American Perceptions: Civil War and Ethnic Hatred

This thesis seeks to advance understandings of why states’ foreign policy decisions vary when the material and social conditions underpinning their interests have not changed. It focuses on American foreign policy, and specifically on US decisions on whether to use military force abroad. It works to show that variation in these types of decisions can best be explained through an emphasis on the different types of ideas that emerge in debates within presidential administrations, rather than through adopting rationalist approaches making generalised presumptions of state self-interest. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has remained a great power and enjoyed relative stability in coalitional alignments. Despite this relative stability in material and relational conditions, however, decisions to use military force abroad have varied considerably across cases, including in humanitarian crises in the Balkans in the early 1990s, the War on Terror from 2001, and more recent conflicts in Libya and Syria. But what explains this variation? Existing rationalist theoretical approaches in International Relations have often pointed to crises and “exogenous shocks” to explain variation in foreign policy interests. In doing so, they have emphasised rational self-interest, presuming that agents use information efficiently in efforts to pursue either material or ideational bases of state interests. Yet, realist, liberal, and constructivist scholars have struggled to explain variation in state interests in the absence of either a change in the international distribution of material capabilities or in the face of ideational change. For example, in regard to possible intervention in Bosnia in the early 1990s, President George H.W. Bush urged restraint, arguing that the conflict was fuelled by “ancient, ethnic animosities”, and that the US “did not have a dog in the fight”. His successor, Bill Clinton, initially adopted the same approach. Yet, following the massacre at Srebrenica in 1995, it became clear that the existing approach to conflict in Bosnia had become a “cancer” in US foreign policy. As such, Clinton demanded a new policy which ultimately led the US intervene and bring the Bosnian War to an end through Operation Deliberate Force. Similarly, despite professing a foreign policy of restraint, President Barack Obama would become drawn into intervention in Libya in 2011 despite their being “no vital security interests” at stake. An approach focussing on a states’ rational pursuit of self-interest would face severe challenges in seeking to explain the decisions ultimately made in either case. Overall, such approaches tend to underrate uncertainty and overrate interpretive efficiency in foreign policy decision-making. This thesis develops an alternate theoretical framework focussed on the role of ideas in influencing the interpretations by states’ principal foreign policy decision-makers of foreign policy interests. Building on Vivien Schmidt’s discursive institutionalist framework, it highlights how agents use different types of ideas — principled or cognitive — as “weapons” as they contest the meaning of events. It focuses on two key mechanisms — narrative displacement and repressive conversion — through which agents come to rely on these different types of ideas as they either repress or displace different sources of information. In doing so, it provides an explanation of how decisions to use force vary as agents come to rely on principled or cognitive types of ideas in their interpretations of foreign policy interests.

The “CNN effect” is a term that has been used to describe the influence of 24-hour news coverage on foreign policy decision-making, particularly in the context of the United States. The term was coined in the early 1990s following the Gulf War, during which CNN's live coverage of the conflict was widely credited with shaping public opinion and influencing US foreign policy decisions. Since then, the concept of the “CNN effect” has been the subject of much debate and analysis in the field of media and foreign policy. The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of the 'CNN effect' on US foreign policy, with a specific focus on its role in shaping public opinion and influencing policy outcomes. Through a case study of US foreign policy initiatives in Somalia, this study analyzes the relationship between media coverage and policy decisions. The methodology used in this study involves conducting an in-depth analysis of media coverage and policy decisions in the selected cases. A combination of primary and secondary sources, including news reports, government documents, and academic literature, was used to develop a comprehensive understanding of the “CNN effect” on US foreign policy decision-making. The findings of this study suggest that the “CNN effect” is a real phenomenon that has had a significant influence on US foreign policy decision-making. Media coverage can create pressure on policymakers to take action by generating a sense of urgency and demand for response among the public and other stakeholders. In addition, media coverage can shape the international community's response to a crisis or conflict, which can further influence policymakers. However, the impact of media coverage on foreign policy decisions is complex and multifaceted, as decision-makers must balance the information presented in the media with other factors, such as strategic interests and long-term goals. This paper contributes to the understanding of the relationship between media coverage and foreign policy decision-making, highlighting the importance of considering the influence of media in policy outcomes. Understanding the “CNN effect” can inform the strategies of policymakers, journalists, and the general public in shaping the discourse and decisions of US foreign policy.
 
