An Apartheid of Souls: Dutch and Afrikaner Colonialism and its Aftermath in Indonesia and South Africa – an Introduction

The British alignment with South Africa at the United Nations in the years 1946 to 1%0 seems simple enough to explain. A British government preoccupied with protecting its economic and strategic interests in South Africa (or even just its economic interests there) supported South Africa in this international forum until the domestic and international resction against apartheid forced a limited change of British policy; and though in 1%1 the British government joined the majority of nations represented in the General Assembly in admonishing With Africa, it continued to resist Assembly initiatives that threatened those same economic and strategic interests for many years to come. This is a familiar explanation of Anglo-South African relations at the United Nations (UN), though a far from accurate one.’ For the first fifteen years after the Second World War, the British government was indeed South Africa’s leading ally on the issues that most directly concerned South Africa at the UN the future of South-West Africa (Namibia), the treatment of ‘Indians’ in South Africa and the ‘race conflict’ there. The British government backed the Smuts government’s initial attempt to incorporate South-West Africa within the Union of South Africa and supported the South African contention that the UN could intervene in the administration of South-West Africa only with the agreement of the South African government itself. In these years, the British government also supported 1. According to Andrew Young, American ambassador to the United Nations during the Carter administration, ‘[tlhere was always a desire on the part of Britain to avoid any confrontation with South Africa because of economic connections’: quoted in H. Hunke, Namibia: Zhe Sestgrh of the Powle.~~ (Rome, lW), 17. For further expressions of theview that economic, or economic and strategic, considerations were decisive, see G.R. Benidge, Economic Power in Anglo-SOruh Africrm Dipn J. Mayall, ‘The South Africa Crisis: The Major External Actors’, in S. Johnson, ed., South Africa: No Twning Back (London, 1988), 304; H. Bull, ‘Implications for the West’, in R. Rotberg and J. Barratt, eds, Conjlict and CompromiW in South Af.ica (Cape Town, 1980), 175-7.

Its official policy of apartheid makes South Af rica the only country in the world in which racial discrimina tion is a matter of governmental doctrine. The situation has been under attention in the United Nations on the grounds not only that the policy violates basic human rights but also that it constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The explosiveness of the South African situation has been increased by the forcible extension of apartheid policies to the mandated territory of South West Africa. Repeated appeals by the Gen eral Assembly and the Security Council, expressions of regret and concern, and demands that it desist from the discrimina tory racial policies and initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality have elicited no posi tive response from the government of South Africa, which rec ognizes and admits its isolation from world opinion but defends the "morality of its outlook" and boasts that it is not isolated economically. A General Assembly resolution was adopted in November 1962 requesting member states to exercise economic sanctions against South Africa. Not all members are persuaded of the efficacy or feasibility of such measures. Other punitive measures, such as expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations, have been advocated. The view is unavoidable that South Africa is on a course which can lead only to conflict within the country as well as throughout the rest of the conti nent and perhaps the rest of the world.—Ed.

