Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State

IntroductionThe study of foreign terrorist fighters has become crucial to understanding the evolving nature of in the twenty-first century. For many countries, terrorism and its perpetrators have become a top security threat. Despite the declaration and launch of the global war on terror, some terrorist entities have been able not only to survive but also to develop and increase their numbers, particularly their number of recruits, known today as foreign fighters. Since 2013, Al Qaeda's offshoot known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Le- vant/Syria (ISIL/ISIS) or Islamic State (IS) has been rapidly gaining a foothold in territories and countries in the Middle East where state control is weakened, predominantly in Iraq and Syria.The analysis of foreign terrorist fighters' recruitment/mobilization has become important given the rapid development of IS. A key feature of IS is the way in which it recruits foreign fighters globally and the way in which individuals join this organization on their own. It is difficult to give an exact number of the people joining IS, but there is an on-going flow of individuals from different countries who are willing to fight for IS.1 As they have taken part in terrorist operations and become exposed to radical interpretations of Sunni or Wahhabi Islam, these people pose a potential security risk to their home countries if and when they should return.In order to understand why IS has been successful in attracting and recruiting foreign fighters, one should study both the mechanisms of recruitment/ mobilization and the independent radicalization process. Specifically, this paper focuses on institutional and individual levels of mobilization of foreign fighters from 2012 to 2014. The former refers to an institution/agency, in this case IS, as the key actor in luring in individuals,2 whereas the latter is based on personal/group radicalization.3 This will be assessed through the examination of merely sixteen individual case studies, due to the limited availability of foreign fighters' profiles. Based on the large scale of mobilization of foreign fighters, their numbers and the countries they come from, the case studies have been randomly selected from the following countries that head up the list of foreign fighters statistics on a regional basis (in terms of absolute numbers): Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, France, and the United Kingdom (UK).4 Firstly, I will consider IS's background, its structure, strategy and tactics. This will be followed by an explanation of the concept and role of foreign fighters. Additionally, the relationship between the country profiles and foreign fighters will be examined. Finally, this will be followed by an analysis of the mobilization and recruitment processes and by sections offering a conclusion and policy recommendations.The Rise of Islamic StateAs a terrorist entity, IS was formed in 1999 and was known as Jama'at al Tawhid wal Jihad under the command of Abu Musab al Zarqawi. It was primarily active in Jordan and Afghanistan. Later, in 2004, it pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Al Qaeda funded its training camps, and the Taliban provided it with territory in the western province of Herat in Afghanistan.5 The same year, this entity renamed itself Al Qaeda fi Bilad al Rafidayn (Al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI]) and participated in the Iraqi insurgency. AQI recruited Iraqis and was very active in cooperating with nationalist and Ba'athist insurgents in Iraq.6 Being [l]ess disciplined, more violent and often terroristicaMy more efficient, al Zarqawi attracted new groups to his unit under Al Qaeda's wing.7 His successful operations helped him to strengthen his position and reputation in the terrorist world.8 Following his death in 2006, the organization merged with other entities, renaming itself several times before separating from Al Qaeda and becoming Islamic State (IS) in 2014 under a new leader, Caliph Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. …

