An Ancient Antidote for Dogmatic Ideology and Intransigent Political Divisiveness

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Contemporary Virtue Ethics

Of late philosophers have begun to write about the implications of research in social and personality psychology for the study of ethics. The spirit of this movement is that ethics should be founded on a realistic conception of human nature and that social and personality psychology have important things to say about these matters. Examples of philosophers involved in this movement are, inter alia, and most prominently, Doris, Flanagan, Harman, and Vranas. On the psychologists’ side, Ross and Nisbett are the most prominent examples of those attempting to insure that the findings of psychology find their way into our conception of human nature. We want to sign up for this movement too. But we are afraid that these philosophers and psychologists have drawn wrong conclusions from psychological results. We believe the lesson to be learned is substantially narrower than the movement seems to believe.

<i>Target Centred Virtue Ethics</i>

The difficulties in tackling climate change are inherently complex and primarily centered on political and social values. This is evident in the United States where political divisions and polarizations are fundamental barriers to advancing national policies, which in turn hinder international agreements, mitigation, and adaptation. Within the United States, the vast majority of agricultural and natural resource lands are projected to incur significant climate departures and are represented by the Republican Party. The resources and economic sectors that will be directly affected by climate change are represented by national leadership that is unlikely to accept policies to prevent or adapt to change. Given the large impact of climate change on ecosystem services, the predominance of political polarizations raises serious concerns about the ability to enhance the resilience of the nation's agricultural and natural resource lands in the face of future change.

V irtue ethics has recently been rousing itself from a long slumber.* Although twentiethcentury hthical theoryhas been primarily concerned with right and wrong action, we have lately seen a revival of interest in (the) virtue(s) as supplementing or even grounding our understanding of right action, and Aristotle and (to a lesser extent) Plato have had the greatest influence on these developments. Over the last few years, virtue ethicists have largely focused on the individual moral life rather than on issues of social justice, and to the extent virtue ethics is content merely to supplement other views, there may be nothing at all problematic about such an omission or de-emphasis. But most philosophers who call themselves virtue ethicists believe that (the) virtue(s) should play a foundational role in a free-standing total approach to ethics that can take its place, e. g., alongside (utilitarian) consequentialism and Kantian ethics; and they will want (one or another form of) virtue ethics to develop its own distinctive account of social morality and of social justice in particular. Yet anyone who has such a hope will, presumably, recognize the considerable obstacles that lie in its path. Virtue ethics has a proven record of siding with anti-democratic social/political ideals, and when one considers that neither Aristotle nor Plato favored democratic forms of government, one may well wonder whether ancient models can provide any sort of plausible contemporary basis for political philosophy or for ethics as a whole. Even if individualistic virtue ethics is not incompatible with current-day democratic values, the Aristotelian virtue ethicist may have to draw upon other traditions in order to give any sort of account of such values; and in that case she will face an intellectually unpleasant choice. If she declines to develop any sort of political philosophy, virtue ethics simply gives up on any attempt to develop a full-scale ethical alternative to currently dominant views, like utilitarianism/consequentialism and Kantianism, that are clearly capable of generating accounts of both individual and social values. (It is interesting that Rawls’s contractarianismmakes no claim to account for the full range of individual morality.)’ However, if virtue ethics has to borrow from Kantian ethics or consequentialism in order to generate a plausible political philosophy, then it acknowledges their strength and superiority in one major sphere

