Ally against Ally: The Zionist-Genevese Front against British Policy in Palestine, 1929–1931

This article analyzes the conditions under which Jews migrated to Palestine and how Britain handled Jewish immigration. With the occupation of Palestine by Britain in 1917, a period marked by conflict and turmoil began in the region. In the early years of the occupation, how Britain would establish an administration in Palestine was a matter of great curiosity. However, the Balfour Declaration, which was announced just before the occupation, was a significant document in terms of revealing what the inhabitants of Palestine would face. The Balfour Declaration, published as a result of intensive negotiations between the British and the Jews, declared that Britain would support the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. At this point, in order to increase the number of Jews -who were fewer in number compared to the Arabs in the region- Zionists encouraged Jewish migration from Europe to Palestine. The Zionists promoted Jewish immigration by disregarding the Arabs. The policy of displacing Arabs from their lands and settling Jews in their place was implemented intensively from the early years of the occupation of Palestine. During this period, the Arabs submitted petitions to the League of Nations in an effort to mobilize the international community against the injustices they faced. This process has been attempted to be revealed through the petitions and reports reflected in some League of Nations and British archival documents. This study also examines the measures taken by the Ottoman State to prevent Jewish immigration, based on Ottoman archival documents.

The years preceding World War Two witnessed significant changes in British policy in Palestine. These changes were at one and the same time the cause and effect of a radical re-adjustment of the British policymaking machine (for want of a better name) responsible for Palestine. Until 1936, Britain had administered the Palestine Mandate in the light of a reasonably objective judgement of the respective rights of Zionists and Arabs. To a considerable degree, policy-making had been delegated by Cabinet and Colonial Secretary to the permanent officials in London and to the men on the spot in Palestine. But the Arab Rebellion which began in April, 1936 and continued intermittently until the eve of war, involved the moral sympathy, political support and even the physical intervention of certain of the Arab States. The increasing involvement of the Arab world in Palestinian affairs of necessity led to an increasing and ultimately dominating interest on the part of the Foreign Office. With the security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean at stake policy in Palestine could no longer be left in the hands of officials, whether in London or Jerusalem. London could no longer afford the luxury of considering the problems of Palestine in isolation from the rest of the Middle East. The re-assumption of ministerial and Cabinet control over policy in Palestine was neither swift nor smooth. Ministers relied heavily on the opinions of their permanent staff, especially when they themselves were new and often ephemeral incumbents. Baldwin's leadership in Cabinet was weak, collective responsibility sadly lacking. Baldwin took little interest in foreign affairs, and believed that Ministers should run their own Departments, with himself on hand to settle disputes or give advice. 1 If during 1935-36 the Cabinet dithered for months over its attitude to Italy, it could not be expected to re-assert swift control over a troubled colony. Government machinery for dealing with Arabian and Middle Eastern problems generally still showed a remarkable lack of unified direction. Apart from the traditional, major, but rather obscure divisions between the responsibilities of on the one hand, the Foreign Office and, on the other, of the India Office and the Government of India in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, policy in Iraq (until its official independence in 1932), Transjordan and Palestine was the responsibility of the Colonial Office.2 Defence policy in the Middle East had been placed in the hands of the Air Ministry during Churchill's tenure at the Colonial Office in 1921, but the despatch of troops in considerable numbers to Palestine in 1936 led to an ad hoc assumption of general command by the G.O.C. of the Army. The Admiralty was concerned for its part with the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf Ports as stop-offs on the Imperial route to India and as terminal ports for oil supplies.