Contents Introduction Chapter One: History What Was Impact of the Anti-Soviet Jihad on the Jihadist Movement? Did the United States Fund Bin Laden and Al Qaeda? Why Was Al Qaeda Founded? What Did Al Qaeda Do in the Sudan? What Were Al Qaeda's Initial Goals? Why Did Al Qaeda Focus on the United States? What Was the Role of Egyptian Militants during Al Qaeda's Formative Years? What Was Al Qaeda's Relationship with the Taliban before 9/11? Chapter Two: Key Attacks and Plots Why Were the 1998 Embassy Attacks So Important? What Were Al Qaeda's Most Important Attacks before 9/11? How Did Al Qaeda Carry Out the 9/11 Attacks? Could the 9/11 attacks have been prevented? How Did Al Qaeda Justify the 9/11 Attacks? What was the fallout from the 9/11 attacks for Al Qaeda? What Attacks Has Al Qaeda Done Since 9/11? Chapter Three: Strategy and Tactics What Are Al Qaeda's Goals Today? Does Al Qaeda Have a Strategy? How Did Al Qaeda Become a Suicide Bombing Factory? How Dangerous Are Lone Wolves? What Do You Learn in an Al Qaeda Training Camp? Could Al Qaeda Get a Nuclear Weapon? Should We Laugh at Al Qaeda? Chapter Four: Ideas and Influences Key Schools of Thought that Influence Salafi Jihadism Who Are the Key Thinkers Jihadists Admire and Read? How Does Al Qaeda Differ from the Muslim Brotherhood? Why Do Other Jihadists Criticize Al Qaeda? How Does Al Qaeda Justify Killing Civilians? What Themes Does Al Qaeda Push in Its Propaganda? Chapter Five: Organization and Recruitment Why Was Bin Laden Such an Effective Leader? How Does Ayman al-Zawahiri differ from Bin Laden? How Is Al Qaeda Organized? So Why Does Al Qaeda Make So Many Mistakes? Is There an Al Qaeda Profile? How Does Al Qaeda Recruit? What is the Role of War? What Is the Role of the Internet? Where Does Al Qaeda Get Its Money? How Does Al Qaeda Spend Its Money? Chapter Six: Friends and Enemies How Did the 2003 Iraq War Shape Al Qaeda? How Does Al Qaeda View Iran and the Shi'a? Is Saudi Arabia Secretly Supporting Al Qaeda? Why Does Pakistan Support Jihadists? What Is the Relationship between Pakistan and Al Qaeda? Why Doesn't Pakistan Cooperate More with the United States? How Important Is Israel? How Do Muslims Perceive Al Qaeda and Why Does It Matter? How Did the Arab Spring Affect Al Qaeda? Chapter Seven: Beyond the Al Qaeda Core What Are the Key Al Qaeda Affiliates? Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb Al Shebaab Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) What About Like-Minded but Unaffiliated Groups? What's In It for Al Qaeda? What's In It for the Affiliates? What are the limits of cooperation? Does the Al Qaeda Core control the Salafi-jihadist movement anymore? So What Do We Talk About When We Talk About Al Qaeda? The Islamic State Who is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi? What Should We Call This Group? Where Did the Islamic State Come from? Why Did the Islamic State Fight with Al Qaeda? What Does the Islamic State Want? How Strong Is the Islamic State? How Does the Islamic State Publicize Its Cause? What is the Khorasan Group? Is the Islamic State a Terrorist Threat to the American Homeland? Why Did the United States Go to War with the Islamic State? Chapter Nine: Counterterrorism Isn't Diplomacy Worthless when It Comes to Fighting Terror? What Role Does the Legal System Play? What about military tribunals, Guantanamo, and other post-9/11 legal measures? What Is and Why Is It So Controversial? How Do We Go After Al Qaeda's Money? What is the Role of Military Force? What About Drones and Other Air Strikes? Do Drones and Other Controversial Tools Result in How Do We Collect Intelligence on Al Qaeda? How Do Tools Change When Fighting Affiliate Movements? The Broader Cause as a Whole? How do we win the war of ideas? What is the role of allied governments threatened by terrorists? How Does Al Qaeda Adapt? How do you counter radicalization? What threat does Al Qaeda pose today to Europe? To the United States? Can We Defeat Al Qaeda and the Broader Jihadist Movement? How Is Fighting the Islamic State Different from Fighting Al Qaeda? What Else Should I Read If I Want to Learn More?

ABSTRACTEmploying counterfactuals to assess individual and systemic explanations for the split between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), this article concludes that individual leaders factor greatly into terrorist alliance outcomes. Osama bin Laden was instrumental in keeping Al Qaeda and ISIS allied as he prioritized unity and handled internal disputes more deftly than his successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although a troubled alliance, strategic differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS were not sufficient to cause the split. Rather, the capabilities of Al Qaeda's leader determined the group's ability to prevent alliance ruptures.