Theatre, as a simulacrum of the cultural and historical process itself, seeking to depict the full range of human actions within their physical context, has always provided society with the most tangible records of its attempts to understand its own operations. It is the repository of cultural memory, but, like the memory of each individual, it is also subject to continual adjustment and modification as the memory is recalled in new circumstances and contexts. (Carlson 2004: 2) Introduction In Jill Fletcher's well-known book on the history of South African theatre, entitled The Story of South African Theatre: 1780-1930 (1994), she gives a fascinating overview of the establishment of a theatre tradition in South Africa during the 18th and 19th centuries. The influence of certain historical events and the impact of various political regimes at the Cape of Good Hope during this period all left traces on the development of such a tradition. The colonisation of the Cape of Good Hope first by Dutch settlers (1652-1806) and then the more prolonged colonisation of the Cape and South Africa by the British (from 1806 till 1961) led to the development of two mainstream European theatre traditions in South Africa: one that was mainly influenced by the British theatre tradition, and one that was clearly to a greater extent influenced by the European (Dutch, German, French) tradition. Afrikaans drama and theatre developed from the latter tradition. I want to highlight in this article the importance of only two plays in this tradition, namely S.J. du Toit's Magrita Prinslo (1896) and Deon Opperman's Donkerland (1996). Whilst du Toit's play is scarcely known or remembered by contemporary Afrikaans audiences and is relegated to the annals of South African/Afrikaans theatre history, Opperman's play is well known, has received the most prestigious Afrikaans (literary) award (namely the Hertzog Prize) and is today widely studied by students, scholars and researchers. The discussion will be placed within the broader context of a contemporary interest in drama and theatre studies, namely a focus on the relationship between theatre and memory. This interest is evident in a number of recent studies (notably Marvin Carlson's The Haunted Stage: The Theatre as Memory Machine). A comparative reading of these two Afrikaans plays, namely Magrita Prinslo (1896) and Donkerland (1996), will focus on the theme of Afrikaner nationalism as a common theme linking these two historical plays. The main concepts and ideas associated with this theme as highlighted in this discussion are: the (re)interpretation of certain events within Afrikaner history and the relationship with the indigenous people of this land; the Afrikaans language; and the volksmoeder theme. 1 Two Afrikaans Plays: Magrita Prinslo (1896) and Donkerland (1996) 1.2 Magrita Prinslo by S.J. du Toit (1896) The significance of du Toit's play lies mainly in the fact that it is considered by most theatre historians (Bosman, Binge, Fletcher) to be the first published play in Afrikaans (1) in South Africa. Magrita Prinslo is on one level just a simple love story, namely the story of Magrita's loyal and unshaken love for Pieter Botha, even after she is wrongly informed by his love rival, Koos Potgieter, that he has died. The historical context in which this romantic love triangle is set, that is, the Great Trek, can, however, be seen as the main focus of this play. The romantic intrigue plays out against the backdrop of important events associated with the Great Trek, namely the infamous Slagtersnek incident (where the British hanged 6 so-called Boer traitors in 1816 in public); Commandant Hendrik Potgieter's Trek to Natal (1838), and Commandant Piet Retief's murder at the hand of the Zulu King, Dingaan (17 February 1838). These historical events are all regarded as important events within Afrikaner history and became the focus of many historical studies of the period. …

Self-reported experiences of racial discrimination are quite prevalent among the adult population of colour in South Africa. This article will argue that ongoing experiences of racial intolerance encourage participation in hate crime. To validate this thesis, two models are tested: (a) the Common Ingroup Identity (CII) and (b) Social Identity Threats (SITs). The former suggests that experiences of discrimination can help create a shared ‘disadvantaged’ identity that produces intergroup tolerance. The latter contends that group discrimination undermines social norms and the stress caused can encourage aggression. The study examined participation in anti-immigrant violence as well as behavioural intention towards the same. Nationally representative survey data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey was used. Multinomial regression analysis found that experiences of perceived personal and collective discrimination influenced participation in hate crime. This finding was consistent with the SITs model rather than the CII model. Socio-economic status was found to buffer the influence of racial discrimination, showing how economic advantages helped people cope with adverse situations. Study outcomes demonstrate how the legacy of white settler colonialism has contributed to xenophobia in the post-apartheid period. Policy interventions (especially those targeting the poor) that reduce racial discrimination will decrease public participation in hate crime.

