Abstract

This book has argued that truth is a functional property that can be manifested differently in distinct domains of inquiry. This chapter looks at how truth is manifested in one such domain: our thoughts about morality. It argues that the truth of moral propositions is manifested by an epistemically constrained property — the property of concordance.

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