Abstract

In electricity market, wind power enterprises, thermal power enterprises and power grid enterprises belong to different stakeholders, thus an interest conflict exists within the utilization of new energy resources. To study the tripartite interest relationship not only relates to the settlement of the conflict among the participants of wind power integration, further, it will provide supports to policy makers to formulate the market structure of electricity and rules of competition. Based on the players with bounded rationality, the game situation of wind power enterprises, thermal power enterprises and power grid enterprises is analyzed by use of evolutionary game theory, and the replicator dynamic system of 2×2×2 asymmetric evolutionary game in three groups is built to simulate the tripartite behaviors according to the payoff matrix. The asymptotic stabilities of all the equilibria are given. Furthermore, the evolutionary result of the three parties without government intervention in new energy resources is given, and the condition to achieve the expected state is provided for the government who can carry out policies to change the three parties profit. The conclusions of the study may offer some reference for the formulation of electricity market structure and competition rules.

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