 Received: 05 May 2022 / Accepted: 18 May 2023 / Published: 20 May 2023

The official history of US foreign policy, published by the State Department as the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), has profoundly changed how historians of foreign relations can conduct research and prepare students to do the same. This primary source amalgam, compiled by professional historians, operates under a statutory requirement to ‘include all records needed’ for comprehensive documentation of all ‘major’ and ‘significant’ US diplomatic activity and foreign policy decisions. FRUS is an easily accessible, digestible resource – a veritable simulacrum of US foreign policy – that profoundly alters research methodology. This article utilises FRUS to conduct a comparative analysis of seemingly similar US-backed military coup d’états in Brazil in 1964 and Indonesia in 1965. Both nations were the largest, most powerful countries in their respective regions and critical to US foreign policy – Brazil by proximity, Indonesia by geopolitical strategy. Both nations also became targets of covert operations, which resulted in military coups that installed governments closely aligned with US foreign policy. Nevertheless, each coup was conducted under differing circumstances that required varying levels of direct US intervention. Regime change in Indonesia, as FRUS so clearly highlights, required a considerably more substantial amount of time, money, and effort than that of Brazil. This case study highlights the stark contrast between the relative ease of system maintenance in a region already subordinated to US hegemony and the painstaking process of drawing a new area of the globe into the American sphere of influence.

Since the end of World War II, the United States’ interests in the Middle East have intensified rapidly, and this presence continues today in response to a variety of economic and security concerns. Following the 2011 Arab uprisings and the Iraqi regime change, US foreign policy has pursued several transformative agendas against some of its traditional allies, apparently contradicting Washington’s longstanding defence of the regional status quo. This has caused levels of uncertainty among regional players about what to expect from the United States. The present study highlights the US foreign policy goals in the Middle East between 2011 and 2021, which includes upholding US military bases in the Gulf countries, supporting client-states and other friendly states, providing support and protection to Israel’s sovereignty, maintaining strategic access to oil in the Gulf countries, and battling Islamic movements and terrorist groups (such as Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)). In addition, the study also focuses on other crucial aspects that might affect the United States and their regional allies’ interests in the regime. To explore US foreign policy decisions and actions between the years 2011 and 2021, data was collected through structured interviews and online secondary data sources. The data was reviewed and analysed to look at the sociopolitical, historical, and economic factors at work in the Middle East. The theoretical analysis uses a descriptive approach as to how the changes in the period after 2011 have influenced American foreign policy in the Middle East. The findings illustrate that terrorism, civil wars, and instability in the Middle East have had significant influence on the United States’ economic, national security, and diplomatic interests in the region. Maintaining strong ties with allies and comprehending the nature of conflicts is critical to attaining the US foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. This research study serves as a reference guide for scholars, policy analysts, and practitioners by examining to what extent the relationship between the US and the Middle East has changed.

Bipartisan consensus on many US domestic and foreign policy priorities has seemingly collapsed in recent decades, and political parties have become qideologically polarized and divided. While some contend that these dynamics are narrowing the space for congressional foreign policy innovation, we argue that factionalism often fosters creativity in the foreign policy process. Specifically, this article explores the role of ‘free agent’ progressive Democrats and conservative Republicans in foreign policy decision-making. These members at the ideological extremes of their parties are finding common ground in anti-establishment views and concerns about executive excess, and they are aligning to challenge traditional foreign policy positions. This paper conducts a plausibility probe of a model of congressional foreign policy free agency based upon roll call voting on war powers-related decisions in the Obama and Trump administrations. During both presidencies, our findings suggest that the free agency model has predictive value for foreign policy maneuvering and offers a non-traditional way of thinking about contemporary US foreign policy development.

