Abstract
Schulting concentrates on two connected elements of Kant’s theory of self-consciousness: the transcendental conditions for establishing the identity of self-consciousness, which first enables the awareness thereof, namely self-consciousness strictly speaking, and the relation between self-consciousness and self-knowledge. Schulting shows that Kant’s view of the identity of self-consciousness is in fact not derivative, and that instead it shows how any account of self-consciousness and the identity of self is first made possible by transcendental consciousness or transcendental apperception.
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