American grand strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II. By Andrew Buchanan

Abstract

The theme of Andrew Buchanan's book is clearly stated in his introduction, where he writes: ‘Viewed in the light of America's modest and often inconsistent prewar aspirations in the region, its emergence barely five years later as the predominant power in the Mediterranean stands out in sharp relief. By the end of World War II, the United States had replaced Britain as the major power in the region with its influence resting on its wartime operational experience, on the continuing presence of American arms, and on its residual network of airbases, ports and military depots. Behind this lay the largely invisible but always critical networks of contacts forged by American diplomats, businessmen, aid workers, technical advisers, intelligence operatives, and military officers … which make international relations—and great power hegemony—work … This book is a study of this dramatic transformation’ (p. 5). This is a worthy theme and, on the basis of American and British archives plus secondary literature, the author has written a workmanlike volume. The chapters on Spain and French North Africa, the account of the activities of and rivalries between the various American agencies, such as the State Department, the Office of Strategic Services and the Foreign Economic Administration, and the emphasis upon the personal role of President Roosevelt, are particularly illuminating.