Part 1 The framework: foreign policy decisions - a beginning foreign policy and national interests a nation in search of a proper role. Part 2 Formulating foreign policy - perceptions and organization: the intellectual element of foreign policy - perspectives the organizational element - achieving co-ordination. Part 3 How Washington decides foreign policy issues: the President and Congress policymaking and bureaucracy the public context. Part 4 Cold War problems: the Cold War and the Korean War escalating tension - Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis into and out of Vietnam a approach to Cold War problems the last decade of the Cold War summing up the book so far. Part 5 Contemporary problems in US foreign policy: the Societ Union dissolved and Eastern Europe freed - implications the European Community ancient cultures and enduring enmities - the Middle East Japan and the future of Asia new problems on the agenda guidelines for American foreign policy in a complex world.

The present paper aims to offer a conceptual exploration of the Presidential-Congressional relations in the US foreign policy decision-making. The US foreign policy decision-making arguably takes place within a functional synthesization of compromised bureaucratic rationality on the one hand, and the ideological, partisan and institutional interests and tendencies of individuals in possession of power on the other. In such a setting, the argument being put forth is that the Presidency is generally situated and equipped reasonably the best to deal with foreign affairs while the gamut of the Congressional authority in foreign policy varies based on the type of decisions made, playing a key role in distribution of resources to achieve particular objectives. In other words, the process of US foreign policy decision-making occasionally lacks the essential structural efficiency to prevent the executive branch from circumventing the Constitution. An executive branch operating in secrecy without legislative accountability is undoubtedly dangerous; therefore, a host of specialized means and preventive measures are required to be taken and practiced in order to avoid such danger and help keep US political structure in checks and balances. Attempt is made to contextualize this argument within a) the domain of decision-making theoretical models presented by G. Allison, and then b) rather practical discussions on requirements of foreign policy proposed by L. Hamilton followed by, c) a brief overview on actual developments affecting power relations in US foreign policy after the Cold War.

Foreign policy is an integral part of international relations. This study examines the United States (US) foreign policy towards Jordan from 1990 to 2017 since the period witnessed important regional and international political events that significantly impacted the US foreign policy. These events have the greatest impact on the development of relations between the two countries in terms of political and security aspects. The study looks at four political events and their impacts on Jordanian-American relations from the political and security aspects. Therefore, the objectives of this study are to examine the US foreign policy towards Jordan from the political and security aspects. This study adopted the qualitative approach. The primary data were collected from interviews while the secondary data were obtained from books, journals, theses, newspapers, seminar papers, articles and other documents. In this study, 16 respondents from political, economic and security experts in Jordan and the US were selected for semi-structured interviews. The study employed Thematic Analysis in analysing the data obtained. This study adopted the neo-realism theory as a theoretical framework. This study found that the US foreign policy recognizes Jordan as a close ally and considers its stability very important. The US foreign policy was seen slightly negative towards Jordan during the Iraqi War on Kuwait in 1990. However, the Wadi Araba peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 had promoted positive US foreign policy towards Jordan. This policy was slightly weakened in 2017 due to the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem. Certain political events play an important role in the US foreign policy regarding security aid towards Jordan. The study found that the US foreign policy provides security support to Jordan to protect Israel, spread American ideology and fight against its enemy. This research also found that Jordan has a suitable location to defend Israel because the country is surrounded by important Arab countries. The US links its aids to Jordan due to political events. Accordingly, the study recommends the necessity for the Jordanian state to increase its influential economic alliances at the international level. In addition, Jordanian policy must be redrawn in line with international realities to pressure the US to make Jordan play an active role in the region and international arena. Jordan should better use its geographical location to achieve international cooperation and enhance Arab security as a barrier against Israel.

Previous research on the role of ethnic minority interest groups in US foreign policy has resulted in the development of an extensive list of criteria thought to condition ethnic minority influence. Existing case studies, in spite of their significant contribution, leave open the question of which factors, if any, actually drive influence. The result is a foreign policy decision-making puzzle. We know that ethnic minority groups attempt to influence foreign policy. We also know that foreign policy decision makers sometimes choose the option favored by certain ethnic minority groups. What practitioners and scholars alike do not know is whether decision makers make choices because of the efforts of ethnic minority groups. The experimental designs presented in this study offer the opportunity to solve the puzzle by isolating the impact of diasporic interests on foreign policy decision making at the congressional level. Using a hypothetical foreign policy scenario, the study examines the independent and interactive effects of diasporic numerical significance, diasporic mobilization, and cultural similarity on foreign policy decision making. Results indicate that decision makers are highly responsive to diasporic mobilization, but were unresponsive to diasporic numerical significance and cultural similarity. The overall implication is that small, but highly mobilized, ethnic minority interest groups may be able to significantly influence the development of US foreign policy at the congressional level.