Employing counterfactuals to assess individual and systemic explanations for the split between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), this article concludes that individual leaders factor greatly into terrorist alliance outcomes. Osama bin Laden was instrumental in keeping al Qaeda and ISIS allied as he prioritized unity and handled internal disputes more deftly than his successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although a troubled alliance, strategic differences between al Qaeda and ISIS were not sufficient to cause the split. Rather, the capabilities of al Qaeda’s leader determined the group’s ability to prevent alliance ruptures.

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this article is to benefit those among the readership currently engaged in designing the strategies and tactics of the struggle against the Islamic State (IS) group, a movement led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi that has become the scourge of Iraq and Syria. ********** In the rational pursuit of vital interests in any human undertaking, the design of concrete actions to pursue them must subordinate to a conceptual strategic design based on a well-researched theory of the specific situation. (1) Any such theory will be based on a combination of hard data and educated guesses about what those data mean. The underlying research must encompass not only the historic sweep of similar cases (history does not repeat, it educates), but it must also examine the peculiarities and differences of the present situation compared to any that came before. Finally, because of the differences between the present case and those of the past, it must adapt, rather than adopt, past practices. What results from such inquiry and contemplation is a rough but useful strategic framework that can be adapted as learning occurs. At the core of such a framework is a theory of the situation at the very heart of the matter and a strategy for resolving it--a core strategy. Other secondary aspects of the situation are accounted for separately in supporting strategies. Having an explicit consensus among allies on a core strategy aligns costly allied operations. Such a core strategy should drive the design of tactics and supporting strategies. (2) My own enquiries along this line have led me to the following core strategy for accomplishing the vital and very difficult tasks at the heart of the IS crisis. The Heart of the Matter This situation is so complex that it is easy to lose focus. One must find, isolate, and take aim at the heart of the matter. The aspect of the situation making the present status quo intolerable enough to trigger a new American (and allied) intervention is the rule of the Islamic State militant group across great parts of Syria and Iraq, and the threat of this 7th century model of governance spreading if not checked at its origin. (There are already indications of this possibility in North Africa and elsewhere.) As such a regime swells in territory and membership, not only Middle Eastern populations will be at risk, but also those of secular industrialized nations across the globe. In other words, the IS problem is not a Syrian or Iraqi problem, it is an international problem. And it needs an international perspective to resolve it. Moreover, IS is, both structurally and in terms of its aims and methods, significantly different than Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda does not need to control territory to exist. It only needs to promote and work toward a foreordained future caliphate. To be what it is, IS needs to control territory and to rule a population by strict Sharia law, on the 7th century model prescribed by the Prophet Mohammed in Koranic scriptures. It draws immigrants to that territory by offering a place for those who wish to live under such rule, and a regime that rigorously enforces such laws. IS also provides a cause that pursues concrete near-term objectives within the current generation rather than the more distant ones Al Qaeda followers pursue across many generations. And that cause, succinctly expressed, is to defend, sustain, and expand a place and a regime that rules according to the prophet Mohammed's 7th century vision in every respect. Finally, because their ends are foreordained by the Prophet, IS leaders and fighters are emboldened to take great risks. This boldness, and the successes they have achieved, combines to attract action oriented adherents from abroad. The difficulty for the largely secular-minded international community is that IS does not advocate a perversion of Koranic scriptures. It adheres to a strict interpretation of un-ambiguous prophetic passages of the holy book. …

