American Factor in Inter-Korean Relations in 2012-2023

Acting on the North Korea Playbook:Japan’s Responses to North Korea’s Provocations Yasuhiro Izumikawa (bio) In 2009, when a series of nuclear and missile tests conducted by North Korea led some analysts to argue that Pyongyang had abandoned diplomacy and aimed to reunify the Korean Peninsula militarily, a highly respected North Korea watcher, Narushige Michishita, opined that Pyongyang was still “playing the same game.”1 While North Korea has continued to upgrade its nuclear and missile capabilities since then, Japan has ironically developed its own playbook on how to respond to Pyongyang’s repeated provocations. Tokyo’s responses to Pyongyang’s defiant actions in 2016 are faithfully based on this playbook: seeking enhanced sanctions, ensuring U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, and enhancing security cooperation with South Korea. Unfortunately, this playbook contains no silver lining that may lead to the resolution of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat. Furthermore, the effects of Japan’s policies based on its North Korea playbook may be undermined by unexpected domestic turmoil in its security partners. In this essay, I elaborate on the three main components of Japan’s responses to North Korea’s provocations and discuss the problems of each component. In the concluding remarks, I point out two immediate challenges for which Japan needs to be prepared and then propose how Japan may be able to overcome the problems with its existing North Korea policies. Seeking Enhanced Sanctions When North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test on September 9, 2016, Japan’s denunciation was swift. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called the nuclear test “totally unacceptable” and promised to “consider further measures against North Korea including further action in the United Nations Security Council.”2 At the UN General Assembly on September 21, [End Page 90] he argued that “the nature of the military provocations North Korea has persisted with…are substantially more serious than before” and declared that Japan would lead the Security Council discussions on how to confront North Korea.3 On the sidelines of the General Assembly, Abe met Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and requested that Iran sever ties with North Korea in military cooperation.4 Given the fact that arms exports are an important source of North Korea’s foreign currency and that Iran is one of Pyongyang’s largest customers, it certainly makes sense to try to undermine Iran’s ties with North Korea.5 However, it is unclear whether these calls for more effective sanctions against North Korea will be heeded internationally, or even whether they may prove effective if adopted. Needless to say, the most significant impediment to enhanced economic sanctions is China, which provides the lifeline for the Kim Jong-un regime. China prioritizes stability on the Korean Peninsula and opposes North Korea’s nuclear program, which it considers a threat that could destabilize the region and potentially risk further nuclear proliferation there. Precisely because Beijing prioritizes the peninsula’s stability, however, it adamantly refuses to take any action, such as cutting North Korea’s energy supply, that could either prompt more aggressive reactions from Pyongyang or lead to the regime’s collapse.6 In addition, Chinese officials suspect that taking tough actions against North Korea could open a gate for Washington to approach Pyongyang, which has sought better relations with the United States from the beginning. For these reasons, it would be extremely difficult to persuade China to comply with Japan’s and the international community’s wish to coerce North Korea economically. Ensuring U.S. Extended Deterrence Following North Korea’s nuclear test on September 9, Prime Minister Abe called President Barack Obama and expressed his desire for maintaining close security cooperation with the United States. [End Page 91] In response, President Obama “explained that he hopes to convey to Prime Minister Abe and the people of Japan that the U.S.-Japan alliance is solid and the United States security commitment to Japan including its extended deterrence is unshakable.”7 Obtaining such explicit assurances from the United States is necessary not only for policy reasons but also for political reasons. With the increasing evidence that North Korea has been mastering technologies needed for the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and the...

On March 7, 2013, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2094 (2013), bolstering the scope of United Nations (UN) sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Resolution represents the international community’s latest attempt at applying diplomatic and economic pressure to the DPRK so as to curb its nuclear weapons program. The resolution is also a response to the DPRK’s third nuclear test on February 12, 2013 and its subsequent threat to carry out preemptive nuclear strikes against the United States and South Korea. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council responded to these grave violations of its existing Resolutions—seen as clear threats to international peace and security—by building upon, strengthening, and expanding the scope of the sanctions regime against the DPRK.

