Alati centralne banke za uticaj na dinamiku hipotekarnih kredita u uslovima valutnog odbora i inflacije

This paper introduces a model where agents are unsure about the central bank's inflation target. They believe that the central bank's inflation target could lie between two extremes, and their beliefs vary depending on the central bank's stock of credibility. They form the expectations used in price and wage setting using this perceived inflation target, and they use past observations of inflation to update their beliefs about the credibility of the central bank. Thus a series of high inflation observations can lead them to believe (incorrectly) that the central bank has adopted a high target. High inflation expectations are incorporated into price and wage setting decisions, and a transitory shock to inflation can become very persistent. The model with endogenous credibility can match the volatility and persistence of both inflation and measures of long-term inflation expectations that we see in the data. The model is then calibrated to match the observed levels of Federal Reserve credibility in the 1980s and the 2000s. By simply changing the level of credibility, holding all else fixed, the model can explain nearly all of the observed changes in the volatility and persistence of inflation and inflation expectations in the U.S. from the 1980s to today.

What are the preferences of a central bank over inflation and output-gap stabilization objectives, and what is its preferred long-run inflation rate? While statements of priorities and goals are important, the credibility of such statements and the market perception of the policy reaction function of a central bank play a key role in determining economic outcomes. This point, early on described as the “credibility” of central bank policies, is a standard theoretical result with recent interpretation in the New Keynesian paradigms. It is also received wisdom among practitioners. The importance of the market perception of the central bank’s acceptable trade-offs between inflation and output goals as well its specific targets naturally leads to the question of how the market acquires this perception and whether and how it evolves over time. One view is that establishing an appropriate institutional structure is the key element in insulating the monetary authority from political pressure and thereby convincing markets that a central bank has a strong and unvarying aversion to inflation. A second, more dynamic, view focuses on the role that actual policy conduct plays in building the reputation of a central bank. These two different views have distinct implications for the relative importance of the institutional structure of a central bank, as compared to its conduct, for attaining and maintaining its credibility. A survey of the heads of central banks and prominent monetary economists reflects a belief that the credibility of a central bank is based more on its past actions than on institutional structures that afford it independence by insulating it from political concerns, although there is also a consensus that structurematters (Blinder 2000). Empirical research has found that institutional features related to central bank independence are associated with economic performance in cross sections of

This article examines the impact of opacity in announcing the central bank's inflation target on macroeconomic volatility and welfare, considering the interaction between an independent central bank and a fiscal authority. Our findings suggest that a key factor influencing the effects of central bank transparency is the relative importance placed by the central bank, compared to the government, on output stabilization versus inflation stabilization. Specifically, when output stabilization is relatively more important for the central bank than for the government, full opacity may benefit the central bank, but not necessarily society as a whole.

Asymmetric information between the central bank and bond markets creates an inference problem that affects the behaviour of long interest rates. This paper employs a simple macroeconomic model with a time-varying inflation target to illustrate the implications of asymmetry for the sensitivity of long rates and volatility of bond returns. When the central bank's inflation target is not communicated and macroeconomic shocks are imperfectly observed, bond markets infer the value of the target from noisy signals. This heightens the sensitivity of long-run inflation expectations to transitory shocks, thereby raising the measured reaction of long rates to monetary policy and to inflation surprises. Calibrated coeffcients from such regressions are more than twice as large when bondmarkets lack knowledge of the target compared with a full information scenario. Time variation in the inflation target is the main source of volatility, but learning adds to the ability of the model to explain the observed volatility of returns along the yield curve.

This paper reviews central banks' legal reform in Latin America during the 1990s and discusses the status of central bank independence in the region. Based on this information, it builds a simplified index of central bank independence which, in addition to the commonly used criteria of political and economic independence, incorporates provisions of central banks' financial autonomy, accountability, and lender-of-last-resort. The paper finds a moderate negative correlation between increased central bank independence and inflation during 1999-2001 in 14 Latin American countries. Disaggregating the index, the same analysis suggests that economic independence is the key component driving the observed negative correlation between legal central bank independence and inflation.