South Africa steps up

In the analysis of data from a college sample, the validity of the Theory of racial and ethnic prejudice is questioned, and thus, through this, the psychologistic approach to the study of social attitudes. A rigorously sociologistic approach is shown to be a better predictor of variations in the data than the thesis, even for the covariations between F-scale scores and scores on two different prejudice scales. importance of differential learning for understanding variations in racial prejudice is stressed. EW issues in the field of social psychology, or in sociology, are more vexing than the relative importance of social and psychic factors in the formation of attitudes. issue, it is true, seldom arises wlheln the problem deals with variable attitudes among separate and distinct cultures. On the other hand, when the problem deals with variations among individuals from the same culture the issue almost invariably intrudes itself. field of study then becomes an arena of battle between psychic drive and cultural norm, personality need and social expectation. Here and there one may see a clear victor emerging, but the more frequent vista of thrust and counter-thrust has inspired the conclusion that there can be no single victor. Rather, it is inferred, there should be no battle at all, and any differences of opinion should and could be settled by conversations betweein colleagues. It is not the purpose of this paper to elaborate the compromise position. Rather than viewing the conflict as an out-worn luxury, this paper enters the field as a combatant. It is our argument that the conflict is too deep and fundamental to admit of any compromises which leave untouched the essential claims of each position. Because the conflict is so fundamental, we must either choose one alternative and reject the other or we must reject both. We cannot incorporate into one conception two positions which are mutually contradictory. thesis will be developed by the analysis of a specific problem. In this framework data from a questionnaire designed explicitly for this purpose will be the basis of a re-examination of the Authoritarian explanation of individual variations in racial and ethnic prejudices. More explicitly, it is the specific thesis of this paper that a considerably more efficient explanation of racial and ethnic prejudice can be designed than the authoritarian explanation, either in its original 1950 versionl or in its later more tempered form.2 Of necessity, the bulk of the paper will be devoted to the data bearing on the specific question of racial and ethnic prejudice. Besides its justification in its own right, the concentration on prejudice will be the vehicle for pointing up the more general issue. WHICH THEORY OF PREJUDICE? Since its publication in 1950, has been reviewed, rewarded, and reviled. A decade later the consensus 1 T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.) 2 Gordon W. Allport, Natture of Prejudice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1954) : Arnold Rose, Relations vs. Prejudice: Pertinent Theory for the Study of Social Change, Social Problems, IV (October 1956), 173-176; Thomas F. Pettigrew, Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: A Cross-National Comparison, Co,jflict Resoluttion, II (March 1958), 29-42; George E. Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities (New York: Harper and Brothers, Revised Edition, 1958) ; James G. Martin and Frank R. Westie, The Tolerant Personality, American Sociological Review, 24 (August 1959), pp. 521-528; Thomas F. Pettigrew, Regional Differences in Anti-Negro Prejudice, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59 (July 1959), pp. 28-36; and Harry C. Triandis and Leigh Minturn Triandis, Race, Social Class, Religion, and Nationality as Determinants of Social Distance, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 61 (July 1960), pp. 110-118. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.91 on Wed, 21 Sep 2016 05:32:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms RACIAL PREJUDICE AND PERSONALITY SCALES 45 among social psychologists appears to be that some measure of its thesis can be accepted even though some of the more extreme versions of the original have been rejected. Subsequent research may have stressed cultural and social variations,3 or suggested other psychological or quasi-psychological factors as alternatives to authoritarianism,4 but the value of personality factors as an explanation of preju-

The League of Nations did not have a comprehensive human rights framework but it did address racism and racial discrimination, primarily in the context of its oversight of the minorities treaties and of the Mandate system. In both systems, petition mechanisms were developed. In the case of minorities in Europe, petitions were able to reach the Permanent Court of International Justice. African American leaders like W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Garvey engaged with the League institutions, as did representatives of indigenous peoples. Several petitions to the Permanent Mandates Commission contained allegations of racism. The system of the mandates was little more than colonialism by another name although petitions opened a few cracks that let the light in. Brutal suppression of the Nama people in South West Africa by South Africa at Bondelzwarts was addressed in the League of Nations Assembly, the first of many international interventions into South Africa’s racist policies. The League also dealt with slavery, but its efforts were targeted at the two African members, Liberia and Ethiopia.

