Allies at Odds? Mapping the Drivers of Turkey–NATO Tensions Between 1991 and 2023

The fundamental cause of friction and wear is the effect of force, resulting in material heating, deformation, fatigue, adhesion and furrow effect, which is closely related to the micro-topography of the contact surface of friction pair. How to establish the real three-dimensional (3D) rough surface, using inter-polation surface reconstruction based on real data, especially in the three dimensional precision measurement data processing, etc, also the lack of research and practice, so in this paper, fractal interpolation and spline interpolation, Fourier interpolation surface modeling interpolation algorithm of three methods for modeling, a detailed analysis and expounds the advantages and disadvantages of the three ways of modeling with surface, and finally to the surface of the atomic force microscope to measure the actual extraction of a small number of sampling points are simulated.

ABSTRACTIn a number of European countries, credit markets were characterised by heavy regulations of quantities and prices, in terms of interest rates, in the post war years. In Norway, the regulations became more vigorous and lasted much longer, than most other countries. This article seeks to explain the extent and persistence of the policy by tracing the role of leading economists, of financial sector, and political considerations in relation to growths policies and the housing markets. Whereas a number of factors are highlighted in the emergence of the system, the role of political considerations in relation to cheap funding for the housing sector appears as a fundamental cause and condition in explaining the persistence of the cheap money policies into the mid-1980s.

"Crisis, by its very nature, requires decisive intervention. However, important questions can be obscured by the very immediacy of the crisis condition. What is the nature of the crisis? How it is defined (and by whom)? And, subsequently, what forms of knowledge are deemed legitimate and authoritative for informing interventions?""

The decisions by the National Party government and the African National Congress-led opposition to initiate direct official negotiation in 1990 were based on the respective leaderships’ calculations of their current and future relative power, as well as on internal political considerations. This analysis of each side’s decision-making highlights political processes that link levels of analysis, particularly changes in threat perception and shifts in domestic politics in response to international and regional shifts, that created incentives for leadership change and negotiation for National Party leaders. Internal and external influences on ANC decision-making are also considered.

Reviewed by: Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic Stephen E. Maizlish (bio) Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic. By Matthew Mason. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006. Pp. 352. Cloth, $45.00.) Now that slavery has been restored to its rightful place in the historical literature as the fundamental cause of the American Civil War and as the key question in the war itself, historians have sought to determine when and how the slavery issue rose to such prominence in the years between the Revolution and the outbreak of sectional warfare. Matthew Mason, in Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic, joins this effort to measure the growing significance of the slavery issue in the early nineteenth century. He forcefully argues that historians have mistakenly maintained, in what he calls the "out of nowhere interpretation," that the Missouri controversy had few roots in the political battles of the period between the abolition of the African slave trade in 1808 and the divisions surrounding Missouri's petition for statehood (3). Mason carefully reviews the years before the Missouri crisis, demonstrating the growing importance of the slavery issue during a time that historians usually describe as dominated by national concerns and east–west conflicts. Slavery, Mason claims, never went "unchallenged" in this period, and northern opposition regularly brought predictable reactions from the South (5). He maintains that the abolition of the African slave trade in 1808 marked a turning point after which the slavery issue took on an increasingly central role in the political debate, particularly during the War of 1812, which Mason calls a "milestone" in the "politics of slavery" (88). [End Page 544] New England's Federalist opponents of the war frequently blamed the South's enhanced power in the House of Representatives for the conflict. In particular, they argued that the increased representation given to white southerners by the three-fifths clause enabled passage of the Embargo Act and other measures that New Englanders viewed as inimical to their interests. Furthermore, the British offer of freedom to runaway slaves during the war and the American demand for compensation for lost human property afterward heightened tensions surrounding the slavery issue. As a result of the war and its aftermath, Mason concludes, Americans "saw the bonds of their still-fragile Union attenuated by their disagreements over slavery" (105). Mason is quick to emphasize that African Americans played a critical role in the development of slavery as a political issue during the early national period. The white South's attempt to control increasingly rebellious slave behavior, especially its pursuit of fugitive slaves, became a source of North–South tension. The political activity of free blacks in both sections also contributed to the rising discord by encouraging and inspiring protest in the slave population. Following the War of 1812, northern fears of slavery expansion dominated that section's perception of the southern threat. The northern concern was that its own freedoms were at risk from an ever-expanding institution of human bondage. Mason even argues that this concern was so central that it contributed to the formation of a northern sectional identity. In the Mid-Atlantic states, anxiety arose from the presence of slave catchers who operated there. In the Old Northwest, alarm focused on the danger of the actual spread of slavery to the region. And all the North was shocked by the number of kidnappings of northern blacks that had been carried out to feed the labor needs of the growing and spreading cotton plantations of the South. The northern reaction to these perceived threats in turn provoked a southern reaction, which, Mason shows, was characterized by a waning of the lesser-of-two-evils position and even some early expressions of the positive-good argument and of strict constructionist, state-rights theory. The Missouri crisis obviously involved "an unusually sustained and intense" level of political debate over slavery, but for Mason it only "exposed and exacerbated but did not create" sectional tensions (179). "The legacy of a decade's worth of political combat involving slavery," he concludes, "was on display" (179). Key to northerners' concerns in the Missouri controversy, Mason explains...

