Algorithmic Sentencing and Human Dignity

Questions concerning the moral and appropriate legal status of abortion are among the most important issues in applied ethics, and answering those questions involves addressing some intellectually very difficult issues. First, many alternatives exist concerning what nonpotential properties suffice to give something moral status. These include (a) having the capacity for thought, (b) having the capacity for rational thought, (c) possessing self-consciousness, (d) being a continuing subject of mental states, (e) being a subject of nonmomentary interests, (f) being an agent, (g) being a moral agent, (h) having consciousness, (i) having both consciousness and desires, and (j) being able to use a language. Deciding which of these, or other alternatives, correctly identifies nonpotential properties sufficient to give one moral status is not at all an easy matter. Second, another crucial and very challenging issue is this. Suppose that property P gives an entity moral status. If something will, in the normal course of development, acquire property P, does that entity then have moral status by virtue of that potentiality? This question, which appears to be crucial for determining the moral status of abortion, is presently the object of serious philosophical disagreement. Finally, given certain answers to the preceding two questions, the moral status of abortion may depend upon answers to questions in areas outside of ethics. Suppose, for example, that something begins to have moral status only when it acquires a capacity for thought. Then the question is when developing members of our species first acquire that capacity. Answering that question, however, depends upon answering philosophical and scientific questions about the nature of human minds, because it may be crucial whether, as some philosophers believe, substance dualism is right, and the human mind is an immaterial entity, or whether, on the contrary, either property dualism or physicalism is correct. If substance dualism is right, then determining when a human first acquires the capacity for thought may depend upon philosophical or religious arguments, whereas if either property dualism or physicalism is correct, the answer will depend instead upon the outcome of demanding scientific investigations in neurophysiology and psychology.

Toward Successful Postbooking Diversion: What Are the Next Steps?

Reflections on Human Embryo Research The thought that human embryos could command moral yet also be acceptably used medical research has struck some as incoherent. Given some assumptions about why they deserve respect, however, thought is not objectionable, indeed not even unusual. How can one have moral for something that one intentionally destroys? This perplexing question is pointedly raised by several commentators on ethics of human stem cell and embryo research when they claim that extracorporeal embryos at one and same time merit respect,[1] ... for [their] character,[2] or special respect,[3] and yet remain suitable for use scientific research that results their destruction. Daniel Callahan, among others, has puzzled about how extracorporeal embryo can be both entitled to profound respect and also sacrificed in deference to requirements of research.[4] The puzzle for Callahan, and for us here, is how we can, without a tragic disingenuousness, accede to the killing of something for which [we] claim to have a profound respect (p. 39). The puzzle raises two questions: Does not having an attitude of for something rule out its ultimate destruction? Second, even if this is not so, is not research use and destruction of embryos more honestly done by simply stripping [these] embryos of any value at all? (p. 40) Our answer to both questions is no. What requires can be an alternative both to a prohibition on destruction and to a moral license to kill. We will argue that a genuine moral for embryos can be joined--without incongruity but not without careful attention to how that is displayed--with their use and destruction legitimate research. This is of course not meant to be a description of moral attitudes that people typically have about embryos. Our conclusion is rather an evocation of a moral ideal especially worthy of recognition at a time when research using human embryos is likely to escalate.[5] Before taking up moral compatibility between respecting something and destroying it, we first provide a brief account of moral status general and then address particular moral status of embryos. The moral status of an entity must be clarified before moral permissibility of its intentional destruction can be ascertained. It is to question of moral status, then, that we turn first. Moral Status and Respect There are nonmoral uses of idea of respect--like one might have for a heavyweight champion's left hook or a scholar's opinion. An agent evinces moral respect, however, when she sincerely considers and actually treats an entity as worthy of some degree of deference, reverence, or regard. Plainly, this kind of is dependent on a reckoning of entity's moral status. An entity toward which moral agents have direct obligations, or whose needs, interests, or well-being require protection, for example, will also command respect.[6] Moral agents clearly have a rather high moral status, and they correspondingly deserve very significant moral respect. However, moral should not be collapsed into an account of for moral agents or their characteristics. Humans who are not agents or not yet agents, sentient creatures, other living things, species, and biotic communities are all sometimes said to have moral status and deserve moral respect. Of course, if such widely varying kinds of entities are accorded moral status, notions of moral status and must admit of degrees.[7] Plainly, too, people differ what they assign status and accord to. Nonetheless, any attribution of moral status, however weak, must be taken seriously by others. We employ method of ascertaining moral status recently elaborated by Mary Anne Warren, who has argued convincingly that no one criterion can determine moral status. …

Moral agency status is often given to those individuals or entities which act intentionally within a society or environment. In the past, moral agency has primarily been focused on human beings and some higher-order animals. However, with the fast-paced advancements made in artificial intelligence (AI), we are now quickly approaching the point where we need to ask an important question: should we grant moral agency status to AI? To answer this question, we need to determine the moral agency status of these entities in society. In this paper I argue that to grant moral agency status to an entity, deliberate norm-adherence must be possible (at a minimum). In this paper I argue that, under the current status quo, AI systems are unable to meet this criterion. The novel contribution this paper makes to the field of machine ethics is first, to provide at least two criteria with which we can determine moral agency status. We do this by determining the possibility of deliberate norm-adherence through examining the possibility of deliberate norm-violation. Second, to show that establishing moral agency in AI suffer the same pitfalls as establishing moral agency in constitutive accounts of agency.

