An Untidy Tapestry of Texts: Secret Diaries of Special Operations in Occupied Burma and the British Official History of World War II

Sir Llewellyn Woodward’s official diplomatic history, though part of Britain’s Second World War official histories, had a very different history from the rest of the series. Commissioned originally during the war as confidential internal histories intended to help future policymakers learn from the wartime past, from 1946 onwards the official histories were targeted through publication at a wider academic and public audience outside Whitehall. The American audience proved a high priority. Unlike other volumes, in 1950 Woodward’s diplomatic history, though still in preparation, was subjected to a prime ministerial ban on publication because of infringements of the rules concerning official histories. Completed in 1956, the five-volume official history was not published until the 1970s, although a sanitised one-volume version was cleared for publication in 1962. Prior to publication Woodward’s full history was available for confidential use by policymakers, but in reality remained locked away in the departmental cupboard, excepting occasional access by politicians like Lord Avon writing their memoirs. Highlighting government efforts to manage the presentation of Britain’s wartime past as well as the difficulties of integrating history into the policymaking process, this study offers illuminating insights into Woodward’s experience of writing official history. In particular, as an academic historian based at Oxford and then Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study, his work as an official historian required him constantly to balance professional standards and reputation against government demands and pressures.

Digital Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Deception, Disinformation and Social Media

Testing Citizenship, Regulating History: The Fatal Impact

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Whose War Was It Anyway? Some Australian Historians and the Great War

Official military histories have considerable status and it is rarely that they are seriously challenged. Their authors are employed for long periods from government funds and have access to public documents well in advance of the general public. The results of their labours are sufficiently authoritative and detailed to tempt researchists to by-pass more wearisome investigation in the Public Record Office. When a serious error of historical fact or assessment is made in an official history the result can be particularly harmful for three reasons. The first stems from the status and high credibility of such volumes, open attacks upon the veracity of which are widely regarded as foolish and rather indecent. The second reason is the likely proliferation of untruth, as of truth, from an official history into many subsequent books, articles and lectures, which are then ranged together in opposition to dissenters from the official line. The third reason is the difficulty which exists in correcting errors and attitudes in an official history. In this article it is intended to consider a particularly gross malassessment of a British general, who was killed in the Burma campaign of the second world war, by the British Official History of that campaign. Major-General Orde Charles Wingate was born in 1903 and made his military reputation by his organization of the 'Special Night Squads' in Palestine before the war, by his command of the mainly Soudanese and Ethiopian 'Gideon Force' which invaded Ethiopia from the west in 1941 and by his two 'Chindit' campaigns in Burma in 1943 and 1944, in the second of which he was killed.

: Second World War history offers the military strategist a cornucopia of lessons learned on how to apply the art of military deception. This paper analyzed six Allied deception operations to identify the fundamental reasons why Allied deception efforts were the most successful in history. The six deception operations reviewed were Barclay, Cockade, and Bodyguard as well as the Soviet deception operations at Stalingrad, Kursk, and White Russia. A critical analysis of these six operations identified seven major factors that made Allied deception efforts extremely effective. These seven factors were that the Allies controlled all key channels of information, had great intelligence 'feedback' on their deception operations, had high-level and centralized control over deception planning, practiced sound deception techniques, subordinated deception to strategic and operational objectives, maintained adequate secrecy, and provided sufficient time for deception execution. These factors are relevant for today's operations and should be imbedded within U.S. doctrine. This study then examined Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, and determined it could better incorporate the lessons learned from World War II. Current joint doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contribution that deception provides to surprise, the importance of integrating deception within all three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting an adversary's preexisting beliefs when creating a deception story. Applying these World War II lessons will bolster U.S. deception capabilities.

ASSYRIAN kings had their armies> accomplishments at war LX chiseled in stone; twentieth-century governments have adopted 1 V the medium ofthe multivolume official history. After World War II, the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force published one apiece, for a total of well over a hundred volumes. The Soviet Union, where history is alive in more than a figurative sense and therefore has to be kept abreast of the times, has so far published one in the Khrushchev and one in the Brezhnev era, eighteen volumes altogether. The British History ofthe Second World War runs to forty-one volumes. The Military History Research Office of the German Bundeswehr has now published three volumes of a projected ten-volume set, The German Reich and the Second World War, which may (or may not) be the Ger? man official history. Whether it is that or not, The German Reich and the Second World War has a lineage in the genre second to none. Official war history is as

While official war histories have been readily criticised for the limitations associated with their government funding and production, the influence of the very contemporary nature of the histories has been less generally acknowledged. In the case of the Second World War, official history programmes were underway in the United Kingdom and across the British Commonwealth by 1946 and often drew on personal documents and recollections in conjunction with the more formal records of war. This article provides an example of the writing of an official history in practice to show ways in which the methodological challenges of producing these volumes could lie as much within their contemporary nature as with their official designation.