Does “soft power” matter in international relations? Specifically, when the United States seeks cooperation from countries around the world, do the views of their publics about US foreign policy affect the actual foreign policy behavior of these countries? The authors examine this question using multinational surveys covering fifty-eight countries, combined with information about their foreign policy decisions in 2003, a critical year for the US. They draw their basic conceptual framework from Joseph Nye, who uses various indicators of opinion about the US to assess US soft power. But the authors argue that his theory lacks the specificity needed for falsifiable testing. They refine it by focusing on foreign public opinion about US foreign policy, an underemphasized element of Nye's approach. Their regression analysis shows that foreign public opinion has a significant and large effect on troop commitments to the war in Iraq, even after controlling for various hard power factors. It also has significant, albeit small, effects on policies toward the International Criminal Court and on voting decisions in the UN General Assembly. These results support the authors' refined theoretical argument about soft power: public opinion about US foreign policy in foreign countries does affect their policies toward the US, but this effect is conditional on the salience of an issue for mass publics.

Modern US foreign policy is aimed at maintaining the world order favorable to Washington by means of military force projection, economic potential and a liberal ideology. A distinctive feature of US foreign policy behavior is the production of new ideas and projects, ranging from ‘The End of History’ to the ‘rules-based order.’ Despite a number of foreign policy setbacks (interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lybia), Washington’s cascade of ideas does not weaken, and US allies and some other actors continue to demonstrate acceptance of new speculative projects. In order to explain this irrational situation, the author employs content analysis of the State of the Union addresses and the US National Security Strategies is conducted to examine the main narratives of the US presidential administrations. This analysis shows that Washington tries to use international ethics to its advantage by formulating narratives that benefit US, as well as to put forward proposals convenient for Washington to replace the norms of international law. Moreover, the author (1) discusses the reasons for such a situation in US foreign policy decision-making; and (2) in order to resolve the issue of acceptance of US ideas, turns to the psychology of international relations. The categories of trust, habit and hypocrisy, according to the author, are able to provide an explanatory framework which closes the gap that appears when attempting to apply rationalist theories.

This book provides a comprehensive historical overview and analysis of the complex and often vexing problem of understanding the formation of US human rights policy over the past thirty-five years, a period during which concern for human rights became a major factor in foreign policy decision-making. Clair Apodaca demonstrates that the history of American human rights policy is a series of different paradoxes that change depending on the presidential administration, showing that far from immobilizing the progression of a genuine and functioning human rights policy, these paradoxes have actually helped to improve the human rights protections over the years. Readers will find in a single volume a historically informed, argument driven account of the erratic evolution of US human rights policy since the Nixon administration.Understanding U.S. Human Rights Policy will be an essential supplement in courses on human rights, foreign policy analysis and decision-making, and the history of US foreign policy.

This dissertation aims to investigate the sources of United States (US) foreign policy toward Azerbaijan by examining the relative impact of domestic, geostrategic and structural factors in explaining US foreign policy toward the country. Azerbaijan is one of the newly independent states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite its small size, the country’s strategic location, vast oil and natural gas reserves, and its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno- Karabakh region elevated its importance and made Azerbaijan the center of interest for great powers. As the sole superpower after the end of the Cold War, the US has largely followed a unilateral foreign policy agenda. US foreign policy toward the South Caucasus in general, and Azerbaijan in particular, has been marked by inconsistencies, and by a lack of coordination and an unwillingness to take the initiative in crucial issue areas. Most importantly, experts have observed several important shifts in US policy toward Azerbaijan. These shifts can be conceptualized as critical junctures as they represent fundamental changes in the orientation of US policy. The dissertation is focused on these critical junctures as they relate to four main issue areas: the political economy of oil, the security partnership, economic reforms, and human rights. Why did the US disengage from Caspian energy issues after the successful completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline? Why did the US lose its commitment to Azerbaijani security, including the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? Why did the US grow unhappy about the investment climate in Azerbaijan in the 2000s? Why did the Obama administration decide to shift to a “human rights policy” toward Baku, despite two decades of neglect of such issues by the Clinton and Bush Administrations? This dissertation follows a chronological format and analyzes the sources of US foreign policy towards Azerbaijan in three time periods: 1991-2001, 2002-2007, and 2008-2015.