Mix En Meng It Op: Emile YX?'s Alternative Race and Language Politics in South African Hip-Hop

The jury is out and the verdict is in, according to most leftist commentators on the African National Congress (ANC) government. The South African political leadership has forgotten its institution...

Hate crimes are crimes that are motivated by personal prejudice or bias. Hate-crime laws criminalise such conduct and allow for the imposition of aggravated penalties on convicted perpetrators. This article examines the historical, social and political factors which influenced the shaping and enactment of the first British hate-crime law. The South African context is also considered since the Department of Justice has recently released the Prevention and Combatting of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill for public commentary and input. While Britain has had a long historical record of criminal conduct that was motivated by the race and the ethnicity of victims, it was only in the twentieth century that civil society first drew attention to the problem of violent racist crimes. Nevertheless, successive British governments denied the problem of racist crimes and refused to consider the enactment of a hate-crime law. Following a high-profile racist murder and a governmental inquiry, a British Labour Party-led government eventually honoured its pre-election commitment and passed a hate-crime law in 1998. Some parallels are apparent between the British and the South African contexts. South Africa also has a long historical record of racially motivated hate crimes. Moreover, in the post-apartheid era there have been numerous reports of racist hate crimes and hate crimes against Black lesbian women and Black foreigners. Despite several appeals from the academic and non-governmental sectors for the enactment of a hate-crime law, and the circulation for public commentary of the Prevention and Combating of Hate Crimes and Hate Speech Bill, such a law has hitherto not been enacted in South Africa. This article posits that the enactment of a hate-crime law is a constitutional imperative in South Africa in terms of the right to equality and the right to freedom and security of the person. While the enactment of a hate-crime law in South Africa is recommended, it is conceded that enacting a hate-crime law will not eradicate criminal conduct motivated by prejudice and bias.

Sexual violence is conceptualised as a hate or bias-motivated crime, and is recognised as a social problem of global proportion. However, the platform for this paper focuses on incidents of rape in South Africa, a country where the most progressive legislation concerning sexual minorities is enforced, including gender non-conforming people namely Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex (LGBTI). South Africa still must address rape inflicted on black lesbians residing in Cape Town townships, despite gender equality being granted in on the basis of sexual orientation (Silvio, 2011). The same applies to same sex marriages, making South Africa the role model of other African countries yet to be included in the signatory to the 2008 United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. An alternative concept to categorising rape as a hate crime might be a more effective tool in the legislation to combat rape based on sexual orientation; justice will be served as a female homosexual enjoys equal citizenship as that of a heterosexual citizen. Preliminary findings show that some rape victims became mothers as a result of the rape. Rape victims discuss conception due to corrective rape and how this affects the mother-child relationship. Feedback from victims include coping mechanisms from religious beliefs to alcohol abuse. None of the rape-survivors interviewed in this study contracted HIV/AIDS as a consequence of the rape.

The end of apartheid has brought a resurgence of research into racial identities, attitudes and behaviour in South Africa. The legacy of systematic racial ordering and discrimination under apartheid is that South Africa remains deeply racialised, in cultural and social terms, as well as deeply unequal, in terms of the distribution of income and opportunities. South Africans continue to see themselves in the racial categories of the apartheid era, in part because these categories have become the basis for post-apartheid ‘redress’, in part because they retain cultural meaning in everyday life. South Africans continue to inhabit social worlds that are largely defined by race, and many express negative views of other racial groups. There has been little racial integration in residential areas, although schools provide an important opportunity for inter-racial interaction for middle-class children. Experimental and survey research provide little evidence of racism, however. Few people complain about racial discrimination, although many report everyday experiences that might be understood as discriminatory. Racial discrimination per se seems to be of minor importance in shaping opportunities in post-apartheid South Africa. Far more important are the disadvantages of class, exacerbated by neighbourhood effects: poor schooling, a lack of footholds in the labour market, a lack of financial capital. The relationship between race and class is now very much weaker than in the past. Overall, race remains very important in cultural and social terms, but no longer structures economic advantage and disadvantage.