ABSTRACT: Through oil smuggling, kidnapping, human trafficking and extortion, ISIL is one best funded militant groups United States has Avoiding a protracted conflict with ISIS requires a more integrated financial and military strategy to undermine group's territorial control and reach. ********** Overshadowed by debate over whether Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) constitutes a state, Islamic or otherwise, and discussion of strategy to degrade and destroy is pivotal role criminality plays in its rise to power. ISIL includes criminals in its ranks and participates in a range of criminal activities to maintain and expand its territory. ISIL's ranks are swollen with criminals released by Syrian President Bashar Assad; its membership includes Sunni ex-convicts freed from prisons when ISIL captured Iraqi towns and cities. (1) In addition, ISIL participates in a number of criminal activities to generate illicit profit. Rather than relying solely on support from wealthy donors in Gulf countries, ISIL generates bulk of its money from criminal activities such as extortion, robbery, kidnapping, trafficking and smuggling. (2) According to one report, it netted $8 million in extortion rackets even prior to group's capture of Mosul. (3) Meanwhile, group generated between $1 million to $2 million per day in profit from oil fields it captured. (4) With massing of such wealth, US Treasury Department believes, but for the important exception of some state-sponsored terrorist organizations, ISIL is probably best-funded terrorist organization we have confronted. (5) By relying on criminal enterprises, ISIL has made itself into a highly adaptable and resilient organization not easily swept from battlefield. By perpetrating criminal acts, ISIL easily earns money for weapons, training, and recruitment and does not depend on significant sponsorship by an external state. It is not reliant on moving illicit money across international borders through established financial institutions, thus insulating itself from many traditional financial countermeasures such as economic sanctions, asset seizures, and clamping down on sympathetic charities. Such insulation means ISIL can use illicit schemes to fund its current operations and potentially extend its fight into other regions. (6) Due to significant role that crime plays in ISIL's power, Unites States requires a more integrated financial and military strategy to undermine group's territorial control and reach. ISIL and Crime Management Like other insurgent and terrorist organizations, ISIL has had to determine its relationship to crime in territory it controls. Crime management is essential to remain both a viable fighting force and a plausible alternative authority structure. Other insurgent groups such as FARC, Sendero Luminoso, Taliban and United Wa State Army that have gained territory have managed their relationship with crime through a mixture of confrontation, cooptation and cooperation. ISIL is proving no different. In its expansion, ISIL has followed a number of steps to confront criminality in territory it has acquired. First, it removed local police force and judiciary by killing some of them while forcing any remaining Sunni to swear obedience to group. Second, ISIL announced harshest form of sharia law is enshrined code of conduct. After completion of these steps, ISIL's final move has been to demonstrate its authority by having newly vetted police and courts mete out lashings, amputations and executions depending on severity of crime.' Other militant groups like IRA and FLN have sought to confront crime by assassinating police and establishing underground legal codes in areas where they operated, while other groups like FARC and Taliban have sought to impose new institutional frameworks for law enforcement and judiciary directly. …

ABSTRACTThe Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) became an increasingly powerful terrorist organisation in a relatively short period of time, drawing more recruits than its former affiliate, Al Qaeda. Many have attributed ISIL’s successful expansion in part to its extensive propaganda platform. But what causes terrorist groups to be effective in their communication to the public? To investigate, we examined one aspect of terrorists’ rhetoric: Integrative complexity. In particular, this historical examination provides a broad integrative complexity analysis of public statements released by key members of ISIL and Al Qaeda over a 10-year period when ISIL was rapidly growing as a terrorist entity (2004–2014). Findings revealed that (a) ISIL demonstrated less complexity overall than Al Qaeda (p < .001) and (b) ISIL became increasingly less complex over this focal time period (p < .001), while Al Qaeda’s complexity remained comparatively stable (p = .69). Taken together, these data suggest that as ISIL grew in size and strength between 2004 and 2014 – surpassing Al Qaeda on multiple domains such as recruitment, monetary resources, territorial control, and arms power – it simultaneously became less complex in its communication to the public.

