Abstract
Abstract The Argument from Self-Defeat purports to show that ambivalence undermines the possibility of integrity. This chapter considers a version of this argument that can be traced back to Plato but has contemporary support in the work of Christine Korsgaard. According to this version of the Argument from Self-Defeat, ambivalence is a threat to well-functioning agency because a fragmented will inevitably issues in actions that involve pernicious forms of self-betrayal. In response, the chapter argues that this initial version of the argument fails to show that ambivalence is self-defeating because it rests on mistaken psychological and normative commitments. It then considers a second version of the argument found in the work of Harry Frankfurt.
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