Abstract
Abstract : Operation ALLIED FORCE, NATO's 78-day campaign against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in the spring of 1999, is a good case study to examine the relevance of Clausewitz's theory of limited war. Although NATO possessed overwhelming military advantages, both NATO and the FRY fought this conflict with the intent of getting a negotiated settlement. Each side fought to get better terms, not to overthrow the other. In the end NATO prevailed in forcing Milosevic to accept its demands and hand over control of Kosovo to an international occupation force. This case study clearly shows the continued prescience of Clausewitz's theory of limited war. It emphasizes the importance of the relative values of the political aims involved, and of understanding that actions taken during war can change the war aims of the belligerents, and thus the magnitude and duration of their use of military power.
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