The period between the publication of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and League of Nations mandates official assignment to Great Britain in 1922 was not lengthy, but highly eventful. All this time England was maneuvring between the Jewish and the Arab national movements, which also gradually formed their own demands and objectives. The problem was, pursuing British interests was possible through maneuvring only, as support of just one local force was not quite strategically advantageous. Britains official commitment to the Balfour Declaration remained at the core of its policy, however it could not completely ignore the demands of the Arab polutaion of Palestine. Although there were quite a number of British administrators and imperial politicians, who were sympathetic towards the Zionist cause and thus were ready to meet their requests to a certain extent, adherence to the British Middle East interests remained crucial to them. The idea of a Jewish national home (not a state, though) in Palestine did not come into contradiction with the general policy of Great Britain in the Middle East: it was rather its integral part. At the same time implementing the Zionist project had to be in line with it: any relatively radical (from the British administrators point of view) proposals were rejected or postponed indefinitely. Towards the Arabs of Palestine Great Britain was conducting mainly declarative policy without any serious consideration of their problems and grievances, although trying to appease their demands to a certain extent. Even the Arab riots of 1920 and 1921 did not cause a serious change in the British political course in Palestine, although they did contribute to the emergence of Churchills White Paper in 1922, declaring certain concessions to the Arab national movement, which never accepted the document. At the same time British policy in general was neither pro-Zionist, nor pro-Arab: England was pursuing its long-term strategic goals in the Middle East, skillfully utilizing Zionist and Arab national movements to achieve them.

US Secretary of State George C. Marshall's Losing Battles against President Harry S. Truman's Palestine Policy, January–June 1948

The Perfidy of Albion: Britain's Secret Re-Assessment of the Balfour Declaration

The British period in Palestine (1917–48) was fundamentally shaped by the commitment to promote the Jewish National Home (JNH) as originally stated in the Balfour Declaration (1917). The extent that that commitment shaped public-security policy in Palestine is examined in this article. While the need to reduce costs and the desire for a civilian (rather than military) force also shaped policy, the government's JNH policy was the key determinant in public-security policy in Palestine. It meant the police was specifically configured to protect the Jewish population and there were always a disproportionate number of British personnel in the force. This became more pronounced as British rule progressed. Following deadly riots in 1929, the number of British police was tripled; with the inception of the Arab Revolt (1936–39) that number more than quadrupled. Moreover, during the Arab Revolt the British increasingly relied on members of the Jewish community to assist with their protection. The majority of these Jewish forces were supposedly for defensive purposes; regardless, they were all members of the semi-secret underground Jewish army, Haganah. The British were well aware of this and tacitly approved. In doing so, the British made a significant contribution to the Zionist project.

Reviewed by: Churchill and the Jews: A Lifelong Friendship Justin D. Lyons Churchill and the Jews: A Lifelong Friendship, by Martin Gilbert. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007. 359 pp. $30.00. A great many books have been written about Winston Churchill, in part because the story of Churchill’s life intersects with many of the most important events of the twentieth century. Sir Martin Gilbert’s Churchill and the Jews: A Lifelong Friendship is yet another illustration of Churchill’s pervasive influence on these events. The central part of this story is Churchill’s support for the Zionist movement, which led eventually to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. Gilbert sets this fascinating and lesser known tale in the context of the world wars and, more importantly, within the political struggle of conflicting interests and opinions. Churchill’s father, Lord Randolph, had bucked the antisemitic sentiment widespread in the British upper classes by maintaining friendships with several [End Page 174] prominent Jews. Churchill continued in his father’s footsteps with personal and political contacts throughout his life. What is more, Churchill became the figure in British politics most central to Jewish concerns both inside and outside Britain. His first political involvement in Jewish concerns came in 1904 as Member of Parliament for Manchester North-West where a third of his constituency was Jewish. He fought successfully against the Conservative Government’s Aliens Bill aimed at restricting the immigration of Jews fleeing Tsarist Russia. Churchill’s defense of Jewish rights in Britain was an important element of his tenure as Home Secretary beginning in 1910. Beyond domestic politics, Churchill was a supporter of Jewish aspirations for a national home even before the 1917 Balfour Declaration. The Balfour Declaration, named for A. J. Balfour, Foreign Secretary in Lloyd George’s Government, pledged British support for the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. That support was given in the hope that both American and Russian Jewry would aid the British war effort: Russia would be encouraged to stay in the war, and the military participation of the United States would be accelerated. Churchill was grateful for Jewish efforts and was adamant that the Declaration, which he viewed as the solemnly pledged word of Britain to the Jews, “could not be set aside when, in later years, it became awkward to fulfill” (p. 28). He pursued the fulfillment of this promise in the face of many practical difficulties and much political opposition. Churchill’s post-war positions in the British Government made him a central figure in the realization of Zionist aspirations. As Secretary of State for War, he had responsibility for Palestine, which was still under British military administration, and had to deal with the difficulties involved in the disposition of the lands previously governed by the Ottoman Empire. In 1921, Churchill was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies and continued his administrative duties over the British Mandates of Palestine and Mesopotamia. During his tenure, the borders of Palestine and the Arab kingdoms were set, Jewish immigration keyed to the productive capacity of the land was ongoing, and practical steps to expand that capacity were encouraged. It was Churchill who authored the 1922 White Paper which, when approved by the League of Nations, internationally guaranteed the Jewish National Home in Palestine. Zionism had its opponents both in Britain and the Middle East. Arab opposition grew with the Jewish population of Palestine, breaking out in violent attacks targeting both Jews and the British. In 1939, Neville Chamberlain’s Government, in response to Arab pressure, issued a White Paper which limited Jewish immigration to Palestine. Its aim was to ensure a permanent Arab [End Page 175] majority there, effectively eliminating the possibility of an eventual Jewish state. Churchill spoke strongly “against what he believed was both a betrayal of the Balfour Declaration, and a shameful act of appeasement” (p. 158). The Second World War did not drive Zionism from Churchill’s mind; in fact, it magnified its importance. The need to recall British troops stationed in Palestine, the need to find a place for Jewish refugees from Europe, and moral outrage at the horrors...

