Annapolis and the Abbas-Olmert direct negotiations: A critical analysis

The United States and Israel

The Threat of BDS

In this work, Yael S. Aronoff studies six Israeli prime ministers: Yitzhak Shamir, Binyamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon, Yitzhak Rabin, Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres, and explains why some departed from doctrinaire political and ideological positions on matters such as the Arab—Israeli peace process and regional political settlement, while others did not. The author traces the leaders’ psychological and political conduct using an ideological index, revealing whether the individuals felt time to be on Israel's side; their ideological goals; whether they saw the world as being for or against Israel; how much peace might contribute to security; and whether peace required territorial compromise. In addition, Aronoff conducts a cognitive style analysis of the leaders relating to, inter alia, their risk propensity, cognitive flexibility, emotional intelligence and image of the enemy. Commencing with Shamir, Aronoff describes a leader averse to compromise on issues he considered vital to Israel's national interests. Nowhere was this better highlighted than in the standoff between the Israeli Prime Minister and the White House of George H. W. Bush, when, in 1992, Jerusalem had to choose between continued construction in the Occupied Territories or American loan guarantees. Shamir chose the former, and, along with Bush, was voted out of power. However, Shamir did attend the 1991 peace conference in Madrid, thereby revealing a tactical, rather than strategic shift. The emerging theme of change continues in the chapter dealing with Netanyahu, who, although sceptical of the Oslo Accords, nevertheless ratified them and went on to sign the Wye Agreement. Aronoff also highlights the importance of the relationship between Netanyahu and Obama, which, in the buildup to, and aftermath of, the recent Israeli elections has taken on a new energy. No observer could have failed to notice the discord between the two leaders surrounding Netanyahu's 2015 speech to Congress, further compounded by US condemnation of the rhetoric employed domestically by Netanyahu on the eve of his recent election victory. Aronoff does justice to Ariel Sharon in the chapter dedicated to the latter-day peacemaker. Special attention is paid to his unlikely rise to power in 2001, his exit from the Likud, his creation of the centrist political party Kadima and Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Sharon explained his political transformation in a succinct sentence after becoming prime minister. Talking of the Prime Minister's Office, he stated: ‘What I see from here, I didn't see from there’.

As populist campaigns against the media become increasingly common around the world, it is ever more urgent to explore how journalists adopt and respond to them. Which strategies have journalists developed to maintain the public's trust, and what may be the implications for democracy? These questions are addressed using a thematic analysis of forty-five semistructured interviews with leading Israeli journalists who have been publicly targeted by Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. The article suggests that while most interviewees asserted that adherence to objective reporting was the best response to antimedia populism, many of them have in fact applied a “strategic bias” to their reporting, intentionally leaning to the Right in an attempt to refute the accusations of media bias to the Left. This strategy was shaped by interviewees' perceived helplessness versus Israel's Prime Minister and his extensive use of social media, a phenomenon called here “the influence of presumed media impotence.” Finally, this article points at the potential ramifications of strategic bias for journalism and democracy. Drawing on Hallin's Spheres theory, it claims that the strategic bias might advance Right-wing populism at present, while also narrowing the sphere of legitimate controversy—thus further restricting press freedom—in the future.

This chapter examines the likely outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war and whether this war could have been prevented or resolved peacefully. It analyzes a peace deal framework agreement between Ukraine and Russia that was close to being finalized in spring 2022. The analysis of this peace deal framework and reasons for its failure is based on its text and statements in the media and social media by the head of the Ukrainian delegation at the peace talks, Ukrainian delegation members, Ukrainian officials close to Zelensky, then prime minister of Israel, top official of the US State Department, the ex-German chancellor, president of Turkey, the Turkish foreign minister, and current and former US and Russian leaders and senior officials. The analysis shows that defeat of Ukraine is the most likely outcome of the war.

The study presents an innovative model for examining both the relationship between the verbal and nonverbal behavior of a political figure in political interviews and the effects of his/her political stature on his/her performance. The uniqueness of the model lies in the simultaneous examination of the two channels of communication, the verbal and nonverbal and the definition of their relationship, e.g., discrepancy when there is a contradiction and inconsistency between the channels, and non-discrepancy when they are consistent and do not contradict each other. The model characterizes patterns of discrepancy and non-discrepancy both in the behavior of the interviewer and in that of the interviewee and relates them to the political standing of the interviewee. The study examined the behavior of Israel's former prime minister Ariel Sharon in television appearances over the past 20 years, in which he had both periods of strong political standing as well as periods of low political status. Findings significantly show that patterns of discrepancy and non-discrepancy between the verbal and the nonverbal messages are indicative of the political stature of the political person being interviewed. The findings have interesting methodological and theoretical implications.