Old Wine in a New Bottle?China’s Korea Problem Ren Xiao (bio) China’s dealings with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have not been easy, not even during the Korean War in which the two fought side by side. The relationship has experienced many ups and downs over the years. Most recently, the nuclear tests by North Korea and the United States’ planned deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea have forced China to rethink its policy toward North Korea. This essay will analyze the recent interactions between China and the DPRK and examine the factors that prompted China to adopt a tougher stance toward Pyongyang. However, this policy change has been complicated and mitigated by the United States’ decision to deploy THAAD in South Korea. Given its multiple strategic interests, China must constantly balance between different players and options, and this has put it in an awkward situation. Nevertheless, together with the United States and other UN Security Council members, China supported UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2321. Looking forward, China is also faced with the uncertainties that result from South Korea’s political crisis and the transition to the Donald Trump administration in the United States. Balancing Act Since Kim Jong-il’s death and his son Kim Jong-un’s assumption of power in December 2011, the Sino-DPRK relationship has been lukewarm. Four years after the 18th Party Congress and Xi Jinping’s rise to the Chinese Communist Party’s top post, no Xi-Kim meeting has happened yet. By contrast, in that time China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have not only exchanged state visits but also formed a free trade area, as the ROK has risen on China’s foreign policy agenda. In October 2015, Liu Yunshan—one of the seven members of China’s top leadership—traveled to Pyongyang for the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK). China made an effort to improve the Sino-DPRK relationship, but less than three months later North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016. The test [End Page 83] immediately changed the dynamic of relations, and two months later China and the other UN Security Council members reached a consensus and released UNSCR 2270 to impose the toughest sanctions to date against North Korea. The resolution contains unprecedented inspection and financial provisions, including mandatory inspections of cargo to and from North Korea and a requirement to terminate banking relationships with North Korean financial institutions. Most significantly, it includes for the first time sectoral sanctions, which prohibit the DPRK from both exporting key resources such as coal, gold, iron, titanium, and rare earth materials and importing aviation and rocket fuel.1 With UNSCR 2270, China became much more serious with respect to implementing the Security Council resolutions concerning North Korea’s nuclear and missile development activities. In early April, the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs released a new list of embargoed items that cannot be imported from or exported to North Korea, though the list excluded items needed for maintaining the livelihood of ordinary people or providing humanitarian assistance. Pyongyang could not have been happy with the sanctions imposed by China. However, neither Beijing nor Pyongyang wanted to sever ties, and instead the two tried to maintain a “normal” relationship during this time of heightened tension. Shortly after the WPK had held its 7th Party Congress in May 2016—the first of its kind in more than 30 years—North Korea sent a high-level delegation to China to give a briefing on developments at the congress. The delegation was headed by Ri Su-yong, a member of the Politburo and vice chairman of the Central Committee of the WPK, who met with President Xi. The delegation delivered a message from Kim Jong-un expressing his hope to work with China to strengthen and develop the two countries’ traditional bilateral friendship and, ironically, maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Building on prior communication, in July 2016, Xi and Kim exchanged congratulatory telegrams to commemorate the 55th anniversary of the signing of the...

Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats:In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations Chung-in Moon (bio) Inter-Korean relations have hit rock bottom. Since President Park Geun-hye’s inauguration in February 2013, her government pursued the Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula initiative and tried to improve ties with North Korea. But such efforts have failed, and inter-Korean relations have worsened.1 After North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, the Park government adopted a much tougher stance by closing the Kaesong industrial complex and completely suspending inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Seoul and Washington have also intensified joint military exercises and training on deploying strategic weapons. Pyongyang responded to these moves by conducting numerous missile test launches and by undertaking an additional nuclear test in September. A vicious cycle of action and reaction has heightened inter-Korean military tension, which has deepened public anxiety. The North and the South are engaging in a dangerous game of chicken without any channels of communication, increasing the risk that an accidental clash may well escalate into a full-blown military conflict. Over the past seven years—while the six-party talks have been derailed—North Korea is believed to have steadily amassed nuclear materials and is now estimated to possess more than ten nuclear warheads. Pyongyang has so far conducted five nuclear tests in total and acquired short-range Scud-type missiles, intermediate-range Nodong and Musudan missiles, and even submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It is also close to developing intercontinental ballistic missiles and claims to have made progress miniaturizing and diversifying its nuclear warheads as well. The North Korean nuclear threat is thus no longer fictional but real and poses serious security threats to the peninsula, all of Northeast Asia, and the world. North Korean nuclear weapons would significantly alter the [End Page 74] military balance on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately impede peaceful coexistence there. The regional security impacts are also profound—a nuclear domino effect might lead to proliferation elsewhere in Northeast Asia. And the possibility exists that North Korea will export nuclear materials, technology, and even warheads to other regions, threatening the very foundations of world security in this age of global terrorism. Against this backdrop, this essay provides a critical assessment of existing strategies to deal with the North Korean nuclear deadlock by focusing on sanctions and other pressures, deterrence and missile defense, and preemptive attack and nuclear armament. It then suggests dialogue and negotiation as a viable alternative. The Limited Effectiveness of Sanctions and Other Pressures The Park Geun-hye government has responded to the threats from North Korea by employing a variety of countermeasures ranging from sanctions and other pressures to deterrence, preemptive strikes, and defense. Its preferred method of managing Pyongyang’s unruly behavior has so far been sanctions. The Park administration strongly believes that North Korea’s crimes (possession of nuclear weapons and violation of UN resolutions) should be punished by comprehensive and forceful sanctions and that such sanctions can compel the North and its leader, Kim Jong-un, to choose a path toward denuclearization. Otherwise, the Kim regime will risk collapse. But sanctions have not been effective. Despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2270, North Korea has not shown signs of compliance. On the contrary, its behavior has become more defiant, with the Kim regime conducting a fifth nuclear test and additional missile tests. North Korea is still a closed society and is very much accustomed to sanctions. Moreover, China does not want to go ahead with any sanctions that would undermine stability in the North and lead to regime collapse. Given that 91.3% of North Korea’s trade is with China, as of December 2015, international sanctions cannot be effective without Beijing’s full cooperation.2 As sanctions and other pressures have not produced any tangible outcomes, the South Korean government has not only strengthened its deterrence posture but also begun to adopt a more assertive defense stance, especially against a potential North Korean missile attack. This deterrence [End Page 75] strategy is composed of three elements. The first is deterrence against the North by implementing a kill chain predicated on improved missile and...

IntroductionWith its geographic proximity, historical and cultural ties, and ideological affinity, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has occupied an important place in the conduct of China's foreign policy. Following the Chinese intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953), which saved the DPRK from its demise, China signed a treaty of friendship and alliance with North Korea in 1961, which is still in effect today. As North Korea's economy deteriorated as a result of the so-called military first policy of the Kim Jong-Il regime from the latter part of the 1990s, China provided increasingly larger amounts of economic aid to its impoverished ally, while shielding it diplomatically and politically from the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council for Pyongyang's violations of international agreements on the denuclearization of North Korea. China is estimated to provide over 90 percent of North Korea's energy imports, 80 percent of its consumer goods and 45 percent of its food.1Under the Hu Jintao government (2002-2012), China's Korea policy revolved around three basic concerns: prevention of the collapse of the North Korean regime, preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. First, China did not want to see the collapse of the North Korean regime, as North Korea provided a valuable buffer zone between China and South Korea where over 28,000 U.S. troops remain stationed. If the North Korean regime collapsed, or were absorbed by South Korea, China would have to face a unified Korea controlled by the capitalist South and allied with the United States. Such a contingency would mean not only the loss of a valuable buffer zone but also a considerable burden on China's national defense, for as many as one-fifth (or 400,000) of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) may need to be deployed along the Sino-Korean border to ensure China's national security.2 Second, China desired to prevent the outbreak of another war in Korea, for that could embroil China in an unwanted war because of its alliance with North Korea. In order for China to continue its economic development and rise, it needed a peaceful international environment in East Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula. Third, China also became concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons program, for the acquisition of nuclear capabilities by North Korea would trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would likely be compelled to counter the North's move by developing their own nuclear weapons programs. Such a development would not be conducive to the maintenance of China's special status as the sole legitimate nuclear power in the region. As a result, China became involved in the politics of denuclearization of North Korea through the Six-Party Talks in and after 2003.Throughout the Kim Jong-Il's rule in North Korea (1994-2011), China's priority was the survival of the North Korean regime (or preventing its collapse). Such a priority did not change immediately after Jong-Il's death, for China's overriding concern was the preservation of North Korea through the successful consolidation of power by Kim Jong-Un. As a result, the Hu Jintao leadership decided to help Jong- Un's consolidation of power by endorsing the legitimacy of the new regime from the very beginning. At the same time, China also wanted a more cooperative new North Korean regime which would help stabilize the situation on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea under Kim Jong-Il had been a political liability and economic burden to China, as that regime defied the international community by perpetrating numerous provocations and crises. Pyongyang carried out missile and nuclear weapons tests in 2006 and 2009 in violation of international agreements. Furthermore, Pyongyang sank a South Korean warship, Cheonan, in March 2010 and shelled South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island, killing over 50 soldiers and civilians, in November of the same year. …