Traditionally, much literature on war details battles and campaigns. Quality varies from compilations of précis to full-length books on “decisive battles.” Much of this work is overly heroic and largely uncritical, but some is deeply scholarly. Accurate battle and operational history is extremely hard to write, especially about wars distant in time. It is also hard to read and understand, and it requires intimate knowledge of topography, not to mention an appreciation of logistics, leadership, command and control, and tactics that frequently change depending on the time and place and what army is involved. Traditional histories were often overly reliant on a few eyewitnesses or took the “top-down” approach dictated by heavy reliance on commanders’ memoirs. Thus, they too often were concerned primarily with military reputations, critical tactical decisions made or not made by commanders which putatively turned the tides of whole campaigns and even wars. From the 19th century, war diaries and letters home by more educated men sprinkled among a generally and more commonly illiterate soldiery enriched battle and campaign reconstructions, but still emphasized command decisions in battle reconstructions. Indeed, they amplified that bias by leaving out the common soldiers’ experiences, recollections, and perspectives. Modern accounts often benefit from the necessary collaborative writing by teams of historians or military professionals working from a multitude of sources on enormous battles of the 20th century, or extending this methodology back to earlier times. Eyewitness oral histories, interviews, and detailed after-action reports have become key sources in writing battle and campaign history, in addition to “official histories” and ever-wider publication of battle memoirs by even very low-level participants in modern wars. Battle study today nearly always includes “bottom-up” social and cultural issues, better reflecting the “face of battle” as it has been and continues to be experienced by ordinary soldiers.

This article analyses an episode in the development of intelligence official history in Britain. While an official history of intelligence in the Second World War was not approved until the 1970s, the idea had been pursued seriously in 1945 by Brigadier Dudley Clarke. Clarke had been the chief of deception operations in the Mediterranean theatre, and wanted to develop an official history and film recounting some of the exploits of his unit. This article argues that Clarke’s proposals, which were ultimately rejected by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff, showed a prescient understanding of the power of official history, recognized that complete secrecy would be counter-productive, and are thus an important early milestone in the evolution of intelligence official history.

(2003). The Turkish official military histories of the First World War: A bibliographic essay. Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 190-198.

史政組織為近代軍事參謀組織下之重要一環，各國藉由史政組織研究歷次戰爭，總結戰史經驗，減少或避免再度發生之前錯誤，做為日後作戰之鑑戒。德國是最早設置近代軍事參謀組織之國家，19世紀初期德國開始重視研究戰史，19世紀中後期，世界列強如美、日、俄、法等國之軍事參謀組織開始成立相關單位編纂戰史。 中國自古以來雖有史官負責紀錄正史，但並無專門記錄有關軍事史之組織，有關軍事之記載則分散於浩瀚史書群或個人著作中，直到清末設置近代軍事參謀組織「軍咨府」，中國開始有專門負責編纂戰史之單位。國民政府成立後，設立軍事委員會，該會下設參謀團（或名參謀部、參謀廳），其職掌有負編纂戰史之責，民國17年改為參謀本部，該部總務廳負責編纂戰史，同時也設置「戰史編纂組」，27年改編為軍令部，第一廳負責蒐編戰史，第二廳負責蒐編敵軍戰史，同時亦設置戰史編纂委員會負責蒐編中日戰史。 戰後，軍事委員會改組國防部，成立國防部史料局負責蒐編戰史之責，施行一陣後更名為史政局，民國38年因為國共內戰配合戰鬥內閣縮編人員，史政局縮編為史政處。史政處員額較之前少，但史政處時期處於「反共抗俄、反攻大陸」剛開始的階段，需要編輯大量與「共匪」、登陸與反登陸、對國民政府有正面宣傳等類的軍事史書，因編制人員不足及蔣中正先生等軍事高層逐漸重視史政的教育、借鑑等功能之因，希望藉由史政，強化軍方及一般民眾精神上的戰力，因此在民國46年7月，史政處再度擴編為史政局，史政局時期，繼續推行史政處時期業務，人員亦有增減，相較於史政處仍是較多；同時因為史政推行已久，累積之檔案極多，因此建立「國軍檔案室」，作為永久保存國軍檔案之單位。後來因應國軍需求實施精簡案，民國62年5月1日，史政局與編譯局合併為史政編譯局。 本文主要研究時間為民國35年國防部史料局成立62年5月1日國防部史政局與編譯局合併為止，亦會稍加敘述戰前國軍史政組織與部分列強史政組織。本文研究可分為三部分，首先國軍各時期史政組織名稱說法不一，本文試圖釐清戰前國軍史政組織之名稱、職掌、編制等。第二，試圖釐清戰後史政組織演變經由擴編、縮編與再擴編之原因，並描述戰後國軍史政組織之組織規模、人員編制、行政制度、訓練制度等制度；第三，試圖重建戰前、戰後國軍史政組織編纂史書之過程、方法。