This article examines the various interpretations of the root causes of US foreign policy towards Cuba. Examining 250 years of policies articulated and defended by prominent US foreign policy decision-makers, the authors decide that geopolitical, economic and ideological explanations of why the US has behaved towards Cuba the way it has need to be supplemented by an understanding of the counter-revolutionary US foreign policy agenda. Drawing upon North American scholars, many of whom have been critics of US policy, and interpreted by a US and Cuban scholarly lens, the article suggests that examinations of the fundamental motivations for US policy go beyond common explanations and should be applied to the recent dramatic announcements by Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro that relationships between the two countries will be significantly changing in the near future.

Vali Nasr The dispensable nation: American foreign policy in retreat New York: Doubleday, 2013. 300pp $34.00 (cloth) ISBN: 978-0385536479America's global leadership, once thought by some to be visionary and purposeful, is now in decline, most observably in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the wider Middle East. A key reason for this decline is the omnipresence of political operatives in the Obama White House; former campaign strategists decide foreign policy based upon crude political calculations. The expert advice of senior foreign policy advi- sors is subverted to the interests of plays best on the evening news.Vali Nasr was senior adviser to President Barack Obama's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, from 2009 2010. His book scathingly accuses the Obama administration of sacrificing long-term national interests in favour of short-term political gains, with grave consequences for American power. The book is an indictment of the administration's mismanagement of foreign policy in the high-stakes post-9/11 world, especially with respect to relations with the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and China.While Obama has received some praise for his foreign policy record, this is chiefly because his team aims to satisfy public opinion first, leaving the difficult strategic calculations about America's long-term interests for his successors. A consequence of allowing political strategists to make foreign policy is that America's official position on a host of issues is to take no position at all. Senior members of the foreign policy establishment have been asked to communicate stunningly obtuse proposals to our allies (3), themselves unconvinced of the wisdom of their actions. Nasr suggests that the White House's treatment of the Department of State, and of Holbrooke, illustrate this point.Apparently the State Department fought to be included in foreign policy decisions. That it participated at all is ow>ed to Hillary Clinton's stature as secretary of state. Holbrooke reportedly had to fight tooth and nail to be heard on AfPak policy, despite his position as special representative. In the face of Holbrooke's advice on this file, Obama's advisers dithered on whether force or diplomacy would best end the war in Afghanistan and wound up choosing neither. This insouciance is visible in other foreign policy files: if they kicked the can down the road long enough, they could avoid public scrutiny, and avoid decisions altogether hoping things would resolve themselves. Not did this approach do nothing to make America safer, but also, Nasr argues, it further put American security at risk, failed to end the war in Afghanistan, and raised serious questions about American leadership.In addition to these failures is the administration's underestimation of Pakistan's importance to the Afghanistan effort. Nasr writes that the troop surge that Obama reluctantly approved would have been useful to assist Pakistan in pressuring the Taliban. This opportunity was missed, as were others, such as chances to address the public outcry in Pakistan over the US drone program and to find alternatives to the pressure only policies with Pakistan and Iran that were clearly not yielding results. On Iran, Nasr convincingly argues that sanctions were the most favoured option precisely because they are what you do when you cannot or will not do anything else (110). American inaction has left relations with both countries unresolved.Moreover, America's hasty exit from Iraq left fertile ground for violent sectarianism. Nasr likens this sectarianism, similar to that which has flourished after the Arab Spring, to a rising storm. The unravelling of American efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the wider Middle East are major vulnerabilities for America. Nasr posits that the combination of weakened regimes, sectarian urges and great power ineptitude have opened the gates to ethnic cleansing, floods of refugees, humanitarian disasters and conditions ripe for al Qaeda to flourish regionally. …