Antisemitic Conspiracy Theories and Violent Extremism on the Far Right: a Public Health Approach to Counter-Radicalization

Creating Conspiracy Beliefs: How Our Thoughts Are Shaped

<p>A conspiracy theory or belief has typically been defined as an allegation of malevolent secrecy and plotting by a group of powerful actors, working in unison to fulfil sinister hidden goals at the expense of the general populace. Such beliefs tend to contradict common (and typically more benign) explanations for events and have the potential to reinforce or be used to ‘justify’ undesirable behaviours (e.g., discrimination, non-adherence to crucial healthcare practices, and environmental damage). However, the social psychological literature, specifically, concerning conspiracy beliefs is in its relative infancy. The overarching aim of this thesis is to provide greater coherency to future literature via a comprehensive examination of the measurement and prediction of conspiracy beliefs. A review of the existing research illustrates that, to date, the literature has tended to take a ‘fractionated’ approach to the study of conspiracy beliefs. That is, studies have tended to focus on scenario-specific conspiracies, and isolated predictors of conspiracy belief. Demonstrating that belief in real-world conspiracies and a generalised tendency to believe in conspiracies are equivalent has theoretical implications of understanding exactly what leads to these beliefs. To address this issue Study 1 examined the development, validation, and comparison of a Specific Conspiracy Belief Scale and a Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale. A comparison of the relationships between various psychological predictor variables and both of these conspiracy belief scales was conducted in Study 2. These studies revealed that the Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale was equivalent in performance in terms of its relationship to various predictor variables, and reliability and validity, to previously used specific conspiracy belief measures. The advantage of using the single generalised measure is its ability to be used consistently and comparatively across a range of different conspiracy scenarios. The review of the literature also revealed that although a number of predictor variables have been identified as being associated with conspiracy beliefs, studies have tended to only look at a relatively small subset of variables within a given study. Indeed, a critical analysis shows that the variables themselves may fall in to various (not necessarily independent) groupings or clusters: socio-political, personality, psychopathological, cognitive, and psychological control factors. Thus, the second goal of this thesis was to gain a better understanding of the relative contribution of the variety of variables that have been suggested as predicting conspiracy beliefs. A comprehensive analysis of the role played by a large number of potential predictor variables on their own and as part of domain groupings was performed within the context of a single population study. This issue formed a second aim of Study 2. The results showed that these variables can be reduced down to several common elements, which reveals there is no (as yet identified) single powerfully predictive psychological cause of conspiracy thinking. Rather, it is likely that psychopathological, socio-political, personality, and cognitive elements combine to explain individual differences in conspiracy belief. Finally, the validity of the Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale and the relationships between a subset of key predictor variables (identified in Study 2) and conspiracy beliefs in the context of a wider population sample was a focus of Study 3. By using a large New Zealand-wide sample, Study 3 also broadened the scope of the thesis to examine the potential contribution of key demographic variables and psychological predictor variables in the prediction of conspiracy beliefs. Combining the demographic and psychological variables together in a hierarchical multiple regression revealed that nearly a quarter of variance in conspiracy belief was explained by these factors. However, when removing the shared variance of these predictors a number of demographic and psychological variables became non-significant or weakly predictive at best – a finding which again suggests that there are common elements that predict conspiracy belief. The remaining unique predictors of conspiracy thinking suggests that one of these common elements represent a hostile, suspicious, cynical, and threat-based worldview. Finally, although demographic variables do impact conspiracy beliefs, their unique effect is very small, and their effect works indirectly by impacting psychological predictors of conspiracy thinking. In conclusion, the current thesis has demonstrated that a single Conspiracy Belief Scale can serve as a useful and valid tool for future studies investigating conspiracy beliefs and that although individual psychological and demographic variables only weakly predict conspiracy beliefs on their own, they do cluster around potential themes which can aid in the development in a more comprehensive theoretical perspective on conspiracy.</p>