Liberalists has declared that economic trade brings about political cooperation and peace between two countries through enhancing the economic benefits, promoting conversation, and removing misunderstanding. On the basis of this declaration, the policy on North Korea has been pushed ahead by the Korean government which tries to transform the relationship with North Korea from mistrust and hostility to reconciliation and cooperation. It has been twenty three years since the economic trade between South and North Korea began in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo which was triggered by the Declaration of July 7 and the North-South Korean Economic Relation Measure of October in 1988. The total turnover between South and North Korea was about 15.9 billion USD during the period from the beginning of January, 1989 to the end of September, 2011, out of which 13.2 billion USD is for commercial trade and 2.6 billion USD is for economic aid. However, the controversy is being aroused in South Korea about the policy on North Korea because North Korea tends to keep hostility towards South Korea through nuclear experiment, blowing up the Cheonan ship, shooting a South Korean tourist in Keumkang Mountain, and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island. It seems to the realists that the economic trade between South and North Korea brings about reinforcing the North Korean military power and weakening the security in South Korea, which results in hindering the peace in Korean Peninsular. From the point of this issue, this paper aims to analyse the effect of trade and economic aid on easing conflicts between South and North Korea empirically. The result of this study can be summarized as follows. First of all, the increase of total turnover is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, which means that the increase of total turnover will decrease the conflict index. Secondly, the increase of commercial trade does not significantly affect the conflict index. Thirdly, the increase of non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, which means that the increase of non-commercial trade will bring about creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea. Finally, the multi-variable analysis shows that rate of change in non-commercial trade is significantly effective on the conflict index, but rate of change in commercial trade is not. To sum up the results of the empirical analysis, the increase of total turnover and/or non-commercial trade is significantly effective on creating the cooperative relationship between South and North Korea, but not in the case of the increase of commercial trade. In other words, the economic trade between South and North Korea does not necessarily reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular. In fact, it has been happening in the real world since fifty years ago. Social welfare in North Korea should be enhanced to reduce the conflict in Korean Peninsular through the economic support and trade from South Korea. The amount of social welfare increase in North Korea should be enough to offset the amount of social welfare decrease due to the cessation of the economic support and trade. Therefore, the economic trade between South and North Korea needs to be vitalized more and more so that North Korea be economically dependent upon South Korea. Limits of this paper, which are left to be studied in the future, are as follows. First of all, it needs to be analyzed how much social welfare has been enhanced in North Korea through the economic trade between South and North Korea for the past twenty three years. Secondly, it also needs to be studied what is the level of dependence of North Korea on South Korea, and whether the economic sanction toward the North Korea of the Lee Myung-bak administration is significantly effective or not.

