Abstract

A signature scheme is existentially unforgeable if, given any polynomial (in the security parameter) number of pairs (m 1 , S(m 1 )), (m 2 , S(m 2 )), . . ., (m k , S(m k )), where S(m) denotes the signature on the message m , it is computationally infeasible to generate a pair (m k+1 , S(m k+1 )) for any message m k+1 $ \notin $ {m 1 , . . ., m k } . We present an existentially unforgeable signature scheme that for a reasonable setting of parameters requires at most six times the amount of time needed to generate a signature using ``plain'' RSA (which is not existentially unforgeable). We point out applications where our scheme is desirable.

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