<p>A conspiracy theory or belief has typically been defined as an allegation of malevolent secrecy and plotting by a group of powerful actors, working in unison to fulfil sinister hidden goals at the expense of the general populace. Such beliefs tend to contradict common (and typically more benign) explanations for events and have the potential to reinforce or be used to ‘justify’ undesirable behaviours (e.g., discrimination, non-adherence to crucial healthcare practices, and environmental damage). However, the social psychological literature, specifically, concerning conspiracy beliefs is in its relative infancy. The overarching aim of this thesis is to provide greater coherency to future literature via a comprehensive examination of the measurement and prediction of conspiracy beliefs. A review of the existing research illustrates that, to date, the literature has tended to take a ‘fractionated’ approach to the study of conspiracy beliefs. That is, studies have tended to focus on scenario-specific conspiracies, and isolated predictors of conspiracy belief. Demonstrating that belief in real-world conspiracies and a generalised tendency to believe in conspiracies are equivalent has theoretical implications of understanding exactly what leads to these beliefs. To address this issue Study 1 examined the development, validation, and comparison of a Specific Conspiracy Belief Scale and a Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale. A comparison of the relationships between various psychological predictor variables and both of these conspiracy belief scales was conducted in Study 2. These studies revealed that the Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale was equivalent in performance in terms of its relationship to various predictor variables, and reliability and validity, to previously used specific conspiracy belief measures. The advantage of using the single generalised measure is its ability to be used consistently and comparatively across a range of different conspiracy scenarios. The review of the literature also revealed that although a number of predictor variables have been identified as being associated with conspiracy beliefs, studies have tended to only look at a relatively small subset of variables within a given study. Indeed, a critical analysis shows that the variables themselves may fall in to various (not necessarily independent) groupings or clusters: socio-political, personality, psychopathological, cognitive, and psychological control factors. Thus, the second goal of this thesis was to gain a better understanding of the relative contribution of the variety of variables that have been suggested as predicting conspiracy beliefs. A comprehensive analysis of the role played by a large number of potential predictor variables on their own and as part of domain groupings was performed within the context of a single population study. This issue formed a second aim of Study 2. The results showed that these variables can be reduced down to several common elements, which reveals there is no (as yet identified) single powerfully predictive psychological cause of conspiracy thinking. Rather, it is likely that psychopathological, socio-political, personality, and cognitive elements combine to explain individual differences in conspiracy belief. Finally, the validity of the Generalised Conspiracy Belief Scale and the relationships between a subset of key predictor variables (identified in Study 2) and conspiracy beliefs in the context of a wider population sample was a focus of Study 3. By using a large New Zealand-wide sample, Study 3 also broadened the scope of the thesis to examine the potential contribution of key demographic variables and psychological predictor variables in the prediction of conspiracy beliefs. Combining the demographic and psychological variables together in a hierarchical multiple regression revealed that nearly a quarter of variance in conspiracy belief was explained by these factors. However, when removing the shared variance of these predictors a number of demographic and psychological variables became non-significant or weakly predictive at best – a finding which again suggests that there are common elements that predict conspiracy belief. The remaining unique predictors of conspiracy thinking suggests that one of these common elements represent a hostile, suspicious, cynical, and threat-based worldview. Finally, although demographic variables do impact conspiracy beliefs, their unique effect is very small, and their effect works indirectly by impacting psychological predictors of conspiracy thinking. In conclusion, the current thesis has demonstrated that a single Conspiracy Belief Scale can serve as a useful and valid tool for future studies investigating conspiracy beliefs and that although individual psychological and demographic variables only weakly predict conspiracy beliefs on their own, they do cluster around potential themes which can aid in the development in a more comprehensive theoretical perspective on conspiracy.</p>

