Abstract
This paper considers the problem of material allocation to competing self-interested agents. A novel resource allocation model is presented and studied in a mechanism design setting without using money as incentive. The novelties and specialties of our contribution include that the materials are supplied at different dates, the jobs requiring them are related with precedence relations, and the utilities of the agents are based on the tardiness values of their jobs. We modify a classical scheduling algorithm for implementing the Serial Dictatorship Mechanism, which is then proven to be truthful and Pareto-optimal.
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