A number of developments in the first quarter of the 20th century have an important role in shaping the Middle East. The Sharif Hussein-Mc Mahon Negotiations, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration and other secret agreements between Britain and France that emerged during the First World War deeply affected the subsequent period of Arab geography. The Balfour Declaration in 1917 can be called one of the founding texts of Israel. In this respect, the declaration has a great impact on all the Middle Eastern politics, especially Palestine. It will not be wrong to say that the Palestine issue, which has become one of the most important problems of the region in time, has its roots in the Balfour Declaration. For this reason, cognizance of the Balfour Declaration and Britain's Palestinian politics after the First World War is crucial to understand the region's later history. From this point of view, this article attempts to examine the regional policies of Britain through the declaration and to provide a causality for the emergence of the declaration. What is the key motivation behind the Balfour Declaration? How can one explain the emergence of the declaration only in 1917, although it came to the agenda in Britain as early as 1915? This study claims that a particular set of internal and external factors associated with British politics gave rise to the declaration. The present article dissects these factors from the perspective of neoclassical realist theory and evaluate the systemic modifiers and unit-level variables in order to explain the Balfour Declaration. Specifically, it examines decision-making process behind the declaration from a systematic and holistic perspective.

Essay| January 01 1930 British Policy in Palestine H. N. Brailsford H. N. Brailsford British Labor Journalist; Former Editor, The New Leader, London; Author of Olives of Endless Age and Other Works Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Current History (1930) 31 (4): 754–757. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1930.31.4.754 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation H. N. Brailsford; British Policy in Palestine. Current History 1 January 1930; 31 (4): 754–757. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1930.31.4.754 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentCurrent History Search This content is only available via PDF. © 1930 by The Regents of the University of California1930 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

This chapter argues while the mandates system aimed at legitimating and prolonging imperial rule, its processes and component parts especially the Mandates Commission proved less docile and more disruptive than its framers intended. If a mandatory power was strongly invested in the League or sensitive to international opinion, however, such oversight could have a significant effect, with the mandatory power adjusting policy to court approval or limit criticism. The mandatory powers held administrative authority, and the small Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) established to review their reports and consider written petitions or appeals was allowed neither to hear petitioners nor to conduct fact-finding missions to territories. To the government's distress, the PMC's report followed the 'Zionists' lead in laying responsibility for the very outbreak of the riots on the 'hesitant' policy of the Palestine administration itself. As in 1929, the conflict quickly internationalized, with the League, various European states, and Palestine's independent Arab neighbours all claiming locus standi in the matter.