Humans seem drawn to dark conspiracy theories, often in favor of the simple truth In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, misinformation and conspiracy theorizing have surged President Trump, for example, praised the antimalarial drug hydroxychloroquine as a "game changer" despite scant empirical evidence of its efficacy and safety for the treatment of SARS-CoV-2 Others in the administration have promoted the unsubstantiated theory that SARS-CoV-2 originated in a Chinese lab, despite scientific consensus that the virus likely originated in an animal source before zoonotic transfer and that no evidence indicates that the virus emerged through deliberate lab manipulation of a related virus Here, Friedman discusses why humans are vulnerable to conspiracy theories

ObjectiveThis study disentangles the known correlates of conspiracy beliefs—such as the general predisposition toward conspiratorial thinking, authoritarianism, and partisan and ideological predispositions—in order to better understand the psychological antecedents of such beliefs and answer the question: Who are conspiracy theorists?MethodsWe use classification and regression tree models to explain individual beliefs in specific conspiracy theories, employing a large set of known correlates of conspiratorial thinking.ResultsDepending on the characteristics of the conspiracy theory employed on the survey, we find that political orientations and conspiratorial thinking provide the most analytical leverage in predicting individual conspiracy beliefs. Furthermore, paranormal beliefs were more predictive than previous literature suggests, while psychological biases demonstrated very limited predictive utility.ConclusionsThe psychological antecedents of conspiracy beliefs used to explain those beliefs vary considerably by the stimuli or events at the center of a given conspiracy theory. Therefore, disproportionately favoring one type of conspiracy theory on one's survey may result in inferences about conspiracy theorists that do not translate across studies. Furthermore, though we are not yet capable of fully determining who conspiracy theorists are, conspiratorial thinking, paranormal beliefs, and political orientations are more predictive of particular conspiracy beliefs than other attitudes, predispositions, and orientations.

BackgroundSimilar effect sizes have been reported for the effects of conspiracy, pseudoscientific, and paranormal beliefs on authoritarian attitudes, which points to a conceptual problem at the heart of the conspiracy literature, namely lack of clarity as to what uniquely defines conspiracy beliefs and whether those unique elements contribute distinctly to authoritarian ideologies. To our knowledge, this is the first study to test empirically the predictive power of variance unique to each construct against covariance shared among these constructs when predicting authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes.MethodsOnline survey was administered to 314 participants in 2021 that included a battery of demographic and psychological measures. Hierarchical factor models were used to isolate unique variance from shared covariance among responses to items representing conspiracy, paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs. Structural equation models were used to test their unique and shared effects on authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes.ResultsWe found that our combined measurement model of paranormal thinking, conspiracism, and pseudoscience exhibited exceptional model fit, and that each construct was strongly predictive of both SDO and RWA (r = 0.73–0.86). Once the shared covariance was partitioned into a higher order factor, the residual uniqueness in each first order factors was either negatively related or unrelated to authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. Moreover, the higher order factor explained the gross majority of variance in conspiracy (R2 = 0.81) paranormal (R2 = 0.81) and pseudoscientific (R2 = 0.95) beliefs and was a far stronger predictor (β = 0.85, p < 0.01) of anti-democratic attitudes than political partisanship (β = 0.17, p < 0.01). Strong partisan identifiers of both parties showed much higher romanticism scores than party moderates.Conclusion and limitationsWhen predicting authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes, we found no empirically unique contributions of conspiracy beliefs. Instead, we found that a shared factor, representing a ‘romantic’ mindset was the main predictor of authoritarian and anti-democratic attitudes. This finding potentially explains failures of interventions in stopping the spread of misinformation and conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theory researchers should refocus on the shared features that conspiracy thinking has with other unwarranted epistemic beliefs to better understand how to halt the spread of misinformation, conspiracy thinking, anti-science attitudes, and even global authoritarianism.

