Abstract
Abstract This paper applies the EVA-based bonus incentive model and the EVA-based stock option incentive model to the executive compensation incentive system of multinational enterprise D and calculates the EVA amount by combining the profitability of multinational enterprise D and compares it with the net profit amount of the enterprise to obtain the difference between the two. In order to further investigate the relationship between the EVA amount and the net profit of multinational enterprises, the correlation hypothesis between executive compensation and the management of accrued surplus and the management of actual surplus is carried out, respectively. The countermeasures for the management of executive compensation in multinational enterprises under the background of the internationalization of the RMB are proposed according to the establishment of the research hypothesis. Executive compensation and accrued surplus management are negatively correlated, as shown by regression analysis, and an increase in the former will have a significant inhibitory impact on accrued surplus management behavior. There is a positive correlation between executive compensation and natural surplus management, and the significance level is 5%. This means that the increase in executive compensation has a promotion effect on natural surplus management.
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