Abstract
While it certainly has proved expedient to describe people’s behavior in terms of probabilities, it is not clear whether, to what extent, or under what conditions, it is admissable to identify actual behavior with some reasonably well-fitting probabilistic description of it. What the authors call the confusion problem arises where such admissibility is implicitly assumed. Some examples of this problem are discussed, viz. those accruing from the determination of subjective probability as degree of felt certainty. A more detailed analysis is presented of the problem of changes in feelings of uncertainty, defined as revisions of opinion.
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