In his 2007 Ethics article, “Responsibility Incorporated,” Philip Pettit argued that corporations qualify as morally responsible agents because they possess autonomy, normative judgment, and the capacity for self-control. Although there is ongoing debate over whether corporations have these capacities, both proponents and opponents of corporate moral agency appear to agree that Pettit correctly identified the requirements for moral agency. In this article, I do not take issue with either the claim that autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are the requirements for moral agency or the claim that corporations possess them. I claim that if both of these claims are correct, then corporate moral agency entails that, in a liberal democracy, corporations should have the right to vote. I show that under the conception of democracy supported by most liberal political theorists, all parties subject to the law are entitled to the right to vote, and all parties that possess autonomy, normative judgment, and self-control are subject to the law. Therefore, if the proponents of corporate moral agency are correct, then corporations satisfy the requirements for the right to vote. I then consider potential objections to this argument. I show that the strongest objection to the corporate right to vote is undermined by Pettit’s own argument for corporate autonomy. I then show that objections derived from other arguments for limiting the rights of corporations are equally unavailing. I conclude with some observations about the implications of my argument for the question of corporate speech rights.

Social robots powered by generative artificial intelligence (AI) are increasingly integrated into various domains of daily life, such as education, nursing care, and entertainment. This integration prompts an important question concerning their moral status: Should we understand them as moral agents or merely as tools? Although understanding social robots as moral agents in a relational way is appealing, it can lead to confusion regarding the attribution of moral responsibility. This paper proposes viewing the moral status of social robots as “props,” drawing on Walton’s fiction theory. This approach allows us to distinguish fictional truths about robots from the real circumstances in which humans produce them. The “props” perspective helps us understand the agency of social robots as a product of human imaginative activities or “games” facilitated by these robots. Thus, we can distinguish between a robot’s agent-like appearance and its moral status—a crucial distinction when attributing moral responsibility. Finally, drawing on this perspective, we emphasize the importance of evaluating social robots ethically in a manner similar to fictional works, rather than through a purely engineering-based approach.

Moral status is a characteristic that we human moral agents attribute to entities, by virtue of which they matter morally for their own sake, so that we must pay attention to their interests or integrity when we consider actions that might affect them, regardless of whether other beings are concerned about them. When an entity has moral status, I may not act toward it in any way I please, disregarding its well-being, preferences, or continued existence. I owe some moral obligations to that entity itself. As a moral agent, I must care to some degree about what it wants or needs, or simply what it is; this imposes some limitations on how I may act toward it. This is importantly different from having obligations in relation to some entity (e.g., my neighbor's house) that are actually owed to some other entity (i.e., my neighbor). It is the being to whom duties are owed that has moral status. Moral status is also importantly different from moral goodness; persons' intentional conformity to moral principles might be one of the characteristics that enhances their moral status, relative to persons who routinely act immorally and to beings who are incapable of moral action, but being worthy of consideration in others' moral reasoning is quite distinct conceptually from acting morally oneself. Because moral status gives rise to moral obligations, what moral status different beings occupy is crucial to all of social existence and to every area of law.

This article examines the relationship between neurocognitive dysfunction, criminal behaviour, legal theory, and Islamic thought, with particular attention to the neurobiological foundations of moral decision-making and criminal responsibility. Employing an interdisciplinary normative approach that integrates cognitive neuroscience, criminal law theory, moral philosophy, and Islamic jurisprudence, this study analyses how neurobiological dysfunctions especially those affecting the prefrontal cortex and amygdala may influence impulse control, moral judgement, and antisocial conduct. Drawing exclusively on a critical review of scholarly literature, judicial decisions, and normative legal sources, the article explores the implications of neuroscientific findings for concepts of free will, moral agency, and criminal liability. The analysis demonstrates that while neuroscientific evidence has the potential to inform sentencing mitigation and rehabilitative strategies, its application raises significant ethical and legal challenges, particularly concerning biological determinism, evidentiary reliability, and procedural fairness. From an Islamic legal perspective, sound intellect (‘aql) constitutes the foundation of taklīf (legal responsibility), yet Islamic jurisprudence recognises circumstances in which responsibility may be diminished or removed, in accordance with the principles of raf‘ al-ḥaraj and maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah. The article argues that the absence of clear procedural standards and limited doctrinal integration of neuroscience within criminal justice systems particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia necessitates a more coherent normative framework. Ultimately, this study proposes a holistic and ethically grounded approach to criminal justice reform that integrates neuroscientific insights with legal principles and religious values, aiming to enhance proportionality, procedural justice, and human dignity.