Note: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of Defense or any other government agency. The Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) is in our interest because, if it is carried out, it will eliminate the North Korean nuclear weapons program. If unchecked, this program threatens two key U.S. interests stability in Asia and checking the spread of nuclear weapons. The stability of Asia is critical to U.S. security and prosperity. The foundation of Northeast Asia's economic growth and political stability is security, and the linchpins of security have been our commitment to our defense relationships with South Korea and Japan. North Korea's long-standing challenge to security and stability in Northeast Asia acquired more ominous dimension with the emergence of major North Korean nuclear weapons program. Since the early 1980s, North Korea has operated large nuclear complex, chiefly at Yongbyon. U.S. intelligence believes that the purpose of the complex is the production of weapons grade plutonium. In addition to small 5 MW(e) reactor in operation since 1985, 50 MW(e) and 200 MW(e) reactor are under construction. We estimate that the DPRK nuclear program had generated enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons and was poised to leap forward in terms of plutonium production. The North Korean program represented an unacceptable threat to the United States' and our allies' interests for number of mutually-reinforcing reasons: * An unchecked nuclear capability in the North, coupled with its oversized conventional force, could be used for extortion or blackmail against the ROK as well as greatly increasing the costs of war in Korea. * A nuclear arsenal in North Korea could ignite nuclear arms race in Asia generally. * Failure to curb North Korean efforts would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. * North Korea could export nuclear technologies and components to pariah states or terrorists worldwide. * With upgraded missile delivery systems, which the North is developing, the nuclear threat could project across most of Northeast Asia. The DPRK signed the NPT in 1985, entered into safeguards agreement with the IAEA in January 1992 and agreed with the ROK in 1992 to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Despite these obligations, in 1989 the DPRK defueled its 5 MW(e) reactor and reprocessed the fuel. In 1992 the DPRK refused to cooperate with the IAEA to clarify the amount and disposition of the plutonium from that load of fuel. The DPRK remained out of compliance with its NPT and IAEA obligations up to mid-1994. Talks aimed at the resolution of the problem faltered. In 1993 North Korea announced it would withdraw from the NPT and then suspended its withdrawal. In June 1994 the DPRK defueled its reactor for the second time and refused to allow the IAEA to take steps that could have helped shed light on the amount of plutonium removed during the earlier defueling. It declared it would end its IAEA safeguards agreement, refuel the reactor, and reprocess the spent fuel. In light of these threats, acts, and the lack of progress in bilateral talks, the United States, in cooperation with the ROK and other allies and friends, took steps to obtain UN Security Council sanctions resolution on the DPRK. North Korea declared that sanctions were, in its view, an act of war. In light of the DPRK's massive conventional capability and its threats e.g. to turn Seoul into a sea of fire we augmented our defensive capability, and in consultation with the ROK, considered wide range of options for additional force augmentations. …

Economists have expressed their opinion that the economic trade between countries brings about economic prosperity as well as peace. Their opinion is based upon that the trading countries do not want to face the situation of decline in their welfare and benefits due to not participating in economic trade. They argue that economic trades between countries give them the opportunities of conversation, decrease misunderstanding, and leads them to peaceful mind and behavioral attitude to adjust the political conflicts. On the basis of this kind of opinion and the reunification of Germany, the economic trade between South and North Korea has been suggested as the most efficient measure to maintain the peace in Korean Peninsula. It has been twenty four years since the economic trade between South and North Korea was triggered in January, 1989 under President Noh Taewoo’s Declaration of July 7 in spite of several crises. The total turnover between South and North Korea is about US$ 18.3 billion from 1989 to 2012, out of which US$ 9.2 billion is the export to the North and US$ 9.1 billion is the import from the North. Since the end of cold war, South Korea and China have established diplomatic relations on July 24, 1992, and they have become strategic cooperative partners. The total turnover between South Korea and China was US$ 6.4 billion in 1992, and it increased to US$ 215.2 billion in 2012. On the other hand, the total turnover between North Korea and China amounts to US$ 5.9 billion in 2012, which is around three times as much as that between South and North Korea. The results of theoretical analyses are summarized as follows. First of all, exports and imports between South and North Korea turned out to ease the conflicts between two countries. Therefore, ‘theory of peace through trade’ by the liberalists was supported here. Secondly, it turned out that the economic trade between North Korea and China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if South Korea and China are in friendly partnership. It implies that China induces North Korea to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. Thirdly, exports from South Korea to China affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are friendly partners politically. Imports from China to South. Korea affects to easing conflicts between South and North Korea only if North Korea and China are in antagonistic relationship politically. Empirical analysis shows that the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea turned out to have a significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It implies that the increase of the difference quotient in the total turnover between South and North Korea is likely to ease the conflicts between two countries. On the other hand, the difference quotient in the imports turned out to have significant positive relationship with the conflict index of the former year. It tells that the increase of the imports is likely to ease the conflicts between South and North Korea. While the expand of trade with China will ease the conflicts in Korean Peninsula from the theoretical viewpoint, empirical analyses present opposite results. It implies that the relationship between North Korea and China since the end of cold war is not the same as that before the end of cold war. It also tells that North Korea puts the higher political priority to developing the nuclear weapon and long-range missile. Inter-Korean policy has to keep consistency focusing economic cooperation apart from political issues. Long-term goal of inter-Korean policy should be unification, although short-term one is peace and stability in Korean Peninsula.