Psychological manipulation refers to the strategic effort to influence and alter the attitudes and behaviors of a target audience. This study examines India's use of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and information warfare since 1947, highlighting how these tactics have jeopardized Pakistan’s sovereignty, national security, and international reputation. Framed through the lens of neo-imperialism, the research evaluates India’s intelligence and cyberspace operations, which have employed persuasive techniques to influence Pakistan’s decision-making, including its nuclear program, during critical incidents. The study identifies diverse methods used by Indian nationalist movements and propaganda campaigns to manipulate international perceptions of Pakistan. These include media and publications, support for separatist movements, counter-propaganda initiatives, and deception operations—all aimed at undermining Pakistan’s global image and influencing the international community. The findings emphasize that exploiting an adversary’s vulnerabilities is central to the success of PSYOP campaigns. India’s strategic use of these tactics underscores the effectiveness of psychological operations in achieving targeted outcomes. The study’s results have significant implications for understanding the mechanisms underpinning PSYOP and provide a foundation for assessing current and future PSYOP capabilities in South Asia. Overall, this research offers valuable insights into the efficacy of PSYOP in influencing audiences and contributes to the broader understanding of persuasion theory in the context of modern information warfare and national security.

John Mosier, The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War One (New York: Harper Collins, 2001). John Mosier, The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War Two (New York: Harper Collins, 2003). The interest of Mosier's works is not so much what he writes—there is a fair amount of misunderstanding, if not error, on offer in his books—but rather what his work indicates about the state of military history. A general and a more specific point arise. The tension between history as question/questioning and history as answer/answering, a tension that overlaps with, but is not completely coterminous with, that between research and theory, is accentuated in the case of military history by the extent to which it appears to attract more than its fair share of assertive individuals not given to qualification and self-doubt. This may seem rather crude psychology, but I invite readers to survey the extent of either in the works of prominent scholars in the field. Indeed the manner of Mosier's piece (which replicates that of a number of other scholars) is amusing. There is little by way of self-doubt and relatively limited citation of the work of others except when the author as hero is castigating their folly. Mosier appears to have a low view of history, especially military historians, and particularly British ones, and he is critical of the use of primary sources, so it is unlikely that he will be interested in my comments or in those of Michael Howard who had recently pointed out that "the only way to answer these questions is to plough through the military documentation; the training manuals, the operational orders, the war diaries, the plans for operations as they developed [End Page 827] at every level of command, the after-action reports, the organisation of logistics."1 Mosier's account of World War One, in his book, is deeply flawed. He fails to understand what happened in 1918 or over the previous years, exaggerates the role of the U.S.A. on the ground in the final defeat of Germany,2 and underrates the first-rate material written in English by British and American scholars on the French contribution. Furthermore, the excellent work on improvements in Allied warmaking, especially on the learning curve in artillery-infantry coordination, produced by scholars such as Wilson, Prior, Travers, Griffith, Sheffield and Beckett, requires appropriate notice. Gary Sheffield has drawn attention to Mosier's failure to move beyond the 1960s' "lions led by donkeys" approach and to take advantage of subsequent scholarship.3 The emphasis on the American role on the ground in the 1918 campaign is not only a misunderstanding of that campaign, but also an aspect of the isolation of the American military experience and imagination that can be more generally misleading. There is a problem of the conflation of "an American mythology of military prowess"4 with an exaggerated sense of exceptionalism in American military history.5 As far as Blitzkrieg is concerned, there is again a mass of first-rate work, not only on the tactical and operational dimension, but also on the strategic, economic, and ideological aspects. Yet, to cite scholarship is not really going to help if we are dealing with a writer whose idea of the subject is encapsulated in remarks such as "The Allies really were surprised in 1939–1940. They had been wallowing in a sort of self-congratulatory complacency after 1918, had convinced themselves that they had beaten the German army at every turn."6 Nothing as vulgar as citing papers from government committees or the private correspondence of ministers or generals. Try for example those of the Committee of Imperial Defence in the Public Record Office or Montgomery-Massingberd's [End Page 828] private correspondence in the Liddell Hart archive. Or, for that matter, referring to recent books such as Nick Smart's on the Phoney War.7 As a British author...

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