Abstract
ABSTRACT We explore whether anti-corruption campaigns affect pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) in Chinese listed companies. Using a detailed anti-corruption data set at the city level from 2012 to 2018, we find that anti-corruption campaigns lead CEOs to shield (justify) their compensation by increasing pay-performance sensitivity. This result passes a series of robustness tests and endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, channel tests show that anti-corruption campaigns increase pay-performance sensitivity via the deterrence effect and the contagion effect. Cross-sectional tests show that the positive relationship between anti-corruption campaigns and PPS is more pronounced in larger firms and firms that belong to oligopoly markets.
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