Moral Modification and the Social Environment Jillian Craigie (bio) Keywords moral psychology, culture, pharmaceuticals, moral enhancement, policy In light of the recent focus in bioethics on questions of deliberate moral enhancement through the use of psychoactive drugs, Levy et al. (2014) argue that the more pressing issue may be the incidental effect that prescription drugs could already be having on moral agency. Although concerns have focused on the possibility of altering moral psychology through direct effects on brain function, the authors point out that this may already be a reality, albeit an unintentional one. They conclude from their survey of prescription drugs already in use, that we should urgently investigate the ways they may be “influencing the shape of our societies” (2014, 123). The question of how we ought to respond to this possibility, I believe, must be considered in the broader context of existing attitudes and policy in response to substances with similar effects; and the relative significance of these drug effects compared with other factors, in particular social factors that shape society through their developmental influence on moral psychology. First, it is important to consider the drugs described by the authors alongside widely used drugs with known, comparable effects. For example, alcohol has profound effects on features of cognition that seem relevant to moral agency, in altering risk assessment and increasing aggression (Bushman and Cooper 1990; George et al. 2005). Its impairing of inhibitory control arguably undermines the reflective processes that are often considered central to moral agency (Craigie 2011; Field et al. 2010). However, by and large the current policy adopted in liberal democratic societies is to educate people about these dangers but leave it up to adults to choose whether they use alcohol. Exceptions to this position are grounded in reasons of public protection, for example, in the case of blood alcohol limits for drivers in order to protect people against injury or death as a result of drunk driving. Restrictions are also sometimes placed on inebriation in the context of particular public roles, for example, serving on a jury, although the issue remains controversial (Law Reform Commission 2010, s. 8.21, 8.26, 8.27). This approach to alcohol regulation offers an established model for responding to the kinds of drugs in question. Broadly, it suggests that concerns about the effect of a drug on moral agency are only considered serious enough to warrant restricting its use when this puts others at risk of serious harms, or when a person is fulfilling a public role where sound decision making is of great importance (e.g., in maintaining trust in institutions such as the criminal justice system). Although at first it may be an alarming thought that pharmaceuticals [End Page 127] could be influencing individual moral psychology, the example of alcohol suggests that this this is a familiar experience, and something for which states already have a policy framework. Caffeine is another commonly used drug with psychoactive properties that seem likely to affect moral agency. Along with potentially morally relevant effects on attention and aggression (Einöther and Giesbrecht 2013; Kuhns et al. 2010), research suggests a connection between cortisol—a hormone that is elevated by caffeine—and the processing of social cues relating to threat (Montoya et al. 2012; Putman et al. 2007). There are little in the way of restrictions on the use of caffeine. Nonetheless, one might be concerned about the possible effects of caffeine on moral agency and society, particularly if the effects are less obvious than in the case of alcohol (Kuhns et al. 2010). The same concern might apply to the pharmaceuticals in question. Perhaps there is a need to investigate these effects on thought and behavior because they are not easy to detect. The greater danger might be in the fact that people do not recognize how these drugs change their appraisals and decisions, rather than in the effects themselves. It seems a reasonable suggestion that if a drug has significant enough effects on interpersonal relationships, then this information should be made available as a part of an informed consent procedure. Pursuing the idea that patients should be alerted to socially relevant side effects that are not...

This chapter presents a few concluding remarks about the goal of achieving a greater consensus in our judgements of moral status. It argues that adopting a multi-criterial theory of moral status does not make it easy to solve all of the moral problems arising from uncertainties about what we owe to other entities. However, it gives us a more adequate set of tools than any of the uni-criterial theories. On the multi-criterial account there are many types of moral status, and many of these come in varying degrees of strength. Moral agents, sentient human beings who are not moral agents, sentient nonhuman animals, non-sentient living things, and such other elements of the natural world as species and ecosystems — all have legitimate claims to moral consideration. Of all the entities with which we interact, only moral agents have full moral status based solely upon their mental and behavioural capacities. The rest have moral status that is partially determined by their social and other relationships to moral agents, and — in the case of entities that are not sentient human beings — by their roles within terrestrial ecosystems.