This article focuses on the way the Islamic State (IS) group communicates and performs a return to the origins of Islam in seventh-century Arabia. IS performs what it imagines to be a caliphate that follows the “methodology of the Prophet”—in what represents an operationalisation of long-alluded-to Islamist rhetorical aims about a return to an Islamic authenticity and about undoing Western influences. It deems everyone who disagrees with it as simply anti-Islamic. I refer to that media strategy, which IS deploys to target its enemies as infidels, as takfiri anachronism (takfiri in Arabic is an adjective describing accusations of apostasy). I seek to demonstrate how IS’s takfiri anachronism relies on mixed discursive textual and visual tactics that aim to conceal its contemporary political hybridity, vulnerability and its presentist approach to Islamic texts. I analyze IS’s self-presentation as a caliphate in a number of its official videos and statements. I focus on the initial IS announcement on the establishment of the caliphate and how its leader Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi performed his role as “the caliph” in the summer of 2014. I also examine how the parallelism between its videos showing the destruction of the Iraqi-Syrian common border, and its videos displaying the destruction of pre-Islamic archeological monuments, presents an absolute binary between the categories of “Muslim” and “infidel,” which is projected across time.

Subject 'Islamic State' blowback risk in Gulf Significance A recent spate of attacks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states suggest that the threat posed to them by the Islamic State group (ISG) arises primarily from 'lone wolf' operations. However, the GCC states face a deeper challenge both internally from networks of ISG cells, and externally from the flow of Gulf nationals to ISG battlefronts in Iraq and Syria. With the Gulf states leading the region in partnering with the United States in the air campaign against ISG, officials must balance this close security relationship with the threat of backlash from domestic supporters of ISG. Impacts GCC states will seek to avoid being drawn directly into any military escalation against ISG in Iraq and Syria. Instead, they will rely on the US military to take the lead, underlining their reliance on Washington as an external security guarantor. GCC states will become increasingly critical of the US air campaign if it fails to roll back ISG gains. Gulf authorities are using the extremist threat to delegitimise and ban most forms of political and popular dissent. Greater security cooperation with Jordan will solidify the kingdom's incorporation into a GCC sphere of regional influence.

On June 29, 2014, The Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Islamic Levant (ISIL), and Daesh, proclaimed the establishment of a caliphate in areas straddling Iraq and Syria. IS is a Sunni Muslim extremist movement that was under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi until his killing in 2019, and it is driven by a vision to unite all extremist Muslims under its caliphate, which was grounded in Syria. IS was, for a period, the most robust and adept insurgent force in Syria and Iraq, and by 2015, it controlled a landmass and population larger than that of many existing states. At the height of its power, it included a vast coastline in Libya, a portion of Nigeria’s northeast where affiliated Boko Haram declared an Islamic territory, and a city in the Philippines. Beyond this, IS was able to establish franchises in different parts of the world including North Africa and the Sahel. Leaders of IS called on extremist Muslims from across the world to leave their homes, and to travel to the so-called caliphate to take up residency there as jihadists and citizens of a proto-state. Those that could not physically join were encouraged to participate online, and others were instructed by Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the IS’s chief spokesman, to find an infidel and smash his head with a rock. IS, from its inception, has looked to the Maghreb and the Sahel as strategic geographic areas for the expansion of its ideology, incorporation of territory into its caliphate, and operational purposes. It is clear that the notion of an Islamic state was popular for a segment of the population in the Maghreb, with many leaving the countries of Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and beyond to join, train, and fight with IS in Syria and Iraq. Tunisia had the highest number of IS foreign fighters, estimated at approximately 6,000; Morocco had 1,200; Libya and Egypt had 600; and Algeria had 170. Returning fighters are destabilizing North Africa. Libya was an early focus of IS due in part to the fall of the Gadhafi regime in 2011, and the ensuing political chaos, which caused a weak and fragile state. Libya served as the first addition to the territories of IS’s caliphate outside Syria and Iraq. Tunisia faced several large-scale attacks linked to IS activities in the country. In 2015 a number of terrorist attacks were carried out, including the massacre of 38 tourists at a beach resort in Sousse, the bombing of a bus containing presidential guards in Tunis, and an attack on the Bardo museum in Tunis. Algeria has had to monitor the country’s borders to prevent the entry of jihadists affiliated with IS who operate in neighboring countries. At the time of writing, concerns were being raised about different franchises of IS that are seeking to better integrate and to take advantage of insecurity in the Sahel, especially around the borders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and into Niger and Nigeria.