Repenting for What Israel Did to Gaza—Without Condoning the Wrongs Committed by Hamas

Political losers' theory claims that political losers can move to a winning position if they turn the tables and change the situation completely. Our analysis shows that political losers can become winners by maintaining their favored option on the agenda. If the alternatives promoted by the political winners collapse and the losers have access to the winners' agenda, then there can be a situation in which the losers' favored alternative might be adopted. The 1993 Oslo Agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) illustrates this. We show how a team of political losers facilitated an alternative that the political winner – Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin – eventually had to adopt when his more favored options for negotiations became irrelevant. Thus, this narrative offers a complementary explanation to existing explanations of the Oslo Agreement, applies political losers' theory and provides further insight into the influence of domestic politics on international negotiations.

The burgeoning conflict over the water sharing is now a global phenomenon. Many international treaties, laws and water management models are available to settle down the water sharing issues among the states like Absolute Territorial Sovereignty and the Upper Riparian, Absolute Territorial Integrity and the Lower Riparian and Mediated Strategy of Restricted Integrity. Inter-provincial water sharing issue in Pakistan is a classic example of upstream-downstream rivalry which has been traced back from the pre-partition history of Pakistan. Lower riparian province Sindh has a historical conflict with upper riparian province Punjab, Balochistan being lower riparian has water conflicts with Sindh, and KPK has water sharing issue with Punjab. The constitution has also empowered the existing institutions like CCI and IRSA and established several new rules for the water manageme among provinces. Currently, it has become the issue of federation and has disturbed the provincial harmony and national integration.

PurposeTo explore a potential relationship between politicians’ media background and social media success through an analysis of content and engagement strategies adopted by three consecutive Israeli prime ministers on their official Facebook pages.Design/methodology/approachA detailed comparative content analysis of a total of 1,242 posts published by three Israeli prime ministers – Benjamin Netanyahu, Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett – on the same official Facebook account, “the Prime Minister of Israel,” during their respective terms. Metrics like engagement rates, content distribution and media type utilization were considered.FindingsAll analyzed prime ministers exhibited consistent messaging strategies, suggesting a standardized approach to digital political communication. However, we found no correlation between a politician’s media background and their success on social media. Instead, decisive determinants of engagement outcomes were factors like longstanding political exposure and familiarity.Practical implicationsThe observed uniformity in leaders’ messaging strategies indicates a prevalent standardized approach in digital political communication, revealing potential avenues for innovation and diversification.Originality/valueThis research challenges the prevailing notion that background in media inherently benefits digital political engagement, emphasizing the significance of political experience. The results provide new insights into the evolving landscape of political communication. Using signaling theory to evaluate how digital content reveals leaders’ intentions and credibility, our findings provide new insights into political communication in the digital era.

PurposeSocial media has been widely adopted by politicians and political parties during elections and routine times and has been discussed before. However, research in the field has so far not addressed how a political leader's private or official social media account affects their message, language and style. The current study examined how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu uses his private Facebook account, compared to his use of his official Facebook page “Prime Minister of Israel.”Design/methodology/approachIn this study, the author identified the differences between these two digital entities using in-depth content analysis based on all posts (N = 1,484) published on the two pages over a 12-month period between 2018 and 2019.FindingsThe study’s findings indicate that Netanyahu regularly uses his personal page to address topics that are not represented on his official page, such as mentioning and attacking political rivals, presenting political agenda, and criticizing Israeli journalists and media organizations. Netanyahu's private Facebook account is also used to comment on personal events such as the criminal indictments he is facing and family affairs.Originality/valueThe findings highlight the need to investigate the different identities that politicians maintain on social media when they use personal or official accounts, sometimes on the same platform. The medium matters, yet the author also discovered that a leader's choice of account and its title are also important.Peer reviewThe peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/OIR-01-2021-0004.

Mara'Abe v. Prime Minister of Israel. Case No. HCJ 7957/04. At <http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html> (English translation).Supreme Court of Israel, sitting as the High Court of Justice, September 15, 2005.In Mara ‘abe v. Prime Minister of Israel, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the routing of a portion of Israel's “security fence” in the northern West Bank violated international humanitarian law. The Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice, ordered the Israeli government to consider alternative paths for the barrier. The Mara'abe decision expanded on the Court's earlier ruling in Beit Sourik Village Council v. Israel, in which the Court ordered the rerouting of another segment of the obstacle. Mara ’abe also revealed some of the Israeli Court's views on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory— the 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding that construction of the barrier anywhere in occupied territory violates international law.