This article examines British policy on Jewish immigration in light of both Arab and Zionist pressures. British policy vis-a-vis Palestine on the eve of the war in Europe apparently was meant to appease the Arabs. When Jewish immigration was perceived by the Arabs to form the crux of the Palestine problem Britain limited the scope of immigration. Zionists undermined British immigration policy by sending to Palestine numerous illegal immigrants from different ports in Europe and by motivating American pressure on London to open the gates of Palestine for the Jews. The illegal immigration and Britains lack of sincerity in opposing illegal sailings bothered the Arabs. The inability of Britain to prevent Jewish immigration was questioned. This was a test case for British-Arab relations. Consequently Britain persisted in its efforts to thwart illegal immigration until the very end of the mandate. Its diplomatic campaign against the countries being entered by illegal immigrant sailings and against the states of these illegal immigrants continued unabated.

Once the Fascist dictatorship completed its national political consolidation at the end of 1929, it directed more and more of its attention towards setting out an explicit Fascist foreign policy in...

Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea

Drawing a parallel between the Jewish State of Israel and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is anything but easy. Given the prevailing hostility of the Muslim countries toward Israel, any comparison between the two is unthinkable and even haram. Having sought an Islam-based identity for itself, how could Pakistan be compared favorably with Israel when the prevailing Muslim sentiment toward Israel is less than warm? Some might consider it appalling when Israel is periodically testing and validating its democratic credentials through endless political acrimony, unstable governments, and early elections. This is in contrast to Pakistan, which is often derided as a failing state by its adversaries and a disappointment by its citizens.Despite a feeling of hostility, Israel and Pakistan share a lot in common. While similarities exist between the two, particularly their struggle for national identity and statehood, comparing them is daunting. Such an approach would also have undermined Pakistan's claim to be the steadfast supporter of the Palestinian cause even before the partition of the Indian subcontinent.Seen within this context, Muslim Zion: Pakistan as a Political Idea is an interesting attempt to examine the paths the two countries and their prestate leaders had taken toward realizing the aspirations of a distinct national identity largely based on religion. Parallels between the Indian subcontinent and Palestine are unmistakable. In both the cases, a minority population sought self-determination and statehood on the basis of being a discrete religious group, and both argued that they were separate nations struggling for a different and distinct political identity. Unfortunately, Faisal Devji does not even offer a minimal comparison between the trajectory of the Jewish and Pakistani nationalisms and their unique characteristics.Devji's focus on the territorial construct of Pakistani nationalism is devoid of any understanding of the intrinsic link between the Jewish diaspora and the land of Zion for close to two millennia. Like Pakistani nationalism, the concept of Jewish statehood took a concrete step during the Second World War, but the idea of Jews being a distinct people, either religiously or nationally, did not emerge through the Balfour Declaration.If the treatment of the subject is any indication, the author's understanding of Jewish history and the struggle that preceded the establishment of a Jewish national home is superficial. He often cites statements by Muslim leaders who saw parallels in their own situations in Jewish history. For example, in 1935, Aga Khan felt that the situation of the Indian Muslims was “similar to the Jews in Europe or the Parsees and Christians in India” (p. 79). Elsewhere, he argues that Muhammed Iqbal “can compare the fate of Muslims to that of Jews” (p. 115). Devji fails to challenge these narratives or their rationale. Did they accurately reflect the status of Indian Muslims? At the same time, he does not hesitate to refute (and with some degree of accuracy) Mahatma Gandhi's repeated parallels between the Jews and the untouchables of India or the Dalits (p. 164). The work would have also benefited from a more critical examination of statements by Muslim League leaders such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Muhammad Iqbal, who referred to Jewish history in explaining the Pakistan movement.Devji is perhaps unfamiliar with the interactions between Muslim League leaders and the Yishuv (the prestate Jewish community and institutions in Palestine). The first known meeting between the Zionist leadership and Indian leaders was not with the Indian National Congress, but with the Muslim League. In January 1931, Chaim Weizmann, then President of the World Zionist Organization, met Shaukat Ali in London. The meeting took place against the backdrop of the offer