Fragmented Pragmatism: On Sungmoon Kim’s Pragmatic Confucian Democracy

The study examined the role of family, school and church educators towards cultivating Christian citizenship in children up to the age of 16 amid increasing societal pluralism. It was undertaken in response to a global moral crisis marked by social fragmentation, secularisation, and diminished civic participation. Within this context, the article explored how Christian moral formation, grounded in divine command ethics and virtue ethics, could contribute to social renewal. Christian citizenship was considered a response to the societal need for individuals who integrate moral integrity, faith, and civic responsibility. The objective was to determine how parents, church leaders and teachers could foster the development of Christian citizens who engage constructively with a diverse society while remaining faith-rooted. The study focused on the potential of Christian (inclusive and compassionate) education to address moral decline and civic disengagement, cultivating virtues essential to democratic and inclusive participation in society. A conceptual, normative research methodology was employed, drawing on theological, ethical, and educational literature. Divine command ethics and virtue ethics were analysed as complementary frameworks for Christian moral education. The study evaluated the application of these frameworks in the family, church, and school contexts, identifying key virtues and strategies for effective moral formation. The article relies on critical engagement with Scripture, classical philosophy, and contemporary scholarship. The study indicated that families nurture moral character through modelling and habit formation; churches instil civic virtue through theological instruction and social outreach; and Christian schools integrate biblical ethics into citizenship education. Families, churches, and schools face contemporary challenges, including pluralism, digital distraction, moral relativism, and political polarisation. Nevertheless, when consistently aligned with a virtue-based ethical framework, these institutions can significantly contribute to the moral and civic formation of children. The study concluded that Christian citizenship can be meaningfully fostered when education in family, church and school is grounded in both the divine command and virtue ethics. These frameworks support the development of moral character, civic responsibility, and respectful engagement with societal diversity. Intentional collaboration among family, church, and school strengthens this process, enabling children to grow into compassionate, just, and principled citizens. Contribution: This article contributes to the scholarly conversation on moral and citizenship education by proposing a Christian ethical model, rooted in divine command and virtue ethics. It offers a normative framework for integrating Christian faith with civic responsibility, aligning with the journal’s focus on education, human rights, and diversity in contemporary society.

Confucian Democracy in East Asia: A Discussion of Sungmoon Kim’s <i>Democracy After Virtue: Toward Pragmatic Confucian Democracy</i>

Virtue ethics has become an important rival to deontology and consequentialism, the two dominant moral theories in modern Western philosophy. What unites various forms of virtue ethics and distinguishes virtue ethics from its rivals is its emphasis on the primacy of virtue. In this article, I start with an explanation of the primacy of virtue in virtue ethics and two dilemmas, detected by Gary Watson, that virtue ethics faces: (1) virtue ethics may maintain the primacy of virtue and thus leave virtue non-explanatory, or it may attempt to explain virtue in terms of something else and thus render virtue second - ary at most; (2) the explanation of virtue may be objective and thus become morally indeterminate, or it may be normative and thus lack objectivity, merely re-expressing the virtue it intends to explain (Section II). After showing the failure of both clas - sical Aristotelian and contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to escape these dilemmas, I turn to the ethical theory of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200)—the greatest synthesizer of neo- Confucianism, whose place in Confucianism is comparable to that of Thomas Aquinas in the Christian tradition—to show how it can successfully avoid both dilemmas.

Politicians have long leveraged public fears about crime and safety to support, a strategy that intensified alongside growing political polarisation in the 2010s. This study analyses data from Waves 6 (2011—2012) and 7 (2017—2018) of the World Values Survey to examine changes in perceived unsafety in Australia and the United States over this period. Using multivariate analysis, the study explores how demographic, socioeconomic and political factors shaped safety perceptions at the start and end of the decade. Findings reveal that while global trends such as political polarisation and a rhetorical shift from crime to immigration concerns influence both countries, national contexts play an equally—if not more—significant role. In Australia, perceptions of unsafety became more politically polarised between 2012 and 2018, with anti—immigrant sentiment emerging as a key mediator. In contrast, the United States saw little change in political divides over safety perceptions from 2011 to 2017, likely reflecting the entrenched demographic and ideological silos of the electorate. However, U.S. immigrant communities—particularly Latino/as—reported consistently high levels of perceived unsafety during this period. Social cohesion was a significant predictor of safety perceptions in Australia but had limited explanatory power in the U.S. context. These findings highlight the importance of accounting for nationally specific political, cultural and institutional dynamics in understanding how fear and feelings of unsafety are shaped and mobilised. The study also raises concerns about the continued use of fear—based political messaging in recent electoral cycles, including the 2025 Australian federal election and the return of Donald Trump to office in the United States.

Many teacher candidates get their first taste of life as a full-time teacher in their practicums, during which they confront a host of challenges, pedagogical and ethical. Because ethics is fundamental to the connection between teachers and students, teacher candidates are often required to negotiate dilemmas in ways that keep with the ethical ideals espoused both by the professional body and the community at large. Presenting the case of a teacher candidate who finds herself emotionally depleted in her devotion to students, we look to the ethics of care and virtue for clarifying insights. Care ethics extols intersubjectivity and reciprocity, while virtue ethics enjoins commitment to a noble ideal for its own sake; both perspectives offer useful insights for our case. We argue that the perspectives and practices of contemplative traditions can facilitate the integration of care and virtue ethics, mitigating the risk of disruption in caring relations while minimizing the possibility of a personal preoccupation with virtue. Drawing on the Bodhisattva ideal in Mahayana Buddhism, we posit a ‘practice of self-with-other’ as a way to enlarge a teacher’s relational capacity, thus apprehending reciprocity and virtue as an interpenetrating mutuality. We conclude by considering how these perspectives might guide a new teacher caught in the wrenching demands of the classroom.