Although muslims make up less than two percent of South Africa’s total population, they are a well-established community with high visibility. In 1994 South Africans will celebrate 300 years of Islam in South Africa. The introduction of Islam to South Africa is usually attributed to Sheikh Yusuf, a Macasser prince exiled to South Africa for leading resistance against Dutch colonization in Malaysia. But the first Muslims in South Africa were actually slaves, imported by the Dutch colonists to the Cape mainly from India, the Indonesian archipelago, Malaya and Sri Lanka beginning in 1667. The Cape Muslim community, popularly but inaccurately known as “Malays” and known under the apartheid system as “Coloureds,” therefore, is the oldest Muslim community in South Africa. The other significant Muslim community in South Africa was established over 100 years later by northern Indian indentured laborers and tradespeople, a minority of whom were Muslims. The majority of South African Indian Muslims now live in Natal and Transvaal. Indians were classified as “Asians” or “Asiatics” by the apartheid system. The third ethnically identifiable group of Muslims in South Africa were classified as “African” or “Black” by the South African government. The majority of Black Muslims are converts or descendants of converts. Of the entire Muslim population of South Africa, some 49% are “Coloureds,” nearly 47% are “Asians,” and although statistics regarding “Africans” are generally unreliable, it is estimated that they comprise less than four percent of the Muslim population. Less than one percent of the Muslim population is “White.”

Note: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or any other government agency. Conclusions Developing National Strategy in Time of Transition We remain in transition to a new international system following the Cold War, a transition that is likely to last through the decade. The nature of the new system will be determined largely by the health of America's alliances with Europe and Japan, by the outcome of Russian and Chinese transitions, and the rate of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Developing a new grand strategy to replace containment has proven difficult precisely because the system remains in transition. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have struggled with their international vision. The Bottom Up Review was developed in the context of a strategy of Engagement and Enlargement that emerged as speeches during the first nine months of 1993. The crises with Iraq and North Korea in the autumn of 1994 confirmed the validity of the two major regional conflict threat envisioned by the Bottom Up Review. That concept may need to be amended in time, but it is appropriate for the interim. The Nature of the Slowly Emerging International System There are at least three ways in which one might envision the emerging international system: The first is a geo-strategic assessment of the major powers. We are in an historically unique moment of relative cooperation among the great powers: the United States, the European Union, Japan, China, Russia and perhaps India. Generally, the major powers don't envision each other as current threats and are not building military establishments to either attack or defend against each other. Regional economic blocks are forming, but are not being used by the great powers to develop closed alliances. Spheres of influence do not appear to overlap in ways that could cause conflict. However, it is unclear how much longer these favorable conditions will last. Another way to assess the emerging international system is to look at political and economic orientations of individual countries. From this perspective, the world can be seen as consisting of three groups. The dominant market democracies, a group much larger than the old First World of the Cold War, includes not just the OECD Countries, but most of Latin America, the tigers of East Asia, and gradually, parts of Central Europe. The success of the major transitional states, including Russia, China, India, and South Africa, is crucial to the future world order. Troubled states, primarily in Africa and the greater Middle East, are falling behind politically and economically and many are torn by rampant ethnic or religious tensions. These countries are the breeding ground for failed states and rogue states. The Administration's strategy of enlargement is most consistent with this perspective of the world order. The third view looks at transnational threats. The porousness of international borders has positive effects: totalitarian regimes cannot last when they can no longer manage the flow of information to their people. But porous borders also mean that international crime, narcotics, disease, terrorists, illegal immigrants, pollution, and smugglers of nuclear material pose greater threats to our national security. Each has a greater impact on the average American than what happens in Somalia. Combining these perspectives, there are grounds for both optimism and pessimism. The grounds for optimism include: * The major powers are at peace and there are few signs of exclusive spheres of influence or economic blocs; * Most nations aspire to democracy and the market system; and; * The U. …

South Africa's health: departing for a better future?