This paper investigates the desirability of adopting a rule in favor of discretionary monetary policy in a model exhibiting Kydland and Prescott's dynamic inconsistency problem. We deviate from earlier work by adopting assumptions regarding policymaker preferences and inflation dynamics that are compatible with empirically motivated models used for macroeconomic policy evaluation. In particular, we dispense with the notion of a fundamental incompatibility between the policymaker's price stability and full employment objectives and allow for stickiness in the determination of inflation. In this setting, we show that if discretion provides a policy flexibility benefit, adoption of a rule remains optimal but only under certain circumstances. If the central bank's preference to contain inflation is fully credible, then a rule is optimal only when inflation exceeds an endogenously determined threshold. This setup gives rise to a discretionary policy zone for inflation with the central bank taking more drastic action towards stabilizing inflation when inflation veers outside the zone. We also examine optimal policy when the central bank's inflation fighting determination is not fully credible. Then, adopting a rule becomes optimal even when inflation is lower. This result provides a reconciliation of the theory regarding the optimality of adopting a rule with the empirical observation that policymakers appear more willing to abandon discretion when facing either low credibility or high inflation but are less inclined to do so otherwise.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that a central bank's asymmetric preferences are able to explain inflation rate in a developing country. In addition, it seeks to help comprehend movements of inflation rate in Jordan and to understand Central Bank of Jordan preferences regarding inflation rate and output.Design/methodology/approachA standard monetary model consists of a central bank's loss function and an economy structure is constructed, which acts as a constraint on the central bank's behavior. Then, a distribute‐lag version of the derived model is estimated using ordinary least squares method.FindingsThe empirical evidence from the Jordanian economy shows that inflation rate relies on the variances of inflation rate and the variances of output. This finding supports the hypothesis that a central bank's asymmetric loss function is able to justify inflation rate movements. Moreover, the Jordanian central banker prefers higher inflation rate and higher level of output.Originality/valueThe paper provides evidence from a developing country regarding the ability of the asymmetric central bank preferences to justify inflation rate movement. In addition, the paper links central banks' losses with the uncertainty level and inflation rate in the economy.

Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets

Inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting: the central bank's inflation forecast becomes an explicit intermediate target. Inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementation and monitoring of monetary policy. The weight on output stabilization determines how quickly the inflation forecast is adjusted towards the inflation target. Money growth or exchange rate targeting is generally inferior to inflation targeting and leads to higher inflation variability. Commitment to target rules may be more effective than commitment to instrument rules.

Monetary policy in a world of radical uncertainty

We analyze how trust affects the transmission of negative demand and supply shocks using a behavioral macroeconomic model. We define trust to have two dimensions: trust in the central bank's inflation target and trust in the central bank's capacity to stabilize the business cycle. We find, first, that when large negative shocks occur, the subsequent trajectories taken by output gap and inflation typically coalesce around a good and a bad trajectory. Second, these good and bad trajectories are correlated with movements in trust. In the bad trajectories, trust collapses, and in the good trajectories, it is not affected. This feature is stronger when a negative supply shock occurs than in the case of a negative demand shock. Third, initial conditions, in particular the initial state of inflation and output expectations, matter. Unfavorable initial expectations drive the economy into a bad trajectory, and favorable initial expectations produce good trajectories. Fourth, we analyze the sensitivity of our results with respect to the size of the shocks. Fifth, we derive implications of our results for our capacity of making forecasts about the effects of large demand and supply shocks.

When does the cost channel pose a challenge to inflation targeting central banks?

This paper introduces structural VAR analysis as a tool for investigating the anchoring of inflation expectations. We show that US consumers' inflation expectations are anchored in the long run because macro-news shocks are long-run neutral for long-term inflation expectations. The identification of structural shocks helps to explain why inflation expectations deviate from the central bank's target. Our results indicate that the recent decline in long-term inflation expectations does not result from deanchoring macro-news but can be attributed to downward adjustments in consumers' expectations about the central bank's inflation target.

Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective

This paper presents a re-formulated version of a canonical sticky-price model that has been extended to account for variations over time in the central bank's inflation target. We derive a closed-form solution for the model, and analyze its properties under various parameter values. The model is used to explore topics relating to the effects of disinflationary monetary policies and inflation persistence. In particular, we employ the model to illustrate and assess the critique that standard sticky-price models generate counterfactual predictions for the effects of monetary policy.