This chapter traces two dimensions of agency as conceived in Anglo-American Aristotelian virtue ethics, from their incipient phase to current criticisms of virtue ethics. Historically, virtue ethics came into play, and has remained in play, not least as a criticism of exaggerated faith in the individual as an unproblematic source of moral action. Among theorists of forms of ethics prevalent in the Anglo-American sphere when virtue ethics first entered the scene, the focus was elsewhere, not least on issues pertaining to the status of ethical justification. The notion of the practically engaged individual proffered by virtue ethicists, is generally one of a type of agent for whom good (virtuous) action is a real accomplishment. This dimension of achievement is only reinforced by the ideal of the perfect agent implied by virtue ethical perfectionism. Aristotelian virtue ethics in its current form came into existence as a criticism of Modernity. Keywords: Anglo-American sphere; Modernity; virtue ethics

The virtue ethics approach to professional morality is most fully developed by Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking in Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles. Using the Aristotelian account of virtue ethics — an account that places central importance on the exercise of reflective moral agency1 — this approach provides a useful way of delineating professional responsibilities and professional morality. Aristotelian virtue ethics is particularly well suited to professional ethics because it ties virtuous behaviour to the concept of good functioning in particular roles. Oakley and Cocking claim that 'virtue ethics' teleological approach to right action in terms of good functioning relative to appropriate ends makes it especially well placed to capture the special roles and sensitivities of particular professions'.2

Political polarization remains a major obstacle to national action on global climate change in the United States Congress, and acceptance of anthropogenic drivers strongly differs between Republicans and Democrats. But has overall interest in science also become ingrained into partisan identity, even among national political figures tasked with making ostensibly science-based policy decisions? Social media outlets such as Twitter have become a popular means of exchanging information and of portraying a carefully crafted public image. We analyzed the 78,753 unique Twitter accounts followed by U.S. senators to gauge their interests as well as the public images that their offices project to the public. In particular, we examined correlations between follows of science-related accounts and recent votes on a series of amendments defining the “sense of the Senate” on global climate change (GCC). Drawing from these social networks, we discuss how political polarization is strongly linked with the role that science - and climate science in particular - plays in the political process. Our analyses show that Twitter social networks reflect political affiliation and polarization, with Senate Republicans and Democrats belonging to distinct and semi-isolated sub-networks. Notably, while follows of science-related organizations were low overall, these sub-networks were characterized by very different levels of interest in science, with Senate Democrats three times more likely to follow science-related Twitter handles than Republicans. This suggests that overt interest in science may partly define party identity. Hence, instead of being viewed as a neutral source of objective information, science may now be considered a special interest in U.S. politics. Notably, however, Republican senators who crossed party lines to vote “yea” on an amendment associated with the Keystone Pipeline bill stating that humans contribute to GCC are more similar to Democrats in their science follows than they are to their fellow Republicans. Our results strongly suggest that overt interest in science may now primarily be a “Democrat” value. However, opportunities exist to inject scientific information into political discussion by targeting key individuals and organizations connected to both sides of the aisle.

This article discusses the growing political divide in the United States and how ideological polarization has increasingly assumed spatial dimensions, as rural areas have become strongly associated with Republican support, and urban areas have become associated with strong Democratic support. In the context of the recent Trump administration, marked not only by authoritarian tendencies, ethno‐nationalism, and hostility towards democratic institutions, but its denouement represented by the U.S. Capitol insurrection on January 6th, 2021 and the weeks that followed, what are the implications for growing spatialized civic and political divides, and indeed for democracy itself? I discuss several main approaches taken by social scientists to explain the relationship between spatial and political divides in the United States, including those that focus on shifting political geographies, cultural factors, economic anxiety, and racial resentment. Then, pointing to several recent exemplars, I identify theoretical, methodological, and perspectival strengths that the discipline of rural sociology can and should engage in developing explanatory frameworks for better understanding these social and spatial shifts – shifts that are simultaneously crises of democracy and crises of epistemology.