In 2010, with the implementation of the May 24th measures, inter-Korean economic cooperation was suspended in all areas except the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Then, in 2016, with the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, all inter-Korean economic cooperation came to a halt. The joint venture enterprises in inter-Korean economic cooperation were mainly concentrated in the Pyongyang region. However, there was a case of inter-Korean economic cooperation in the form of a joint venture enterprise outside the Kaesong Industrial Complex that could be accessed using the entry and exit procedures of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. South-North Equity Joint Venture Enterprise in Kaesong can utilize the industrial, transportation, and transit facilities of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and has the advantage of active participation by North Korea, which holds shares. In the Equity Joint Venture Act, it is necessary to clarify the criteria for setting land usage fees, ease the all-out agreement system, and ensure education for workers. In addition, it is necessary to fairly define subsequent procedures in cases where consultation is impossible. Under the North-South Economic Cooperation Act, it is necessary to simplify the North's project approval process and stipulate that the North should manage its property in good faith, at least to a minimum extent, in special circumstances. The law on the development of inter-Korean relations needs to clearly define the special relationship between North and South Korea and elevate the legal status of the inter-Korean agreements to the level of general treaties. The law on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation should clearly stipulate in writing the procedures for obtaining North Korean visit approvals and for importing and exporting goods, and should minimize the time required for these processes. The agreement on investment protection between North and South Korea should specify in detail the abnormal issues that impede economic cooperation and provide for step-by-step investment protection accordingly. Regarding the agreement on the resolution of commercial disputes between North and South Korea, the follow-up procedures of the agreement should be promptly carried out, and the establishment of a governing law that applies to both North and South Korea is necessary. The inter-Korean agreement went through the legislative approval process outlined in Article 60, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, thereby establishing its legal validity. However, due to North Korea's non-compliance, it has become practically ineffective. However, as North Korea has not explicitly rejected the validity of the agreement, it is not advisable to disregard the agreement and its provisions in preparation for future inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea has been attempting to improve its external economy through scientific and technological exchanges, economic development zones, and other means since the 2010s. However, the situation has worsened due to North Korea's nuclear tests leading to U.S. sanctions and the impact of COVID-19. Due to COVID-19, there have been zero exchanges of people between North and South Korea for a period of two years starting from 2021. In the current tense situation of strained inter-Korean relations, inter-Korean economic cooperation should be carried out flexibly and adaptively, taking into account the interests of both North and South Korea and contributing to their reunification, in accordance with the dynamics of inter-Korean and international relations.