by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin Al-Husseini, to inter the body of Shaukat's younger brother in the haram al-sharif in the old city of Jerusalem. The Mufti had previously met the Ali Brothers, the leaders of the Khilafat Movement, during the hajj a few years earlier. Conscious of the potential Islamization of the issue, Weizmann sought to limit the involvement of Muslims of British India (then the largest Muslim community in the world) in the Palestinian conflict. Likewise, Immanuel Olsvanger, the first Zionist emissary sent to India in mid-1936, met a number of League figures, including some Muslim leaders. The only known contact between Mahatma Gandhi and the Zionist leadership took place on October 15, 1931, in London with the explicit purpose of keeping the Indian domestic struggle between the Congress party and Muslim League from spilling over to Palestine.Moreover, toward the end of the First World War, the Indian Muslims rallied behind the Ottoman Caliph through a mass struggle commonly known as the Khilafat Movement. The Ali brothers played a key role in the Khilafat Movement, and Shaukat later became a key ally of the Mufti of Jerusalem in organizing the Jerusalem Islamic Conference in December 1931. According to Devji, “it was only natural for the Mahatma to join the Khilafat Movement, and indeed to become its leader” (p. 81). However, he fails to recognize that Mahatma's pronounced opposition to the Jewish political aspirations in Palestine germinated during this phase.One could argue that partly because of their contact with the Zionist emissaries, and their exposure to the Jewish struggle, that the Muslim League leaders made these references to Jewish history and statelessness. At the same time, it is essential to recognize that from the very beginning, the League opposed the Balfour Declaration and criticized the British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine. Indeed, the delays in the Balfour Declaration were partly attributed to the perceived opposition of the Indian Muslim population.The League's opposition to Jewish aspirations was not merely political, but was rooted in Islamic theology. In Islam, Jews are seen as a religious community and not as a distinct nation. Hence, even while making some references to Jewish history, the League and its leaders were presenting the Muslims of India as a nation, not just as a religious community. For the proponents of Pakistani nationalism, Jews were a religious community whereas the Indian Muslims were a distinct nation; hence, the Jews need “protection” as dhimmis, whereas Muslims are entitled to statehood. Devji does not delve into this critical difference.Furthermore, having successfully argued in favor of a religion-based state for the minorities in the subcontinent, Pakistan adopted the opposite position when the Partition Plan for Palestine came before the United Nations. Its Foreign Minister, Muhammed Zafarullah Khan, incidentally an Ahmadiyya, led the Arab-Islamic opposition to the partition plan. Hence, if the League leaders were drawing parallels with Jewish suffering, why did they equally oppose the Balfour Declaration, the partition of Palestine, and continue to resist normalizing its relations with the Jewish State? If Jinnah and others were drawing a favorable parallel between their community and Jewish marginalization, how come the League adopted radical positions vis-à-vis the Jewish national home?The Arab–Jewish struggle in Palestine also resulted in an intense competition between the League and Congress for the support of Indian Muslims. The League's uncompromising stand vis-à-vis Palestine was one of the factors that compelled the Congress party to side with the Arabs. Led by Mahatma Gandhi, the Congress leaders, including future Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, looked at the Arab–Jewish conflict in Palestine through the Islamic prism. Thus, until India's partition, the Palestine issue and the Jewish aspiration for a national home was a contest between the Congress and the Muslim League. After 1947, it became a competition between India and Pakistan for Arab support.For a long time, various Indian leaders, academics, and commentators attributed the lack of diplomatic relations with Israel to New Delhi's opposition to “religion-based states.” Speaking in Cairo in 1966, within months of assuming office, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared that the Indian support of Arab countries “is not only due to our traditional friendship towards the Arab people, but to our belief in and commitment to secularism and to the principle that states should not be carved out or created on the basis of religion.” The inference was obvious; it was supposed to refer to Pakistan for the Indians and to Israel for the Arabs.Unlike Zionism, there is no historic or emotional bond between the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent and the territory that became Pakistan in 1947, even among Pakistani nationalists. There are no parallels between the core issues of Promised Land and dispersal. Despite the cavalier usage, the treatment of Muslims in India either under the British or successive governments, cannot be compared to