Moshe Sharett, Israel's second Prime Minister from 1953–5, its Foreign Minister from 1948–56, and one of the founders of the State of Israel, was at the centre of events in Israel and the Yishuv for over three decades. Under his leadership, the ‘moderate’ camp exerted a seminal influence on the politics and orientation of the young Jewish state. This definitive biography of Sharett provides a needed challenge to the accepted view that stresses the dominant role and achievements of Israel's first prime minister, David Ben–Gurion, and his activist supporters. Ben–Gurion, representative of the school of retaliation in relation to the Arabs, opposed Sharett's negotiative politics and forced his resignation. This book restores the reputation of Sharett and his followers. Following Sharett's political life, the book provides an original detailed account of major episodes in the history of the Holy Land from the beginning of the 20th century to the mid-1960s, using previously untapped sources. It tells of the hitherto untold struggles between the founding fathers of the Jewish state, particularly concerning peace with the Palestinian Arabs and the neighbouring Arab countries. It concludes that Sharett and his moderate friends constituted a realistic and humane alternative to the activists led by Ben–Gurion, and it will provide a new source for future studies of the Yishuv and Israel.

Reviewed by: Innocent Abroad Itamar Rabinovich Innocent Abroad, by Martin Indyk. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009. 494 pp. $30.00. Almost a decade after Bill Clinton's departure from the White House his ambitious effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and its failure remain the focus of considerable attention and an acrimonious debate. The problems addressed by the Clinton administration—the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian conflicts—remain acute issues on the Middle Eastern and international agendas, and the Obama administration's decision to assign a high priority to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to try early on to open dialogues with Iran and Syria have raised fresh interest in the failure of an earlier Democratic administration to implement a similar program. Some of the actors in the diplomacy of the 1990s are still in place and some are back—Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel's Prime Minister and Ehud Barak as Minister of Defense. And if Bill Clinton is not back, his wife, as Secretary of State, is designated to play a major role. Martin Indyk's Innocent Abroad is the latest account of Clinton's policy in the Middle East. Indyk chose to focus his book on Bill Clinton, his team, and his effort to restructure the Middle East, to resolve the Arab Israeli conflict, and to describe and analyze from his unusually rich perspective—Senior Director for the Middle East at the NSC, Ambassador to Israel (twice), and Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Near Eastern Bureau—what was attempted and what went wrong during that extraordinary period. The outcome is not yet another peace process memoir but a well written, absorbing, and insightful book, enhanced by Indyk's frankness in depicting his superiors and colleagues and by his willingness to digress every so often from the narrative to provide an in-depth analysis of an important issue. As the title of his book suggests, Indyk believes that U.S. presidents like Bill Clinton (and in a different fashion, George W. Bush) had to be disabused of a great deal of innocence (and in fact also hubris) when they encountered the complexity of the region. But tough or insurmountable as the challenge may be, U.S. presidents feel that they cannot ignore such major problems in a [End Page 157] crucial part of the world and are often fascinated and tempted by the unusual stage and the characters who populate it, only to find out that even the world's most powerful leader is unable to overcome an awesome set of obstacles: They will run up against the same structural impediments described in this book: the resistance of Arab leaders to change; the factiousness of Israeli politics; Palestinian dysfunctionalism and the vulnerability of any political process to endemic violence and terrorism. (p. 393) In order to understand fully what Indyk means by these "structural impediments," it would be useful to take a closer look at his account and interpretation of three of the most controversial episodes of that period. The first concerns one of the most important turning points in the evolution of the Madrid Process: Rabin's decision in August 1993 to sign the Oslo Accord rather than proceed with the Syrian track after having deposited with Secretary of State Christopher a conditional willingness to withdraw from the Golan in exchange for a package of peace and security comparable to the one given at the time by Anwar Sadat to Menachem Begin. As Rabin's negotiator with Syria and ambassador in Washington, I attributed the failure of this gambit to Rabin's disappointment with Asad's response to his bold move (yes in principle but a very low counter offer) and with Christopher's decision to pass on this response rather than tell Asad that it was unacceptable. Indyk has an entirely different interpretation. As he sees it, Rabin intended all along to make his first deal with the PLO, and the whole purpose of the Syrian gambit was simply to put pressure on Arafat in order to extract from him a better deal. Small wonder, then, that the Secretary of State and his team felt used and angry. In...

Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East