well. The national exit poll conducted by the National Election Pool found that 7% of electionday voters had cell phone service but no land line; younger voters were far more likely to be cellonly: 19% among those 18-24 and 20% among those 25-29. Within these two youngest age cohorts, cell-only voters were significantly more likely to be single and childless. While cellonly voters were more supportive of John Kerry than voters overall, they were similar to voters within their own age cohort. Because of this, pre-election telephone surveys that weighted their data appropriately by age were not significantly biased by the absence of the cell-only voters.

This paper presents an Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis and Spatial Econometric modeling of the 2011 National Constituent Assembly elections (NCA) in Tunisia. By using electoral data at delegation level of the six main political parties (Ennahda, Congress of the Republic, Ettakatol, the Democratic Progressive Party, the Petition and the Democratie Modernist Pole), we show that geographical proximity matters in Tunisia’s voting behavior. The results overwhelmingly support the spatial Durbin model, including spatially weighted independent variables, as the best model to explain the voting phenomenon. Employing LeSage and Pace’s approach, we find that the largest direct and indirect effects are associated with age cohort and level of educational attainment. Voters who live in poorer neighborhoods are more likely to support the Petition list. Our results also show that younger voters are more likely to vote Ennahda, while older voters with high educational attainment are more likely to support Ettakatol and the Democratie Modernist Pole parties. Men are more likely to support Congress of the Republic than women voters.

Generational shifts in consumer shopping behavior have garnered increasing interest, particularly due to the impact of the Covid‐19 pandemic on different age cohorts. This study examines changes in the shopping behavior of Slovak consumers in 2020, 2021, and 2024 using representative research data, focusing on all generational cohorts (except Generation Alpha). The analysis reveals differences and similarities in fast‐moving consumer goods shopping behavior among generations during the Covid‐19 pandemic. Findings highlight generational trends in store choice, purchase frequency, and panic buying. Our findings deepen the understanding of how generational differences shape consumer responses to crises like the Covid‐19 pandemic.

The Scottish independence movement and its leadership have claimed ‘time is on our side’, citing the increased support for independence among younger citizens as evidence a future referendum would be more likely to deliver a ‘Yes’ result. Even amid protracted crises and tumultuous leadership changes within the Scottish National Party, observers still point to robust support for independence among younger voters as evidence of future change. Assessing this claim is important because it clarifies the role of different cleavages in Scottish and British politics and it helps us understand the motivations on both sides for trying to control the timing of any future independence referendum. In this research note, we assess the claim that time sides with the pro-independence movement, using data from the Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys and the Scottish Election Study from 1999 to 2021. Overall, we find limited support for the claim that generational replacement will help the pro-independence movement. Based on data from 1999 to 2021, the most appropriate interpretation is that time will neither help nor hurt the independence movement. Therefore, we need to treat claims on this topic from political actors with caution.

Next-generation DNA sequencing technology (NGS) is one of the most powerful tools available for researchers in life sciences. It allows accurate, high-speed, and high-throughput DNA sequencing. This technology is routinely used for genome sequencing (both de novo and re-sequencing), simultaneous sequencing of multiple samples and genes in single experiment at a depth and coverage that researchers could only dream of a decade ago. In recent years, this technology has been the driving force for the rapid growth and advancement of genetic screening, molecular diagnostics, precision/personalized medicines to synthetic biology, to name a few. Due to rapid reduction of the cost of DNA sequencing, individual genomic information – the blueprint of life, can be accessed at affordable cost. This empowers people in many ways from using in personalized medicines to knowing own ancestry. The breakthroughs of DNA sequencing technology rely on the integration of new chemistry with precision instrumentation, advanced detection system, and computational methods. This technology together with the gene synthesis and the gene-editing tool, as well as other contemporary technologies such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, etc., will play important role in this centuries’ biotechnology revolution.

Generational shifts in attitudes and beliefs about alcohol: An age-period-cohort approach

The article is devoted to the political preferences of young voters in contemporary Russia’s elections. Building on the conclusions of their previous research on the relationship between modernisation and political pluralism in Russian regions, the authors attempt to evaluate the role of the age factor in voting behaviour by means of correlation and regression analysis, using as control variables the factors of modernization tested by them earlier. Their research showed that the perception that young voters are more likely to support liberal and democratic parties than older generations is not entirely true. Voters aged 18 to 24 were indeed more prone to vote for opposition parties, but not necessarily liberal and democratic ones. In the 2016 Duma elections, the caricature neo-Stalinists from Communists of Russia benefited the most from the support of the youngest category of voters; in the elections to regional assemblies in 2016—2021 the radical imperialists from the Liberal Democratic Party did it. In the Duma elections of 2021 the greatest support from the youngest age cohort received, on the one hand, the “systemic opposition” in the face of the Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party, and on the other hand, the debutant of the election campaign, the New People Party, that adheres to liberal positions in the economic sphere, but is quite loyal to the existing regime.