IntroductionDoes economic integration between South and North Korea generate positive spillover effects on their relationship? Or, are geopolitical factors and security issues still powerful enough to dominate Korean politics, limiting the effect of economic integration? The level of economic integration between the two Koreas has deepened over time. The amount of bilateral trade was only about $1.1 million three years after they officially began their trade relationship in 1988. It increased to $400 million in 2000 and then $2 billion in 2012. Currently, South Korea is North Korea's second largest trading partner, accounting for about 38 percent of its total trade in 2007. Considerable research argues that economic integration generates positive spillover effects on economic partners socially and politically.2 Scholars of liberal peace, for instance, claim that bilateral economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict between trading partners.3 Strong economic ties and material gains generated from it may promote economic partners' incentive to maintain or strengthen their relationship and avoid threats that may disrupt their partnership. Frequent interactions can also increase common knowledge, understanding, and interest on various issues. To the extent it occurs, economic partners are likely to narrow their policy preference gaps over various foreign policy issues.4 In this regard, it is reasonable to suspect that increasing economic integration between the two Koreas may have promoted their foreign policy preference similarity, increasing political cooperation in international organizations.Meanwhile, from a realist perspective, military tension and external forces on the peninsula, such as the U.S. and China, are still powerful factors that drive Korean politics. From this perspective, inter-Korean relations and their foreign policies have been shaped and affected by geopolitical issues and regional super powers. Therefore, bilateral economic integration may have a negligible impact on inter- Korean relations.Both claims have solid theoretical grounds. Nevertheless, virtually no empirical studies have tested these claims and show whether economic integration has gen- erated any positive spillover effects on inter-Korean relations. This article examines whether deepening economic integration has promoted cooperation between the two Koreas by analyzing their voting (dis)similarity in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) over the time period, 1991-2011. Also, it tests whether their voting decisions are strongly influenced by the positions of the U.S. and China on the issues. Empirical results show no significant evidence that economic integration promotes cooperation between South and North Korea in the UNGA. However, the two Koreas show relatively similar voting patterns over economic issues and Palestinian issues, while they tend not to agree on nuclear, security, and human rights issues. Meanwhile, their vote coincidence is strongly influenced by the United States' and China's positions on votes. These results imply that political rather than economic factors are still significant in explaining non-cooperation on the Korean Peninsula.In the following pages, we first examine the theoretical basis of the relationship between economic integration and states' cooperation. Next, we explore states' voting behavior in the UNGA in general and that of the two Koreas in particular. Research design, the data and variables used in this article, and the empirical results are reported in the next section. Finally, we conclude with a summary of the findings and their implications.Economic Integration and Cooperation Between StatesEconomic integration, which is typically defined as the free flow of goods, capital, and labor across national borders, has deepened in many places in the world. The Korean Peninsula is not an exception from this global trend. Ever since the devastating Korean War in 1950-1953, the two Koreas lacked a formal economic relationship until 1988. …

Degradation, urbanization, and restoration: A review of the challenges and future of conservation on the Korean Peninsula