We evaluated a prebooking law enforcement assisted diversion (LEAD) program (i.e., initial diversion from the criminal justice system paired with harm-reduction case management and legal assistance to individuals with repeated, low-level drug or prostitution offenses) on criminal justice and legal system utilization and associated costs. We used a nonequivalent-groups longitudinal quasi-experimental field trial design in which participants received either the prebooking law enforcement assisted diversion (LEAD) program or the comparison condition (i.e., booking and prosecution as usual). We compared outcomes for LEAD (n = 202) versus comparison (n = 114) participants on criminal justice and legal system utilization and associated costs. Subsequent to evaluation entry, LEAD participants had 1.4 fewer average yearly jail bookings, spent about 41 fewer days in jail per year, and had 88% lower odds of prison incarceration relative to comparison participants. LEAD participants also showed significant pre-to-post reductions in legal costs (− $2100), whereas comparison participants showed cost increases (+ $5961). LEAD was associated with statistically significant reductions in criminal justice and legal system utilization and associated costs and represents a promising alternative to the criminal justice system for repeated, low-level drug and prostitution offenders. LEAD is well positioned to positively impact criminal justice policy.

The European Parliament recently proposed to grant the personhood of autonomous AI, which raises fundamental questions concerning the ethical nature of AI. Can they be moral agents? Can they be morally responsible for actions and their consequences? Here we address these questions, focusing upon, inter alia, the possibilities of moral agency and moral responsibility in artificial general intelligence; moral agency is a precondition for moral responsibility (which is, in turn, a precondition for legal punishment). In the first part of the paper we address the moral agency status of AI in light of traditional moral philosophy, especially Kant’s, Hume’s, and Strawson’s, and clarify the possibility of Moral AI (i.e., AI with moral agency) by discussing the Ethical Turing Test, the Moral Chinese Room Argument, and Weak and Strong Moral AI. In the second part we address the moral responsibility status of AI, and thereby clarify the possibility of Responsible AI (i.e., AI with moral responsibility). These issues would be crucial for AI-pervasive technosociety in the (possibly near) future, especially for post-human society after the development of artificial general intelligence.

This paper presents an analysis of and recommendations for improving the relationship between the mental health and criminal justice systems in Charlottesville and Albemarle County, Virginia. The project team used data analysis, detailed process modeling, and stakeholder discussions to identify three major problems in the current system for managing the needs of people with mental illness, also referred to as consumers. First, encounters between consumers and law enforcement or mental health personnel resulted in unnecessary safety risks. Second, the limited resources of both the criminal justice and mental health systems were consumed from ineffective responses to consumers' needs. Third, when an individual with mental illness moved from one agency to another, they often experienced gaps in treatment which caused a crisis situation to develop, requiring police involvement. To address these problems, the project team recommends that the city and county re-align their existing resources into a collaborative crisis intervention system (CIS). The CIS would seek to improve the coordination between agencies in the criminal justice and mental health systems; it would be able to handle both the acute needs of consumers in crisis and minimize the potential for crisis situations to develop by providing long-term stability. In addition to using these systems' limited resources effectively and efficiently, the development of a CIS would enhance the quality of life for the region's consumers and benefit the community as a whole. This project was conducted by University of Virginia students as an evaluation team for the crisis intervention team (CIT) taskforce, a diverse group of local representatives from both the mental health and criminal justice systems who are advocates for improving the relationship between the systems.

How could the fundamental demands of morality be objectively prescriptive, i.e. function as weighty reasons in a fashion not grounded in our subjective responses? The chapter distinguishes moral status and the moral significance of the interests of beings with a moral status. Following Kant, I take it that being a moral subject, equivalently having a moral status—being such that moral agents are obliged to respect one’s real and legitimate interests on pain of wronging one—turns on an objective worth found in beings with a moral status. Contra Kant that worth lies not in reason-directed agency, which many animals with a moral status lack. Contra Bentham, it is not the capacity to suffer, which is an infirmity and thus not itself a ground of worth. That infirmity is at most a reliable sign of the presence of the ground of worth, namely being a conscious valuer of (species-relative) value that can act to secure those values, as they are presented via one’s evolved affectivity. Conscious wills thus exhibit the higher order value of valuing what is valuable. There is accordingly only one kind of moral status, not admitting of degrees but only of differing determinate forms. The distinctive moral significance of human beings lies in the range and import of their real and legitimate interests. The argument for the objectivity of the moral protections owed to beings with a moral status turns on the shamefully belated character of our appreciation of the interests of non-human animal wills.

Some philosophers have argued that moral agency is characteristic of humans alone and that its absence from other animals justifies granting higher moral status to humans. However, human beings do not have a monopoly on moral agency, which admits of varying degrees and does not require mastery of moral principles. The view that all and only humans possess moral agency indicates our underestimation of the mental lives of other animals. Since many other animals are moral agents (to varying degrees), they are also subject to (limited) moral obligations, examples of which are provided in this paper. But, while moral agency is sufficient for significant moral status, it is by no means necessary.