Suicide bombing refers to someone who carries out a bomb attack with the intention of killing themselves as well as others. The destruction of human life, particularly involving women, without proper justification is considered contrary to religious and humanitarian values. However, there are extremist groups that use women to carry out suicide attacks that are oriented around religious arguments. Therefore, this study was conducted to analyze the fiqh perspectives on suicide attacks, particularly those carried out by women in the Islamic State (IS) group. This qualitative study used a selected informant interview approach in addition to document analysis of the IS group’s Dabiq magazine and other written materials. The results of the study show that suicide bombings, lone wolf attacks, and the like by women in the IS group against any infidels or those considered apostates are actions that are contrary to Islamic teachings. They are considered forbidden and sinful. However, scholars have differing views regarding suicide bombers that are specific only to the context of the Palestinian state and not other Islamic territories.

In the past, women in the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) were known to serve as homemakers (i.e., wives, mothers). However, in recent times there has been a shift in their roles, as more women are starting to emerge on the front lines as suicide bombers, recruiters, or a part of ISIS's official women police brigade. This article investigates this phenomenon by performing a thematic analysis on open-source material, namely research reports, media reports, and propaganda material produced by ISIS. In doing so, it presents the evolution of the roles of women in ISIS from past to present and highlights key reasons that motivate women to join ISIS, which include ideology, alienation, romance, peer influence, and a sense of security. Implications for research on women in terrorism have also been identified.

This research aims to investigate forms of propaganda spread by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) as represented in an Arabic History Coursebook they prepare for ISIS’ school environments. It utilizes Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as its research method to examine and reveal values and ideologies behind choices of words, grammar, and text structures. Using an ISIS’ Arabic History Coursebook entitled Al-Tarikh: li al-Shaff al-Khamis al-Ibtida'i (published in 2016/1437H) as the data source, this research is primarily focused on the analysis of clauses and phrases which contain words of daulah and qital. The data were analysed utilizing functional linguistics and propaganda techniques as its analytical framework. Results of analyses show that as an organization ISIS fights for ideologies which underlie the idea of the Islamic State and spreads values of radicalism to its targeted communities. Propaganda techniques such as name calling, glittering generality, transfer, plain folk and bandwagon are found to be dominant in ISIS’ propaganda projects.

The first rule for rebels is to avoid attacking civilians. As previous chapters have shown, terrorism hurts the cause by lowering the odds of concessions and survival. There is considerable variation in the tactical IQ of militant leaders. Smart leaders understand the costs of terrorism or at least learn them over time from their own experience or that of others. By contrast, stupid terrorist leaders, such as those of the Armed Islamic Group, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Islamic State never learn the value of tactical restraint. These groups pay a steep price for having ignorant leaders. This chapter shows that the leadership is important to militant groups in order for them to wield violence productively.

This chapter analyzes the roles of women within the Islamic State in comparison to those in Al Qaeda. It scrutinizes the ideological and operational frameworks that shaped women’s participation in both groups, highlighting key differences in how each organization approached female involvement. The chapter details how, despite the Islamic State’s foundational ties to Al Qaeda in Iraq, it remained reluctant to place women in combat roles, even during moments of significant territorial loss. The chapter discusses the use of women in auxiliary functions, such as the Khansa’a Brigade, and notes claims of female combat units that lack substantiated evidence. It assesses the symbolic and strategic use of female imagery in propaganda, contrasting this with the absence of verifiable female-led operations. The chapter reveals how the promise of frontline participation was extended to women without actual deployment. The chapter then considers the limited tactical evolution of the Islamic State in regard to gender roles, in contrast with perceptions of growing female militancy. It presents a critical review of how both groups positioned women within their respective jihadist agendas.