The Failure of Maritime Sanctions Enforcement against North Korea Robert Huish (bio) KEYWORDS NORTH KOREA, SANCTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, MARITIME TRAFFIC [End Page 131] 2018 update Subsequent to the publication of this article, Raetsmarine Insurance provided evidence to the author to reflect that it insured the Kum San Bong (IMO 8810384) under the Mongolian flag, and not under the DPRK flag as was erroneously recorded in the MarineTraffic Database. The MarineTraffic Database has been updated accordingly. Raetsmarine’s policy is to prohibit the insurance of North Korean flagged vessels in order to be in compliance with the sanctions regime. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This article examines the ineffectiveness of current sanctions on marine traffic into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by identifying four weaknesses that allow traffic there to continue: flags of convenience, misidentification or false registration, offshore ownership, and shell-firm owners, managers, and insurers. MAIN ARGUMENT Based on a review of automatic identification system data tracking approximately 70 vessels that entered DPRK ports between April 2016 and October 2016, current sanctions on North Korea do not appear to be impeding marine traffic into the country. The majority of marine traffic into the DPRK during this period was from Chinese ports by vessels flagged by several countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the DPRK. The registration and flagging of vessels trading with North Korea occurs via offshore firms that are based outside sanctions enforcement zones in places such as Hong Kong, the British Virgin Islands, and the Seychelles. Sanctions against North Korea are thus largely symbolic gestures of disapproval that do not demonstrate any capability to change the political behavior of the Kim Jong-un regime. For sanctions to influence the regime’s behavior, it would be necessary to pursue restrictions on the capital flows that allow marine traffic to enter the country rather than sanctioning the regime itself. POLICY IMPLICATIONS • The role of offshore capital reduces the potency of smart sanctions and recent financial measures against North Korea. If offshore interests are not taken into consideration, then it is unlikely that these policies will have any real effect on the regime’s political behavior. • he intermediaries of vessel owners, managers, and insurers are all financially gaining from trade with the DPRK, which presents an important target for financial measures. Insurers of some of these vessels are situated in countries that do uphold sanctions, notably the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, South Korea, and New Zealand. • The Banco Delta Asia case demonstrates an important aperture in sanctions enforcement by relying on financial measures that do not target the regime itself but go after the surrounding capital networks on which it relies. [End Page 132] In February 2016 the United States escalated its enforcement of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and in June 2016 it imposed a new set of prohibitions on the regime, citing evidence of gross human rights violations.1 Sanctions, in the form of financial restrictions and the prohibition of marine traffic, have been increasingly imposed on a global scale against the DPRK in the past several years.2 Many scholars and policy analysts have long questioned the efficacy of sanctions to alter the behavior of hostile countries or thwart human rights abuses.3 This article analyzes the efficacy of current sanctions on the DPRK, specifically those focused on curtailing marine traffic into the country. Despite the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions in March 2016 and U.S. sanctions in June 2016, marine traffic into the DPRK continued throughout 2016. Between April 2016 and October 2016, I used automatic identification system (AIS) software from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to analyze marine traffic into active DPRK ports and identified approximately 70 incoming vessels, mostly arriving from Chinese ports but also from other locations, including a vessel that traveled to Sinpo harbor from Vancouver, Canada. While the methods used in this article are insufficient to produce a conclusive account of all marine traffic into the DPRK, this study finds that, despite the existence of sanctions, marine traffic regularly enters DPRK ports owing to the reflagging of vessels under flags of convenience and ownership of vessels by offshore capital management firms. This...

Last orders in Pyongyang

Mitigating the proliferation of biological weapons remains uniquely challenging, even 48 years after the ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Suspected development of advanced biological weapons by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), despite its status as a party to both the BWC and other nonproliferation agreements, has emphasized the need for international efforts to keep biological weapons out of the hands of rogue nations and terrorist networks. Among the numerous weaponized cultures believed to be in development by the North Korean military are anthrax, botulism, cholera, plague and smallpox. With a steady decrease in resources and attention devoted to preparedness for biological attacks or outbreaks since 2001, the United States and its allies remain vulnerable to biological weapons in development by North Korea. An ongoing example of this danger is demonstrated by the international community’s struggle to respond to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. With United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540’s expiration in 2021, this paper aims to assess its effectiveness in preventing the proliferation of biological weapons by analyzing the legal requirements UNSCR 1540 imposes on UN member nations. Using North Korea’s biological weapons program as a case study, this paper will evaluate the successes and failures of UNSCR 1540’s legal mechanisms in controlling biological weapons development in North Korea in its penultimate year of validity. This paper will also examine the overlapping roles served by the World Health Organization (WHO), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and UNSCR 1540, and how their administrative frameworks identify and respond to natural disease outbreaks and biological attacks. Finally, this paper will recommend actions the United Nations Security Council may take to more effectively pursue its mission of nonproliferation.

America's North Korea nuclear policy has been a failure. Instead of achieving its goal of preventing North Korea from possessing and proliferating nuclear weapons, it has had the opposite effect. This failure was a result of the George W. Bush administration's blanket rejection of the previous administration's approach to North Korea, the tendency to ignore the advice of experts, neoconservative influence on foreign policy, and divisions within the administration resulting in an inconsistent approach. This article suggests a bold new approach in which the United States offers North Korea full diplomatic recognition and a formal end to the Korean War as first steps toward the goals established in the 2007 Six Party Talks on North Korea, i.e., that North Korea give up its nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons programs, and cease its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Taking these moves as a starting point rather than a reward for compliance will deepen North Korea's commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation by removing its gravest external security threat—the United States.