Previous research on the voting propensity of young Americans has largely treated the effects of state electoral laws as homogenous, despite today’s youth belonging to the most racially and ethnically diverse age cohort to date. Research has documented differences in participatory resources across racial, ethnic, and age groups, with recent work also suggesting differences in racial and ethnic identity influences across age groups. These factors may lead to significant differences in voter turnout under different state electoral environments. Using the Current Population Survey (2000–2016), national voter rolls (2012), and the Cost of Voting Index, this study investigates how the intersectionality of age and racial/ethnic identification affect voting decisions across state electoral environments. Whether comparing young voters across racial/ethnic identifications or comparing young voters to their older racial/ethnic counterparts, results strongly support the assertion that young voters are affected to differing degrees by increased costs to vote along racial/ethnic lines.

Party politics in contemporary Europe often exhibit marked generational biases. Older voters are both more likely to turn out to vote to support political parties at elections and also to be members of political parties (Goerres 2009). Conversely, younger voters are increasingly disinclined to participate in formal party-electoral politics leading to concern over the ‘greying’ of party democracy and of socio-political organizations (Henn et al. 2002; Phelps 2006; Goerres 2009; and Robertson 2009). Certain (types of) parties are disproportionately supported by older age groups. Indeed, in certain cases – as with the members of the British Conservative Party during 1990s (Whiteley et al. 1994) or the electorate of the Czech Republic’s Communist Party (Hanley 2001) – older age cohorts can find themselves in the majority, significantly affecting the way such parties understand, prioritize and respond to issues of the day and often tending to narrow their political appeal over time.KeywordsWelfare StateParty SystemParliamentary ElectionRetire PeoplePolitical EntrepreneurThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Have digital tools and methods accelerated the rate of scholarly production over the last 20 years? If so, has this acceleration been beneficial for scholarship? This article considers examples of accelerated historical scholarship as well as calls for a “slow history.” Through an analysis of the author's own experiences with the digital humanities, it examines the advantages and disadvantages of digital technologies in the field of history. It concludes that online resources and digital technologies have expanded the archive for the historian and created new ways to reach other specialists and the general public. Nevertheless, historical scholarship must still rely on carefully crafted, well-argued prose whose production cannot be accelerated by new digital technologies, although recent developments in the field of artificial intelligence may ultimately challenge this situation. In recent decades, the field (or, at times, discipline) of digital humanities (DH) has revolutionized the scholarly profession and beyond—and with good reason. Seen at times as a democratizing force, DH has led to the creation of an increasing number of open- access databases and scholarly publications, the launching of massive archival digitization initiatives, and the development of numerous digital tools that help streamline the work of the academic researcher, student, and educator. In many ways, then, its benefits are manifest. Yet, recent years have also begun to reveal numerous problems that could influence various aspects of our trade as well as what—and how—information will be available in the future. This article discusses some of the advantages and disadvantages of DH and invites the reader to reflect on what we can do to help mitigate these problems. Exciting new modes of digital scholarship have emerged in recent years, providing us with expanded windows onto the past. This process has been accelerated by somewhat democratized ways of digitizing and analyzing source material. A main issue of contemporary knowledge production using digitized sources is how power can so easily be reinscribed into access to archives. The choice to digitize collections, even the existence of collections themselves, creates a great opportunity for research but also runs the risk of reinforcing the privilege and worldviews that have shaped and continue to shape the very processes of digitization and digitalization. Drawing on examples of Western and non-Western digital scholarship, this article argues that, although the digital facilitates greater public knowledge of collections, when it comes to decolonizing our research subjects, it also introduces significant layers of complexity. This article advances an analysis of the development and state of critical digital humanities. It posits two modalities for this approach to digital humanities (DH). The first is a modality of inward-looking, functional self-critique that comprises a rethinking of computational genesis stories, logics and methods, institutions and infrastructures, and digital capitalism, and the second is an outward-looking critique best understood as a form of situated sociopolitical engagement that embraces epistemic and social justice projects that are decolonial, anti-racist, inclusive, collaborative, and multilingual. Through these analyses, the article offers a vision of critical digital humanities in its mission to critique the ideologies, social inequities, and epistemological hierarchies that are built into technological products and computational logics and that are concomitantly fostered by knowledge- creation industries of universities, corporations, governments, and the GLAM[R] sector. In this way, the article shows how critical digital humanities helps us to envision the role that DH can play in processes of recovery, reparations, emancipation, and community-building. Drawing upon over 20 years as Editor-in-Chief of H-France, I argue that the scholarly profession, established in Cold War era, pre-digital institutions, has only begun to adapt to the transformations introduced by the global digital humanities. A generational shift is currently underway as younger scholars more natively adept with digital technologies use their skills and forms of new media to press for changes in hiring and tenure practices, to demand greater progress on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) issues, and to insist that the academy confront the collapse of academic positions in the humanities and provide training for and recognition of alternative career paths. I call upon professional organizations to undertake difficult conversations and take leadership in reshaping professional organizations for a post–Cold War, digital age, especially in terms of funding priorities. Scholarly organizations will best gain influence through collaboration.

Journal Article Cohort Analysis of Party Identification Among Southern Whites, 1952–1972 Get access CAROL A. CASSEL CAROL A. CASSEL Assistant Professor of Political Science the University of Missouri—St. LouisThe author is indebted to Robert Erikson and Norman Luttbeg for their encouragement and helpful comments. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Public Opinion Quarterly, Volume 41, Issue 1, SPRING 1977, Pages 28–33, https://doi.org/10.1086/268349 Published: 01 January 1977