ABSTRACTWe hypothesized that certain cognitive biases associated with delusional ideation might be associated with a tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. These biases were assessed using the Cognitive Bias Questionnaire for Psychosis (CBQp). Though conspiratorial thinking does not constitute clinical delusions (i.e., the aforementioned psychosis) per se, both delusions and belief in conspiracy theories involve beliefs that are not substantiated by evidence. The findings revealed that some of the cognitive biases of the CBQp, particularly anomalous perception, jumping to conclusions, intentionalizing, threatening event, and emotional reasoning, were correlated with generalized (Study 1) and more specific beliefs (Study 2) in conspiracies. The theoretical implications for conspiracy belief and subclinical delusional ideation are considered.

Conspiratorial thinking, selective exposure to conservative media, and response to COVID-19 in the US

Henrik Ibsen and Conspiracy Thinking: The Case of <i>Peer Gynt</i>

This chapter describes how, in the two intervening years since the 2015 report was completed, the landscape of the right-wing extremist (RWE) movement in Canada appears to have changed dramatically, in large part thanks to Donald J. Trump’s journey to the White House. His campaign and his surprising electoral victory rode a wave of anti-elitism and xenophobia. He masterfully exploited the economic and cultural anxieties of white working-class and petite bourgeois Americans by deflecting blame for their woes onto the “usual suspects”, among them minorities, liberals, Muslims, professionals and immigrants. His rhetoric touched a chord, and in fact emboldened and energized white supremacist ideologies, identities, movements and practices in the United States and around the world. Indeed, the Trump Effect touched Canada as well. This chapter explores how the American politics of hate unleashed by Trump’s right-wing populist posturing galvanized Canadian white supremacist ideologies, identities, movements and practices. This chapter provides an overview of the manifestations of the Trump Effect in Canada. We also contextualize the antecedents of Trump’s resonance in Canada, highlighting the preconditions for and currents and characteristics of RWE in Canada.

This dissertation consists of one review chapter (Chapter 2) and four empirical chapters (Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6). Jointly these chapters emphasize the importance of categorizing conspiracy theories as either ingroup (i.e., the suspected conspiracy is located within a valued community, e.g., own government or own political party) versus outgroup (i.e., the suspected conspiracy is located outside a valued community, e.g., a foreign government or an opposing political party). Specifically, the thesis is designed to examine the different psychological antecedents and social consequences of ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories. Conspiracy beliefs are commonly treated as a homogeneous phenomenon. Accumulating research suggests, however, that it is necessary to distinguish between different types of conspiracy theories, as such different conceptualizations have different psychological effects. Chapter 2 proposes at least three facets that are important. Besides the distinction between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories (1), also matters (2) whether the conspiracy theory is directly relevant for perceivers’ core values, and (3) how much power or status the perceived conspirators have. We describe this organizational framework in terms of the acronym “GIST” (Groups, Ideology, and Status - Typology). In Chapter 2, we also discuss some distinct consequences of these facets in affecting societally consequential behaviors, such as collective action, protest, hostility, or polarization. The following four chapters zoom in empirically on the first (“Groups”) facet. Chapter 3 examines how a variety of social crisis situations influences outgroup conspiracy beliefs, as well as the underlying cognitive mechanisms linking existential threats to outgroup conspiracy beliefs, within a Chinese context. Chapter 4 reveals how ingroup victimhood orientation inherited from history, and the conspiracy beliefs about the historical perpetrator group, jointly affect current collective action tendencies. The chapter specifically comprises a series of studies examining the influence of victim consciousness on conspiracy theories and collective action among Chinese participants. Chapter 5 explores the complex relationships of two different forms of ingroup identification – collective narcissism and collective self-esteem – with both ingroup and outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Previous research has established that collective narcissism and non-narcissistic positive ingroup identification (such as collective self-esteem) are associated differently with conspiracy beliefs. We propose that these specific relationships are different for ingroup and outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Chapter 5 reports three cross-sectional surveys conducted in China and the United States to explore the intricate relationships between these variables, along with their underlying mechanisms and cross-cultural consistency. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the contrary effects of embracing ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories on system-justifying belief, as well as the underlying psychological mechanisms. By distinguishing between ingroup versus outgroup conspiracy theories, Chapter 6 seeks to explain a paradox in conspiracy theory research: Namely, that conspiracy beliefs are associated with both derogation and justification of the social system. To conclude, this dissertation sought to investigate how outgroup conspiracy beliefs emerge in crisis situations and influence intergroup dynamics. Moreover, the dissertation delineates how outgroup conspiracy beliefs differ from ingroup conspiracy beliefs in terms of psychological antecedents and social consequences. The findings are consistent with a key goal of our proposed GIST model, which is to highlight the complexity of different conspiracy beliefs, avoid overgeneralization of research findings, and provide direction to the domains in which ingroup and outgroup conspiracy theories may originate and persist. Taken together, this dissertation attempts to provide an organizational framework to help researchers design future studies that are more mindful of the types of conspiracy theories under investigation.