To explore the underlying logic behind the evolution of the US–Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era, this research constructs an explanatory framework that analyzes the alliance cohesion in security, economic, and political cooperation through threat perceptions and visions of order. It proposes a typology including four types of alliances: Drifting Alliance, Rules-Maintaining Alliance, Threat-Balancing Alliance, and Comprehensively Collaborative Alliance. In the Drifting Alliance, alliance cohesion is the lowest, as the differing threat perceptions and divergent visions of order between the United States and Japan resulted in deviating objectives and hindering cooperation; In the Rules-Maintaining Alliance, alliance cohesion is semi-strong. Despite differing threat perceptions, the United States and Japan share converging visions of order, allowing the US–Japan alliance to enhance economic and political cooperation, but impeding security cooperation. In the Threat-Balancing Alliance, alliance cohesion is medium. Their consistent threat perceptions and divergent visions of order strengthen imperative security cooperation to balance threats, but fail to reach a consensus on economic cooperation and political cooperation. In the Comprehensively Collaborative Alliance, alliance cohesion is the strongest. The United States and Japan share consistent threat perceptions and converging visions of order, resulting in the strengthening and mutual reinforcement of security, economic, and political cooperation.

What explains natives' attitudes towards immigrants in host countries? This paper argues that not only economic and cultural but also political threat perceptions influence attitude formation. Natives consider the political balance of power and calculate the potential political benefits of admitting immigrants. This is because expected in‐party members will affect the balance of power in their favour. Leveraging a conjoint experiment in the United States, this study explores whether an immigrant's expected party affiliation shapes native attitudes. The findings indicate that immigrants with defined party affiliations are favoured compared to non‐affiliated ones. Moreover, respondents favoured immigrants perceived as political allies and penalized those seen as rivals. Expected party affiliation is even a strong predictor of attitudes for natives with existing anti‐immigrant attitudes as they curbed their negativities and favoured certain party identities. Overall, results suggest the pivotal role of political considerations as well as the importance of studying unexplored factors in attitude formation on immigration.

How does the United States build multilateral military coalitions? Conventional wisdom focuses on the role of formal alliance structures. Allies band together because they share threat perceptions, political ideology, norms, and values. I argue instead that US-led coalition-building efforts are influenced by the entirety of bilateral and multilateral ties that connects the United States with a third party. The breadth of institutions matters because it allows officials to gather information on the potential coalition partner’s deployment preferences beyond straightforward security considerations—such as what kind of economic and political considerations affect its willingness to join the coalition. Diplomatic embeddedness also helps American officials identify linkages between military and non-military interests. This facilitates the construction of side-payments. I find evidence for my argument by using an original dataset including all US-led multilateral coalitions in the pre– and post–Cold War era. I complement the quantitative analysis with a case study on US coalition-building efforts for the Korean War.