the Holocaust. Above all, despite the pre-1947 rhetoric, Pakistan was never conceived as the homeland of Indian Muslims, and the continuing problems of Muhajirs in Pakistan and the Bihari Muslims in Bangladesh are a testimony to this. Thus, while immigration (or aliya) was integral to Zionism, it was not part of Pakistani nationalism.The attitude of Pakistani nationalism toward partition was also ambiguous. It saw partition as the solution to the conditions of the Indian Muslims but vehemently opposed the same in Palestine. Furthermore, Pakistan became a reality because the majority population of the British Raj represented by the Congress party accepted partition as the price for freedom. In the case of Palestine, however, the Arab majority was opposed to the idea of partition and the Zionist leaders had to settle for a unilateral declaration of independence.If the idea of Pakistan was similar to that of the Jewish national home, how does one explain the continued, often virulent, official and popular Pakistani rhetoric against Israel? Or how did the League fail to internalize the similarities with “Jewish history” and seek a friendlier posture? The pro-Israel statements made by various Pakistani leaders since 1947 are directed at Washington, and reflect their desire to befriend the United States even while domestically maintaining Islam-based animosity against Israel and of late toward the Jews in general. Like many other Islamic countries, Pakistan does not have any direct bilateral dispute or conflict vis-à-vis Israel, yet like many Arab and Islamic countries, it has consistently refused to establish formal ties with the Jewish State. This requires a careful understanding. Locating their similarities on the “imagined territory” (which, however, is not the case for Zionism) is the greatest drawback of Muslim Zion.Devji's comparison of Israel returning the Sinai Peninsula after the Camp David accord with the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 (p. 23) is jarring. Reflecting prevailing conspiracy theories in the Middle East, his Eretz Israel “can include large chunks of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon” (p. 22). According to the author, the “antecedents of both Muslim and Jewish states should be sought less in the European history of nationalism, with its focus on some mystical way of belonging to a land, as much as in the fantasy of creating a state by purely rational means, one that was founded upon its idea alone” (p. 39). Without recognizing Israel's desire to be the homeland for the Jews and its unique Law of Return that bestows near-automatic citizenship upon any Jew requesting it, Devji claims that “neither state had been envisaged as a destination for the majority of India's Muslims or Europe's Jews” (p. 44).Devji forcefully argues that “Muslim nationalists rejected history, geography and even demography as the foundations of their political life, opting instead for an abstract idea of belonging together” (p. 123). By juxtaposing this with Zionism, he opens himself to unavoidable criticism. Early in the book, Devji observes that “both emerged from situations in which minority populations dispersed across vast subcontinents sought to escape the majorities whose persecution they rightly or wrongly feared” (p. 3) but executed it badly.There is a significant corpus of literature that compares Pakistan with Israel and materials available in the Central Zionist Archives in Jerusalem shed interesting light on the meetings between the Yishuv and Muslim League leaders including Jinnah. Not all comparisons cast the countries in a negative light. In a monograph published in 2000 by Tel Aviv University, this reviewer argued that normalization of relations between Israel and Pakistan would be beneficial to both countries and should not be viewed in terms of the third party interests and calculations.Ideally, the author should have confined himself to writing Pakistan as a Political Idea and that would have made for an interesting treatment. By bringing in Muslim Zion, Faisal Devji exposed his unfamiliarity with Zion itself, its complexities, and his lopsided understanding of the parallels. Muslim Zion is an excellent idea whose scholarly treatment is still awaited.

There is hardly a question more laden with myths than the recent history of Palestine. This is true not only of the post-World War II era, but even more of the inter-war years. However, the opening to public perusal of the British government's records of the 1930's has enabled students to examine the facts and to attempt to expose certain false notions about British policy in Palestine. The creation of notions and myths is a simple matter; their refutation involves painstaking and detailed study of people, actions and policies. - Introductory paragraph. Sidney Webb, 1st Baron Passfield (Lord Passfield) served as Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Labour Government from 7 June 1929 to 24 August 1931. Between 23 and 29 August 1929 there were riots in Palestine, by then a British Protectorate, resulting in serious loss of life. As Colonial Secretary he issued the Passfield White Paper which revised the government's policy in Palestine.