ABSTRACTObjectiveThe COVID‐19 pandemic and other recent crises have fueled the spread and political exploitation of conspiracy theories across both the United States and Europe. Despite growing concerns about their influence, particularly in election campaigns and public discourse, research on conspiracy beliefs' psychological and value‐based roots remains underdeveloped in the European context. This study addresses this gap by examining how individuals’ deeply ingrained values shape their susceptibility to conspiratorial thinking.MethodsDrawing on data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from 20 European democracies and the Schwartz Value framework, I use linear regression models to analyze how values influence the likelihood of believing in conspiracy theories and how these effects differ across countries.ResultsThe findings highlight that specific values make individuals more prone to conspiracy beliefs. Individuals who prioritize the well‐being of others (self‐transcendence) are less likely to endorse conspiracy theories. In contrast, those who focus on personal gain and power over others (self‐enhancement) are more susceptible to conspiracy thinking. However, these findings vary substantially depending on national contexts.ConclusionBy empirically demonstrating these patterns, this study advances our understanding of the psychological foundations of conspiracy beliefs and offers insights for developing tailored, context‐sensitive interventions that leverage value framing to counteract the spread of conspiracy narratives.

While some research addresses the relationship between religiosity and political attitudes, little is known about the relationship between religion, conspiracy beliefs, and political culture. Using the concept of authoritarianism, we hypothesise that a conspiracy mentality is likely to be associated with ethnocentric and anti‐democratic attitudes, just as some types of religion—e.g., religious fundamentalism—have a close affinity to authoritarian attitudes. Using data from an online UK survey (N = 1093; quota sample, representative of education, gender, age, and region), we enquire to what extent belief in conspiracy theories is associated with xenophobic, racist, and anti‐democratic attitudes, which aspects of religiosity in combination with other factors play a role in conspiracy beliefs, and which communicative and interpretative practices are associated with belief in conspiracy ideologies. Our analysis reveals that both belief in classical conspiracy theories and belief in Covid‐19 conspiracy theories are significantly related to anti‐Muslim sentiments, anti‐Black racism, and right‐wing extremism. Moreover, a regression analysis shows that an initially discovered relationship between the strength of religiosity and conspiracy mentality disappears once religious fundamentalism is included in the model. The effect of religious fundamentalism is moderated by narcissism and the style of social media use—namely, trusting posts made by one’s friends more than the opinions of experts.