Reviews 113 justify his perception of a communist threat is based on the comparison of results of the national election in 1981 in selected cities with those ofthe municipal elections in 1982. This effort is methodologically unsound. It should also be stated that while Macridis makes an issue of the electoral alliances in some municipalities between the KKE and PASOK, in the second round he neglects to mention that there were also electoral alliances between the New Democracy and the KKE. Macridis' conclusion that the Greek socialist government is moving in the direction of the statism and authoritarianism of Third World socialism rather than toward Western democratic socialism is erroneous in the assumptions upon which this conclusion is contingent , and it is analytically unsound. Categorizing Greece as a Third World country, subject to Third World style authoritarianism, is invalid : Greece does not share the level of underdevelopment, the historical legacy or the sociocultural patterns of either Africa or Asia. Moreover, the Third World socialist regimes Macridis alludes to are countries such as Mozambique and Ethiopia, which are ruled by Marxist-Leninists, an ideology which PASOK repudiates. All in all, Macridis' study of Greek socialism is superficial, highly biased, lacking in analytic depth or meaningful insights, and theoretically weak. It contributes little to one's understanding of Greek socialism. Adamantia Pollis New School for Social Research Andrew L. Zapantis. Greek-Soviet Relations, 1917-1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Pp. 615. Western and Soviet scholarships on Greek-Russian relations during the tsarist period made appreciable strides during the last two decades. Published scholarship and ongoing research in the field touches on various aspects of this relationship—diplomatic, political, cultural and economic. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the Soviet period, and the appearance of the volume under review, Greek-Soviet Relations, 1917-1941, by Andrew L. Zapantis, is of necessity a welcome study about a poorly researched topic. One would have expected that despite understandable obstacles, especially inaccessibility of diplomatic and related documents, some attempts 114 Reviews would have been made earlier by either Soviet, Greek or Western scholars to rescue some of the fast vanishing details that touch on Greek-Soviet relations. Nothing ofthe sort happened, and Zapantis' work stands in a category by itself. As the author points out in his preface, Greek-Soviet Relations is an expanded version of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Philipps -Universität Marburg in 1978. As such, it is characterized by the virtues and shortcomings usually associated with dissertations— and expanded ones at that. Its main virtue or contribution is that it directs attention to the nature of diplomatic relations and the conditions which affected those relations between Greece and the Soviet Union. Indeed, this is the first time that so many published sources and related studies in Eastern and Western European languages, including modern Greek, have been utilized to prepare a narrative, parts of which until now remained buried in textbooks, monographs and memoirs and some of which were entirely unknown or presumed not to have existed. It is sometimes forgotten that despite the inevitable strain between Greece and the young Soviet regime resulting from ideological, political and economic considerations, the two countries established "full diplomatic and consular relations" as early as 1924 and that these relations survived remarkably well until the fall of Crete in 1941. It was a turbulent relationship, to be sure, made more so by European political developments during the interwar years, the political fortunes of Greece itself oscillating between democratic and dictatorial regimes, the existence and fate of the Communist Party of Greece, the Greek refugees who fled Russia after the failure ofthe Allies to "extinguish" the Bolsheviks, the question of mutual claims especially as it affected Greek properties in Russia, and the arrest and deportation of Greeks in the Soviet Union during the Great Purges ofthe 1930s. It is worth noting that among the individuals who had helped initiate and sustain relations between the two countries during this period were Greeks who had fled from Southern Russia after the Civil War and Intervention. This story and much more is told responsibly, chronologically but rather unimaginatively, by the author. Maybe the story in its...

The introductory chapter seeks to provide an overview of India’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and places in perspective India’s overall participation and contribution to the mechanism. At the same time, this chapter examines the various political economy considerations, internal challenges, domestic contestations and the key motivations that drove India’s disputes. The introduction highlights the jurisprudential and doctrinal contributions of some of the key disputes and also examines the role of various interest groups and stakeholders in shaping India’s dispute settlement activity. Overall, this chapter provides a snapshot of India’s WTO dispute settlement activity by drawing upon the personal experiences and reflections of various authors who have participated in each of these disputes either as an official, a legal professional or an industry stakeholder.

The level of alliance cohesion is affected by the shift of attitudinal aspects (such as homogeneity in goals and threat perceptions) and behavioural aspects (such as strategic compatibility, command structure and defence burden-sharing) of alliance operation. In particular, a clear threat perception tends to make an alliance cohesive, as it suppresses (potential) disputes over the behavioural aspects of alliance operation. This article argues, however, that it is not sufficient to evaluate whether an alliance is cohesive or not only by looking at how these attitudinal and behavioural indicators have changed over time. If it were sufficient to do so, it would be supposed that the level of alliance cohesion would be bound to become lower with a change of government from conservative political forces to liberal ones in cases such as those of the US–ROK and the US–Japan alliances. We argue that the list of indicators for alliance cohesion should include not only attitudinal and behavioural aspects of alliance operation, but also functional aspects. While serving its primary purpose of responding to a specific threat, an alliance incurs an additional function of serving to maintain or to build a favourable regional order that is appreciated by both liberal and conservative governments. The interests in relation to order-building and order-maintenance motivate allies to invest for the alliance, often at their own political risk, even while they are engaged in contentious negotiations with the United States over attitudinal and behavioural aspects of alliance operations. Such investments can be considered as a different type of alliance burden sharing than has heretofore been given adequate attention. The investments indeed consolidate the alliance, paving the way for further upgrading of the alliance as conditions warrant.

The theater nuclear weapons modernization program of the Atlantic Alliance is in deep trouble. Since a first CFE Treaty was signed during the CSCE Paris summit last November, the beginning of negotiatiosn on these weapons systems can be expected in the near future. This article presents several factors that political and military leaders should consider before defining the outcome of such negotiations. These factors are the capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO's declared strategy, Alliance cohesion, threats and threat perceptions, costs, and the domestic context. The author argues that past attempts at comprehensive analysis have been inadequate.

In the mid-2010s NATO allies were facing the resurgence of a Russian threat at their borders, as well as terrorist actions in Europe and the MENA region. This evolving security environment provoked heated talks both within and outside NATO on its adaptation, often depicted as being the sign of irreconcilable disagreements. Conversely, this article argues that the "NATO 360-degree" concept adopted during the Warsaw Summit shows cohesion between the allies thanks to the Alliance's decision-making process. As a security community, member states were incentivised to find common grounds despite their diverging interests, which resulted in this new concept encompassing the "arc of insecurity". Its subsequent implementation also confirms the cohesion hypothesis, despite its obvious refocusing towards the East and collective defence. This article will first present the diverging threat perceptions within the Alliance. It will then focus on the implementation of the "NATO 360-degree" concept, promoted during the Warsaw summit, to finish with an initial assessment of the changes at work.

This article examines the reasons why the level of alliance cohesion between the United States and the Republic of Korea (rok) was suboptimal during the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis (2002–2006). Existing studies on this phenomenon primarily attribute its causes to factors like the rise of anti-Americanism in the rok and/or the increasing divergence in the two nations’ respective threat perceptions of the North Korea and their resulting policy preferences. However, these explanations are partial at best. The main finding here is that one should understand the frictions in the U.S.-rok alliance in terms of the rok’s status concerns. In particular, the rok, with a sense of entitlement to its solid middle power status, had set out to cooperate closely with the United States in seeking to answer the nuclear problem, based on the spirit of horizontal, equitable alliance relations. However, the United States failed overall to reciprocate, thereby leading the rok to boldly pursue its own set of policies at the expense of eroding alliance cohesion. These events demonstrate that (dis)respect for status concerns in international politics can make a major contribution towards facilitating (or impeding) interstate cooperation.

What motivates a weaker country to pursue a security strategy that is not supported by a major power? In this paper, we examine the disconnect between the United States and Taiwan regarding the latter’s defense strategies against threats from China. For years, the U.S. has encouraged Taiwan to adopt an asymmetric defense strategy in response to security challenges posed by the PLA. Nonetheless, Taiwan continues to invest significant resources in conventional military platforms, diverging from U.S. recommendations. Why does Taiwan pursue a defense approach that contradicts the advice of its more powerful partner? Drawing from the literature, we propose four hypotheses: trust, organizational and bureaucratic factors, symbolism, and strategic concerns. To test these hypotheses, we conducted original elite interviews with decision-makers in Taipei. The results strongly support the organizational and bureaucratic factors and strategic concerns hypotheses. This research also contributes to security studies by highlighting the differences in threat perception between the two countries, which could hinder alliance cohesion and collaboration. Theoretical contributions and policy implications are discussed in the conclusion.