This presentation summarizes a register-based study on women who have been identified as belonging to three violent extremist milieus in Sweden: violent Islamic, violent far-right, and violent far-left extremism. We studied the women in these milieus along a number of analytical dimensions, ranging from demographic and educational to criminal background and network relationships, and compared them to three reference groups: (i) non-extremist biological sisters to female extremists in the study population; (ii) men in the respective extremist milieus; and (iii) female members of other antagonistic milieus such as organized crime. Our results showed that there are both similarities and differences between groups. In some cases, like age and region of birth, there are commonalities between violent far-right and violent far-left women. Regarding region of birth and migration background, women affiliated to violent far-right and violent far-left extremism are predominantly born in Sweden. Women affiliated to violent Islamic extremism tend to be born in Sweden to a greater extent than men in the same milieu, but to a much lesser degree than women in the violent far-right and violent far-left. When it comes to education, women in the violent Islamic milieu are closer to women in violent far-right extremism. Women in violent far-left extremism perform best at school, with consistently higher grades. The average score of women in violent far-left extremism is identical to that of their sisters, and women in violent far-left extremism perform on average substantially better than men in the same milieu. Women in violent Islamic extremism, in contrast, perform on average similarly to men in violent far-left extremism, and they perform better than their biological sisters. Regarding labor market attachment, violent Islamic extremists have the weakest attachment and the highest dependency upon financial assistance as well as a low employment share (36 percent in 2016), but also a relatively high share of individuals with a high number of unemployment days, suggesting that women in violent Islamic extremism experience higher social exclusion. We find the highest employment share among women in violent far-left extremism, where 89 percent are gainfully employed in 2016 (80 percent for at least three of the last five years) and about a 20 percent unemployment share. Men in violent far-left extremism have an employment share around 10 percent below that of the women in far-left extremism for 2016. The highest fractions of individuals that have not been in contact with the health system due to mental disorders are among violent Islamic extremism, with the women’s fraction at 84 percent, compared to their non-extremist sisters and men in the same milieu that are just above 79 percent. Women in violent far-left extremism have the highest share of in-patient major mental disorders among the extremist milieus (3 percent), higher than men in the same milieu (less than 1 percent) as well as than women and their sisters in the other categories. During the period 2007–2016, 68 percent of individuals in the extremist milieus are covered by the register of suspected individuals. The coverage is substantially higher for men, 72 percent than for women, 43 percent. Compared to their sisters, women in all three milieus are criminally active to a much higher extent. However, women in all three milieus are less criminally active than women in other antagonistic milieus, among whom 67 percent have been suspected at least once. In all three milieus, the share of men with a criminal record is about twice as large as that of women. As far as the gender aspect is concerned, we know that extremist milieus generally have a conservative view of the role of women in society. In our results, this is reflected in the low rates of crime in women compared to men, and relatively marginal positions in the co-offending networks. The fact that women in violent far-left extremism have stronger positions in their networks than the other women in the study population is expected, given that the ideology of this milieu allows for greater equality. This means that women in violent far-left extremism participate more often than, e.g., women in violent far-right extremism, in political actions where violence is common. This pattern of gender roles and criminal involvement also holds concerning women in violent Islamic extremism. This milieu has a more traditional view of the role of women than views among even violent far-right extremists. Women in violent Islamic extremism are less involved in crime and, in particular, violent crime.

Although a growing body of studies has explored the antecedents of people’s adoption of conspiracy beliefs, the behavioral consequences of conspiracy theories – particularly regarding political engagement – have been less explored. Research has looked at conspiracy beliefs, exposure to specific conspiracy theories, conspiracy thinking, and the communication of conspiracy theories as predictor variables. To date, the findings are mixed due to conceptual differences and the selection of predictors with different functions and aspects. I offer new evidence. First, I explore whether conspiracy beliefs translate into political engagement. Having analyzed the 2012 American National Election Study, I find a positive association between conspiracy beliefs and political activities. Second, by manipulating exposure to a nascent conspiracy theory that emerged during the 2016 presidential primary elections, I examine whether exposure to conspiracy theories drives intention to engage in politics. Across two original survey experiments, the results indicate that conspiracy theories may lead to positive action, encouraging people to get involved in politics. The findings demonstrate that the spread of conspiracy theories is not uniformly detrimental to society. These findings also help to explain why elites within losing political organizations are more likely to spread conspiracy theories: they are a means for mobilizing disenfranchised citizens.